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Introduction
This book is the collection of articles by young researchers from Latin America, Africa 
and Asia who were laureates of the South-South Institute held in Bangkok, Thailand in 
November 2014. The primary objective of the South-South Institute is to offer advanced 
research training opportunities to the younger scholars on the diverse problems and 
challenges faced by the countries of the South, and the theoretical and methodological 
perspectives that might be appropriate for gaining a full understanding of the specific 
situation of the countries and peoples located outside the core of the international 
system such as it is presently structured. The main premise of this effort is the glaring 
inadequacy of much of the theories and methodologies developed in the North, as 
crystallised in the mainstream social sciences, to provide the required instruments for 
a sound understanding of the problems confronting the countries of the South. The 
Institute mobilises young scholars from across the three continents, involving them in 
discussion, critiques and adaptations of existing theories and the generation of alternative 
approaches.
The theme of the seventh South-South institute, “Inequality, Development and 
Democracy and Beyond” is of immense significance for the countries of the global South. 
Decades of experience of following neoliberal economic policies in various countries 
across the globe have provided ample evidence that we now live in a more unjust world 
than before. The withdrawal of the state has led to the emergence of powerful private 
entities and increased the power for global finance and transnational companies that 
are guided only by the motive of profit with no social compulsions, and are not even 
democratically accountable for their actions. This has been associated with significant 
increases in inequality in most countries and regions. The decentralisation of power 
and authority has been curbed severely, making nonsense of the rhetoric of democracy 
typically advanced by neoliberal ideologues. Nor has neoliberalism succeeded in delivering 
higher growth of putput and employment. As evidenced by the Great recession and the 
still ongoing financial crisis, the rise of neoliberalism has increased economic instability 
with grave welfare consequences. 
Not surprisingly, for more than a decade now many countries, especially in Latin 
America, have gone “beyond” neoliberalism, experimenting with alternative policy 
regimes. The experiment is still on, but already many positive results are visible. The 
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developing countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia faced unique challenges, which 
led to each adopting different policy mixes for development in different phases of their 
post-War history. The homogenised policy framework imposed on these countries under 
the neoliberal agenda is now proven to be ill suited to address these country specific 
challenges.
In this context, the discussion at the South-South Institute revolved around several 
questions. How have policies in different countries in the South evolved over the past 
decade? How have the associated economic changes affected the social dynamics 
in these countries? Has neoliberalism been able to address the issue of inequality and 
development, or has the neoliberal model of development exacerbated the problem of 
inequality? How do the pre and post liberalisation periods compare in terms of changing 
trends in inequality, poverty, unemployment, etc? How has the changing nature of State 
power affected democracy in these developing countries? Has neoliberalism empowered 
democratic governments, or given rise to more autocratic States? Has neoliberalism 
caused economic and political power to be concentrated in the hands of the elite in 
these countries? How have the political formations in these countries responded? How 
has social tolerance in cases of ethnic, racial or other social divides been shaped in the 
liberalised period? 
The articles in this book reflect both the individual contribution of the scholars 
themselves as well as the insights gained through discussions at the Institute. As the work 
of these young scholars shows, there are many variations in responses and in the nature 
of challenges in different countries of the South – and there are also many possibilities 
for fruitful analysis and for the development of alternative strategies. It is hoped that 
this book will add to the understanding of recent social and economic processes in the 
South as well as point to newer modes of interpreting them and of seeking progressive 
alternatives.
Inequities and Democracy:  
The Case of Post-Revolution Tunisia
Sofiane Bouhdiba1
Abstract
Many factors were behind the Tunisian revolution (January 2011). This study 
focuses on the socio-demographic determinants (pyramid of ages, high level of 
education, unemployment, under-employment, internet…). It also examines the 
sharp inequities that existed between the upper and lower classes of society.
This research aims at checking the degree of inequalities in Tunisian society, and 
tries to see if democracy is a guarantee of more economic balance in society. The 
study is organized in three sections. The first one recounts briefly the methodology 
used in the survey. The second part presents the main results of the survey. The last 
part of the study discusses the main results of the study.   
Introduction
On 14January 2011, in what has been called the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisians managed 
to end the totalitarian regime that had been brought in 23 years ago by General Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali2. Many factors were behind this revolution, in particular, socio-
demographic ones (pyramid of ages, high level of education, unemployment, under-
employment, internet…), and the sharp inequities that existed between the upper and 
lower classes of society.
In fact, Tunisia was considered a model of political stability, and there was a general 
belief that such a situation was due to the absence of notable discrepancies in the 
population. In December 2010, the whole world discovered suddenly that there were so 
many inequities between the various classes of the Tunisian societies that this led to a 
revolution and the Arab Spring.
This research aims at checking the degree of inequalities in Tunisian society, and to 
try to see if democracy is a guarantee of more economic balance in society. The study 
is organized in three sections. The first one recounts briefly the methodology used in 
the survey. The second part presents the main results of the survey. The last part of the 
study discusses the main results of the study.   
1 The author is a Professor of demography in the University of Tunis, and consultant with the United Nations.
2 He took power in a peaceful way on 7 November 1987
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The Jasmine Revolution 
The Revolution
It is difficult to determine precisely when it all began. As in the most popular uprising that 
has taken place in the world, the Tunisian revolution was the result of the accumulation 
of a multitude of micro-events, ending with a mass reaction. 
The parabola of the water lily is a good example of what happened in Tunisia. In a pond, 
every day, the size of a water lily doubles, but nobody notices it. Slowly, the water lily covers 
half the pond surface, but still nobody realizes the emergency of the situation. Finally, the 
water lily covers the whole surface of the pond, suffocating it and eliminating all trace of life 
in what seemed to be a quite micro-environment. But now it is too late to do anything.
This is precisely what happened in Tunisia. Since 1987, when Ben Ali came to power, 
many small events took place, creating and then consolidating a sentiment of frustration: 
rackets, confiscation of land, unmerited promotions, abuse of power... When a citizen 
eventually expressed his frustration in a dramatic way, everything suddenly turned upside 
down. 
If the young Mohamed Bouazizi did not immolate himself with fire on 17 December 
2010, one day or another someone elsewould have committed suicide, or made an 
attempt at hostage-taking. Today, we say that it all started in Sidi Bouzid3, but it could 
have begun anywhere in Tunisia. What happened in the beginning of 2011 could have 
taken place one year before, or two years later. It could have started during the popular 
turmoil that took place in 2008 in Gafsa (at the centre of Tunisia), or in August 2010 in 
Ben Guerdane (at the extreme south of the country). The goal of this research is to show 
that the conditions behind the Jasmine Revolution had existed for a long time.
Although it is difficult to determine the exact date of the beginning of the Jasmine 
Revolution, we will assume here that it all started on 17 December 2010 when a young 
man, a university graduate yet unemployed, was selling fruits on the street and had his 
things confiscated by the police. Vexed, he splashed himself with fuel and set fire to himself 
in front of the governorate headquarter of Sidi Bouzid, immediately provoking a wave of 
popular protests that ended on 14 January with a general strike and a riot grouping more 
than one million people in front of the Ministry of the Interior in the centre of Tunis.
The Socio-Demographic Determinants of the Jasmine Revolution
Many determinants were behind the Jasmine Revolution. This second part of the study 
examines the socio-demographic ones, trying to determine if poverty was a major factor 
pushing the protestors onto the streets.
3 A poor town situated in the Centre of Tunisia.
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The Youth
We estimate today that around 30 per cent of the Tunisian population is aged between 
15 and 29 (belonging to the category of the ‘young’, according to the United Nations 
definition). This is clearly shown in the following age pyramids:
Undeniably, and despite an ageing process that started in the mid 1980s4, the Tunisian 
population is very young. More precisely, it is at a point called ‘demographic bonus’by 
demographers, that is, a period where the major part of the population is constituted of 
young men and women of an employable age5. 
This is very important, as we know that the Jasmine Revolution was initiated and 
consolidated by the young6. We can estimate that around 75 per cent of the demonstrators 
were aged between 15 and 29. Would there have been so many protesters in the streets 
if only six or seven per cent of the population was of that age? 
Education 
The Tunisian population is highly educated, as a result of the strategies of education for 
all settled since the independence of the country in 1956. In fact, the rate of school goers 
among children aged 6-14 has risen from 10 per cent in 1946 to 95.1 per cent today, 
with equalityamong genders (95.5 per cent for boys and 94.7 per cent for girls).
We could then say that education is nearly universal in Tunisia, with a high equity 
4 As result of the collapse of the fertility level, which is today around 1.8 child/woman, that means below the replacement of generations level 
(2.1 child/woman)
5 This period is considered ideal because it offers the possibility to the majority of the population to contribute to the economic development of 
the country. But this can occur only in a situation of full employment.
6 The same president declared 2011 year of the Young.
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between genders with regard to access to the schooling system, which is quite a rare 
phenomenon in the Arab world. 
At the university level, the rate of enrolment (proportion of the young aged 19-24 
registered in a university) is around 50 per cent today, with 260,000 students enrolled in 
the different universities. Thus, around 35,000 young men and women graduate every 
year from the 14 Tunisian universities, with poor prospects of finding a job. Paradoxically, 
the high level of education was a major problem in Tunisia and initiated the protest 
among the young and then the entire population.
Unemployment
Officially, the unemployment rate in Tunisia today is 15 per cent, but it is certainly over 
20 per cent if we take into account the non-secure jobs (cleaners, watchmen, unskilled 
workers, unauthorized sellers, etc.). Compared to other countries in the Global South, 
Tunisia distinguishes itself with a high unemployment rate among university graduates. 
In fact, in 1984, the unemployment rate among graduates was only 0.7 per cent, while 
it was over 20 per cent in 2010, and reached 60 per cent in some sections, such as 
literature or human sciences graduates.
Such a situation creates frustration not only among the young, but also among their 
families, as they would have made many financial sacrifices to enable to their children to 
finish their education. 
Urbanization 
Today, 67 per cent of the Tunisian population is urbanized. And we know that, during 
the Jasmine Revolution, major events took place in the central squares of the big and 
middle-sized cities of the country. 
In fact, the immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the burning of police stations, the 
attacks against the Ministry of Interior, the sit-in in front of the prime minister’s office in 
El Kasbah, all took place in front of the symbols of the Ben Ali regime, in particular the 
headquarters of the governorates, the municipalities or the headquarters of the firms 
belonging to the president’s clan. All these spaces are typically urban.    
Empowerment 
The traditional education programme, the strong opening on the Mediterranean and 
Europe, and globalization were major factors that contributed to the empowerment of 
women. Women played an important role in the popular manifestations that conducted 
the fall of the Ben Ali.
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Internet
Internet has had a huge success in Tunisia, and one-third of homes have a direct or 
indirect access to the web7. Most of them live in urban areas. There are 305 cybercafes, 
nearly always crowded, as they are very popular and cheap8. In fact, internet access is 
easy for anyone who knows how to use a keyboard. The number of internet users has 
doubled in the past three years, reaching 700 000 users today, with more than 100,000 
accounts. The number of connection contracts is about 24,000, and there exist around 
2,000 Tunisian websites. 
The Tunisian people are avid Facebook users. In fact, Facebook played a central role in 
the rapid organization of big rallies (more than 100,000 people). In fact, the Tunisian police 
are not used to dealing with such huge e-meetings. They have more experience in following 
individuals who meet in small groups in private spaces, such as houses and firms.   
The Inequities Factor
When examining the determinants of the Jasmine Revolution, some remarks could be 
made concerning poverty and economic inequities.
First, it seems that poverty is not the leading factor, as people in the street were 
demanding more democracy, better governance, less corruption and social justice. One 
of the slogans of the protesters was: “Khobz ou me, ou Ben Ali le! (Bread and water, 
and no Ben Ali).” Protesters made it clear that they were not asking for improving their 
economic lives. 
That was not the case a couple of decades ago, during what has been called the 
‘bread riots’. At the end of December 1983, following a request from the International 
Monetary Fund to stabilize the Tunisian economy, the government announced an 
increase in the prices of bread, and cereal products such as semolina. Soon after, on 
3 January 1984, riots took place, starting from the poorest cities of the country (Douz, 
Kebili, Gabes, Kasserine…), and reached Tunis. On the 6 January, President Habib 
Bourguiba announced on television that all price increases would end. Today we are in 
a completely different situation.  
Another fact is that the protesters of December 2010 belonged to various social 
classes, which was not the case in 1983, as the ‘bread riots’ were committed by the 
poor, those who were not more able to buy bread after the increase in prices. During 
the Jasmine Revolution, the elite had participated massively in the turmoil, and it was 
an honour for them to explain to the international media that they were not asking for 
economic measures but for democracy.
7 Agence Tunisienne d’Internet.
8 A one-hour connection is 1.8 Tunisian Dinars, about 1.4 US$.
Inequities and Democracy
Inequality, Democracy and Development under Neoliberalism and Beyond 15
 The claim for more equity appears, then, as one major determinant of the Tunisian 
revolution. Unfortunately, four years after the fall of the regime of Ben Ali it does not seem 
as if Tunisian society enjoys more equity. To verify this, I have conducted a survey.
Inequity and Democracy
Manal Wardé, Director of Oxam for the Maghreb region, declared recently that “inequities 
are still a major fact in Tunisia, and the reasons that pushed the Tunisian people to revolt 
in 2011 still exist”. According to Oxfam, the main evidence of inequities is “the unequal 
public investment, and the unequal access to public services between the interior regions 
and the coastal regions”.
In April 2014, the American think tank Pew Research Center conducted a survey 
and came to the conclusion that 77 per cent of the interviewed Tunisians declared 
that inequities between the poor and the rich were the number one problem in Tunisia. 
Of a total of 46 countries, Tunisia ranks third concerning the perception of economic 
inequities, just behind Greece and Lebanon.
Lastly, Oxfam has estimated that, now that parliamentary elections have been achieved 
and the last steps towards democracy have been taken, it should be the priority of the 
new Tunisian government to reduce economic inequities.
In order to have a quantitative idea of the level of economic inequities in Tunisia, I 
conducted a survey during summer of 2014, with a sample composed of 195 individuals 
living in two areas : 95 individuals in Ettadhamen (10 km west of Tunis), and 100 individuals 
in Kasserine, a town situated in the centre-west of Tunisia.
The Survey
Methodology
The questionnaire includes 31 questions organized into four sections :
	 •	Food:	4	questions
	 •	Health:	11	questions
	 •	Education:	2	questions
	 •	Leisure:	2	questions
The method consists of comparing the level of life of the rich and the poor in the sample, 
using lower and top quartiles. The objective of the study is to check if there are still large 
inequities between the richest and the poorest, after the revolution, in the consumption 
of food, access to health, education and leisure. 
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Concretely, the method consists of three steps:
	 •	Step 1: calculate top and lower quintiles 
	 •	Step 2: calculate the interquintile ratios: Rq = Q5/Q1 
For exemple, Rq (consumption of fish) = 3 means that 20 per cent of the richest consume 
three times as much fish as the 20 per cent poorest.
The analysis of the 195 questionnaires permitted to come out with the two following 
matrixes, one based on revenue, the other on environment (urban/rural):
Matrix of Inequities Related to Revenue 
Criteria Ratio
Food
Rq (number of meals with fruits and vegetables by month) 
(number of meals with fruits and vegetables in the top quintile-20% richest/number of meals with 
fruits and vegetables in the 20% poorest)
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 1.7
•	Kasserine :2.7
Rq (number of meals with meat by month)
Cité Ettadhamen : 2.5
•	Kasserine : 3.4
Rq (number of meals with fish by month) 
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 1.7
•	Kasserine : 2.6
Rq (number of meals with mineral water, juice, wine… by month)
•	Cité Ettadhamen :2.6
•	Kasserine : 2
Health
Rq (perception of state of health, between 100:perfect health, to 0:near to death)
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 1.7
•	Kasserine : 0.8
Rq (number ofmedical visits-control)
Medical visit here meansgoing to the doctor for check-ups, not being sick 
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 2
•	Kasserine : 3
Rq (medical treatment)
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 0.9
•	Kasserine : 1.4
Rq (entertainment)
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 0.7
•	Kasserine : 1.3
Hygiene
Rq (having a kitchen at home)
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 1.4
•	Kasserine : 0.9
Rq (existence of WC)
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 1.1
•	Kasserine : 1.2
Rq (existence of shower)
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 1.9
•	Kasserine : 1.4
Rq (existence of sewers)
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 1
•	Kasserine : 1.6
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Leisure
Rq (expenses on leisure)
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 7.5
•	Kasserine : 2.8
Rq (Perception of level of life)
•	Cité Ettadhamen : 2.1
•	Kasserine : 2.2
Matrix of Inequities Related to Environment (Urban/Rural, Kasserine) 
Criteria Ratio
Revenue
RU (revenue) (revenue of urban/rural)
1.7 et 1.4 
RU (activity)
1.2
Food
RU (fruits and vegetables)
1.2
RU (meat)
2
RU (fish) 
1.6
RU (mineral water, juice, wine…)
1.4
Health
RU (health perceived)
0.9
RU (medical visits)
2.3
RU (medicines)
0.9
RU (entertainment)
1
Hygiène
RU (existence of kitchen)
1
RU (existence of WC)
1.1
RU(existence of shower)
1.7
RU (sewers)
9.4
Loisirs
RU(expenses on leisure)
1.8
Results
We clearly see in the two matrices that most ratios are over one, meaning that there are 
inequities between the rich and the poor, and between urban and rural, the gap being in 
favour of the urban-rich population. There are only two ratios inferior to one in Kasserine: 
the perception of state of health (0.8) and the existence of a kitchen at home (0.9). 
We also notice that the gap between the poor and rich is larger in Kasserine than in 
Ettadhamen. This may explain why the first turmoil that led to the Jasmine Revolution 
started in Kasserine.
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Concerning food, the richest consume twice (1.7 to 3.4) as much as the poorest. In 
Kasserine, interquintile ratios are higher than in Ettadhamen. For example, in Kasserine, 
the consumption of meat by the richest citizens is 3.4 times higher than the poorest.
Concerning health, the gap is also large between rich and poor. Paradoxically, the 
poorest citizens living in Ettadhamen consume more medicines than the richest (Rq=0.9). 
This may be due to the existence of solidarity.
Concerning hygiene, the inequities are minor, if we except the existence of showers, 
where a gap still exists between poor and rich in Ettadhamen (Rq=1.9), and between 
the urban and rural population in Kasserine (RU=1.7). We notice, for example, that most 
households are equipped with a WC, whatever the revenue or the environment.
Concerning leisure expenditures, there are large discrepancies between the rich and 
the poor. In particular, in Ettadhamen, the expenditures of the richest on leisure are eight 
times as much as those of the poorest.
Conclusion 
This study, based on a small survey, shows that large discrepancies still affect Tunisian 
society today, four years after the revolution. This may be a sign of failure, as we know 
that inequities were one of the major determinants of the Jasmine revolution. We could 
conclude that the first years of democracy are very difficult for citizens, as they experience 
economic difficulties due to political instability.
In the long term, it is more likely that the new democratic environment could create a 
framework for economic growth, and thus a reduction in inequities between the various 
classes composing society. In particular, with the parliamentary elections that took place 
on 26 October 2014, there are hopes of more democracy and less inequities in the 
coming years.
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Inequality and Democracy in a Developing 
Economy: A review of trends and prospects1
Nicholas Kilimania*2
Abstract
This paper provides insights into the historical developments as well as configuration 
of the different forces which in the end determine outcomes in democratic societies, 
especially in the developing world. In this paper, we use existing empirical and 
theoretical literature to present a brief but intriguing exposé of the relationship 
between democracy or what it is perceived to be, redistribution and inequality in 
the developing countries. First, we examine the link between democracy, economic 
growth and equity, and then give a detailed analysis of the democratic experience 
in developing countries. This is followed by a highlight of the institutional and policy 
issues that drive democracy, governability and inequality in a developing country 
context. Most importantly, the paper also explains the reasons why democracy is 
expected to increase redistribution and reduce inequality, and why such an outcome 
may fail to be realized when democracy is captured by the powerful segments of 
society.
Finally, the paper shows that democracy can yield beneficial outcomes of the majority 
if, and only if, it is deliberately configured towards effective delivery in policy areas 
that influence the life chances of the majority. So far, however, the experience from 
the developing world has shown that those basic ingredients are largely missing.
Introduction
Keefer (2004) shows how a vast body of empirical evidence points to how governance 
failures are a root cause of slow and inequitable economic growth. This, in turn, has 
been fronted as the characteristic cause of the dismal social economic performance 
in most poor countries. Such evidence has justified the prioritization of governance on 
many policy research agendas. This approach has been fronted with the view to better 
understand the political economy of economic development. 
A number of theoretical arguments can be made about the causal relationships that 
operate over time between a country’s years of democratic experience and income 
inequality; and income inequality and the stability of democracy. Empirical evidence 
1  This paper draws extensively from Kohli (2014), The State and Development in the Third World: A “World Politics” Reader.
2  a Department of Economics, University of Pretoria , Private Bag X20, Hatfield 0028-South Africa.
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points to the fact that continuous and qualitative measures of years of democratic 
experience are estimated to have a significant negative impact on income inequality, 
independent of economic development and other control variables, for a sample of 55 
countries (see Muller, 1998). Similarly, a strong inverse correlation is observed between 
income inequality and regime stability for a sample of 33 democracies. This association 
holds independent of economic development, which is found to have no direct effect on 
democratic stability after controlling for income inequality.
José and Wacziarg (2001), in their study of how democracy affects growth, show 
that democracy fosters growth by improving the accumulation of human capital but is 
less robust in lowering income inequality. Conversely, democracy may hinder growth by 
reducing the rate of physical capital accumulation through raising the ratio of government 
consumption to GDP. Once all indirect effects are accounted for, the overall effect of 
democracy on economic growth was found to be moderately negative. In addition, 
Olson (1982), among others, has argued that policy-making in democracies tends to be 
captured by interest groups whose demands increase the size and scope of government. 
In fact, democracy was also found not to have a direct and necessary bearing on a more 
egalitarian distribution of wealth and status in society. 
Thus, democracy as a form of government, democratization of power as a political 
process, and socio-economic democracy as a possible goal, are analytically and 
empirically distinguishable. A democratic government, however, may be seen as an 
improvement over the authoritarian governments because people in most countries 
prefer a predictable to an arbitrary government, value the freedom of expression and 
association as ends in themselves, and increasingly hold that they have a right to have 
some say in the selection of their political leaders. 
It is against this background that the paper reviews the known effects of governance 
on development, the interrelationship among the different dimensions of democratic 
governance, and the different forces which serve to drive the observed outcomes, 
especially in the developing world. The review highlights important questions and 
impediments which need to be addressed, particularly with respect to how democracy 
can best serve the preferences of the majority. The basic premise of this paper is to 
demonstrate that democratic governance, although necessary, is not sufficient to 
facilitate democratization of power in society. The latter requires political struggles and 
deliberate crafting of institutions and policies within the framework of a democratic 
government. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the the link 
between democracy, economic growth and equity. A detailed analysis of the democratic 
experience in developing countries is given in Section 3, while Section 4 gives a higlight 
of the institutional and policy issues that drive democracy, governability and inequality in 
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a developing country context. A concise explanation of why inequality may not decline 
despite the postulations in both theoretical and empirical literature on the positive role 
of democracy as a tool for resolving inequality is given in Section 5. Section 6 gives a 
conclusion and summary of emerging issues from the review.
Democracy, economic growth, and equity
A number of factors influence the distribution of assets and income that a market 
economy generates. These include the distribution of innate abilities and property 
rights, the nature of technology, and the market structures that determine investment 
opportunities and the distribution of human and physical capital. Therefore, the impact 
of a political system on distribution depends on the laws, institutions and policies 
enacted by it. However, the nature of institutions or policies which a political system 
generates depends on the distribution of power in society and how political institutions 
and mobilized interests aggregate preferences (Acemoglu et al., 2013). For example, 
institutions which concentrate political power within a narrow segment of the population 
– typical of non-democratic regimes – are expected to generate greater inequality3. A 
number of channels exist through which such impacts are generated. One would be 
the enactment of policies benefiting the politically powerful at the expense of the rest of 
society, including policies such as pushing down wages by repression and other means. 
This was the case during the apartheid era in South Africa prior to 1994.
Generally, empirical literature is very far from having consensus on the relationship 
between democracy, redistribution and inequality. Several studies have reported 
a negative relationship between democracy and inequality using specific historical 
episodes or cross-national studies. Persson and Tabellini (2003) present cross-national 
evidence; and Lapp (2004) points to a statistical association between democratization 
and land reform in Latin America. Other studies find contrasting results. For instance, 
Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) and Gradstein and Milanovic (2005) have argued that cross-
national empirical evidence on democracy and inequality is ambiguous and not robust. 
Therefore, cross-national evidence on the impact of democracy on economic growth, 
and of democracy on equity, is highly inconclusive. Whereas all democracies may share 
some political traits that are economically consequential, non-democracies do not. In the 
latter case, many countries have had highly development oriented authoritarian regimes. 
Many factors – which include rates of investment, infrastructure, quality of human capital, 
level of research and production of knowledge, quality of organization and management, 
3  Non-democracies tend to be dominated by the rich, either because the rich wield sufficient power to create such a regime or because those 
who can wield power for other reasons subsequently use it to enrich themselves.
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and balance of intersectoral investments – influence economic growth. Since it is difficult 
even to assign weights to these proximate determinants of growth, the cross-national 
quantitative studies, attempting to relate democracy systematically, are bound to remain 
highly inconclusive. 
Acemoglu et al. (2014) provide theoretical evidence on why the relationship between 
democracy, redistribution and inequality may be more complex than empirical expectations 
might suggest. First, democracy may be ‘captured’ or ‘constrained’. In particular, even 
though democracy clearly changes the distribution of de jure power in society (see e.g., 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), policy outcomes and inequality depend not just on the 
de jure power but also on the de facto distribution of power. For example, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008) argue that, under certain circumstances, those who feel that their de 
jure power is being eroded by democratization may sufficiently increase their investments 
in de facto power (e.g. via control of law enforcement, mobilization of non-state armed 
actors, lobbying, and other means of capturing the party system) in order to continue to 
control the political process. If so, the impact of democratization on redistribution and 
inequality may not be observed.4 Similarly, democracy may be constrained by either other 
de jure institutions such as constitutions, conservative political parties, and judiciaries or 
by de facto threats of coups, capital flight, or widespread tax evasion by the elite.
Second, democratization can result in “Inequality-Increasing Market Opportunities”. 
Non-democracies may exclude a large fraction of the population from productive 
occupations (e.g. skilled occupations) and entrepreneurship (including lucrative 
contracts) as was the case in apartheid South Africa or the former Soviet bloc countries. 
To the extent that there is significant heterogeneity within this population, the freedom to 
take part in economic activities on a more level playing field with the previous elite may 
actually increase inequality within the excluded or repressed group, and consequently 
entire society.5
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), each elite agent individually contributes 
to their collective de facto power, which needs to be greater in a democracy to exceed 
4  Relatedly, there could be reasons for dictators to redistribute and reduce inequality to increase the stability of that regime (e.g. Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2001, and Albertus and Menaldo, 2012, more generally). Plausible cases of this would be the land reform implemented by the Shah of 
Iran during his White Revolution of 1963, to help him become more autonomous from elites (McDaniel, 1991), the agrarian reforms made by the 
Peruvian military regime in the early 1970s (Chapter 2 of Seligmann, 1995), or the educational reforms in 19th century oligarchic Argentina (Ellis, 
2011).
5  Empirical evidence shows that inequality has in fact, increased in South Africa between 1990 and 2000 (or 2005) and in ex-Soviet countries 
between 1989 and 1995 (or 2000), periods that bracket their democratic transitions in 1994 and 1989 respectively. This is probably, at least 
in part, driven by the increase in inequality amongst previously disenfranchised blacks and repressed citizens (see Whiteford and van Seventer, 
2000, for South Africa and Milanovicv, 1998, for ex-Soviet countries for a detailed exposé on the post-democracy distributions of income).
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the increased de jure power of poor citizens. Under certain conditions, the main result, 
the study argues, is that the probability of the elite controlling political power is invariant 
to democratization – or more generally, may not increase as much as it may have 
been expected to, due to the direct effect of the change in de jure power. Similarly, 
a democracy may be highly dysfunctional, or effectively captured, if its institutional 
architecture is chosen by previously restricted franchises or dictatorships. Acemoglu 
et al. (2011) develop a model where the elite can take control of democracy by forming 
a coalition in favour of the continuation of patronage, keeping the state weak. This has 
been the case in many developing countries. This arrangement has not been completely 
different even in developed economies (see e.g. Gilens and Page, 2014, for an intriguing 
insight into the travesty of democracy even in a developed society).
Acemoglu et al. (2013) revisit the relationship between democracy, redistribution 
and inequality. Using a number of theoretical reasons, they detail why democracy is 
expected to increase redistribution and reduce inequality, and why such an outcome 
may fail to be realized when democracy is captured by the richer segments of the 
population. Specifically, Acemoglu et al. (2013) argue that when a democracy caters 
to the preferences of the middle class, or when it opens up disequalizing opportunities 
to segments of the population which were previously excluded from such activities, it 
exacerbates inequality among a large part of the population. The notable example for 
this is the post-apartheid South Africa. They suggest that inequality tends to increase 
after democratization when the economy has already undergone significant structural 
transformation, when land inequality is high, and when the gap between the middle class 
and the poor is small.
Democracy in developing countries
The experience of developing countries with democracy has been mixed. The early 
attempts at creating democracies in the 1950s failed because neither the state-society 
relations within, nor the global context of the developing countries, was conducive for the 
consolidation of democratic regimes. This was especially the case among poor countries 
with small urban middle classes, and influential traditional elite with roots in landed 
wealth, a considerable elite-mass gap, and nonexistent or weak political institutions. 
These circumstances encouraged the political elite in a few countries to reconsolidate 
traditional polities (Middle Eastern countries) and in few others (China and Cuba) to 
undertake revolutionary overthrow of the old regimes. The global context of the Cold War 
also hindered consolidation of democratic experiments in the developing world. 
	 	 •		In	East	Asia,	the	indigenous	traditions	were	deeply	authoritarian.	The	colonial	
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impact often reinforced these tendencies. This area was also a battlefield for 
the cold war – especially Korea and Vietnam. 
	 	 •		Africa	 emerged	 from	colonialism	 in	 late	 1950s	 and	 early	 1960s.	 Its	 political	
forms were characterized by weak central and civic authority and of poorly 
established public spheres. Democratic experiments, therefore, evolved into 
sectional conflicts over distribution of state power, leading to military coups.
	 	 •		Democratic	 experiments	 in	 Latin	 America	 too	 experienced	 a	 similar	 fate.	
Conditions of deep inequalities, established business and landed interests, as 
well as US sponsored Cold War politics in the region, led to coups (examples 
include Brazil, Chile and Nicaragua) as the region became a ideological 
battleground between capitalism and communism.
The reasons for the failure of democracy in developing countries across the world 
can be summarized as lack of domestic political cohesion and an unfavorable global 
environment. India stands as an exception. With rapid economic growth in countries 
such as South Korea and Brazil, the case for authoritarianism received a boost. Similarly, 
the success of China and Cuba in creating more egalitarian societies and eliminating 
bottom level poverty also helped in creating a favorable impression for communism. 
This, however changed by 1980s when more and more countries started shifting from 
the authoritarian forms to democracy. 
The economic and political performance of the authoritarian regimes was being 
increasingly questioned over the 1980s. On the economic front, the 1974 oil crisis set 
the stage for global economic contraction. Wary of the political consequences of slow 
economic growth, numerous authoritarian rulers sought to “borrow and grow” their 
way out of the adverse global circumstances. While this strategy had marginal success 
in East Asia, it contributed to a severe debt crisis in Latin America and Africa. As a 
consequence, the rulers who presided over this economic downturn found themselves 
in growing political difficulty. Reduction in threats from communism – the ending of the 
Cold War – undermined one of the major reasons for the existence of autocratic regimes. 
Many authoritarian rulers like Fedinand Marcos (Philippines), and Mobutu Sese Seko 
(Zaire) turned out to be no less corrupt than their predecessors, and therefore came to 
be seen as an obstacle to more desirable forms of government. There was also a shift 
in power balance within the countries; the power of the traditional elites declined with 
the emergence of the urban middle class, which was less nationalistic, more attuned to 
global economic and political trends, and concentrated in urban centres. Performance 
based legitimacy of many authoritarian regimes declined henceforth. Many authoritarian 
rulers, upon taking power, had made themselves minimally acceptable to their citizens by 
promising superior performance in establishing political order and facilitating economic 
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dynamism. Over time, however, these claims began to appear hollow. Since coercion 
seldom provides infinite resources to maintain rule, declining legitimacy and growing 
opposition reinforced each other, contributing to eventual change in regime. China, 
North Korea, Indochina, and many countries of Southeast Asia still remain exceptions.
Democracy, governability and inequality
Most new democracies in the developing world have continued to find the tasks of 
consolidating these democracies and providing effective governance difficult due to 
various institutional and policy issues.
Institutional issues
  ◆  Disintegration of authoritarian regimes was often relatively rapid, which left in its 
wake a divided elite and a mobilized populace with heightened expectations, 
and weak links between the elite and the masses. As a result, the elite tended 
to co-opt each other in perpetuating their self interests more often at the 
expense of the populace.
  ◆  Irrespective of the levels of civil society activism during the anti-authoritarian 
phase, power in many new democracies has come to rest in the hands of 
a few individuals, if not a single leader. These leaders have done everthing 
to weaken state insitutions and civil society in order maintain a firm grip on 
power for decades on end  – e.g. Blaise Compaoré, Burkina Faso, 1987-2014; 
Yoweri Museveni, Uganda, 1986 to date; Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe, 1987 to 
date; Eduardo dos Santos, Angola, 1979 to date.
  ◆  Since strong institutions constrain powers of individuals, there has been 
an incentive for leaders to undertake periodic deinstitutionalization. The 
consequence has been the inability of the state to address the very basics of 
service delivery in many contexts. Masses have been left to fend for themselves 
with rising inequality as the end result.
  ◆  In elite dominated polity bereft of strong institutions, leaders have mobilized 
socio-economic groups more as power resources in intra-elite struggles, and 
less to satisfy group aspirations.
  ◆  Leaders who acquire power because of a personal appeal (the system of 
‘individual merit’ in Uganda) have had little incentive to encourage the 
development of political parties.  On the contrary, parties as institutions often 
constrain the individual discretion and power of towering leaders. Thus, 
leaders have not had the incentive to strengthen political parties and have 
instead reconfigured their dynamic to look like it is personal property. The 
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recent case in Uganda of a fallout between Yoweri Museveni, the National 
Resistence Movement (NRM) party chairman, and John P. Amama Mbabazi, 
the party Secretary General, over the latter’s rumoured ambitions to contest 
for party chairperson and national presidency is a just case in point. Similar 
struggles have happened in Kenya between Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya, 
Julius Nyerere and Oscar Kambona in Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda and Simon 
Kapwepwe in Zambia, and Kamuzu Banda with Kanyama Chiume in Malawi. 
A related but separate institutional issue concerns the political problems generated by 
misdirected state intervention. An interventionist state in the early stages of development 
has difficulty in establishing a separation between the public and private spheres in 
social life. The most important consequence of this, from the point of view of democratic 
consolidation, is that an interventionist state cannot claim that distributive problems 
are social and not political. Also, an interventionist state typically controls a substantial 
proportion of a poor economy. Thus, many of the society’s free-floating resources are 
controlled by politicians and bureaucrats. The consequence of it is worsening inequality, 
perpetuation of lip-service, and the creation of public programmes whose end goal is 
more for regime survival than a concerted effort to better the lives of the masses.
Policy issues
The emergence of free market capitalism has not been spontaneous – it has been both 
due to the influence of external powers and the imposition of ideology by the ruling elite. 
The short term consequences of economic liberalization programmes have made most 
members of society worse off.  As a matter of fact, the level of inequality is becoming 
an increasing function of economic liberalization. In the absence of social safety nets, 
coupled with the breakdown in public service delivery, the consequences are becoming 
evidently disastrous.
The gap between expectations and reform induced reality generally aggravates the 
problems of fragile democracies.
In the short run, there have always been problems such as implementing economic 
reforms. The choice of reform strategy continues to be of considerable significance 
for consolidation efforts. The short to medium term problems pertain to the political 
consequences of democracy under developing-world conditions of weak political 
institutions, divided societies, and heavy state intervention. What is clear is that the 
consolidation of democracy in a developing economy remains an a endeavour full of 
hurdles. 
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Why inequality may not decline: Captured democracy and 
constraints on redistribution
Greater democratization may not always reduce inequality. First, even though democracy 
reallocates de jure power to poorer agents, richer segments of society can take 
other actions to offset this by increasing their de facto power. This possibility, noted 
in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), can be captured in the following sense. Suppose 
that the distribution of income has mass at two points – the rich elite who are initially 
enfranchised, and the rest of the citizens who make up the majority of the population 
and are initially disenfranchised. Suppose, in addition, that the rich elite can undertake 
costly investments to increase their de facto power, meaning the power they wield 
outside what is strictly institutionally sanctioned – such as their influence on parties’ 
platforms via lobbying, or repression through control of law enforcement, and/or non-
state armed actors (see Acemoglu et al., 2013a; Santos and Robinson, 2013; Acemoglu 
et al., 2013b). If they do so, they will “capture the political system”, for example; control 
the political agenda of all parties.
Other mechanisms include de jure constitutional provisions that restrict the scope 
for redistribution which remain unaltered during democratization. For instance, Siavelis 
(2000) and Londregan (2000) argue that the constitution imposed by the Pinochet 
government in Chile prior to the transition to democracy was a way to constrain future 
redistribution. Another way may be the threat of a future coup, preventing democracy 
from pursuing high redistribution. Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) discuss how fear of 
a military coup induced voters into electing Charles Taylor in Liberia in 1997 (see also 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001).
Conclusion and emmerging issues
The overall assessment shows that democracy is not associated with extremes of growth 
performance. On the issue of economic growth, stable developing democracies are 
likely to fall in the middle range. A somewhat middle case can be made for democracies 
on the equity aspect because democracies are unlikely to undertake radical property 
redistribution. Over time, however, if democratic politics result in democratization of 
power, then democracies may generate some pressures towards greater equalization. 
The policy implication, however, is clear: improvements in equity may be compatible with 
democracy if, and only if, the design of new democracies consciously aims to strengthen 
social democratic institutions, such as social democratic parties, peasant and labour 
associations, careful decentralization, and restructuring of the role of governments away 
from unnecessary intervention and towards those policy areas that influence the life 
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chances of the majority. So far, the experience from the developing world has shown 
that those basic ingredients are in the meantime far from attainable in most countries.
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Problematizing Media and Democracy in 
Africa: Decolonial Perspectives
Sarah Chiumbu1
Abstract
The relationship between media and democracy in Africa has attracted vast scholarly 
attention since the so-called third wave of ‘democratization’ hit Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) in the early 1990s. Much of this scholarly work is premised on Euro-American 
centric theories. To the extent that these theories are held to be universal, they hinder 
critical theorization of the role of bilateral/multilateral donors and Western policy 
think tanks that have materially and ideologically supported media policy reforms 
and the democratization agenda in Africa. I argue that this donors’ support is not 
neutral, but is tied to certain material and ideological interests. This reality therefore 
provides a backdrop from which to interrogate and problematize the role of these 
global actors in major media policy debates in SSA.  To do this, I move away from 
dominant Western models and theories and rely on decolonial theories which are 
broadly committed to theorizing the problematic of colonisation, (post) coloniality 
and decolonization. Decolonial perspectives have intimate links with strands of 
postcolonial thought, subaltern theory, dependency, World System analysis and 
African political thought. I use these theories to critique the material and ideological 
legacies of the colonial encounter that continue to shape and influence the politics 
and practices of media reform and practices in Africa. 
 
Key Words: Media, Democracy, Decoloniality, Coloniality, Donors
Introduction
The broad questions of how media access and consumption impact on the fostering of 
civically and politically engaged citizens has been the object of much research since the 
emergence of democracy debates in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from the early 1990s 
onwards. The language of citizenship through the media entered the political discourse 
in the region in the 1990s, during the so-called ‘third wave of democratization’. Over the 
years, the ‘democracy project’, has led to massive political and economic changes in the 
region, accompanied by broader media reforms in the print and broadcasting sectors. 
The media reforms have certainly brought media diversity and pluralism across many 
countries in the region. The relationship between media and democracy has attracted 
1 Sarah Helen Chiumbu is an African Research Fellow in the Human and Social Development Programme at the Human Sciences Research 
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vast scholarly and policy debates over the last 25 years, most of it centred on the belief 
that a free and democratic society is impossible without free and independent media 
and an active civil society. These studies broadly see the media and democracy as 
symbiotically related (e.g. Ronning, 1994; Berger, 1998; Tettey, 2001; Hyden, Lesley & 
Ogundimu, 2002).
As we enter the third decade of democracy, there is need to disrupt and unthink 
some aspects of the media and democracy nexus and create new discourses. To do 
this, I draw on a decolonial critical theoretical frame to unsettle and critique the dominant 
understandings and practices of democracy, human rights and media. Decoloniality 
is an epistemic and political project that seeks to liberate knowledge, power and 
being, and entails an undertaking of “producing a radical and alternative knowledge” 
(Grosfoguel, 2007: 211) outside the bounds of Eurocentrism. According to Walsh (2007: 
226), “Western thinking must be confronted and a different thought constructed and 
positioned from ‘other’ histories and subjectivities”.
In this paper, I make three key arguments. First, I argue that the democracy, human 
rights and the normative media frameworks are modernity projects. Following Suarez-
Krabbe (2011, 2013), I contend that these two concepts need to be understood in 
the historical materialization of European modernity which itself “emerged through a 
relationship of exploitation, violence and control that Southern Europe practised against its 
African and American others” (Suarez-Krabbe 2013: 83, emphasis original). The second 
argument I am advancing is that the media and democracy agenda that emerged in SSA 
in the early 1990s is a form of coloniality. I state that disciplinary neoliberalism has been 
used by the West to impose the democracy project and neoliberal media reforms on 
Third World countries. Democracy promotion derived and financed by dominant Western 
actors has been essentially an imperial project designed to serve Western interests. The 
third argument is that the narratives and ideas framings media and democracy debates 
essentially emerge from Euro-American epistemic sites and this leads to some form of 
epistemic coloniality.
This paper is divided into three major parts. The first section locates democracy 
and freedom of expression in debates on modernity. The next section demonstrates 
how the media and democracy (Western) agenda as manifested in SSA is a form a 
coloniality. The third section discusses issues of epistemic coloniality and explores how 
NGOs and policy elites in SSA (re)appropriate and circulate dominant media policy 
reform discourses produced in Western knowledge centres. The paper ends with an 
argument for an epistemic rupture and unthinking of the media, democracy and human 
rights discourse.
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Media and Democracy in Africa: A Brief Context
In the developing world, most importantly in SSA, the ‘third wave’ of democratization in 
the 1990s saw the introduction of economic and political reforms in the form of multi-
party democracies, and the adoption of economic structural adjustments programmes 
promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Underpinning these 
reforms were pervasive discourses of democracy, human rights and good governance, 
and the media was seen as one of the tools for achieving these ideals. The international 
community thus urged African governments to reform print, broadcast and telecoms 
media. Non-governmental organizations, with funding from Western bilateral donors, 
pushed the media reform agenda. In Southern Africa, this was most prominent with the 
establishment of organizations such as the Media Institute of Southern Africa in 1992 
following the passing of the Windhoek Declaration on Promoting an Independent and 
Pluralistic Press2 the previous year, which stated that anindependent press is “essential 
to the development and maintenance of democracy in anation and for economic 
development”. 
(Re)Theorising Media and Democracy
Existing academic accounts of media and democracy in SSA have predominantly derived 
their analyses from two dominant approaches. The first one, liberal-pluralism primarily 
focuses on political-legal issues such as freedom of expression and questions of state-
media relations (e.g. Hyden et al., 2002; Kupe, 2003). In this approach, the media is seen 
as the Fourth Estate, defender of the public interest and guardian of democracy. The 
second approach is rooted in Marxism and political economy arguments which view the 
media as integrated into the existing economic and political elites and therefore reflecting 
their interests. In the analysis of African media, scholars using these Marxist perspectives 
have provided robust critiques to processes of deregulation, liberalization, privatization 
and commercialization that have accompanied media reforms on the continent (e.g. 
Ronning, 1994; Tomaselli and Dunn, 2001; Heuva, Tomaselli, K. and Tomaselli, R., 2004; 
Nyamnjoh, 2005; Banda, 2006; Moyo, 2006; Moyo and Chuma, 2010). 
As useful as these two dominant approaches have been in scholary conversations, 
they have made little or no effort to problematize the role of actors, ideas and interests in 
2 The Windhoek Declaration was formulated and adopted at a seminar on promoting an independent and pluralistic African press, held in 
Windhoek, Namibia (29 April–3 May 1991). The seminar also paved the way for the UN General Assembly Decision on 20 December 1993 to 
establish 3 May as World Press Freedom Day. Windhoek was the first of five major regional seminars on the same theme organized by UNESCO 
and the United Nations Department of Public Information with the active collaboration of a number of press freedom organizations between 1991 
and 1997 all over the world –Alma Alta Declaration (Kazakhstan), Santiago Declaration (Chile), Sana’a Declaration(Yemen) and Sofia Declaration 
(Bulgaria) (Boafo, 2001, n.d.). 
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shaping the media and democracy agenda. Although media reform policies in Southern 
Africa have mainly been championed by human rights-based advocacy NGOs, their 
fostering has been done by bilateral and multilateral donors, Western think tanks 
and private business interests. The support of media reforms by these actors is not 
neutral, but is tied to certain material interests. The ‘democratization’ agenda, under 
which the media reforms project falls, has been central in promoting the West’s foreign 
policy interests (e.g. see Scott, 1999; McFaul, 2004; Scott and Steel, 2011). It is this 
reality that I argue provides a backdrop from which to interrogate and problematize 
the role of these global actors in major media policy debates in Southern Africa. In 
his seminal work on African political thought as an alternative epistemic framework for 
analysing African media, Banda (2008) opens up opportunities to rethink and question 
the dominant theoretical models used in examining media reforms on the continent. He 
suggests that African political thought, which is part of postcolonial theorizing, can be 
applied to analyse the role of the media in nationalist resistance and struggle and post-
independence construction of African statehood. In addition, African political thought 
enables us to ponder how contemporary media and cultural production are caught up 
in the structures and processes of globalisation (Banda, 2008). In these endeavours to 
rethink Western theories,  a  number of African scholars have introduced in their study 
of African media, elements of critical theory as post-colonialism and Afrocentricism (e.g. 
Fourie, 2008; Wasserman, 2008;Sesanti, 2010) and Afriethics (Kasoma, 1996). These 
scholars critique Western notions of journalism ethics, which they argue are constitutive 
of the capitalist world-system, and propose a media normative framework embedded 
in Ubuntu, which puts emphasis on community and collectivity –it moves away from the 
Western preoccupation with ‘self’ (Fourie, 2008). According to Fourie (2007:10), Ubuntu 
is therefore “a moral philosophy, a collective African consciousness, a way of being, 
and a code of ethics and behaviour deeply embedded in African culture”. This move to 
use non-Western paradigms to analyse African media, feeds into a larger movement 
by primarily US and Europebased scholars to ‘internationalise’, ‘de-Westernise’ or 
‘decolonise’ the field of media and cultural studies (Curran and Park, 2000; Abbas and 
Erni, 2004; McMillin, 2007). In line with this alternative way of thinking and theorizing the 
media-society nexus in Africa, I use decolonial critical theoretical approaches.
Decolonial theories are rapidly gaining ground in critical social theory. These theories 
originate in Latin America and are generated by liberation and world systems scholars 
who have articulated this theory as a response to the historical crises resulting from the 
project of Western modernity in the Global South. It is noteworthy that although decolonial 
critical theories are associated with experiences from Latin America, their genealogy can 
be traced to a group of thinkers of liberation like Aime Cesaire, W.E.B. Dubois, Amilcar 
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Cabral, Franz Fanon, Cheikh Anta Diop, Kwame Nkrumah, Walter Rodney, Thomas 
Sankara and Steve Biko, to name but a few who confronted coloniality and its principal 
apparatuses. In addition, decolonial theories invoke some of the key arguments in the 
postcolonial and pan-Africanism projects. Walter Mignolo (2011) states that decoloniality 
has its historical grounding in the Bandung Conference of 1955 which brought together 
countries from Africa and Asia, thus the political and epistemic foundations of decoloniality 
have been in place for over five decades.  Nelson Maldonado-Torres states the following:
The decolonial turn does not refer to a single theoretical school, but 
rather points to a family of diverse positions that share a view of coloniality 
as the fundamental problem in the modern (as well as postmodern and 
information age), and decolonization or decoloniality as a necessary 
task that remains unfinished (Maldonado-Torres 2011: 2) .
Using the term ‘coloniality’, decolonial theories attempt to understand the “continuity 
of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial administration” (Grosfoguel, 
2007: 219). It is argued that with decolonization, we have moved “from a period of 
‘global colonialism’” to the current period.
Coloniality exists in the realms of power, knowledge and being. Peruvian sociologist 
Anibal Quijano (2007) coined the term coloniality of power which is “a global hegemonic 
model of power... that articulates race and labour, space and peoples, according to 
the needs of capital…” (Escobar, 2007: 185). This concept helps us understand how 
social and political power is distributed, and how this distribution (access to power) is 
connected to a history of colonization and forms a dynamic part of global imperial designs 
(Quijano, 2007). I argue in this paper that this coloniality of power is implicated in global 
processes that direct and fund media and democracy projects. As stated earlier, the 
democratization agenda, under which the media reforms project falls, has been central 
in promoting the West’s foreign policy interests. As Saltman (2006) and Reifer and Mercer 
(2005) have argued, democracy promoting initiatives are not benign, but are usually 
strongly tied to the donor countries’ geo-strategic priorities. Coloniality of knowledge 
refers to the manner in which Eurocentric knowledge systems are privileged over other 
knowledges and epistemes (Mignolo, 2007). Quijano (2007:169) states that “African 
modes of knowing, of producing knowledge, and of producing perspectives became 
subordinated to Euro-American epistemology that assumed universal proportions 
and universal truth”. Hegemonic narratives are thus projected as absolute and other 
knowledges outside the bounds of Western modernity are ignored, marginalized or 
repressed. More critically, however, coloniality speaks to the issues of location and the 
locus of enunciation. Grosfoguel (2007) articulates that knowledge is situated, and in 
terms of the locus of enunciation, the location of the enunciator is geopolitically and 
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historically important.  For instance, one can be geographically located in Africa, but 
articulate issues affecting Africans from the loci of the empire. For instance, as I argue, 
NGOs and policy elites in Southern Africa articulate and frame debates on media policy 
reforms from the empire’s locus of enunciation. For the purpose of this paper therefore, 
coloniality of power and knowledge are used to problematize neo-liberalism which has 
underpinned the media and democratic project and knowledge production processes 
implicated in this project respectively.
Locating freedom of expression and democracy in Modernity 
Many studies on media and democracy have not been overly critical of the modernist 
aspirations of the democratization agenda. The notions of democracy, human rights 
and freedom of expression are taken as pre-given and are not often subject to scrutiny, 
and yet these notions have their foundations in the European modernity project and 
have been influenced by early classical thinkers such as John Milton and John Stuart 
Mill (Keane 1991). Dominant scholarly narratives of modernity trace their origin to the 
17th century. For instance, Giddens (1990:1) notes that modernity refers to modes of 
social life or organization which emerged in Europe from about the 17th century onwards, 
and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence. This view 
suggests that modernity can be explained by factors that are generally internal to Europe 
(Escobar, 2007: 181).This paper teases out ideas of Latin American philosopher Enrique 
Dussel (e.g. 1993, 2000), who puts forward a theory of two stages of modernity. Dussel 
(2000) locates the origins of modernity with the Spanish conquest of the Atlantic in 
1492, rather than in the dominant and commonly accepted processes of Enlightenment 
in the 18th century. Dussel dismisses as partial and provincial the understanding of 
modernity as essential or exclusive European phenomenon (Dussel, 1993:65). He calls 
this the “myth of modernity”, as it denies and conceals its negation of the other and 
hides its underside and its suppression and disqualification of subaltern knowledges 
and cultural practices (Escobar, 2004). The understanding of modernity as essential or 
exclusive European phenomenon is thus partial and provincial (Dussel, 1993:65). Rather 
than the Eurocentric version of modernity, Dusselargues for a world perspective view 
of modernity that sees 1492 as the date of the birth of modernity during the conquest 
and colonization of America, “when Europe was in a position to pose itself against an 
other, when, in other words, Europe could constitute itself as a unified ego, exploring, 
conquering, colonizing an alterity that have back its image of itself” (Dussel, 1993: 66). 
This period also marked the origin of the capitalist world system. According to Dussel’s 
central thesis, this conquering was not only for economic reasons, but demonstrates a 
Problematizing Media and Democracy in Africa
Inequality, Democracy and Development under Neoliberalism and Beyond 40
modernity “that is constituted in a dialectical relation with a non-European phenomenon, 
but one constituted in a dialectical relation in a non-European alterity that is the ultimate 
content” (Dussel, 1993:65).  
The ‘second modernity’ (1645-1945) took shape through the processes of 
Reformation, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, colonisation of Africa and the spread 
of Europe’s hegemony over the Atlantic and these events must be seen as the result 
and consequence of the ‘first modernity’ rather than a starting point (Dussel 2000). 
Thus “the second stage of modernity... expanded and broadened the horizon started 
in the fifteenth century” (Dussel 2000:470). The European dominance over Africa took 
place in this second phase of modernity and can be generally separated in two historical 
moments. The first moment began in the early 17th century with the establishment of 
exploitative slave trade along the West African coast. The second moment came in the 
19th century just as the slave trade was abolished by Britain and United States. This 
second historical moment saw the actual colonisation of the continent that commenced 
soon after the Berlin Congress of 1885 (Chowdhury 1997: 37).
The capitalist world-system expanded to cover the whole planet during the second 
phase of modernity (Wallerstein, 1979) in tandem with Euro-American processes of 
nation-building, citizenship rights and democracy. Therefore, the genesis of narratives 
on freedom of expression and human rights in the 17th centuries, linked to European 
philosophers such as Milton, Locke and Stuart Mill, need to be understood within this 
‘second phase’ of modernity. Grosfoguel (2002:2012) states that while categories of 
modernity such as citizenship, democracy, human rights and nation building were 
“acknowledged for the dominant northwestern Europeans, the colonial others were 
submitted to coerced forms of labour and authoritarian political regimes in the periphery 
and semi-periphery”. While Europe has been preaching democracy in Africa, what it has 
created through the colonial encounter, is “an intensely antidemocratic, violent, deeply 
racist, hierarchical, and exclusionary form of leadership (Soyinka-Airewele 2010:120).
Although the idea of human rights as conceived by European liberal thinkers consists 
of the premise or claim that every human being is sacred, at its conception did not 
include black people, Jews, Muslims and women. The idea that the African was a 
lesser human being pervaded the Enlightenment period. Today, even as human rights 
have been made universal as demonstrated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), cultural relativists argue that human rights remain  “a product of the 
dominant Western parts of the world, framed in their language, reflecting their needs and 
aspirations” (Brems 1997:142). As Mutua (2010:339) reminds us, Africa was not present 
at the drafting table of the UDHR and the Latin American men who were invited were 
‘decidedly Eurocentric’. Mutua goes to on to argue that although the UDHR is framed as 
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an ideologically neutral project “that orbits in space, not anchored in historical, cultural 
and ideological choices” (2010: 340) and its drafters present the human rights idea as 
universal, ahistorical and nonideological, in reality the drafting of these document was 
informed by Western liberal pluralist thinking and practice (Mutua 2010:338). In other 
words, it can be argued that the concepts of democracy and human rights are a product 
of Western liberalism and are still centred on Western-centric epistemologies and world 
views. This is manifested in dualist thinking that has framed the West’s democracy and 
human rights project in the Global South. Democracy and human rights discourses 
remain the core part of a hegemonic world order that reinforce pre-existing imperial 
tendencies. Rajagopal (2006:769) cautions against viewing the human rights discourse 
as post-imperial discourse, “unsullied by the ugly colonial politics of pre-1948, when 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) initiated the modern human rights 
movement”.
Democracy and dualist thinking
Although democracy is seen to have ‘arrived’ in the Global South in the 1980s and 
1990s, I argue that it should be seen as the continuation of the post-WWII development 
agenda which was premised on ‘modernizing’ the non-Western man. Dussel reminds 
us that the development agenda is not a product of post-WWII, but is rooted in 
modernity and Eurocentrism discussed in the last section, that are implicit in the “fallacy 
of developmentalism” which “consists in thinking that the path of Europe’s modern 
development must be followed unilaterally by every other culture … development is 
taken here as an ontological, and not simply a sociological or economic, category” 
(Dussel, 1993: 67-68). The idea of development comes from a belief in a single modernity 
centred in Europe and imposed as a global design on the rest of the world that has 
subalternized other local histories and designs. Development is thus part of the rhetoric 
of modernity. As stated earlier, the darker side of modernity did not only involve the 
conquering of other people, as stated earlier, but also the alteritization of the ‘other’.
As Dussel (1993:66) argues, modernity was born “when Europe was in a position to 
pose itself against an ‘other’, when, in other words, Europe could constitute itself as 
a unified ego exploring, conquering, colonizing an alterity that gave back its image of 
itself”. Therefore this thinking has developed into a form of dualism that sees the world in 
a rigid binary, e.g. capital-precapital, Europe–non-Europe, primitive-civilized, traditional-
modern (Quijano, 2000: 552) and believes in a non-linear and unidirectional evolution from 
a primitive state to a modern European existence. This Manechian world of tradition vs 
modern is based on the foundational myths of modernity that consider all non-European 
as “displaced on a certain historical chain from the primitive to the civilized, from the 
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rational to the irrational, from the traditional to the modern, from the magic-mythic to 
the scientific” (Quijano, 2000:556). Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007:45) terms this 
duality of thinking as “abyssal thinking” consisting of “visible and invisible distinctions, 
the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible ones”. Abyssal thinking was at the 
centre of the making of colonial zones as “the other side of the lines” and metropolitan 
zones as “this side of the line”. The developmental agenda that emerged in the 1950s in 
the wave of the end of the World War II and Third World decolonization was based upon 
this form of dualism and abyssal thinking. For instance, US President Harry Truman, in 
his inaugural speech in 1949 stated:
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions 
approaching misery … Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. 
Their poverty is a handicap and a threat to them and to more 
prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the 
knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people (cited 
in McPhail 2009: 4-5). 
The West thus took it upon itself to embark on a ‘civilizing mission’ to move developing 
countries from ‘primitive’ to ‘modern’. The post World War II modernization paradigm saw 
the media as one of the tools to engender development. The mass media, particularly 
radio, were viewed as being central to improving the economic and social lot of the 
poor in the southern hemisphere. In recent years, new media technologies (ICTs) have 
replaced mass media in perpetuation of the same thinking. The ‘ICT for Development’ 
supported by a host of multinational institutions and bilateral donors, posits that ICTs 
contribute to economic growth and sustainable development and uncritically projects 
the appropriation of ICTs as being equivalent to progress and modernisation (Chiumbu, 
2008). This thinking is best encapsulated in the oft-quoted opening lines of the World 
Bank World Development Report (1999): “Knowledge is like light. Weightless and 
intangible, it can easily travel the world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere. 
Yet billions of people still live in the darkness of poverty” (p. 1, cited in Chiumbu, 2008). 
Drawing on post-colonial theory, post-development scholars such as Escobar (1995), 
Crush (1995) and Rahnema and Bawtree (1997) have offered a critique of the modernist 
ideology underpinning the development paradigm. They argue that the development 
project represents the ‘Third World’ as backward, problematic and in need of Western 
intervention. Although the development project faced many crises and critiques from 
dependency and Third World scholars, it remained trenched as a Western policy towards 
the Global South. But in the 1990s, it was apparent that development, as an idea, had 
run its course. In its place, the discourse of democracy emerged. The paradigm of 
modernization was reinvented as democracy as illustrated by Abrahamsen:
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The disciplinary aspects of development can be illustrated through 
the sudden inscription of democracy as a necessary condition for 
development assistance in the early 1990s. The good governance 
agenda spearheaded by the World Bank and adopted by most bilateral 
donors, was heralded at the time of  its emergence as a radical break 
with a development tradition tainted by its frequent support for the 
strong or authoritarian state, due both to a pervasive Cold War logic 
and to a conviction that democracy was suited only to industrialised 
countries...on closer inspection however, the good governance 
agenda, appears to be less of a radical break with the past, in that it 
reproduces the hierarchies of previous development where the Third 
World is still to be reformed and delivered from its current stage of 
underdevelopment by the West (Abrahamsen, 2003:202-203).
Democracy has been mainstreamed into development strategies of multilateral 
institutions and Western states. Dualist thought framing the development agenda 
is apparent in discourses of democracy wherein African Third World societies are 
positioned as the deviant Other to those of Western Europe and North America (Koelble 
and Lipuma, 2008). Robins et al. (2008) argue that the exporting of liberal democracy 
to Africa by Western donors, NGOs and governments, can be seen as part of a “new 
civilizing mission” that seeks to modernize and democratize the Third World (cited in 
Chiumbu, 2013: 68-69).
Democracy, Western interests and global coloniality
As discussed at the beginning of this paper, the early 1990s witnessed the promotion 
of democracy by Western countries in many countries in SSA. Democracy was tied in 
with discourses of human rights and good governance. The form of democracy that 
flourished in the 1990s, and continues to do so, has mainly been of the liberal version. 
While this form of democracy has been heavily critiqued as stated at the beginning of 
this chapter, very few scholars have questioned its Eurocentric and modernist framings. 
It would not be wrong to say that attacking democracy is considered sacrilegious. 
Democracy has become an international norm that is beyond critique. But using the 
lens of coloniality, it becomes clear that the Western understanding of democracy and its 
attendant practices towards the Global South reveal the workings of coloniality of power. 
Because it operates in a hidden form, coloniality of power is able to provide a ‘human 
face’ to ideas and practices that promote Western interests that may be detrimental to 
Africa and its subjects. 
Problematizing Media and Democracy in Africa
Inequality, Democracy and Development under Neoliberalism and Beyond 44
In the early 1990s, the promotion of democracy was seen as a priority focus of the post-
Cold War foreign policies of Western governments and some multilateral organizations. 
Western states and institutions began to increasingly link their development assistance/
aid to democratization. In this vein, many countries in SSA were coerced to adopt 
economic structural programmes which were accompanied by several conditionalities, 
such as realigning policy frameworks with those of the West as a precondition for 
participating in the global economic system (Mengisteab, 1996). Thus, in the course 
of the 1990s, the promotion of liberal democracy, good governance and human rights 
became progressively both an objective and a condition for aid by Western donors. These 
aid conditionalities opened avenues for the transfer of Western policy ideas, instruments 
and frameworks, under the mantle of promoting democracy and good governance. In 
relation to the governance agenda of the early 1990s, Ihonvbere argues:
In the majority of African states, development planning, financial 
matters and public policy were already being determined, influenced, 
or severely constrained by the policies, interests, and power of these 
bodies [World Bank, IMF] and bilateral donors. Political conditionality 
therefore, would create a platform to using the disbursement of 
foreign assistance to condition, influence, and determine the content 
and context of politics, the political agenda, and the overall ideological 
content of politics (Ihonvbere, 1994).
Countries that did not conform to the dictates of liberal democracy were disciplined 
through withdrawal of aid. Coloniality of power thus operates under myriad forms of 
structural violence, a form of violence which is indirect and non-physical. The radical 
anthropologist Paul Farmer states that structural violence is subtle, often invisible and 
embedded in the political and economic organization of our social world. Structural 
violence can also be related to what Zizek (2009) calls ‘objective’ violence which falls into 
two further forms. The first is ‘symbolic’ violence “embodied in language and its habitual 
speech forms ... the second type is ‘systematic’ violence located within economic and 
political systems” (cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012: 421). It is this systematic violence 
that is hidden within structures of global coloniality. A form of structural violence that is 
implicated in the democratization agenda is disciplinary neoliberalism (Haardstad, 2012) 
which is “an imposition of neoliberal policies and market structures on nation-states by 
multilateral institutions (Chiumbu, 2013: 69). As Giroux (2008:1) argues, neoliberalism as 
the dominant discourse of our time is “reproduced daily through a regime of commonsense 
and a narrow notion of political rationality”. This “regime of commonsense” has made 
capitalism as the only economic system of organizing life, to the detriment of many 
people who have suffered under this system. Processes of deregulation, privatization 
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and economic openness have led to increased inequality, exclusion and suffering for 
many people in the region. Freedom of expression and human rights NGOs in Africa 
are in a way implicated in reproducing coloniality, and act as ‘translating’ centres that 
help consolidate a form of democracy which is subtly underpinned by the hegemony of 
neoliberalism. 
Epistemic Coloniality
NGOs have been high-profile actors in the field of democracy and human rights in 
Africa, both as providers of services to vulnerable and marginalized communities and 
as campaigners for policy change and reform. They have also provided ideas and 
narratives framing development discourse and policies. What is noteworthy is that these 
ideas are often highly conditioned by hegemonic perspectives drawn from global policy 
institutions, think tanks and multinational corporations. These actors have set the agenda 
and terms of policy debates –problematizing issues and providing solutions. In Africa, 
debates on media, democracy and human rights have been influenced by discourses 
such as ‘liberalization’, ‘privatization’, ‘deregulation’ ‘media pluralism’ and diversity’. 
These policy discourses have been shaped in high-level conferences and meetings. 
These discursive spaces wield tremendous influence in policy formulation and also assist 
in consensus formation. NGOs working in the media and freedom of expression sectors 
have peddled these hegemonic ideas on democracy and human rights, often without 
any critical assessment, and have used them to design media declaration documents 
such as the Windhoek Declaration on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic Press 
(1991), African Charter on Broadcasting (2000)and Declaration of Principles of Freedom 
of Expression (2002). These declarations, espousing a neoliberal media ideology, are 
considered ‘home drawn’ and ‘African-driven’, and indeed to some extent they are. But 
I argue that the participation by domestic NGOs in global conferences and epistemic 
communities entail a process where the NGOs and other domestic elites inadvertently 
move their viewpoints to match the views and class interests of Western dominant actors. 
It is not being suggested that NGOs in the South are unthinking and have no agency, 
but the creation of consensus around hegemonic discourses is conducted through 
‘soft’ forms of power that mask power dynamics. So NGOs such as Media Institute 
of Southern Africa, the Media Foundation for West Africa and Freedom of Expression 
Institute, “through a mixture of policy learning and ‘soft forms’ of coercion, act as 
facilitators of policy transfer, articulating and repackaging hegemonic ideas on media 
reforms (Chiumbu, 2013:72). The construction of consent means that certain ideas and 
discourses around media reforms and democracy have become common sense. This 
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creation of common sense points to coloniality of knowledge or what Florescano (1994) 
calls “epistemic coloniality” – “the process by which the institutionalization of knowledge 
as scientific knowledge permits the integration of domestic elites into the dominant 
Western ideology of modernity” (cited in Ibarra-Colado, 2006, 464). Therefore NGOs and 
policy elites in Africa reproduce and circulate dominant ideas on media and democracy 
in campaigns, declarations, position papers and training programmes. This shows the 
close link between power and ideas.Foucault rightly argues that belief systems gain 
momentum (and therefore power) as more people come to accept the particular views 
associated with that belief system as common knowledge. This subtle form of power 
operates covertly. Foucault’s notion of governmentality draws attention to the ways in 
which a multiplicity of authorities and agencies seek to shape people’s behaviour by 
working through their desires, aspirations and interests (Abrahamsen 2003).
Concluding Remarks: Unthinking Media and Democracy
There is need for an epistemic rupture and unthinking of the media, democracy and 
human rights agenda beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity 
through what Walter Mignolo (2000) calls “critical border thinking”, the epistemic response 
of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity or “pluritopic hermeneutics” 
referring to the possibility of “thinking from different spaces, which finally breaks away 
from Eurocentrism as sole epistemological perspective” (Escobar, 2004: 219). Mignolo 
states that border thinking is not an anti-modern fundamentalism; it is a decolonialtrans 
modern response of the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity.As Ibarra-Colado (2006: 
479) states, it is important “that we move towards a different modernity: one that does 
not rely on totalitarian models or a single ideology”. In concert with this line of thinking, 
Chinweizu et al. (1980) emphasize the importance of working from the standpoint of 
Africa and not from some abstract universalism. The philosophy of Africanity privileges 
Africa as a starting point of subjectivity, what Mafeje calls “endogeneity– a scholarship 
grounded in and driven by the affirmation of African experiences and ... an intellectual 
standpoint derived from a rootedness in the African conditions; a centring of African 
ontological discourses and experiences as the basis of one’s intellectual work (Adesina, 
2008: 134-135).
This unthinking or epistemic rupture comes at a time when two centuries of Euro-
American domination, due to the rise of countries like China and Brazil, have given 
way to some form of a multicentric structure, and this calls for a review of theories that 
sorely rely on the Euro-American experience (Rehbein, 2010:1). The current political 
and economic moment that the world finds itself in provides opportunities to counter 
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the dominant conceptualization of neo-liberal democracy that has been dominant since 
the 1980s. Recent developments and events such as the global financial crisis that 
[un]folded from 2008 onwards, Occupy Movements and the Arab Revolutions in 2011 
indicate that we may be entering a period of ‘non-hegemony’ and an era of significant 
transformation in the organization and structure of world order.  In addition, as Six (2009, 
cited in Chiumbu, 2013: 74) asserts, the rise of new state donors such as China or India 
questions not only the established modes of development cooperation but also the 
development paradigm as a whole, and the consequence is that “the Western dominance 
which for decades determined the external and internal relations of many developing 
countries, is in decline”.  As Cox states, “We are living in a time of gradual disintegration 
of a historical structure, which not so long ago seemed to be approaching what Francis 
Fukuyama once called ‘the end of history’” (Cox, cited in Schouten, 2009:1).
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Limits to Democracy and Emancipatory 
Politics in South Africa post-1994
Lyn Ossome1
Abstract
Who is the subject of democracy? For whom does it hold out promise, and how 
does the existential condition of those who aspire for freedom through democracy 
impose conditions upon the very practice of democracy? In this paper I show 
how racialized, classed, autochthonized and gendered people in South Africa are 
gradually being condemned towards a ‘slow death’, and towards an existence more 
akin to the ‘living dead’. As the people’s possibilities of freedom become more and 
more defined by and restricted to place, inward-looking logics – anti-immigration 
legislation and xenophobia– deepen the notion of South Africa’s exceptionalism and, 
increasingly, the people seek a reactionary validation from within the ethnic group, 
nation and race. Such de-radicalization of a politics of being is more profoundly 
expressed as the reality of abject existence becomes apparent and the people no 
longer find validation or affirmation of their humanity in and of itself. Reduced to their 
‘entitlements’ rather than their rights, the people are faced with the stark realization 
that the government has long abandoned them, and the race/nation/gender/class 
to which allegiance once meant a politics of resistance, now merely function as 
institutionalized identities, depoliticized by their (neo)liberal application under the 
constitution. As social identities becomes a liability, so too do any politics that 
suggest a common existence and a politics of struggle based on shared suffering. 
This atomization of individuals and their alienation from the structural roots of their 
oppression suggests the impossibility of claiming justice from a state that has long 
disarticulated its interests from those presented by the people, and now merely 
functions as a guarantor of society’s slow death.
Introduction
In 2008 the African continent stepped out of its proverbial fishbowl and watched in 
horror as Black-on-Black violence in South Africa played out on television screens 
and mass media. Those who more accurately defined this dramatization of hatred as 
negrophobia, afrophobia and anti-Black violence (Mngxitama, 2010), also drew parallels 
with similar forms of violence in the West and sought to reveal the racial dimensions 
1  Lyn Ossome is a researcher in feminist political economy, specializing in land and agrarian studies, labour sociology, political theory, social 
and public policy. She holds a postdoctoral position at the Unit for Humanities at Rhodes University (UHURU), South Africa. 
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of this situation (Gordon, 2000). Not only did the characterization of this violence as 
xenophobic seek in fact to re-cast its victims as bereft of class or racial distinction 
(“victims of a crime without context or history”), more insiduously, it facilitated the very 
state – “untransformed, racist and anti-Black, now under the management of the ANC” 
(Mngxitama), that had since 1994 continued to structure the oppression of Black people 
in South Africa – in casting aside its singular culpability and enabling it to lead the declared 
war against xenophobia. This culpability is, of course, shared by liberals everywhere, 
who worked hard to anomalize violence that emerged directly from a marginalized, 
disenfranchized section of society that expressed their brutalization upon the only sites 
that remain admissible, visible and accessible to them – bodies which like their own 
reflect a brutalization beyond rescue. The liberal mediator (for his participation remains 
an oxymoron and impossibility) condemns even as he authorises. This authority that any 
state is able to periodically regenerate towards its own ends, marks the denouement of 
the liberal democracy, which in functioning for and on behalf of the bourgeoisie class, 
Marx might have characterized as producing its own gravediggers, no differently from its 
capitalist iteration. Twenty years into the post-apartheid (liberal) democratization project 
in South Africa, the marriage between liberalism and capitalism is indeed complete – 
institutionalized and almost autonomously functioning entirely towards the oppression 
of Blacks in industry, in the academy, in the townships and on the streets. The surest 
marker of this institutionalization is in its implementation that has turned the poor and 
those termed as ‘undesirable’ into a mere statistic, presented as fact. On violence that 
assumes this nature, it is not the individual acts of violence that guarantee its severity, 
but rather its processes – through institutions, conditions and structures – that ensure 
its autonomy and absolves its perpetrators, the real ones, of which are not the hapless 
border patrol officer, policewoman or man, or immigration officer. The post-1994 state 
has returned underground – this time as a reactionary, murderous, anti-Black and anti-
intellectual apparatus of the White racist captialist patriarchy that insists on defining and 
imprisoning the notion of democracy as a function of the Enlightenment – endangered 
by anything or anybody that challenges its essential racism.
More recently, the violence against movements of the landless, the homeless and 
mine-workers in Marikana exemplify an equally terrifying reality of a state that has 
cemented its union with capital.
Marikana further exposed the limitations of understanding the mine-workers’ strike 
and massacre from a narrow Marxist and nationalist historiography in which the worker 
is theorized purely as a subject of capitalist exploitation devoid of agency, subjectivity 
and context (Naicker, 2013). In her illuminating feminist analysis, Naicker sought instead 
to show the migrant in the Marikana community as residing “within a subaltern history 
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of colonialism, apartheid, and elite nationalism”, reasserting a conception of democracy 
and an attempt to deepen and explore democratic praxis in what she views as more 
meaningful and participatory ways than the “official domain” – what in this paper I too 
critique as the institutionalization and instrumentalization of democracy – of politics 
would allow marginalized people (Naicker, 2013). In connection to this one might again 
pose the question, who is the subject of democracy? The mine-workers’ struggles, the 
struggles in resistance of the “gears of the machine” (Brown, 2014), and intellectual 
struggles to account for communities that remain unaccounted for even on the Left, 
are all for emancipation, and are being expressed in a terrain of politics that is grounded 
in a genuine desire for democracy. Yet to understand the demands, and indeed the 
limitations of these demands, for freedom is to hold up for scrutiny the post-1994 state 
and its challenges to freedom (as a real possibility) under democracy.
Who is the subject of democracy?
Democratic theory proceeds from the imaginary of the oppressor as speaking on 
behalf of those who require rescuing and recognition, and from the imaginary of the 
oppressed as that which stands in evidence as capable of being claimed. Read in 
totality, democracy implies a subjective ceding of power and an objective assimilation 
that redirects oppression away from the histories, cultures and politics that necessitate 
it. The democratic man, in Rancière’s observation, is armed with the unique ability to 
reify the inherent dignity of every human being – the “rights of man” being the symbolic 
iteration of a new man endowed with a just, conscientious and moral imperative different 
from the contexts which create him, yet still functioning within the same context. Yet 
what does it mean to cede power? What does it mean to re-imagine a self as apart from 
its inherent subjections? What does it mean to be able to claim power and what does 
it take to existentially express power as something other than an oppositional force that 
is always in resistance? Upon what conditions might power materialize as an objective 
force rather than always as a subjective one?
Beyond these conceptualizations of people/citizens within a sovereign state lie even 
more precariously situated groups who, while not able to claim citizenship by fact of 
foreign nationality, are nonetheless entitled to certain forms of rights by virtue of their 
humanity that is shared across the cultural/political sphere (say Pan Africanism), as well 
as the sphere of political economy. These groups, more than any other, represent the 
complexities attached to notions of ‘sovereign’ power. For what does it mean for the 
state to exercise its sovereignty based on imperialist impulses that valorized identity 
formation as a form of rule (race/ethnicity/gender/class), yet at the same time devaluing 
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those oppressed by such valuations? To suggest the workings of imperialized logics, 
now articulated to the global political economy, as undermining the idea of state’s 
sovereignty, however, is neither to suggest the state as ‘powerless’, nor an attempt 
to over-determine the fact that states themselves become complicit in forms of 
governmentality that emphasize these imperial links. It is, rather, to highlight the problem 
with the spatial notion of state sovereignty, given that post-Westphalian states are at 
present “increasingly compromized by growing transnational flows of capital, people, 
ideas, goods, violence, political and religious fealty” (Brown, 2010: 22) and can no longer 
exert sovereign power. I view this problematic as critical in understanding the nature of 
emancipatory politics in the postcolonial transition to democracy. 
Understood differently, the notion of ‘autonomy’ of states at the current juncture 
of monopoly finance capitalism in the neoliberal era is fundamentally undermined by 
the captivity of the state to the interests and machinations of global capital. As such, 
while states no longer exercise control over their transnational borders, the expectation 
that states continue to act out their sovereignty remains tangible (e.g. through the 
dichotomies under liberal democracy that distinguish good/legitimate/developmental 
states from bad/illegitimate/failed states). If, as Arendt in equating sovereignty with 
tyranny suggests, “only power arrests power”, then the unbridled flow unleashed under 
late capitalism ought to be read as a mechanism that both acts against the excesses 
of the state and inspite of the state. In other words, as symbolizing both the erosion of 
nation states and their mutability to global capital. It is this contradiction that the paper 
seeks to examine in the sections that follow, arguing that the conditions imposed on 
states under neoliberal capitalism demand a more expansive notion of the practice of 
democracy to interrogate the emerging form/s of sovereignty (which Brown suggests is 
no longer to be found in the state but rather in the political economy) and the possibilities 
of emancipatory politics against the challenges being posed by these new forms of what 
is considered ‘sovereign’. This latter view is further complicated by the concern that 
if statelessness corresponds not only to a situation of rightlessness, but also to a life 
deprived of public appearance, how could those excluded from politics possibly claim 
and indeed enact Arendt’s notion of the one true human right, the “right to have rights”? 
(Schaap, 2011: 22).
Injurious and delegitimating logics of the neoliberal capitalist state
Individuals enter the market and its self-rationalizing tendency essentially as an absence. 
That is, under neoliberalism, we are confronted with the fantasy of the possibility of 
markets without people, and an even more fantastical notion of ‘equality’ of exchange, 
Limits to Democracy and Emancipatory Politics in South Africa post-1994
Inequality, Democracy and Development under Neoliberalism and Beyond 55
through which people become (are humanized) in and only through their participation in 
a realm assumed to include everyone. The neoliberal state applies all of its apparatuses, 
including its political devices and institutions in maintaining this logic. In it, human beings 
are no longer viewed in terms of their individual potentialities, capacities, or indeed 
freedoms to realize their worth or value as human. Rather, the free market fundamentalism 
that presently defines South African society means that individuals only enter into the 
consumerized realm as commodities – according to their self-worth (based on the notion 
of who does rather than can access the market), and more strikingly, according to their 
ability to participate in the market. Those, like refugees, undocumented workers, migrant 
workers and so forth, are circumscribed from this possibility (of entry) by the structural 
forces that detest their temporality. The reason being that the markets cannot account 
for these foreign, undocumented, and thus ‘undesirable’ individuals. Indeed, recent 
studies of biometrics in South Africa, discussed in detail below, illustrate precisely how 
critical such accountability is to the neoliberal imperatives of the state. 
Biometric accountability forms part of the growing spectrum through which individuals 
are being interpellated and compelled to partake, not so much in the state as citizens, as 
in the market as available, obligated, disciplined and assured consumers. It is also one 
of the new means through which neoliberal states and their flagrant, speculative markets 
have merged to consolidate and guarantee the survival of both state and market. The 
notion of a migrant, mobile, unemployed, immiserated and exploited worker, whose 
income in the labour market is unlikely to be locked into the economy (illustrated well 
by South Africa’s restrictions on external cash remittances), thus remains a notion that 
contradicts the particular logics of the bourgeois state.
It is in these ways that the neoliberal project there and elsewhere continues to 
contradict the democratic project there and elsewhere. It is the demos in the service 
of the state and not vice versa. It implies recognition (constitutional/institutional) 
based upon accommodation constituted by the negation of oppression, as opposed 
to subjectification, which would compel a regime of rights and liberties that actually 
recognizes or acknowledges the humanity of all – humanity as a universal possibility. 
Instead what we witness is this possibility as an impossibility, a universality that manifests 
as a function of exclusion of certain histories, cultures, politics and identities. For the 
Black, undocumented, migrant worker appears or is constituted in this site of ‘rights’ as 
a negation, as an impossibility and as an “undesirable”.2 It is then their non-existence 
that most contradicts the human dignity that seeks expression through struggles for 
democracy,which in its present iteration remains an almost absolute fantasy. 
2  The language adopted by the Department of Home Affairs to describe foreign nationals it wishes to expel from the country.
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Foreign owners of capital, of the means of production – regardless of their racial 
identity – escape this trap, for their being is inducted and legitimized precisely through 
the markets they exercise control over, a spectre that haunts the globe, phantom-
like in its mobility and transnationalism, espousing a materiality that is determined in 
the last instance by capital. This is the primary force driving ongoing patterns of land 
and resource accumulation on the continent – the reign of markets which undermine 
the sovereignty of states at the same time as they deny the power of those who lay 
legitimate claim on the land. The division is then (and in this formulation, is dialectically) 
that between capital and labour; of economic imperatives that determine the ways in 
which individuals subjectively reinscribe their own exclusion by appealing to the state 
for redress, and through claims-making that legitimize a rights regime that in the first 
instance is circumscribed by discrimination, exclusion, dehumanization and negation. 
The colour-blindness of capital, though, renders invisible the fundamental anti-Blackness 
of exclusionary neoliberal regimes, resistance to which ought to unite people on the 
basis of race in their struggles against oppression under late capitalism. 
Furthermore, the evasion of class analysis in late capitalist societies has meant that we 
talk around the nature/truth of our particular oppressions, and evade rather than confront 
it. The notion of human rights, of identities as inherent, are formulations through which 
we construct alternative ways not only of viewing ourselves in relation to that world, but 
also of explaining how it is that we get to become as we are – in our denied, denigrated, 
oppressed states. In other words, that our existential realities present themselves as 
objective truth, divorced from the structures, institutions and conditions which generate 
different realities for people differentially racialized, classed and gendered. What would it 
mean then to put aside this ontological reality, and where might it lead us to interrogate 
with Gordon (2012), assumptions regarding what we are, where we are and what they 
are? What is the reality of Black people? Or of people in a given space or country or 
time? If, as Gordon’s reflections suggest, reality is not that the people are a problem but 
is rather the conditions that construct people as a problem, then it becomes possible 
to assume an ontological position that denaturalizes identities as essentially legible and 
available for inclusion or redress.
The former ontological reality disingenuously redirects a burden towards individuals 
by constructing subjectivity around identities – and away from the conditions that 
necessitate identification in certain ways, as such leaving unchallenged the status quo. 
What do we invite when it is our identities that continue to evolve around a static set 
of conditions which in reality are worsening? What do we make of the reality that our 
actions as beings living and existing in a capitalist world with its alienating and destructive 
tendencies, are also implicated in this depletion? Is it not the case that identities so 
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constructed upon our perceived injuries eventually come to define the condition/s of 
being itself? This inability to perceive individuals as being not just victims – and hence 
inscribed with and subjected to the precarity of their identities – but rather as ‘collective 
subjects of their own liberation’ (Neocosmos, 2011: 362), which reinstates a dialectic that 
both ontologically recognizes the universality of freedom, and paradoxically, legitimates 
the struggles (and violence, as with Fanon) that genuine freedom entails. In Nietzche’s 
rendering of this paradox, “the free man as a warrior”. What harm then, does liberal-
democracy’s universalization of oppressions, negation of difference and delegitimation 
of legitimate violence (as struggle), hold out for the realization of emancipatory politics? I 
turn below to an examination of some of these predicaments in relation to South African 
state practices, and meanings for the democratic project there. 
In so doing, it is critical to make a clear distinction between what is presented as the 
liberty to claim freedom, and what in reality undermines the freedom to practise difference. 
For instance, here we might ask what alternative trajectories of emancipation can be 
read within South African, and more broadly, African postcolonial feminist struggles that 
are not embedded in the liberal normative discourse of human rights? If human rights as 
a normative discourse has functioned instrumentally in regulating forms of subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity, and further, authorized normative violence, what does it mean 
to overturn such subjugative orders? What does it mean to challenge regimes that 
normatively grant recognition (rights), yet at the same time negate legitimate expression 
and presentation of the desires around which different identities come into being? If, as 
Dhawan contends, this work – of generating alternative visions of normativity – requires 
challenging Eurocentric, heteronormative, social and political normative orders, then the 
question not only becomes how do norms emerge, but also how can norms be employed 
and even appropriated to strive for inclusion, justice and equality to overcome historical 
violence. Yet, any such political project runs the risk of reinforcing perspectives, identities 
and positions deemed to be just, while suppressing others that might be considered to 
counteract justice. 
Ideological apparatuses of the state
In Althusser’s rendering, one of the key distinctive features of the bourgeois state is 
the extent to which it functions through its Repressive Apparatus (RSA) such as the 
Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc. 
(1971: 142-3). These are institutional mechanisms of the state and instruments of power 
that are not only easily recognizable, but from a civic point of view, also available for 
public scrutiny, and so it follows, can be more readily apprehended. A less distinctive 
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realm of state control to which Althusser extends his theoretical consideration is the 
ideological apparatuses available to the state, for the purposes of elite control of state 
power. These, the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), encompassing a plurality of 
mechanisms that range from the religious, the educational, the family, the legal, the 
political, the trade union, the communication, the cultural, etc. are on the other hand, 
not as readily visible. It is precisely on this basis that the state interpellates actors (and 
actions) towards its ends without the necessity of direct injunction, and even more 
insidiously, the means through which repressive regimes of rule become sustained as a 
variable of the ‘good’ versus the ‘bad’, the ‘desirable’ versus the ‘undesirable’, and so 
on. That which appears in public necessarily does so as valid/validated, and that which 
is relegated to the ‘private’ remains so as undesirable/invalid/invalidated. 
This is a discursive distinction already extensively critiqued within feminist political 
theorizations of the state, and further, in Black philosophical thought and queer studies. 
The organizing principle here might be better understood by considering (with Althusser), 
the idea that the (bourgeois) state is neither ‘public’ nor ‘private’, but is rather the 
precondition for the public and the private (Gramsci), i.e. what is considered public/
private is determined solely by the state, upon the basis of its (bourgeois) interests. 
Stated differently, “the distinction between the public and the private is a distinction 
internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the (subordinate) domains over which bourgeois 
law exercises its ‘authority” (1971: 144). It is here then, that we distinguish between 
RSAs and ISAs – the former functioning primarily through violence, the latter mainly 
through ideology.3 In the sections below, I extend my examination of the South African 
state through some existing and emerging mechanisms that highlight ISAs and the ways 
in which they compel a rethinking of democratic practice as freedom. Critical to note is 
the fact that ISAs are neither inherently symbolic of particular intent nor functional for 
any purpose other than that for which they become requisite. That is to say – without 
essentially reducing their functionings to the interest of the ruling classes – that ISAs 
obtain materiality only to the extent that they reproduce the logics of the capitalist state 
through a dialecticism that in turn further reproduces them as (ruling) ideology:
All ideological State apparatuses, whatever they are, contribute to the same result; the 
reproduction of the relations of production, i.e. of capitalist relations of exploitation. Each of 
them contributes towards this single result in the way proper to it. The political apparatus 
by subjecting individuals to the political State ideology, the ‘indirect’ (parliamentary) or 
‘direct’ (plebiscitary or fascist) ‘democratic’ ideology (Althusser, 1971: 154).
3  Note, however, that both RSAs and ISAs can function through both violence and ideology, although it is often the case that RSAs 
function predominantly through repression and only secondarily through ideology.
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In seeking to evade the economism of classical Marxism, my analysis below follows 
a critique of the techniques of rule, through which I reinvigorate individuals as subjects 
of repressive state practices, and not merely as caricatures but as bearers of agency 
through resistance, and thus presenting contradictions which raise, at the discursive 
level at least, the possibilities of re-articulating freedom (as struggle) to the democratic 
project under neoliberal rule.
Biometrics and new mechanisms of control and abjection
Current political theory points to an ever-intensifying connection between the ‘biometric’ 
or the ‘biological’ and the ‘political’, as evidenced in the concept of ‘biopolitics’, a grey 
area in which democratic governments resort to anti-democratic practices, ostensibly 
for the purposes of protecting their citizens (Lebovic and Pinchuk, 2010). Biometric 
legislation’s declared purpose is to fight crime and prevent terrorism. In actuality, 
it alienates the citizen and confers a degree of unlimited authority on the state; the 
information age now enables the state to track the activities of individual citizens’ without 
revealing itself or its interest in them (ibid., emphasis added). It is hardly coincidental, 
as Lebovic and Pinchuk note, that the field of biometrics is based on technologies 
developed by commercial entities, or that these technologies are already being used by 
commercial clients. Breckenridge shows that for much of the last century, South Africans 
have lived with such a biometric order, and in recent years the democratic state has 
begun to invest in a massive scheme of digital biometrics for the “delivery of benefits and 
the elimination of fraud”. This HANIS system has been preceded by a massive project 
of digital biometric grant delivery that affects millions of people throughout the country – 
its essential feature being a fingerprint-authenticated identity document, and a national 
database to record the identity of citizens (2005: 267). Valued by its US proponents as 
a system whose power lies in the joining of commercial and government databases 
around a single biometirc index, Breckenridge shows that South Africa too is already a 
fully-fledged biometric order – “a society characterized, on the one hand, by ubiquitous 
biometric identification and a centralized repository of this data, and, on the other hand, 
by a massive and unbridled commercial data analysis sector” (2005: 269). Like the 
United States, it has an extremely sophisticated and largely unregulated consumer credit 
industry. In South Africa, as is likely to be the case in the United States, the two systems 
of data will mingle unhindered (ibid). In the US the effort to deploy biometrics today is 
a coercive project aimed at improving the state’s surveillance. In contemporary South 
Africa, Breckenridge shows this as also being part of the state’s interest in biometrics, 
directed particularly against immigrants and citizens who illegally claim welfare benefits.4
4 The Janus-face of this system is acknowledged as also strongly motivated by a project of redistributive social justice. In contemporary South 
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Charting some of the ways in which biometrics is changing state practice, Breckenridge 
highlights, for instance, that powerful multi-functional smartcards issued by IT company 
Aplitec, that became the vehicle for pension payments in 1999 (instead of a direct cash 
payment) means that pensioners now receive a credit directly, which can then be used 
immediately to draw cash from an adjacent cash dispenser. The cards were, however, 
only secondarily identification tools – they were intended primarily to make the otherwise 
utterly secluded cash economy of the rural pensioners ‘bankable’ (ibid., 273).5 From 
April 2002, three working groups representing business and government interests were 
convened to discuss the most important issues. The first group was formed to examine 
the technical standards for the card, the capacities of the chip it will carry, and the 
problem of card security. Another group was to consider the other smartcard projects 
– such as Aplitec’s pensions system – already underway in South Africa. And the last 
group, consisting primarily of the South African Banks and the consortium of Europay, 
Mastercard and Visa (EMV), would look at the ways in which the cards could be made 
to interact with the banks’ existing infrastructure, current international standards for 
smartcards and the new “electronic purse specifications”’ (ibid., 278).
Apart from consolidating immense power and control in the hands of the state, 
scholars further point to the effect of biometrics as being on the one hand, the 
government distancing itself from its private citizens and automating its relationship with 
them, and on the other hand, a shrinking of distance between the ruling authority and 
the individual citizen’s body to that between a computer keyboard and its operator. The 
price of increasing the distance between the government and the individual may well 
serve the purpose of determining, as Lebovic and Pinchuk (2010) argue in the case of 
Israel too, “who is truly” South African, for the goal of these legalized mechanisms is not 
merely to improve the existing system’s efficiency, but rather to create a system based 
on ethnic and demographic distinctions. The combination of a dangerous biometric 
control apparatus designed to distinguish between populations “may well turn out to be 
the point at which democracy as we have known it breaks down” (ibid.).
For foreign nationals, inclusion remains a permanently circumscribed possibility 
Africa the state’s interest in digital biometrics is very largely driven by a desire to repair a broken bureaucracy, to deliver grants and other benefits 
to the poorest and most vulnerable of its citizens. There is a certain irony in the fact that these coercive technologies are now being applied to the 
task of hastening the distribution of benefits to those they were originally designed to subjugate (Breckenridge, 2005: 270). This fact, however, 
completes the rationality upon which such a subliminally coercive system is bound to proceed from.
5  It has been primarily in the area of financial services that the smartcards have wrought the most significant changes. Aplitec im-
mediately began to make the smartcard’s automatic deduction facilities available to a small group of companies providing services like family 
funeral policies and life assurance. A company called Cornerstone, for example, provides life assurance policies to some 230,000 pensioners 
in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, using the risk-free deduction facilities provided by the smartcards. More recently Aplitec has begun to offer 
short-term credit facilities directly to grant-holders (Breckenridge, 2005: 273).
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in a system of government overly determined by the growing interaction between 
“big money” and “big government” (ibid.). If it is the case that the right to exist and 
encounter a particular society is guaranteed only through a systematized validation of 
worth, what then does it mean to experience (the lack of) human rights, or in the most 
essential sense, one’s humanity (or dehumanization), as a non-existent subject? That 
such systems incarcerate human beings into exercising their rights in reference to the 
extent to which they are able to access the market? Recall here Rancière’s thesis, which 
calls into question the notion of impassivity with regard to consumption of goods or 
service when he speaks of human rights as being the rights of egotistical individuals of 
bourgeois society (2006: 17). By this he suggests that the culture of protest and rights 
claims ought to be read as “impatience” on the part of the consumer who has been 
seduced by the seeming “limitless growth that is inherent to the logic of the capitalist 
economy: democracy as the reign of individuals always yearning to consume ever more” 
(2006: 20). The exchange between society and state, however, takes place on by far 
inequitable terms: for the liberal democrat, the condition upon which the citizen’s wishes 
are granted rests on the adherence of the citizen to the state’s neoliberal (disciplining) 
agenda – of government within limits, of social regulation, and of economic austerity.
What is at stake with this trade-off is the political and metaphysical element of 
human rights. What collectives enable with the depoliticization of human rights is the re-
articulation of human rights in line with the aims of the very (political and economic) regimes 
which oppress and impoverish the communities. As I argue elsewhere, the paradoxical 
nature of rights claims in the liberal democracy is that the apparent “freedom” that 
citizens exercise in claiming their rights leads them deeper into an existential unfreedom 
(Ossome, 2015). Political subjects come to expect new things from democracy, which 
is newly understood as the guarantor of the promises of rugged individualism, mass 
consumption, and privatization. No longer the guarantor of civic rights, democracy is 
equated to consumer freedom, allowing “freedom of choice” and “freedom of expression” 
in and through the marketplace. Democracy is thus newly expected to guarantee 
open markets, and it is in and through open markets that citizens expect what was 
previously guaranteed by the state (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 2005: 100). Identities 
once defined by work and civic responsibility come to be structured under the organizing 
principle of consumerism. It is thus as consumers that individuals participate and find 
meaning in democracy. Those, like migrant labourers, non-unionized workers, ethnic 
minorities, and other marginalized individuals and groups become disenfranchised by 
an increasingly consumer driven society, which they can no longer participate in. As a 
result, the gap between their subjectivities and democracy’s services continue to grow 
(Nielsen, 2007).The biometric state, in this regard, takes on the logic of the market itself, 
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at once minimizing conflicts through its valorisation/authentification of certain sections 
of society that serve its needs, and adjudicating against those sections of society that 
present contradictions to its logic. The primary contradiction we see in this instance is 
that social grants have been shown, in South Africa at least, as being an insufficient 
basis of ensuring minimum household consumption. The heightened expression of class 
struggles is testament to this. The reason, for instance, that the state is even proposing 
to increase the minimum age for the Child Grant (from 18 years to 23 years) owes in part 
to the fact that it needs to minimize class consciousness and class solidarity, or simply, 
consciousness and solidarity – both of which transcend race, ethnicity, nationality, age, 
gender and sexuality.
Legal formalism and constitutionalism as dogma
“Laws that allow us to diminish the humanity of anybody are not laws, 
they are frameworks for crime.”6
Under the neoliberal ideology definitive of late capitalism, the law is the primary 
mechanism of transition to, or creation of, a democratic state (Neocosmos, 2011). Yet 
setting aside briefly the assumption that the law anticipates and is capable of satisfying 
the justice claims of variously subjugated groups, or indeed that it is in its application 
that activism ought to focus upon, it is worth considering the mediating space between 
the dispensers of justice and those who receive it. This space problematically places 
those ostensibly with the power to ‘guarantee’ justice on one end and those in need of 
some form of redress, whether redistributive or recognition, on the other, and assumes 
that this distribution takes place through the allocation of particular goods or services. 
However, a distributive understanding of power as a possession of particular individuals 
or groups misses the supporting and mediating function of third parties (Young, 1990), 
and misses the structural phenomena of domination (Hartsock, 1983). 
The structure of domination in South Africa at present is precisely that post-1994, 
a progressive constitution re-coded justice as essentially a restorative process that 
both assumed the existential condition of suffering as transparent to our reading, as 
well as stifled the discursive and organic processes through which the newly ‘liberated’ 
could articulate their notions of freedom. The ‘constitutional moment’ in 1996, while 
admissible to the extent of its symbolic transition (from the old regime) and encoding 
desires so expressed, as a deliberatively constituted process, at the same time reifies a 
consensus based on an exclusionary universality around notions of who is indeed free. 
Institutionalising difference circumscribes the possibilities of emancipatory politics as an 
“excess” – only possible in the sites beyond the various domains of politics regulated by 
6  John Davinier in the 2014 film titled Belle.
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the state (Neocosmos, forthcoming). This is so because the liberty to claim difference 
stands in marked contrast to the freedom to practice difference. The mechanisms that 
enable the former (constitutional encoding and legislation) do not, by its very logic, include 
or facilitate the mechanisms necessary for the actualization of the latter. Constitutions 
are put in place precisely to compel actions in non-consensual ways, to calibrate 
difference for a ‘common’ good, and to ensure disciplinarity in/through governance. In 
other words, the regimentation of ‘progressive’ society succeeds precisely because of 
the institutionalization of a duality that ascribes not only proper attitudes and behaviour 
of those ‘for whom’ the law is mandated, but also to ensure compliance as the basis for 
accessing the ‘goodies’ of liberation. 
The totalizing effect of constitutional dogma as observed in the South African context, 
then, is that the institutions so established materialize as panopticals of what is just or 
unjust. Foregrounded here are the questions of whether the law can produce intelligible 
and viable subjects, and whether the normative framing of a progressive constitution can 
accord variously subjugated groups genuine freedom from all forms of discrimination, 
accord them justice, and protect their enjoyment of full citizenship rights enshrined in this 
document. Stated differently, can the desires of the oppressed be adequately read within 
the liberal discourses of constitutionalism and human rights out of which they are being 
translated (Ossome, 2015)? Is not enshrining an injury a denial of existential conditions 
that constantly reproduce that injury, and do institutions not subject the injury to its own 
imperatives and machinations of power by encoding it? 
In ‘Does Democracy Mean Something’, Rancière makes clear his view that 
“democracy cannot consist in a set of institutions”. Institutions, he argues, mean nothing 
in themselves. The reason for this, he argues, is that one and the same constitution 
and set of laws can be implemented in opposite ways depending on the sense of 
the ‘common’ in which they are framed. Rancière’s point is, on one level, obvious. At 
times, the constitution and the laws are invoked to stifle debate and dissent. At other 
times, they are called upon to enable and further the call for new political institutions. In 
themselves, the constitution and the laws are not decisive. But Rancière goes further. 
Not only are political institutions not decisive in politics, they occupy the field of politics 
with a claim to legitimacy and thus delimit and shrink “the political stage”. By establishing 
what is constitutional and legal protest and who can protest and who is even a citizen, 
the institutions of politics limit politics in “a biased way”. They police the boundaries and 
access to politics “in the name of the purity of the political, the universality of the law 
or the distinction between political universality and social particularity”. What again is at 
stake here is the possibility of an excessive politics that might carve out spaces for more 
emancipatory politics. 
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Reactionary nationalisms and anti-intellectualism
The upsurge of popular dissent in South Africa over the past decade is perhaps the most 
profound indication of the existence of a sphere of excessive politics, and the violent 
suppression of dissent the surest confirmation of both the contradictions inherited from 
the racist apartheid state and the current regime’s reactionary nationalism. Political 
assassination, writes Pithouse (2014) has become a sustained feature of political life in 
South Africa, with at least 450 political assassinations since the end of apartheid, the 
bulk of them in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. People involved in grassroots struggles 
are also at risk of being killed by the police, who have killed at least 43 people during 
protests around the country during the past 10 years – a figure that does not include the 
37 striking miners the police killed in Marikana in August 2012 (ibid.). The ruling party 
has continually found legitimacy in its capacity to exercise violence despite sustained 
critique, and its shift towards what Pithouse terms as the “mobilization of horizontal 
violence” against grassroots activists differs little from the apartheid state’s tactics in the 
late 1980s, at the time confronted with urban rebellion. 
The poor and landless are expressing their sentiments in ways that move beyond 
the ascribed rights claim regime instituted by the state. Instead what we see is protest 
alongside conscientization and actions that are not only rooted in an intellectual tradition 
that takes seriously the minds of the oppressed, but is also organically gaining expression 
at the level of affecting a progressive national consciousness. This is the real threat to the 
ruling hegemony – the fact that the oppressed are resisting the ridicule of a bourgeois 
politics of representation, by expressing their own desires into the public discourse, and 
highlighting the possibilities of popular ‘presentation’, which Neocosmos (forthcoming) 
views as inherent in emancipatory politics. Through such a politics, 
people collectively become a subject. This is called a process of 
‘subjectivation’; it is a collective process of becoming and without it 
we cannot begin to speak of emancipation. In other words a politics 
of emancipation must be a self-actualising process of subjectivation 
founded on a universal conception of equality (Neocosmos, 
forthcoming).  
The politics of representation confirms critiques in this paper regarding the impossibility 
of mediating the emancipation of people through institutional and social arrangements 
that mobilize certain groups as dispensers of justice (state, civil society) and other groups 
as (always) receivers of justice. In Neocosmos’s rendering, “there can be no state politics 
or identity politics of emancipation, the idea of an egalitarian state is simply an oxymoron”. 
Furthermore, the anti-intellectualism that is inherent in the suppression of organic dissent 
is one of the mechanisms through which the state compels the oppressed to waive 
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their freedoms as the condition for the dispensation of justice. To present oneself as a 
subject is thus on the one hand, to circumvent an institutional path conditioned upon 
relinquishing certain parts of our claims, and on the other, to articulate the desires of the 
oppressed away from the prescribed dichotomies of difference through which the liberal 
democracy legitimates its validity. 
Although Mouffe’s (2000) notion of radical democracy, which she envisions as an 
extension of the dissentive space of politics is problematic to the extent that it does not 
articulate dissent beyond the confines of the state, her elaboration of the liberal democracy 
is here, instructive in her characterization of it as a regime with a specific form of organizing 
politically human coexistence which results from the articulation between two different 
traditions: on one side, political liberalism (rule of law, separation of powers and individual 
rights) and on the other side, the democratic tradition of popular sovereignty (2000: 18). 
What is at stake, she argues, is the legitimization of conflict and division, the emergence 
of individual liberty and the assertion of equal liberty for all (2000: 19). What we witness, 
however, is the negation of conflict and the undermining of difference within the liberal 
human rights framework that proceeds from a universalist and essentialist point of view. 
Where pluralism has been factored in, it has, in Mouffe’s argument, been an “extreme” 
type that emphasizes heterogeneity and incommensurability, and according to which 
pluralism – understood as valorisation of all differences – should have no limits. Such a 
formulation ignores the limits imposed on the extension of the sphere of rights by the fact 
that some existing rights have been constructed by the very exclusion or subordination 
of others. Such exclusion stands as the primer of the racist, patrimonial, capitalist state 
that this paper has sought to theorize as the antithesis of any emancipatory politics.
Possibilities of democracy as freedom
The possibilities of emancipation have found critical expression in broad theoretical 
spheres, including in the realm of philosophical thought highlighted here. Lewis Gordon’s 
contention that one cannot walk around as a Black/oppressed person without being in 
relationship with a myriad other sets of relations, reasserts a set of prospects for those 
at the margins of the circumscribed terrain of (liberal) democratic politics. To be Black is 
to be in relation with the social structures that define one as Black. It is to be constantly 
and existentially immersed in one’s state of being, and by implication, having always 
available to one the means through which to not only recognize and understand your 
world, but to fundamentally change it for your own benefit. To truly assert our humanity 
is to resist the narcissistic ambition to turn away from reality, and deal with the reality that 
is facing us in the world today that is complex, relational and multidimensional (Gordon, 
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2012) – a reality that by this logic, equally confronts and contests its own persistence. 
How then, might we begin to reconceive the possibilities that democratic struggle holds 
out to us in a world constructed around exclusion, abject identification and subjection 
to power? The notion of a double-consciousness vs potentiated double consciousness 
(Du Bois) remains unresolved in this regard – the question that halts the presupposition 
that ‘there is something wrong with the individual’, reworked to insist instead that ‘there 
is something wrong with society’. As such, requiring not acting on yourself in ways that 
seek to exterminate that which you perceive as being wrong with yourself, but rather 
externalizing our struggles (based on the more accurate perception of a shared humanity 
and what it means to be human), and harnessing this power and agency towards the 
annihilation of the conditions and structures that impose on us a negative reality of being 
– in Gordon’s terms, “a critical evaluation of a society that structures you as a negative 
term”. It is to resist, and struggle in a constant dialectical fashion against resentiment 
(Althusser)/resentment (Brown) – that is, against a politics that affirms and reinscribes 
our subjection from within the categories handed through our naturalized identities, and 
which can only always delimit our struggles to the possibilities of those institutionalized 
identities. In short, we need a new word for the people’s pain, and new tools with which 
to dismantle the master’s house – in this instance, the really existing democracy which 
has shown itself as incapable of confronting the question of human dignity and freedom.
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Elite Capture and Elite Conflicts in 
Southeast Asian Neoliberalization 
Processes1
Bonn Juego2
Abstract
Neoliberal globalization has ushered in a variety of capitalism in Southeast Asia’s 
uneven development landscape. Unpacking the complexity of contemporary 
capitalist development in the region entails an appreciation of how vested interests 
give shape to processes of neoliberalization. This article investigates how and why 
dominant elite classes and social forces mediate the interrelated neoliberalization 
processes of market reforms and state institutional restructuring in ways that are 
incoherent with the ideology of competitive capitalism. Empirically, by studying diverse 
socio economic structures of the Philippines and Malaysia, the article provides an 
exposition of recent infrastructure projects done through state dealings with capital 
as part of, or in relation to, neoliberal policies of privatization and liberalization which 
have been embroiled in controversies over graft and corruption practices involving 
sections of domestic elites and transnational capital. It shows the realpolitik of the 
elite-driven and conflict-ridden constitution of capital accumulation in emerging 
economies of Southeast Asia. Specifically, the empirical cases offer insights into 
the common pervasive themes of “elite capture” and “elite conflicts” that mutually 
constitute Southeast Asia’s evolving political economy of development.
The evolving shape of capitalist development in diverse socio-political and economic 
formations in Southeast Asia is bewilderingly complex. Unpacking this complexity involves 
an appreciation of an array of complementary, intersecting, or conflicting interests that 
constitute processes of neoliberalization. Essential to this analytical endeavour is the 
need to investigate how and why domestic and international elites as dominant class and 
social forces mediate, negotiate, promote, or resist neoliberalization processes. A critical 
understanding of this dynamic requires an interrogation of ‘competitive capitalism’– 
1 This article is based in part on the author’s doctoral dissertation. Updates on the two case studies presented here, together with other case 
studies, were presented in different academic occasions. The author is particularly grateful to colleagues and participants at the Asian Dynamics 
Initiative Conference in Copenhagen in October 2014 and the Seventh South-South Institute in Bangkok in November 2014 for their feedback 
and advice that have importantly contributed to the refinement of the ideas and arguments in this study. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 Bonn Juego is a Filipino researcher on the global political economy of development and currently Postdoctoral Researcher in Development and 
International Cooperation at the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Finland. Email: bonn.juego@jyu.fi.
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which is a system and culture of competition where no particular faction of the capitalist 
class is feared or favoured in economic activities –as the ideal-type neoliberal reform, 
and a recognition of the realpolitik of conflicting elite vested interests in shaping a specific 
capitalist structure.
A couple of objectives are set out in this article – both of which are expected to 
contribute to the study of the contemporary political economy of Southeast Asia. The 
first objective is to illuminate the question of agency as it interacts with the structural 
evolution of capitalist development. In doing so, it shows the structure-agency dynamics 
in the historical process of social change. It makes an argument that the process of 
neoliberalization is greatly shaped, yet intrinsically constrained, by its dependence on 
elite interests. By taking into consideration the impediments that stand in the way of 
neoliberalization, the process is examined vis-à-vis the social and material conditions in 
which it is deployed. Thus, the analysis here is not only critical of structural determinism, 
nor merely based on voluntarist interpretations, but it takes into account the social and 
political contexts in which the reproduction of neoliberalism takes place. Central to this 
is an understanding of the ways in which neoliberal policies and global accumulation 
mechanisms have been adapted, modified, or challenged given the historical particularities 
and circumstances of social relations at the domestic level. The second objective is 
to highlight another reality – one that is within social conflict theory – in Southeast 
Asian elite dynamics, apart from the already established studies on ‘political-business 
alliances’ (Gomez, 2002) and ‘interlocking elites’ (Case, 1996, 2003). The aim here is to 
demonstrate that while there have been alliances and interlocking interests among elites 
in specific regimes for purposes of political stability and economic accumulation, there 
are also conflicts among vested interests particularly in the neoliberalization process. 
To achieve both objectives, the discussions presented in this article have empirical 
and theoretical implications for an understanding of capitalist development in Southeast 
Asia. In empirical terms, the article provides an exposition of recent infrastructure 
projects planned, initiated and done through state dealings with capital as part of, or in 
relation to, neoliberal policies and market reform initiatives which have been embroiled 
in controversies and allegations of graft and corruption involving factions of domestic 
elites and transnational capital. Its purpose is to show the elite-driven and conflict-
ridden constitution of capital accumulation in emerging economies of Southeast Asia. 
Specifically, the empirical cases for both the Philippines and Malaysia give insights 
into the common pervasive themes of ‘elite capture’ and ‘elite conflicts’ that mutually 
constitute Southeast Asian neoliberalization processes. Elite capture means the 
usurpation, utilization, or appropriation of the neoliberalization process – as well as the 
neoliberalism ideology – by local and transnational elite, to secure and advance their 
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interests in the accumulation of wealth and power. Elite conflicts refer to the struggle, 
scramble, competition, contention, dispute or rivalry between (inter-) and among (intra-) 
the dominant political and economic classes in pursuit of their particularistic interests 
in the accumulation opportunities opened up and made available by a neoliberalizing 
capitalist regime. For the Philippines, the case studied is: 
 [i]  the NAIA-3 disputes (Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 3): the multi-
million US dollar long-running investment disputes between, on the one hand, 
the Philippine government and, on the other, a joint venture of a Philippine group 
of Filipino-Chinese business people (PIATCO - Philippine International Airport 
Terminals Corporation) and Germany’s Fraport AG.
For Malaysia, the case examined is:
 [ii]  the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ) fiasco: a multi-billion ringgit scandal that is 
arguably Malaysia’s biggest corruption case regarding the dubious purchase of 
the 1,000-acre land area and its development as an integrated commercial and 
industrial free zone in Port Klang.
These cases and issues have been chosen as concrete examples to show elite 
dynamics in contemporary Southeast Asian capitalism for two interconnected reasons: 
firstly, they are related to the neoliberalization process which have ramifications for the 
principles and policy of neoliberalism; and secondly, they have taken the centre stage 
of public debate since the beginning of 21st century capitalism in the Philippines and 
Malaysia. Hence, all these controversial issues reveal various dimensions of conflicting 
elite relations in the process of neoliberalization in their scramble for capital accumulation. 
To this end, the flow of discussion of the empirical cases proceeds as follows: first, it 
delineates the context of the cases which situates their association with, or relationship 
to, the respective neoliberal reform efforts and neoliberalization processes in the 
Philippines and Malaysia; second, it identifies conflicting agents and their interests in 
particular projects with a focus on their involvement in the controversies and, as such, in 
the conflictive neoliberalizing accumulation regime; and third, it highlights the important 
points of conflict that inform and give essential inference about the particularities of 
capitalist development with emphasis on the conflicts in, and contradictions of, the 
neoliberalization processes in Southeast Asia.  
In terms of theory, the discussions in this article have implications for a number 
of theories on neoliberal globalization, capitalist development and social change, 
particularly on Southeast Asian capitalist regimes. One, it challenges the hyperglobalist 
thesis that sees globalization as a seamless process completely dominated by global 
market forces. Two, it questions the class and economic determinism in some elements 
Elite Capture and Elite Conflicts in Southeast Asian Neoliberalization Processes
Inequality, Democracy and Development under Neoliberalism and Beyond 71
of ‘vulgar Marxism’. And three, it reifies the assumptions of social conflict theory in the 
specific accumulation regimes of the Philippines and Malaysia.
The following discussions examine concrete empirical cases depicting the dynamics 
of elite interests vis-à-vis the evolution of the peculiarly neoliberalizing accumulation 
regimes of the Philippines and Malaysia respectively. Based on these cases, the final 
section concludes with emphases on comparing and contrasting elite dynamics in 
specific accumulation regimes of Malaysia and the Philippines, characterized by different 
political-economic power structures and institutions.
Case in the Philippines: The NAIA-3 Dispute
Context
The controversies surrounding the NAIA-3 issue is symptomatic of a neoliberalization 
process in the Philippines undertaken through public-private partnership that is ridden 
with conflicts involving, notably, governments, foreign and local investors, domestic 
judicial institutions, and international arbitration institutions. It is about the nettlesome 
disputes between vested interests in connection with the construction of a public utility, 
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA-3). This long standing 
political-economic and legal quagmire spans all post-Marcos administrations – basically, 
ever since the country has embarked on neoliberal policies.
During the presidency of Corazon Aquino in 1989, the Department of Transportation 
and Communications (DOTC) hired the expertise of Aéroport de Paristo conduct 
a comprehensive study of the condition of Manila’s primary airport, to recommend 
developments needed for future growth of traffic and to come up with a preliminary 
design for a new passenger terminal. In 1993, six Chinese-Filipino tycoons – namely, 
John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun, Henry Sy Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty, and Alfonso 
Yuchengco – met with then President Fidel Ramos to express their investment interest in 
the construction and operation of a new airport terminal. These tycoons then incorporated 
the Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC), and submitted an unsolicited proposal 
under the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) law for the construction of a new airport 
terminal (the NAIA-3) to the government, through the DOTC and the Manila International 
Airport Authority (MIAA). The DOTC endorsed the AEDC proposal to the National 
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), which then approved the project (see 
Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2003, 2004). 
In 1994, the DOTC formed the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) 
to subject AEDC’s approved proposal to competitive bidding, and invite comparative 
proposals from alternative bidders. Another prospective bidder, People’s Air Cargo 
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& Warehousing Co., Inc. (PAIRCARGO), a joint venture of local and foreign investors 
competed for the NAIA-3 project. In the end, PBAC awarded the project to the PAIRCARGO 
Consortium. AEDC filed a court petition to nullify the bidding proceedings, specifically 
questioning PBAC’s decision on the bases of, among others: one, PAIRCARGO’s actual 
(rather than potential) financial capability; and two, the inclusion or appointment of foreign 
corporations for its prequalification bid (i.e. Germany-based companies Siemens and 
Lufthansa as contractor and facility operator, respectively), which violates the Philippine 
constitutional requirement of majority Filipino owned and controlled enterprises for the 
operation of a public utility. Eventually, however, AEDC had not proceeded with the case 
and the contract was awarded to PAIRCARGO.
In 1997, PAIRCARGO Consortium incorporated into PIATCO and entered into a 
‘Concession Agreement’ with the Philippine government – through the MIAA and DOTC 
– for the build-operate-and-transfer arrangement of the NAIA-3. As a build-operate-
transfer scheme, the government gave PIATCO the franchise to build, operate, and 
maintain NAIA-3 – including the collection of fees, rentals, and other charges – during 
the concession period of 25 years. After the concession period, which is also renewable 
for a maximum of 25 years, NAIA-3 shall be transferred to the Philippine government’s 
MIAA.
PIATCO and its German partner Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide 
(Fraport) started building NAIA-3 in 1997 and planned to finish the construction in 2002. 
While the NAIA-3 contract with PIATCO-Fraport was completed during the Ramos 
administration, the contract has been considered one of the biggest cases of corruption 
in the succeeding administrations of Joseph Estrada and Gloria Arroyo. The Estrada 
administration made amendments to the contract in late 1998. This ‘Amended and 
Restated Concession Agreement’was regarded to be even more disadvantageous to 
the government that “allegedly gave PIATCO much bigger revenues” – which included 
contract terms “for PIATCO to collect terminal fees in US dollars while remitting 
government share in pesos, which would allow PIATCO to profit from the local currency’s 
depreciation; the state’s effective guarantee on PIATCO’s loans, making it a risk-free 
borrower; and the scrapping of PIATCO’s obligation to build underground tunnels to 
connect the three terminals, which would have cost it [PHP] 700 million” (Tiglao, 2011). 
The Arroyo administration, which came to power with an anti-corruption mandate upon 
the ouster of the short-lived Estrada administration, was also embroiled in the NAIA-3 
corruption scandal. As Arroyo’s former presidential spokesperson and presidential chief 
of staff, RigobertoTiglao (2011), himself has noted: “Rumours circulated that PIATCO 
was able to quickly involve in their project powerful personalities in the new government 
of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.”This is thus contrary to the promise made by 
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President Arroyo early on her presidency when she announced the cancellation of the 
NAIA-3 contract in November 2002 upon the recognition that the NAIA-3 issue is “a test 
case of [her] administration’s commitment to fight corruption to rid … [the] state from the 
hold of any vested interest” and upon the determination of the Solicitor General and the 
Department of Justice “that all five agreements covering the NAIA Terminal 3, most of 
which were contracted in the previous administration, are null and void” (Supreme Court 
of the Philippines, 2003: fn. 5).
As President Arroyo proclaimed that her administration would not honour the NAIA-
3 contracts, PIATCO sought arbitration proceedings before the Singapore-based 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in March 2003. This move of PIATCO to 
recoup its investments was just the beginning of the long-running convoluted conflicts 
over the NAIA-3 project, broadly involving an alliance of transnational and domestic 
business elite (PIATCO-Fraport joint venture) versus the government (Republic of the 
Philippines). 
Conflicting Agents
Under ideal conditions of a competitive market economy, the joint venture of PIATCO 
(the Philippine group led by the Chinese-Filipino air cargo magnate Vic Cheng Yong) 
and Fraport AG (Germany’s international airport company) winning against the proposal 
of AEDC (the conglomerate of Chinese-Filipino tycoons) in the bidding of the NAIA-3 
project, would have been the start of a promising public-private partnership and the 
key to the PIATCO-Fraport joint venture’s opportunity to amass profits to be guaranteed 
by state institutions. However, due to the irregularities and illegalities surrounding the 
contents as well as the proceedings in the awarding of the contracts, this post-bidding 
award of contract was only the outset of protracted conflicts in the highly contentious 
domestic and international accumulation regimes.
Several members of the House of Representatives, labour unions, and private 
citizens filed a petition in the Supreme Court to prohibit the Philippine government from 
implementing its concession agreement with PIATCO-Fraport. These petitioners mainly 
argued that the agreement directly contravened provisions of the constitution and the 
BOT Law (see Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2003). In its 5 May 2003 decision, the 
Court found merit in the arguments of the petitioners that the five contracts awarded by 
the Philippine government to PIATCO to construct, operate and maintain NAIA-3 were 
null and void ab initio because of violations of the country’sconstitution, laws, bidding 
rules and public policy. PIATCO appealed this ruling for reconsideration but the Supreme 
Court denied it with finality in 2004.
In fact, the Supreme Court decision has interpreted and enforced what business 
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relations, as well as the rights and obligations between the state and the private sector, 
under conditions of competitive capitalism, should mean within the institutional framework 
of the Philippine constitution. Firstly, in deciding that PIATCO was not a qualified bidder, 
the court has emphasized the importance of complying with the rules of public bidding:
The basic rule in public bidding is that bids should be evaluated 
based on the required documents submitted before and not after the 
opening of bids. Otherwise, the foundation of a fair and competitive 
public bidding would be defeated. Strict observance of the rules, 
regulations and guidelines of the bidding process is the only 
safeguard to a fair, honest and competitive public bidding.
(Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2003)
Secondly, in nullifying the 1997 Concession Agreement, the court explains the logic of 
honest and transparent public bidding which benefits competitive firms and which must 
secure the advantage of the state: 
Public bidding is a standard practice for procuring government contracts 
for public service and for furnishing supplies and other materials. It 
aims to secure for the government the lowest possible price under 
the most favourable terms and conditions, to curtail favouritism in the 
award of government contracts and avoid suspicion of anomalies, and 
it places all bidders on equal footing. Any government action which 
permits any substantial variance between the conditions under 
which the bids are invited and the contract executed after the 
award thereof is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack 
or excess of jurisdiction which warrants proper judicial action.
(Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2003)
Thirdly, in prohibiting contract provisions on direct government guarantees on public-
private partnerships, the court has upheld the original intention of privatization in the 
BOT Law with regard to the duties and responsibilities of the private sector and the 
government – specifically, the formula for the government not to spend but earn, while 
the private sector spends and earns:
To declare the PIATCO contracts valid despite the clear statutory 
prohibition against a direct government guarantee would not only 
make a mockery of what the BOT Law seeks to prevent – which is to 
expose the government to the risk of incurring a monetary obligation 
resulting from a contract of loan between the project proponent and 
its lenders and to which the government is not a party to – but would 
also render the BOT law useless for what it seeks to achieve – to make 
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use of the resources of the private sector in the “financing, operation 
and maintenance of infrastructure and development projects” which 
are necessary for national growth and development but which the 
government, unfortunately, could ill-afford to finance at this point in 
time. (Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2003)
Fourthly, in denying PIATCO’s demand for payment from the government, the court 
has justified and asserted the constitutional right of the state to temporarily take over a 
business with public interest:
PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the 
Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and 
obligate the government to pay “reasonable cost for the use of 
the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.” Article XII, Section 17 of 
the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the exigencies 
of the times necessitate the government to “temporarily take over or 
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business 
affected with public interest.” It is the welfare and interest of the public 
which is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not 
to temporarily take over a particular business.  Clearly, the State in 
effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police power. Police 
power is the “most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers.” 
Its exercise, therefore, must not be unreasonably hampered, nor its 
exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the absence 
of damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus, requiring the 
government to pay reasonable compensation for the reasonable use 
of the property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes 
the Constitution. (Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2003)
And finally, in addition to the decision to declare the contracts awarded to PIATCO 
null and void, the Court has underscored in its final ruling the obligation of the Philippine 
state to regulate monopolies for the interest of the public:
Section 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the 
State prohibit or regulate monopolies when public interest so requires. 
Monopolies are not per se prohibited. Given its susceptibility to abuse, 
however, the State has the bounden duty to regulate monopolies to 
protect public interest. Such regulation may be called for, especially 
in sensitive areas such as the operation of the country’s premier 
international airport, considering the public interest at stake.
By virtue of the PIATCO contracts, NAIA IPT III would be the only 
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international passenger airport operating in the Island of Luzon…. 
Undeniably, the contracts would create a monopoly in the operation 
of an international commercial passenger airport at the NAIA in favour 
of PIATCO.
The grant to respondent PIATCO of the exclusive right to operate 
NAIA IPT III should not exempt it from regulation by the government. 
The government has the right, indeed the duty, to protect the interest 
of the public. Part of this duty is to assure that respondent PIATCO’s 
exercise of its right does not violate the legal rights of third parties. 
(Supreme Court of the Philippines, 2004)
For the operation of a public facility like an airport, Article XII on national economy and 
patrimony of the Philippine Constitution mandates the granting of franchise, certificate, 
or any other form of authorization to Filipino citizens and to majority (i.e. at least 60 per 
cent) Filipino-owned corporations. This constitutional provision is in consonance with 
the long-established ‘protectionist’ Anti-Dummy Law of the Philippines that prohibits 
Filipinos to be used as mere fronts of foreign capital and that prohibits foreign investors 
to intervene in the management and operation in the governing body of any public utility 
enterprise.
President Arroyo, citing the investigation and recommendations of the Solicitor 
General and Justice Department, voided the government’s contracts with PIATCO in 
2002. But since NAIA-3 was by then almost completely built (i.e. around 90 per cent 
complete), at the cost of USD 565 million, PIATCO asked the government to pay for its 
construction expenses. The government thus initiated expropriation proceedings in a 
regional trial court to determine the amount and the rightful recipients of compensation. 
In addition to PIATCO, some subcontractors like the Japanese Takenaka Corporation 
and its subsidiary Asahi Kosan Co.Ltd also demanded just compensation.
Various Philippine government institutions– the Senate, House of Representatives, 
Office of the Ombudsman, and the Anti-Money Laundering Council– conducted 
investigations on bribery and corruption activities that shrouded the awarding of the NAIA-
3 contract and its implementation. Criminal cases were filed before the Sandiganbayan, 
the anti-graft court, against PIATCO executives and Fraport’s German representatives 
in Manila – an instance which is “perhaps the first time or one of the rare occasions that 
anti-graft cases were filed against foreign investors” (Rimando, 2011: 36). 
The decision of the Philippine executive branch and the Supreme Court to nullify and 
cancel the government’s concession agreement and contracts with PIATCO-Fraport 
triggered a series of costly state-investor arbitrations. In 2003, PIATCO initiated arbitration 
against the Philippine government at the Singapore-based International Chamber of 
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Commerce (ICC), an international commercial dispute resolution organization, for breach 
of concession agreements; and its foreign investor partner, Fraport, requested arbitration 
from the Washington-based International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), an institution created by the World Bank. Both suits claimed a combined 
payment of over USD 1 billion.
The ICC International Court of Arbitration, in its 22 July 2010 decision, denied 
PIATCO’s reimbursement claim from the Philippine government amounting to USD 565 
million because the company violated the country’s Anti-Dummy Law. PIATCO then 
appealed this decision, but on 10 May 2011 the ICC issued a final award in favour of 
the Philippine government. In the final decision, PIATCO is directed to pay the Philippine 
government 25 per cent of the reasonable costs of the ICC Arbitration.
After PIATCO’s setbacks at the ICC, the company asked the High Court of Singapore 
to reverse ICC’s arbitral award to the Philippine government. PIATCO argued that the ICC 
tribunal misapplied the Philippine’s Anti-Dummy Law and failed to accord due process 
to the company’s complaint. On its 15 November 2011 decision, the High Court of 
Singapore upheld the ICC’s decision that PIATCO committed an illegality in the NAIA-
3 contracts and ruled that it was unconvinced of PIATCO’s arguments, and as such 
denied the company’s compensation claims (Office of the Solicitor General, 2011).
While PIATCO’s suits against the Philippine government filed before the ICC and the 
High Court of Singapore have already been dismissed with finality, Fraport’s case against 
the Philippine government at ICSID was not yet closed as of 2014. The dispute at ICSID 
was based on two international agreements: [a] the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments effective 1 February 2000, and [b] 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States effective 14 October 1966 (the ICSID Convention).
ICSID accepted Fraport’s request for arbitration on 9 October 2003, which was 
registered as Case No. ARB/03/25. On 16 August 2007, the majority of the tribunal–with 
one dissenting opinion– made a decision to dismiss claims of Fraport for compensation 
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the finding that Fraport’s investment is not covered 
within the scope of BIT because it did not comply with the Philippine’s Anti-Dummy 
and other laws. Fraport then appealed to ICSID to annul this award to the Philippine 
government. On 23 December 2010, an ad hoc Committee in ICSID granted the petition 
of Fraport to annul the earlier decision that favoured the Philippine government. Following 
this annulment decision, Fraport again filed a request for arbitration on 30 March 2011, 
which was then registered by the Secretary-General of ICSID and assigned a new case 
number ARB/11/12. The Philippine government objected to these actions of Fraport to 
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file a new dispute and of ICSID to register it with a new case number. On May 2011, the 
Philippine government and Fraport agreed on the appointment of three new arbitrators, 
and by February 2012 the tribunal of arbitrator-judges was formed by the Italian Piero 
Bernardini (president), Bulgarian Stanimir Alexandrov (Fraport appointee), and Dutch 
Albert Jan van den Berg (Philippine government appointee).
The Government of Germany, Europe’s largest economy, finds it imperative to defend 
the interest of Fraport, whose majority shareholders are two state entities. The NAIA-
3 controversy can thus be construed to have direct bearing on diplomatic, trade and 
investment relations of the Philippines with Germany, as well as the European Union. The 
then German Ambassador to the Philippines, Christian-Ludwig Weber-Lortsch, proposed 
a “peaceful settlement” of the issue. He recommended that the Philippine government 
pay Fraport a reasonable compensation. But while this proposal seems appropriate, as 
former Philippine Chief Justice ArtemioPanganiban (2011a) has opined, “the devil lies 
in the details – how much a sum can be considered ‘reasonable’; and to whom is how 
much payable … has been the crux of this controversy from the beginning”.
From the rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the High Court of 
Singapore to the decisions of the international arbitration institutions ICC and ICSID, the 
Philippine government prevails over PIATCO-Fraport joint venture. However, the earlier 
order of President Arroyo to file an expropriation case – which is based on the principle 
of “eminent domain” that allows the state to buy private property for public use – before 
a regional trial court has, in effect, burdened the Philippine government the obligation to 
pay “just compensation” to PIATCO. Accordingly, “the expropriation case succeeded in 
weakening the government’s right to take over the facility with little or no payment” to 
the claimant PIATCO, which was found by the Supreme Court to have violated, among 
others, the Anti-Dummy Law, when its foreign investor Germany’s Fraport AG increased 
direct and indirect ownership to 61.44 per cent – thus becoming the consortium’s majority 
shareholder (Rimando 2011: 40; see also Supreme Court of the Philippines 2003). The 
former chair of the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission, Perfecto Yasay, has 
defined well the irony in the expropriation proceedings: that while the two arbitral cases 
in ICC and ICSID were dismissed “on the findings of graft and corruption participated 
in by both Fraport and PIATCO”, these expropriation proceedings over the NAIA-3 
“purposely instituted by the government to cover up the anomalies that accompanied 
the BOT project” (Yasay 2010). Moreover, as a consequence of the expropriation of 
NAIA-3, “PIATCO can still be paid a staggering compensation approximating [USD] 1.1 
billion because PIATCO is deemed the owner of the property when, in fact, it is not” 
(Yasay, 2010). A related unresolved issue in this expropriation case is the mysterious 
killing of the regional trial court’s presiding judge, HenrickGingoyon, and a Philippine 
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government lawyer, Assistant Solicitor General Nestor Ballacillo (Panganiban, 2011b).
Interestingly, while the conceivable burdensome effect on the Philippine state of 
the expropriation proceedings for PIATCO appears to be a threat for now, the revival 
and prolongation of Fraport’s case at the ICSID puts on the Philippine state’s coffers 
increasingly onerous legal expenses. In this regard, lawyers can also be viewed as 
central actors in the conflicts in the general neoliberalization process. For seven years 
since the legal battles started, it is estimated that the Philippine government has already 
spent around PHP 2 billion (or USD 50 million) as legal costs for private lawyers – 
specifically, a pioneering international law firm, White & Case, based in Washington DC 
– hired by MIAA through the government’s counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, to 
represent the republic in local and international judicial bodies (Rimando, 2011; Tiglao, 
2011; Panganiban, 2011b). These legal costs have negatively impacted not only the 
improvement of the public utility but also the overall government’s revenues and hence 
social services. 
Points of Conflict
Reflections upon the NAIA-3 saga can certainly provide important lessons for policy 
and institutional reforms. At the same time, it unravels the internal contradictions in the 
ideology of neoliberalism itself, particularly in the aspect where the normative logic of 
competitiveness has been falsified by the very ‘rationality’ of elites to act on the basis 
of their political-economic interests – in a word, behaviours and actions that do not 
necessarily follow the rules of free market capitalism. Importantly, the issue depicts an 
empirical manifestation of conflicts in the relations between elites within the process of 
neoliberalization whereby public-private partnership has gone awry, and the elements of 
trust and shared interests in a purportedly political-business alliance has been ruptured.
First, the NAIA-3 controversy has evolved from a simple bidding competition between 
local investors to a network of conflicts involving states and transnational capital, as 
well as domestic and international judicial institutions. It spawned an inter-elite conflict 
between, on the one hand, the PIATCO-Fraport alliance of local-foreign investors and, on 
the other, the Philippine state executives, legislature, and courts. International arbitration 
institutions (ICC and ICSID) and ‘external’ judicial bodies (High Court of Singapore) also 
factor in ostensibly, not on smoothly settling investment disputes, but on a tangled web 
of interest assertions and claims.
Second, the NAIA-3 case illustrates the structural contradictions in the logic and 
process of accumulation under conditions of neoliberal globalization: that is, the conflict 
between the national sovereignty of states and the global strategy of capital. Investor-
state dispute resolution provisions in trade agreements do not only confer greater legal 
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rights to foreign investors than domestic businesses, but such mechanism fundamentally 
encroaches on state sovereignty. International trade and investment regimes have given 
corporations the right to sue governments. However, governments cannot be entirely 
written off in enforcing capitalism’s accumulation agenda simply because governments 
have jurisdiction over accumulation issues at the level of states which intrinsically 
implicate the public sphere. While there seems to be an increasing conception that 
the accumulation strategy of the capitalist class operating in a globalizing world have 
become transnational and extra-terrestrial, the reality is that accumulation per se, 
particularly production and money, continues to be materially embedded in territoriality 
and ideationally tied to questions of legitimacy.
Third, the NAIA-3 mess reveals a conflict in the neoliberalization process between 
the idea of competitiveness and the practical concerns of private investors. The logic of 
competitiveness in neoliberalism not only demands states to compete with each other 
and observe free market competition, but it also compels firms and the private sector 
to be competitive. However, the graft and corrupt practices in the illegal awarding of 
contract to PIATCO is not only suggestive of the well-known susceptibility of government 
officials to corruption, but also of a firm’s tendency to avoid transaction costs by resorting 
to building alliances with state functionaries through bribery. In other words, the case has 
shown how a firm’s strategy in pursuit of its accumulation interest may include the tactic 
of bribing government decision-makers and power brokers so as to avoid costly market 
competition.
Fourth, the NAIA-3 debacle reveals the conflict in the neoliberal policy of privatization 
through public-private partnership within the BOT scheme. BOT promises a private 
sector-led accumulation regime that spares the state the financial burden of constructing 
and running public utilities. In the case of the amended BOT contract with sovereign 
guarantee provisions for NAIA-3 construction and management, the Philippine 
government is being made to guarantee PIATCO’s obligations to its contractors, 
suppliers, and creditors. Moreover, as evident in the demands of PIATCO-Fraport for 
just compensation petitioned before local courts and international tribunals despite their 
business transactions done in bad faith, the Philippine state finds itself absorbing – or 
being pressured to absorb –the risks and costs of failures of both the BOT project and 
the market itself.
Case in Malaysia: The PKFZ Fiasco
Context
The Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ) fiasco has been considered one of the biggest 
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corruption scandals in the history of Malaysia involving big fish in the country’s political 
arena and government institutions. The planned development of PKFZ was envisioned 
to emulate the success story of Jebel Ali Free Zone in Dubai, which was established 
in 1985 and currently recognized as the leading business hub in the Middle East. The 
PKFZ project, however, has turned into, arguably, the most scandalous financial fiasco in 
Malaysia that could have cost the country’s taxpayers around MYR 12.5 billion in losses. 
But there is also a deeper dimension being revealed in this issue about the unfolding 
behaviour of elites vis-à-vis the neoliberalization process in Malaysia’s political economy. 
It is about the tendential nature of entrenched domestic elitesto appropriate surplus in 
the name of liberalization and ‘free market’.
PKFZ is a regional industrial park with 1,000-acre land area located along the Straits 
of Malacca in Port Klang. As its name suggests, the area is declared a ‘free zone’ 
for supply chain management of a specific cluster of exports-oriented manufacturing 
industries and commerce, where the principles and practices of free markets, free 
trade, free competition, free movement of goods and labour, and full foreign ownership 
of enterprises are supposedly observed. It is one of Malaysia’s largest integrated free 
zones for industrial and commercial activities whose operations are sanctioned by 
the Free Zones Act of 1990 and the Ministry of Finance to promote entrepôt trade of 
manufacturing companies, where importation of raw materials and other production 
inputs is duty free and the exportation of manufactured goods is facilitated through 
minimal customs formalities. Hence, the neoliberal policy of liberalization is to guide the 
economic activities of production and exchange in the area.
Port Klang became a free trade zone in 1993 as part of the government policy of 
making it a national load centre and a regional transhipment hub within the medium and 
longer term government’s privatization master plan consistent with the growth strategies 
of the Sixth Malaysia Plan for 1990-1995 and further outlined in the Seventh Malaysia 
Plan for 1996-2000. By 1998, despite these plans and the infrastructure facilities for 
trading offered by the port, more than a third of Malaysia’s external trade amounting to 
hundreds of billions of ringgit continued to use Singapore ports. In its desire to capture 
market share, which would entail the reduction of trade diversion to Singapore, the 
Malaysian government aimed to improve Port Klang’s status as a regional port hub 
(see Tull and Reveley, 2002). Part of this vision was to make Port Klang a cost-effective 
alternative to Singapore and China for shipping companies servicing the Asian market. 
On 24 March 1999, the Malaysian Cabinet approved the project to boost and develop 
PKFZ as the country’s leading container port to be facilitated by the Ministry of Transport 
(MOT), Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Port Klang Authority (PKA). MOF then made a 
directive for the compulsory acquisition of land for the PKFZ and recommended that the 
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development cost be self-financed through PKA’s issuance of government guaranteed 
bonds.
PKA is supposed to be the government’s specifically designated regulatory institution 
to facilitate market operations in a neoliberalized economic area of Port Klang with 
privatized facilities and liberalized trading operations. As a statutory body created under 
the Port Authorities Act of 1963, PKA is planner, developer, regulator, facilitator, manager, 
and the state mandated authority in the free economic zone of Port Klang. However, the 
narrative about the involvement of the political-bureaucratic elites with official functions 
and responsibilities in PKA, in connection with the scandal surrounding the development 
of the PKFZ project, depicts the case of a regulatory institution deciding and acting to 
the disadvantage of the government, to the distortion of free markets and to the benefit 
of the vested interests of a few personalities.
Conflicting Agents 
The PKFZ scandal is a complex case that, as of 2014 – i.e. seven years since official 
investigations and public curiosity commenced – continued to reveal the money trail of 
corruption. Nevertheless, powerful domestic political-business elites are being implicated 
in the case and tried in the courts. Private and government institutions have also been 
included in the conflicts. Political opposition groups, civil society, the media, as well as 
whistle-blowers within the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition and state agencies have 
elevated public awareness of this high profile corruption scandal which encompasses 
the successive BN-dominated governments of Mahathir Mohamad, Abdullah Badawi, 
and NajibRazak.
In 2001, PKA signed a memorandum of understanding with Dubai-based Jebel Ali 
Free Zone International (JAFZI) to conceptualize, develop and market the PKFZ project. 
PKA later on appointed JAFZI as operator and manager of PKFZ for a period of 15 years, 
and PKA also commissioned JAFZI to draft a Master Plan and Market Assessment 
Studies, which was completed in December 2004. However, PKA’s agreement with this 
international private firm JAFZI, or the planned PKA-JAFZI joint venture, got into conflict 
with PKA’s parallel negotiations with a local private company, Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd 
(KDSB). On 12 November 2002, PKA purchased the land in Pulau Indah for the port’s 
development from KDSB for MYR 1.08 billion, repayable in 15 years at 7.5 per cent per 
annum interest. At the same time this land acquisition deal was made, PKA made a 
separate agreement to engage the same private company, KDSB, as developer for the 
first 400 acres of the port amounting to MYR 350 million. For the period 2003-2006, 
PKA made a series of supplemental agreements and additional development works on a 
turnkey basis with KDSB, whose scope of work had expanded from 400 acres to the full 
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1,000 acres in a single phase. The total project outlay in all these PKA agreements with 
KDSB escalated from MYR 1.957 billion to MYR 4.947 billion, which includes interests of 
7.5 per cent per annum and deferred payments (see PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009).
PKA has been accused of giving dubious favours to KDSB, which sold the land to 
the government in the first instance, and then awarded the development contracts in 
the absence of open tenders. KDSB also started the infrastructure work in January 
2003 – that is, two months immediately after signing the contract with PKA (November 
2002), and about two years even before the finalized Master Plan from JAFZI was issued 
(December 2004). All these development contracts and construction agreements were 
awarded to KDSB with only cost estimates, without the detailed specifications on building 
plans, especially for a turnkey infrastructure project. Moreover, the appointment of a 
quantity surveyor, the QS4 Consortium (comprised of Peruding BE Sdn Bhd, Jurukur 
Bahan H&A, ASA-CM Jurukur Bahan Sdn Bhd, and RK Partnership), came nine months 
after KDSB’s construction work had begun. PKA carried on these dealings with KDSB 
despite constant advisory and recommendation from the Auditor General which, in 2004, 
made an initial assessment of PKA’s insufficient and unstable financial resources to meet 
its obligations for the project and which, for the period 2005-2007, urged PKA to look for 
financial sources to be able to meet its capital obligations to contractors and developers.
At the first scheduled payment in 2007, PKA resorted to secure a 20-year soft loan of 
MYR 4.632 billion from the Finance Ministry because it was not able to meet its financial 
obligations to KDSB. Interest cost for this loan would result in a total outlay of MYR 
7.453 billion. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), a multinational consulting firm, projected 
that if this soft loan would not be restructured, it might lead to default in 2012 and/or to 
a total project outlay of MYR 12.453 billion.
KDSB has virtually held PKA hostage for its business operations on PKFZ development, 
in which risks and costs are passed on to the government and its taxpayers. The private 
company was the one who sold land to PKA on overpriced rates; at the same time, 
it assumed to become the main contractor for the project’s ambitious plans – where 
the free port is to be developed in a single stage rather than in phases – without any 
public biddings or open tenders. This unscrupulous arrangement would result in cost 
overruns in both land acquisition and development expenditures amounting to MYR 4.9 
billion, which is about five times PKA’s estimated MYR 1 billion sustainable debt level 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009).
PKFZ had its soft opening on November 2006. Afterwards, on July 2007, PKA 
terminated JAFZI’s services. Reports point to a turf war within the PKA-JAFZI 
partnership where the international firm, JAFZI, was complaining about problems 
in the joint venture such as “bureaucracy, interference by politicians and others with 
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vested interests, deliberate incorrect minuting of meetings and even attempts at tax 
evasion by the Malaysian negotiators” (Nadeswaran, 2009). Signs of the acrimonious 
relationship between PKA and JAFZI included the interrogation – if not harassment – 
made by Malaysia’s Immigration Department on JAFZI’s representative, Noel Gulliver, an 
Australian citizen who was himself the free port zone’s managing director.
The termination of the agreement between PKA and JAFZI raised serious policy 
concerns that led the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the Malaysian Parliament on 
August 2007 to inquire about the PKFZ project, to ascertain whether adequate funding 
or bailout could be provided by the government to fix the problem. PAC’s inquiry, which 
was chaired by Shahrir Abdul Samad of the dominant party, United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO), elicited a variety of controversial issues that resulted in a profound 
investigation of the PKFZ imbroglio which implicated elite personalities from government 
institutions and private firms. A particular finding of PAC was the unusual arrangement in 
the public-private partnership contract to develop PKFZ where a government guarantee 
provision obliges the state to bond holders on papers, which were issued by the private 
company KDSB itself. Even though PAC’s mandate is limited to a legislative inquiry, 
its findings formed the bases for the ensuing administrative and criminal charges filed 
against public officials and private individuals. 
One of the first government officials to be summoned by PAC was former PKA 
general manager, Paduka O.C. Phang, who also served as chair of the PKFZ board of 
directors. PAC sought an explanation from Phanga bout the financial procedure and 
transactions in connection with the development of the PKFZ project, since she was 
responsible for the PKA funds, including disbursement, in RHB Bank from 2001 to 2006. 
Former Transport Minister Chan Kong Choy was also invited in the parliament, but he 
consistently denied allegations of improprieties in the deal and seemed to prevaricate 
over pointed and sensitive questions, especially from opposition parliamentarians. As 
a result of the parliamentary investigations, PAC recommended to the Malaysian Anti-
Corruption Commission and the police to investigate Phang and Chan for criminal 
breach of trust.
The PKFZ scandal became a main issue during the 8 March 2008 general elections. 
It particularly put BN’s coalition ally, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), in the 
hot seat. MCA is the party which has controlled the Transport Ministry and whose 
leaders have been chairpersons of PKA since 1989. The corruption issue has arguably 
contributed to the lacklustre performance of the Abdullah-led BN electoral coalition. 
Likewise, the unfolding PKFZ controversy represented, as well as deepened, intra-elite 
conflicts, whereby MCA party members themselves were the ones who made public 
exposés of the anomalies done by their partymates in the MCA-controlled PKA and 
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Transport Ministry. 
On October 2008, then PKA’s newly-appointed Chairman, Lee Hwa Beng (who is an 
MCA party member) and General Manager Lim Thean Shiang (who is Phang’s successor) 
engaged the services of PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory Services Sdn Bhd, based in 
Kuala Lumpur, to come up with a position review of the PKFZ project and the corporation 
itself, the Port Klang Free Zone Sdn Bhd. The PwC audit report was made public on 
May 2009, and it effectively heightened public consciousness about the MYR 12.5 billion 
PKFZ scandal involving influential public officials making deals and decisions that betray 
public trust and the nation’s interest. Notwithstanding the fact that the PwC report is only 
a ‘position review’ which pointed out the PKFZ project’s enormous cost overruns, weak 
governance, and weak management, and which accordingly recommended financial 
restructuring to avoid default (see PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009), it has become 
an influential and credible reference for the media, the parliamentary inquiry, the anti-
corruption commission investigation, and the court trials, as it has provided leads about 
the questionable dealings and identified personalities who might be culpable of violating 
government rules and laws. In fact, the PwC report has also urged Prime Minister Najib 
to, at least rhetorically, set up a ‘Super Task Force’ in September 2009 headed by the 
Chief Secretary to the Government, Sidek Hassan, to conduct its own investigations into 
the PKFZ scandal (Lee Hwa Beng and Lee Siew Lian, 2012; cf. Lim Kit Siang, 2012). The 
opposition politicians from the Democratic Action Party (DAP) – namely, Lim Kit Siang, 
Tony Pua, Ronnie Liu, and Teng Chang Kim – have also sustained their criticisms of the 
scandal, which they depict as the “mother of all scandals”, to mobilize public awareness.
After three years (2008-2011) of his chairmanship of PKA, Lee Hwa Beng then co-
authored with Lee Siew Lian, an investigative journalist, the book PKFZ: A Nation’s Trust 
Betrayed which offers an insider’s account of the scandal involving Malaysia’s political-
business elites (see Lee Hwa Beng and Lee Siew Lian, 2012). Lee Hwa Beng noted 
that parliamentarian Ong Tee Keat, former president of MCA and former Minister of 
Transport, helped him in his exposé of the involvement of their own MCA partymates 
and colleagues. Under his chairmanship of PKA, Lee Hwa Beng also initiated lawsuits 
against Phang for breach of duty during her term as PKA general manager and also 
against the project’s private contractors (Goh, 2009).
The audit reports, investigations and exposés have elicited a perplexing narrative 
of involved public and private personalities in the PKFZ mess. In the overpriced land 
sale and questionable mode of land acquisition, the involvement of private companies 
and a government agency that are affiliated and connected with BN politicians have 
been identified, specifically: [a] the UMNO-controlled Koperasi Pembangunan Pulau 
Lumut Bhd (KPPLB), which was the original landowner for the PKFZ project; [b] KDSB, 
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whose chief operating officer is Tiong King Sing, member of parliament for the Bintulu 
constituency representing another ruling party – the Sarawak Progressive Democratic 
Party (SPDP) – that is allied with the BN coalition; and [c] PKA under its former general 
manager Phang, who is closely associated with and appointed by MCA leaders heading 
the Transport Ministry. KPPLB sold the 405 hectares of land for the free port facility 
to KDSB for only MYR 95 million in 1999, but when PKA bought the land from KDSB 
in 2002, it cost a whopping MYR 1.08 billion – i.e. equivalent to ten times land price 
appreciation in just three years. 
Key leaders of the MCA who managed the Transport Ministry have been charged of 
cheating the government in connection with the role they played in the facilitation of the 
PKFZ deal. Former Transport Ministers Ling Liong Sik (then MCA president) and Chan 
Kong Choy (then MCA deputy president) have issued ‘letters of support’ to KDSB to 
raise MYR 4 billion bonds to fund and develop PKFZ – an act which is perceived to be full 
of irregularities because of their influence in the signing of a questionable public-private 
partnership agreement that allows for the issuance of bonds by a private company 
(KDSB) which, at the same time, obliges the Malaysian government to guarantee these 
bonds to fund the infrastructure. These letters of support from both former Transport 
Ministers – which undergirded KDSB to set up four special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
to issue bonds to raise funds for PKFZ project – were issued without approval from 
the Finance Ministry, but the letters had the effect of being construed as government 
guarantees and, as such, a government liability. The project is thus found to have 
‘bypassed’ government’s institutions for checks and balances, such as the necessary 
examination by the Attorney General for a huge infrastructure project and the guidelines 
and stipulations of the Treasury and the Finance Ministry on financial transactions and 
the issuance of government-guaranteed bonds (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009).
Ling, who was then MCA president and concurrently Transport Minister, is reported to 
have muscled his way into making PKA buy land from KDSB despite the cheaper options 
preferred by the Federal Government and the Finance Ministry (Lee Hwa Beng and Lee 
Siew Lian, 2012). Ling has been charged of cheating the government together with his 
successor Transport Minister Chan. For his defence, Ling wanted his witnesses in the 
court trials to include incumbent Prime Minister Najib, the former Premieres Abdullah 
and Mahathir, as well as other bureaucrats – a move noted by KL High Court Judge 
Ahmadi Asnawi as “calling almost all the cabinet ministers” (Tamarai Chelvi, 2011).
Five years after the parliament and executive investigations started in 2007, only 
six personalities have been charged by the Office of the Attorney General Abdul Gani 
Patail, and brought to court in connection with their probable culpability in the large-
scale PKFZ scandal. Three are from the private sector, who are charged of cheating and 
Elite Capture and Elite Conflicts in Southeast Asian Neoliberalization Processes
Inequality, Democracy and Development under Neoliberalism and Beyond 87
making false claims, namely: [i] Stephen Abok, former chief operating officer of KDSB; 
[ii] Bernard Tan Seng Swee of BTA Architect; and [iii] Law Jenn Dong, former engineer 
at KDSB. The other three are MCA party leaders and former government officials who 
are accused of criminal breach of trust and cheating on the government, namely: [iv] 
Phang, former PKA general manager; [v] Ling, former Transport Minister; and [vi] Chan, 
another former Transport Minister. All of them have already claimed court trials, but the 
Klang Sessions Court has been criticized for imposing a low amount of bail relative to 
the offense of these accused. 
Several other BN politicians – particularly, political leaders of MCA and UMNO – have 
been named in the investigations, exposés, and news reports. However, they are yet to 
be summoned in executive and parliamentary investigations and charged in courts for 
potential conflict of interests – that is, for holding concurrent government and business 
positions. These political-business elites who have allegedly committed misconduct, 
graft and corruption include:
 [a]  Chor Chee Heung, MCA politician representing Alor Setar in the parliament and 
also Minister of Housing and Local Government who was both PKA chairman 
and director of KDSB’s parent company, Wijaya Baru Global Berhad (WBGB), an 
investment holding company with diversified portfolios operating in Malaysia and 
China; 
 [b]  Ting Chew Peh, MCA politician and former PKA chairman;
 [c]  Tiong King Sing, a member of parliament allied with the BN coalition and former 
chief operating officer with controlling shares at WBGB and KDSB; 
 [d]  Azim Zabidi, former UMNO treasurer and former chairman of WBGB and a 
director of KDSB; 
 [e]  Onn Ismail, UMNO’s permanent chairman and speaker and assemblyman of 
Sementa state while he was chairman of KPPLB;
 [f]  Faizal Abdullah, Onn’s son-in-law and UMNO youth leader, who is chief executive 
officer of KDSB and executive director of WBGB;  
 [g]  Abdul Rahman Palil, an UMNO politician assemblyman of Sementa state who 
succeeded Onn as KPPLB chairman while he was PKA board member;
 [h]  Abdul Rashid Asari, then UMNO’s deputy chief for the Kapar division in the Klang 
district who headed the law firm Rashid Asari& Co. that drafted the PKA-KDSB 
land purchase and development agreement; and 
 [i]  Prime Minister Najib, who was then Abdullah’s deputy premier when the federal 
government approved the MYR 4.6 billion soft loan to PKA to pay for the latter’s 
obligations to KDSB. 
All of these politicians with business interests have been identified to have taken 
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active and incriminating roles in the scandalous issues of land acquisition, the awarding 
of development contracts, and the issuance of bonds that besieged the PKFZ mess (see 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009; Ong, 2009; Lee HwaBeng and Lee Siew Lian, 2012; 
Lim Kit Siang, 2012).
In October 2013 and January 2014, the High Court acquitted the BN-MCA party leaders 
and former Transport Ministers Ling and Chan, respectively, for failure of the prosecution 
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the accusation of cheating the government and other 
criminal charges against the defendants. The government prosecutors at the Attorney-
General’s Chambers have not appealed for reconsideration the court’s decisions, 
prompting criticism from the political opposition that these acquittals only show “what 
every Malaysian had expected to happen” and that “[c]onnection and ties will always get 
[one] places” in Malaysia where there are “crimes without criminals” (Shazwan 2014).
Points of Conflict
A few notable points of conflict in the neoliberalization process in Malaysia arise from the 
PKFZ case. The first is the conflict between the ‘old’ existing relations of institutionalized 
crony capitalism and the ‘new’ emerging logic of disciplinary neoliberalism. In the PKFZ 
project, sections of domestic political-business elites with access to and influence over 
state decision-making institutions and functionaries have appropriated, or attempted to 
profit from, the neoliberalized economic activities in a free market zone to their personal 
interests and advantages. It appears that the market forces of neoliberalism have 
been subjected to Malaysia’s established system of crony capitalism – thus, contrary 
to the perceived effect of the neoliberalization process to sweep away the vestiges of 
uncompetitive and market-distorting accumulation structure. This conflict between the 
opposing forces of crony capitalism and competitive neoliberalism is expected to persist 
until a hegemonic accumulation regime – secured through legitimacy and/or coercion 
– emerges with its peculiar norms, institutions, and practices for political-business 
relations.
Secondly, neoliberalization normatively aims to depoliticize accumulation, but it is 
actually a politicized process. In the case of the project to develop PKFZ as a free market 
space, the rules of engagement between state functionaries and the private sector were 
not based on market principles or government institutional regulations for markets, 
but on political wheeling and dealing. The domestic private company (KDSB) in this 
regard did not rely on market mechanisms, but on political connections with decision-
makers in state institutions. As a result, instead of playing by the principle of competition 
that is supposed to be observed in a free economic zone, this domestic company has 
attempted to make the state the protector and guarantor of its private accumulation 
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interests. At the same time, the company’s partner political elites within state institutions 
have found this arrangement personally profitable. Thus, neoliberalization’s objective of 
definitively securing market relations has been essentially captive of political relations.
Thirdly, the PKFZ case reveals how a regulatory institution (PKA) has been captured 
by a section of private vested interests where a politically-connected private company 
(KDSB) can make an acquiescing government agency (PKA and MOT) pay for a 
purportedly free market-oriented infrastructure project on non-market-based rates – 
in particular, the principal price of the land, the cost of development work and their 
interest rates on deferred payments, which are way above market rates. The regulatory 
institution (PKA) that is mandated to balance market mechanisms with state interest has 
turned out to be acting against the general interest of free market capitalism and the 
particular interest of the state. PKA has favoured a politically connected domestic private 
firm (KDSB) and sealed agreements that put the state – specifically, the national treasury 
and the taxpayers – in debt, at risk, under liability, and at a gross disadvantage.
Finally, the political-business alliance in the PKFZ deal (i.e. the alliance between MCA 
politicians in the government agencies MOT-PKA and the private sector KDSB and its 
contractors) comes into conflict with erstwhile political allies and business partners. In 
the political sphere, this refers to the MCA politicians in the Transport Ministry and PKA 
who have been exposed, investigated, and charged by their MCA partymates and BN/
UMNO coalition allies. In the business sector, it alludes to the terminated partnership 
between the domestic private company KDSB and the international private firm JAFZI. 
Indeed, while there had been political-business alliances in the project to make the free 
zone a more attractive and market-friendly investment site, this neoliberalization process 
itself has also delineated conflicts among political-business elite interests. 
Contrasts and Conclusions
Actual class and social forces shape the evolution of capitalist development. In 
particular, elite vested interests permeate through the process of neoliberal reproduction 
in Southeast Asia. This active interaction between elite interests and the neoliberalization 
process reflects a specific configuration of power relations in the regime of accumulation.
A couple of interrelated mechanisms have emerged in the empirical expositions of 
this article about Southeast Asia’s contemporary political economy: [i] the structure-
agency dynamics in the development of capitalism, and [ii] the conflictual nature of 
accumulation. Firstly, the issues presented for both the Philippines and Malaysia have 
highlighted the scope of agency – particularly the dominant elite classes in politics and 
business – within the structures of an expanding circuit of capital, in the context of the 
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material and ideological opportunities for accumulation brought about by a globalizing 
economy and the ideology of neoliberalism itself. Secondly, the studied cases have 
shown that, alongside political-business alliances intrinsic in capitalist relations, there 
exist class and social conflicts naturally arising from the often-competing drive of vested 
interests to accumulate wealth and power. 
The findings from these empirical cases have implications for theories of neoliberal 
globalization, capitalist development, and social change. Specifically, the interpretations 
from market fundamentalism, structural determinism, and pure voluntarism are being 
challenged. First, the study has falsified the hyperglobalist thesis based on the orthodox 
ideology of neoliberalism about the dominance of market forces and the rationality of the 
market logic in the era of globalization, by presenting the reality that vested elite interests of 
local elites (with political affinity to states within which capital ultimately settles and operates) 
and of transnational capitalist elites (with business interests and strategies in emerging 
markets and developing economies) have the power and capacity to shape the process of 
neoliberalization. Second, it has illuminated the limitations of the fundamentally class and 
economic deterministic assumptions of some elements of vulgar Marxism, by rendering ‘the 
agential’ visible in the structure of capitalist accumulation and by specifying ‘the political’ 
behind ‘the economic’ in the political economy of Southeast Asian neoliberalization. Third, 
it has concretized a social conflict theory to understand the dynamics of neoliberalizing 
accumulation regimes, by particularly identifying ‘the who’ and explaining ‘the how’ in the 
conflict-ridden nature of accumulation regimes in the Philippines and Malaysia.
Neoliberalization processes in the Philippines and Malaysia are being driven and 
appropriated by conflicting elite interests. In principle, elites in these countries have no 
qualms about capitalist development and have a common drive for power and wealth 
accumulation. However, an overriding issue of conflicts is on who gets what, or who 
should get more, in neoliberalism’s accumulation opportunities and how the neoliberal 
accumulation regime is to be organized. Thus, to understand the specificities of the 
evolving development of capitalism in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to decipher the 
dynamics of dominant elite class interests at stake and proactively involved in the 
diversifying accumulation processes under neoliberalism – i.e. particular interests of 
the elites in politics, business and the economy, which are sometimes converging and 
oftentimes conflicting.
Critical differences on elite class dynamics in the evolution of the neoliberalization 
process between the Philippines and Malaysia can be distinguished in three major aspects 
that characterize their respective accumulation regimes. The first and foremost contrast 
point is on the power structure, specifically state-capital relations, in the accumulation 
regime. Malaysia’s distinctiveness is that it has an UMNO/BN-led state-party with a 
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powerful political-business network embedded since Independence (i.e. for almost 60 
years) whose vested interests are deeply entrenched, and can be reproduced, in the 
regime’s political-economic institutions. These established political-business alliances – 
notably, the system of consociationalism between actors in the state, domestic capital, 
and foreign capital – have historically institutionalized the culture of individualist economic 
transactionalism together with the agenda of the protection of particularist class and 
ethnic interests. On the other hand, elite interests in the Philippines are being articulated, 
negotiated, or advanced in an accumulation regime in which state control – and, as such, 
economic opportunities for capital –alternately circulates among competing sections of 
the elites through the country’s regularly contested electoral democratic space. In this 
context, the wielding of political-economic clout is contingent upon whose faction of the 
political class, with its respective business partners, is in power.
The second contrast point is the accumulation regime’s prevailing economic 
development structure, specifically the economic specialization or activity, in which 
elite interests are promoted in the neoliberalization process. In other words, this relates 
to the different economic contexts between elite interests in a neoliberalization with 
industrialization (i.e. Malaysia) and in a neoliberalization without industrialization (i.e. the 
Philippines). In Malaysia, the scandalous project of PKFZ is constitutive of neoliberal 
reform efforts in privatizing and liberalizing trade policy and government procurement, 
which are accordingly linked to the country’s national industrialization strategy. The 
state-party’s UMNO/BN network of business cronies and political allies has long been 
well-placed in the regime, whose strong relationships are forged and bound together as 
an important part of the country’s enduring industrialization project. Consequently, these 
elites are well-positioned to influence and take advantage of virtually all accumulation 
opportunities from development projects and activities associated with the interconnected 
agenda for national industrialization and global competitiveness that basically require 
political decision-making, government sanctions, and state resources. In the Philippines, 
the controversial deal for the NAIA-3 project was supposed to have been done in the 
spirit of the neoliberal policies of privatization and liberalization, particularly through 
build-operate-transfer schemes and public-private partnerships. This infrastructure 
development project was, on paper at least, simply tied to the neoliberal market and 
institutional reform policies, but not to any long-term politically planned industrial policy. 
While the industrializing economy of Malaysia has ‘the usual suspects’ in its accumulation 
regime coming from the age-old UMNO/BN political-business network, every incumbent 
administration in the Philippines presents itself with its own clique of politicians and 
favoured business elites with a relatively short-termist predisposition and a tendentially 
expedient accumulation agenda.
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The third contrast point is the different political institutions of Philippine and Malaysian 
accumulation regimes that delineate – but not necessarily determine – elite behaviour 
within the larger polity and society. Authoritarian features in Malaysia control government 
apparatuses and the media that make it difficult to publicly reveal anomalies, let alone 
institutionally enforce punitive actions against corruption and other wrongdoings. In 
essence, the state-party dominates the executive, parliamentary, and judicial institutions, 
as well as the influential means of socialization through mainstream media. This, therefore, 
poses tremendous challenges and difficulties, as well as risks, for opposition politics. 
On the contrary, post-Marcos dictatorship Philippines has been able to move towards a 
democratization process and put in place some democratic rules and institutions, notably: 
the system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judiciary; a 
relatively free press and vigorous media with activist investigative journalism; and a multitude 
of active civil society and social movements. This configuration of democracy provides an 
important institutional basis for public vigilance and opposition against elite misbehaviour 
and deviance in the conduct of political and economic activities. Arguably, political-
economic actors in the Philippines accept, at least, the procedural rules of democracy; 
that is why those accused of misconduct most often get investigated by executive and 
congressional bodies, prosecuted and tried in courts, and in some cases, convicted.
Notwithstanding these contrast points, an overarching theme in thisarticle is that 
elite capture and elite conflicts pervade the process of the peculiar neoliberalizing 
capitalist regimes in Southeast Asia. Neoliberalization is expanding the circuit of capital 
accumulation beyond the nation-state and creating new capitalist class formation and 
pro-capitalist political forces; but, simultaneously, it is broadening a set of prospective 
clients from whom entrenched domestic elites can extract rents and appropriate profits. 
Dominant elite classes – at both the local and transnational levels – have strategies to 
profit from neoliberalism through the usurpation of the neoliberalization process itself, 
consistent with their particularistic interests in the preservation and perpetuation of their 
personal stakes, social status, and class power. After all, the neoliberalization process, 
as well as the ideology of neoliberalism, is a fundamentally elite-led and elitist agenda. 
This, however, does not mean faithful conformity of the elites to orthodox neoliberal 
policies. As illustrated in the cases for both the Philippines and Malaysia, the interests 
of elites in the expansion of capital accumulation, particularly their behaviours and 
actions toward both the constraints and opportunities in the structures of accumulation 
under conditions of neoliberal globalization, often contradict the ideology of competitive 
capitalism. At the same time, it has become more palpable that there are inter- and intra-
elite conflicts coexisting with the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ political-business alliances in the 
neoliberalizing accumulation regimes of the Philippines and Malaysia. 
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Balancing Out Forests: Implications of the 
Forest Conservation Act, 1980 in Southern 
Odisha, India
Poorna Balaji1
ABSTRACT
The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 was enacted to conserve India’s forests by regulating 
the de-reservation of forests with approval from the Central Government. The act is 
seen as a straightforward solution to loss of forests by facilitating development through 
conservation. Through the case of conservation by compensatory afforestation as 
prescribed under the Act, this study interrogates whether the Act holds up a win-
win scenario for development and conservation by examining its ground level 
implementation. In doing so, the paper also tries to unpack the socio-ecological 
outcomes in the study area. To unpack discourses at policy level interviews were 
conducted with scholars, academicians, and several forest department officials in 
Delhi and Bhubaneshwar. To understand implementation and outcomes two villages 
in Kashipur block of Southern Odisha was selected; one near the forest diverted for 
mining conveyor belt and other near the compensated site respectively. These cases 
are indicative of the outcomes of the Act. Ethnographic tools including interviews and 
observation were used to collect village level data. Preliminary analysis of the data 
suggests that the Act operates in an unequal power setting – inequality in access to 
prior information, non-recognition of pre-existing rights over forest, denial of customary 
use of land and in relationship with the state. Communities at both villages face social 
and environmental outcomes such as excessive dust from construction, loss of 
cultivable land and changing social dynamics within the village. Forests are primarily 
viewed only as trees squarely leaving out its social value and ultimately becoming a 
question of land. The Act is seen to cause complications in an already marginalised 
landscape failing to create a win-win scenario; state and the user agency in the gain. 
The findings of this paper contribute to the micro-level understanding of this important 
Act taking into account political and historical processes in the landscape; essential in 
a state endowed with minerals ready for exploitation. 
Introduction
Large scale diversion of forests for development projects such as mining, dams and other 
projects such as railways has been a major driver for the loss of forest land. The Forest 
Conservation Act, 1980 (FCA) enacted by the Government of India institutionalized a 
1  PhD Student, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment (ATREE); Email: poorna.balaji@atree.org
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set of procedures to divert forest areas for other non-forest purposes such as mining, 
industries and dams. The FCA has an inbuilt mechanism to compensate forest loss due 
to diversion through compensatory afforestation (CA) in other non-forest or degraded 
forest sites in the vicinity of the project. The National Forest Policy of 1988 rehashes 
the importance of safeguarding forests as property of the state managed with the help 
of specialists (Kohli and Menon, 2011). The money thus far collected from the user 
agencies towards CA remained underutilized. As per a report of the Central Empowered 
Committee (CEC) on compensatory afforestation, less than 60 per cent of the total funds 
recovered from user agencies were spent and only 61 per cent of the total target area for 
CA had been covered by 2002 (Kohli et al., 2011). This brought about the formation of 
the ad hoc Compensatory Afforestation Planning and Management Authority (CAMPA) in 
2005 to streamline disbursement of funds and monitor progress (Kohli et al., 2011). The 
money collected from the mining corporations for compensatory afforestation, additional 
afforestation, Net Present Value (NPV2) is deposited in the CAMPA fund which is then 
disbursed to respective States and Union Territories. Afforestation activities, conservation 
measures and other ancillary activities to strengthen the forest department are carried 
out by the Forest Department based on the CAMPA guidelines stipulated in 2009. 
Kohli and Menon (2011) highlight that there is large scale diversion of forest land for 
non-forest purpose although the extent area diverted varies each year. This diversion 
can be viewed alongside a reported increase in forest cover by the Forest Survey of India 
(FSI) in the country from 21.05 per cent in 2011 to 24.01 per cent in 2013, with most of 
the increase being reported in non-forest areas. These numbers promote the FCA as a 
facilitator of development by displaying a seemingly win-win situation for conservation 
and development. 
The linking of capitalist accumulation processes with conservation initiatives at a policy 
level has been theorized. Neil Smith suggests that strategies are developed to ensure there 
is no dampener on capitalist accumulation where nature is commoditized as in the case 
of carbon trading, marketized and financialized (2009); these strategies are even profit 
generating. Castree (2008) characterizes certain ‘biophysical fixes’ through which nature 
is neoliberalized. Each “‘fix’ constitutes a way of achieving strategically a core objective 
for capital and /or the state” (Castree, 2008). One such fix directly refers to capitalist 
accumulation through resource extraction, and another fix illustrates initiatives by the 
state to maintain legitimacy among capitalists, civil society and the natural environment. 
The FCA can be viewed as one such fix as a means to overcome capitalism’s inherent 
2  NPV is “understood as a value to compensate, in money terms, for the loss of tangible as well as intangible benefits flowing from the forest 
lands due to its diversion to non-forest use. The new user of the forest land is expected to bear the cost of these losses by the payment of NPV.” 
(Kohli et al., 2011)
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‘ecological crisis’ (O’Connor, 1988). While capitalist resource extraction such as mining 
results in forest loss, the state enacted the FCA to acknowledge this ‘ecological crisis’ 
that follows such extraction, by developing neutralizing measures such as compensatory 
afforestation. Therefore, despite FCA stating that it is meant for the conservation of 
forests, it still has mechanisms to facilitate change of forest land use (Kohli et al., 2011). 
In this paper, through the case of ‘conservation’ by compensatory afforestation 
as prescribed under the FCA, I interrogate whether it holds up as a win-win situation 
for both development and conservation in my study area. The paper also attempts to 
unpack social and ecological outcomes on the landscape. 
Context
37.34 per cent of Odisha’s geographical area is forested, which includes 18 wildlife 
sanctuaries and one tiger reserve (FSI, 2011). Unchecked timber smuggling, mining, 
industrialization and uncontrolled grazing have been cited as some of the key factors 
causing degradation of forests in the state. The state has a long history of forest 
protection and conservation measures such as joint forest management, compensatory 
afforestation schemes, the Odisha State Forestry Development Project (OFSDP) funded 
by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and several other working plans. It 
has been reported that an increase in conservation measures and teak and bamboo 
plantations in scrub areas has resulted in a net increase in forest area (FSI, 2013). There 
was 1,444 sq. km increase in total area of forest cover between 2011 and 2013, with a 
544 sq. km increase particularly in tribal areas (FSI, 2013). 
Odisha is also rendered important in the global economic arena due to its vast and 
diverse mineral deposits (Indian Minerals Year Book, 2011).The state of Odisha alone 
accounts for 55 per cent of India‘s total bauxite3 resources (Indian Minerals Year Book, 
2011); they form a part of the East Coast Bauxite deposits developed due to residual 
weathering in a series of plateaus and hills across the states of Odisha and Andhra 
Pradesh (Rao and Raman, 1979). These deposits are found in complex environments 
which form part of Odisha’s forest cover which are inhabited by tribal and non-tribal 
people, and wildlife. Most mineral-rich hills and forests fall under Schedule V4 areas 
as prescribed under the Indian constitution, and are home to 62 different scheduled 
tribes who constitute 22 per cent of Odisha’s population5. The landscape has been 
subjected to continued human interventions, including subsistence practices such as 
3  Bauxite is the central mineral used for the production of aluminium
4  Schedule V and VI of the constitution say that mineral rights in tribal land belong to indigenous people.
5  From Ministry of Tribal Affairs, http://tribal.nic.in/index2.asp?sublinkid=545&langid=1
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shifting cultivation and Non timber forest product (NTFP) collection, and state practices 
such as plantations and conservation initiatives (Das, 2001). 
With the advent of neoliberal economic policies, over the last decade there has been 
a surge in clearances for bauxite mines due to increase in need for aluminium for military, 
mobile phone and packaging purposes, nationally and internationally (Padel and Das, 
2010); 29 permits for bauxite mines have been cleared during the last 11th Five-Year Plan 
period (DTE, 2012). Apart from this, there are 27 prospecting lease applications and 53 
mining lease applications pending with the Govt of Odisha.6 
Nine bauxite reserves occur in southern Odisha forming a tract cutting across the 
three districts of Koraput, Kalahandi and Rayagada. Many of these areas have become 
sites of contestation where the local communities are fighting against the state and 
corporations for their livelihoods and homes, and against environment damage (Das, 
2001). The legal relationship of tribal people with their land, on which many of them 
practice subsistence agriculture, has been under constant transformation since colonial 
times, with land becoming important for revenue, timber, development projects such as 
roads and rails, conservation or mineral resources over different periods in time (Das, 
2001; Sahu, 2008; Sarangi, 2004). This landscape has also witnessed many anti-mining 
protests mobilized both by local communities and external actors, of which some have 
been successful in stalling mining operations. This illustrates the complex processes 
which include degradation, protection, and modification of livelihoods and resistance 
that a particular landscape is subjected to when exposed to a mainstream paradigm of 
neoliberal development through resource extraction.
The intensive expansion of economic production and conservation initiatives need 
to be interrogated in tandem to highlight the unpredictable nature of neoliberalism in 
creating winners and losers within a particular political, ecological, geographical and 
historical setting. 
Study Site
I locate this study in one of the most backward regions in the country, the Kashipur Block 
of Rayagada district. Rayagada is one of the eight KBK (Koratpur, Balangii and Kalahandi) 
districts which have been identified as backward regions and are subjected to several 
integrated management plans since the early 1990s to accelerate poverty reduction and 
create opportunities for economic, social and human development. This block forms 
6  Note on Bauxite Mining in Odisha: Report on Flora, Fauna, and Impact on Tribal Population (2007) Additional information sought by Supreme 
Court with respect to Writ Petition (Civil) no. 202 of 1995. While some of this information on pending licences may be dated, currently permission 
for Vedanta to mine Niyamgiri has been rejected by eight out of 12 gram sabhas in the districts of Kalahandi and Rayagada. 
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a part of the east coast bauxite reserve mentioned earlier. Incursion of multinational 
companies with an interest to mine bauxite in this area started around the early 90’s, and 
for the next 15 years the area was subject to a lot of violence and protest movements. 
After much violent perseverance from the companies mining permission was granted 
and a refinery was also built relocating three villages. Mining has started since 2013 and 
the refinery is also operational now.  
Kashipur Block is spread over 1,501 sq. km and comprises 415 revenue villages. 
Many of these villages could ideally be called hamlets.  As per Census 2011, Scheduled 
Tribes (STs) comprise 60 per cent of the population and Scheduled Castes (SCs) about 
20 per cent. The local population practise both settled and swidden agriculture, although 
there has been a considerable reduction of area available for cultivation and shifting 
cultivation practices have transformed to short fallow cultivation on hill slopes (Kumar, 
Chaudhury et al., 2005). The block has four CA sites set up against the forest diversion of 
Utkal Alumina International Limited (UAIL) which operates both the mine and the refinery; 
102 ha of forest land was diverted for constructing the alumina refinery, which has been 
compensated in three sites surrounding the Titiguda forest reserve in 2000-01; 2.335 
ha of forest land was diverted in 2010 for the construction of a conveyor belt line, which 
was compensated in 2012 near the Podabandh protected forest. 
This paper focuses on two villages, one near the diverted forest and another near 
the compensated site, to understand the immediate social outcomes of implementation 
of the FCA, such as reactions towards diversion and compensation, and change in 
community dynamics within the village.
Methods
To answer the question of whether conservation through compensatory afforestation 
produces win-win scenarios on the ground, data was collected at the community 
level as well as from members of civil society. I conducted interviews with scholars 
and academicians, and several forest department officials in Delhi and Bhubaneshwar. 
Secondary data such as government documents and other reports was also collected 
from various sources. This was done to try and unpack discourses around FCA at a 
macro-level to collate it with micro-level data. 
Ethnographic data was collected during October-December 2014 from Podabandh 
village located in the vicinity of both the CA site and the Podabandh Protected Forest. 
Several visits were made to the village, and village walks were undertaken to visit the CA 
site. A household (HH) survey of the entire village based on a semi-structured questionnaire 
was conducted. There were two focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted in the 
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village. For the purpose of this paper, mostly data from the FGDs will be presented and 
discussed.  An FDG with 22 villagers was also conducted in Hatikhman, where a village 
forest was diverted for the construction of conveyor belt. 
Discussion
At the outset I would like to add the caveat that this is work in progress and this section 
is based on preliminary analysis of the data collected thus far. The first part of the 
discussion will focus on secondary data and data gathered among civil society, and the 
second part will focus on data gathered at the community level. 
Discourses around the Forest Conservation Act, 1980
FCA as ‘monetisation of responsibility’ is an idea put forth by an eminent academic lawyer 
in Delhi in my interview with her. She was appointed as the chairperson to prepare an 
independent site inspection report for forest land diversion under the FCA for mining bauxite 
ore in Lanjigarh Bauxite Reserve. She reiterated that collecting funds from user agencies 
is dilution of responsibility by ‘converting responsibility into cash’. This does nothing but 
sidesteps the main issue of actual forest loss and promotes activities such as mining. The 
FCA has institutionalized a combination of a “centralized, standardized system of valuation 
and compensation, thus giving a semblance of efficient and scientific forest regulation a.k.a. 
conservation” (Kohli and Menon, 2011). This system of valuing forests and compensation 
has made conversion of forests into decontextualized, mobile and tradeable commodities 
between regions (Kohli and Menon, 2011). This system of valuation also leads one to 
the question – what are forests under the FCA? How are forests defined and how are 
they being valued? Forest had not been defined under the FCA; it only mentions that it 
includes lands that have been notified as forests under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (Das, 
2010). In 1996, an order in the popular Godavarman case7  expanded the meaning of the 
word “forests” to its dictionary meaning in the FCA (Kohli et al., 2011). This meant that 
even non-notified areas irrespective of ownership would be categorized under the FCA 
(Das, 2010). This open-ended definition of forests, subject to various interpretations, has 
facilitated easier transfer of forests to non-forests, and the power of the state to denotify 
forests have worked in favour of development projects (Das, 2010).  
In answer to what is being valued, in my interview with an academician in Delhi who 
has worked on the micro-politics of mining in Zambia, said that there is an absence of 
systems thinking within the FCA. It simply talks of replacing one element of an entire 
system, i.e. trees into another system. In effect, forests are only thought of as trees. 
7  T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad vs Union of India [W.P. (Civil) No. 202 of 1995] is popularly known as the Forest Case. It is an ongoing matter 
being heard in the Supreme Court against large-scale illegal felling of timber and denuding forests in Gudalur Taluk, Tamil Nadu
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There is also no concern of how another system where afforestation happens could be 
altered. A monetary value assigned to the trees depending on the forest type is then 
paid by the user agency. In 2005, the concept of Net Present Value was introduced to 
take into account that a forest didn’t only comprise of trees but was also a provider of 
ecosystem services and goods. A committee was constituted to develop a methodology 
applicable to different biogeographical zones to estimate NPV in monetary values. In an 
interview, the 2005 NPV committee chairman told me that the committee’s suggestion 
to evaluate on a case by case basis instead of an eco-classsification was dropped by 
the government. This case by case basis could mean more time taken towards diversion 
and further delays. For the government, it made more sense to have values assigned 
for each biogeographical area except in eco-sensitive zones, to expedite the process 
of diversion. The then chairman of the NPV committee also pointed out a pitfall in an 
economic valuation, case by case or otherwise – that only the supply point of view is 
taken into account, not the demand aspect. This means that the demand for mines, 
dams and other non-forest purposes is left out of the equation. This is an important point 
that there is no long term plan for activities such as mining in our country – if this is done, 
it will be possible to develop a comprehensive picture of diversion. The ex-chairman 
also pointed out the limitations to markets being used for conservation, such as ignoring 
demand, and also assigning values to intangible services provided by a forest block. 
In both cases of compensation for afforestation and NPV, the social setting of both 
the area diverted and the area compensated has been entirely ignored. A scholar in 
Delhi pointed out that compensatory afforestation happens in an unequal power setting 
where the communities in the area have no information on why land is being taken up 
for afforestation. The user agency has a much higher preference with the government, 
as it is seen as the harbinger of development, foreign direct investment (FDI), and as a 
source of revenue for the state. 
Finally, compensatory afforestation becomes politics of land (Kohli and Menon, 2011) 
as it has to be carried out in non-forest land, preferably adjacent to a forest block. In the 
non-availability of such land upon certification by the Chief Secretary of the state, CA is 
to be done over double the extent of degraded forest area at the cost of the user agency. 
Most of the non-forest land identified belongs to the revenue department and/or is under 
customary land use with unique ownership and management practices (Kohli and Menon, 
2011). In several cases, the existing land uses are ignored, and are transferred to the forest 
department to be eventually notified as reserve forest. The key stakeholders of the land 
that is transferred for compensation are squarely left out of the Act. The several outcomes 
that may arise within the community and the environment itself are not addressed in the 
FCA; these outcomes will be discussed in the next section through a case study. 
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To summarize, the FCA, even at the policy level, has several issues that makes the 
question of whether it truly promotes a win-win situation even more compelling. The 
FCA is seen as a very linear, simple process that appeals to logic devoid of any social or 
ecological implications. I now turn to the case study to explore the immediate outcomes 
of implementation of the FCA to unpack the ground situation. I will first explore the 
implications in the village where forest land has been diverted and then in the village 
where non-forest land has been transferred to the forest department for compensatory 
afforestation. This enquiry of immediate outcomes of diversion and compensation in 
tandem will help highlight the problems associated with the FCA. 
The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 – on the ground
Diversion of forest land and its associated village
A diversion of 2.335 ha of forest land for construction of the conveyor belt corridor and 
mines access road was proposed in 2009. The site inspection report of the Divisional 
Forest Officer states that the legal status of the forest proposed for diversion is ‘Gramya 
Jungle’ or ‘Village Forest’8. Out of the total 2.335 ha, an area of 1.465 ha is managed 
by the nearby village, Hatikhman Van Samrakshan Samithi9 (VSS). As described in the 
report, the forest mainly consists of degraded scrubby sal growth. The report mentions 
forest land of all villages being devoid of forest growth except in the village Hatikhman 
where there is scrubby sal with full root stock. The report also states that reduction in 
forest cover will have little impact on the eco-system. To compensate this reduction 
5.93 acres of non-forest land was identified in another village, Podabandh, adjacent to 
the Podabandh protected forest. I will first discuss results from data gathered from a 
community level discussion with village members from Hatikhman.
Hatikhman and its diverted forest
Hatikhman is a small village with 29 HHs; 27 HHs belong to an OBC group called the 
Gouda, 1 HH is ST and the other SC. There are not many hills or dongars surrounding 
the village and currently none of the HHs practise shifting cultivation. The villagers had the 
erstwhile kodki patta10, which was retained even during the 1961 survey and settlement 
of the revenue department. This patta was revoked later in the 1991 settlement. Since 
then the village has stopped shifting cultivation, as their own village doesn’t have any 
8  A forest can be notified as a village forest under the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 for the benefit of any village community or a group of village 
communities
9  VSS is group set up by the forest department in the village to help the FD undertake its activities. A joint bank account is set up with the VSS 
president, who belongs to the village, and the forester. In Podabandh the VSS was set up in 2009. 
10  A kodki or hoe was used for shifting cultivation. Previously assessment was made on the basis of kodkis owned by a family, i.e. the number of 
working hands in a family (Kumar, Choudhary et al., 2005). Patta is the legal document that acknowledges ownership over private land. 
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dongars. The village is present along the 30 km long conveyor belt line that is under 
construction to transport bauxite ore from the mine to the refinery. 
During the discussion that was held in the village, the people complained of dust from 
the construction of the belt hampering their agriculture. Most of their agriculture happens 
on patta land near the belt line. This has had a severe impact on their crop yield. A lady 
also mentioned that even their cattle cannot graze due to excessive dust. Four villagers 
have lost patta land to the belt and have received compensation. It came out in the 
discussion that people sought some compensation for the troubles they are facing due 
to excessive dust. 
In 1992-93 a VSS committee was set up in the village to oversee protection of the 
village forest. At the time when the VSS was set up, there were only 15 HHs. An elderly 
man in the village mentioned that the VSS committee has a village level patta over the 
forest. I observed that the sal trees on the way to the village weren’t big, and probed 
why this was so. One of the men in the village commented that the trees were being cut 
by people from other villages surrounding the forests, to be used as personal firewood 
and to be sold. It was mentioned that the forester doesn’t come, and that it is left to 
the village people to protect the forest. Protection duties become difficult to perform as 
there is no monetary support from the FD. They said that even if they report the people 
who are cutting trees, the FD files no case against them. Hence protection of the trees 
becomes difficult. During the conversation, when I incorrectly spoke of the forest as a 
reserve forest, the villagers immediately turned to correct me that it was ‘their’ forest, 
and that they even have a patta for it. The 22 people present at the discussion seemed 
to be aware that this was ‘their’ forest. 
Upon being asked about the diversion proposal11 for construction of the conveyor 
belt which was already underway none seemed aware that ‘their’ forest had been 
proposed for diversion. When I explained to them about how this proposed diversion 
and compensation near Podabandh village, they became very defensive. They reiterated 
that the forest belonged to the village and that even if the company (user agency) had 
permission they could not cut them; they needed the villagers consent. In fact, the 
villagers said even that if they protected the forest fiercely now, it would grow back in 
three years with such big trees that no one could cut them. 
The villagers seemed clueless about the compensatory afforestation site that had 
already been set up. I explained to them about the concept of CA and told them that once 
the government was satisfied with the growth of CA plantation and other compliances 
sought, the trees in ‘their’ forest would be cut. Even though they did not entirely believe 
11  At the time of interaction with the village, the trees were not yet cut as Stage II clearance was still pending.
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what I said, their immediate response was to ask whether they had rights over the trees 
planted elsewhere. It was a logical question, as ‘their’ trees were being cut and hence 
the rights over the trees compensated must be theirs. During the conversation, one 
man remembered that the conservator had come to their village two years ago and had 
said that only if the seven members of the VSS agreed would the trees be cut for the 
construction of the belt line. The man said, “If we don’t give the signature, even if he is 
Brahma12 he cannot build the belt line. He can take the belt line around the trees.” This 
statement shows the confidence of their perceived rights, and the trust they have in the 
government that no trees would be cut if they denied permission. 
The trees were eventually cut in December 2014 after Stage II permission was granted 
by the state. The discussion brought to the fore the villagers’ naivety and deceptive 
tactics used by the government and user agency to obtain permission from the VSS 
committee. There was lack of prior information and awareness among the villagers that 
their forests were going to be cut in December. Their crops and cattle continue to suffer 
because of the dust arising from the construction. 
To understand the other part of the story, I will now discuss the experiences from the 
village near the CA site.
Podabandh and the compensatory afforestation site
Podabandh is a village neighbouring the Podabandh protected forests. It has 40 HHs 
belonging to SCs, STs and OBCs. The forest extends to an area of 96 ha and consists 
of dry peninsular plain sal forests. It is known to have housed fauna such as sloth bears, 
boars, leopards and also tigers. Historically, there have been incidences of loss of cattle 
and odd events of children falling prey to leopards and tigers. Over the years, most of the 
fauna have become locally extinct. From the interviews it is understood that there has been 
a severe loss of forest starting from when the Forest Department in the late 60s cut part 
of this forest to send wood to the saw mills. This was done through external contractors 
and led to more illicit felling of trees. The protection of the forest is lackadaisical and the 
place is accessed heavily by neighbouring villages for firewood and wood for activities 
such as the construction of houses. The main livelihood is from agriculture, both settled 
and shifting. The study village has limited land and hills as compared to other villages 
where agriculture is undertaken. 
In 2012, 5.93 acres of government non-forest land (Abada Ajogya Anabadi) from 
Podabandh village, adjacent to the forest, was transferred to the FD for compensatory 
afforestation. This area has been planted with teak trees with the help of the village VSS. 
The state gazette notification mentions that 5.93 acres of land has been transferred for 
12  Brahma is a Hindu god who is believed to be the creator of the universe.
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the purpose of CA, but the village head emphatically disagreed and said they had lost 
up to 10 acres of village land to this plantation. The village also had no clue as to why 
plantations were set up on their village land. 
Loss of land to afforestation and other state efforts 
In the early 90s, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) entered 
Kashipur Block to improve livelihood practices, afforest hills with fruit trees and reduce 
dependence on shifting cultivation. Under IFAD, about 100 acres in one of their dongars 
or hills was planted with agave. This was to help them make rope and sell it in the 
market. The land below this plantation belonged to another village; over time that village 
cut down the plantation and usurped the hill. IFAD also planted several fruit trees, 
including cashew and mango, on the hills after informally distributing the land among 
the households. But almost all of these trees have been felled over the years, either 
for household use or to clear the place for shifting cultivation. This was the first loss of 
dongar land used for shifting cultivation by the village.
In 2005, with the entry of the watershed programme, about 30 acres of land was 
given up for planting trees.  Most of these trees were cut by the villagers, again either for 
household use or to clear land for shifting cultivation. About 50 per cent of the trees still 
remain in the 30 acres. In 2013, post CA plantation, about 20 acres were planted with 
Albizia sp trees under the OFSDP. This was again on government land where villagers 
practised shifting cultivation. Overall, Podabandh has experienced a net loss of cultivable 
land, and this has in particular affected the landless HHs in the village. Mr Naik, a landed 
villager, says, “In total, we have lost 50 acres of our village land to these various projects. 
There was no patta to this land, it is government land, but we used to do dongar chaas 
(shifting cultivation) in these areas. But what can we say, now that it is government land.”
In particular regard to the 2012 CA site, the legal status of land has also changed due 
to its transfer from the revenue department to the forest department under the FCA. The 
site has been brought under the ambit of the Podabandh protected forest. 
The compensatory afforestation site – landed vs. landless
Podabandh already being a village with limited land as compared to other villagers, the 
loss of land has especially had an effect on the landless of the village who depended 
more on it. Upon interviewing the landless HHs, it was found that they were unhappy 
with land lost to the CA site. Mr Jhodia says, “The landed in the village just gave away 
land to the forest department. We need to be one village to stop the FD. What little we 
grow now is not enough – we have to go out now.” Another statement about the CA site 
by a landless person was: “People who have bhota land (10 per cent slope land below 
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a hill, where landed people have patta) tell us that the dongar is also ours for which they 
actually don’t have a patta. They allowed us landless to do dongar chaas there and then 
they also give permission to the FD to plant trees. We have used the land before.” In 
reaction to this Mr Naik says “You (landless) were doing agriculture on government land. 
Why will landed people give any permission or deny that it is their (government) land 
which they took it away.” This shows the division in the village between the landed and 
the landless. The latter still depend on shifting cultivation, in spite of having to cultivate on 
denuded hills. This reduction in cultivable area has not only exacerbated an already inbuilt 
inequality within the village but also forced the landless to look for alternate livelihood 
strategies. Many of the landless HHs send their young men out for seasonal migration to 
work on construction sites and factories in cities outside the state. 
Adverse reaction among the landed towards the CA site was more in terms of rights 
over the trees planted, and the fact that the FD planted and forgot about the trees. These 
reactions clearly don’t stem from a basic livelihood concern since many of the landed 
had given up shifting cultivation already, owing to heavy loss of soil due to the lack of 
trees on the hills. The bitterness amongst the landed was more directed at the FD for not 
consulting them on the species planted and the fact that the CA plantation was never 
cleaned and provided with manure, and the fact that the villagers were also not paid their 
proper dues for coolie work in setting up the plantations. 
Outcomes
In Hatikhman village, forest that is being diverted comprises degraded sal trees. But at 
the CA site, teak has been planted contrary to even what the CA guidelines specify. The 
guideline specifies that local species of trees need to be compensated on non-forest 
land adjacent to a reserve forest or protected forest. As described earlier, the Podabandh 
protected forest has sal, and in accordance to the spirit of the law, sal trees should have 
been planted to replace what was cut. In planting teak, the FD seems to have only 
increased the ‘economic value’ of the plantation. Can a teak plantation be deemed a 
forest? How does a teak plantation in any ecological or social way compensate for the 
loss of a degraded sal forest? How have the local rights of people over the diverted forests 
been compensated? These are pivotal questions that bring out the complications of this 
seemingly logical act essential to understand whether the FCA is a win-win solution. 
Hatikhman being situated near conveyor belt will continue to experience the problem 
of dust affecting crops and cattle, not just during the construction phase but during 
the operations phase as well. In Podabandh, the outcomes have been around two 
main issues: loss of cultivable land, and creating differences between the landed and 
landless. Podabandh also receives no form of compensation except for the coolie work 
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done during the setting up of the plantation. The landless squeezed out of their dongars 
receive no compensation. At the very least, keeping with the spirit of the law, planting sal 
in the CA site adjacent to the protected sal forest or planting species that the community 
want there is of some potential ecological or social value. With the change in the legal 
status of land, the communities will not be able to demand profit sharing if and when 
the timber is harvested at the site. The FCA also created further inequalities between the 
landed and landless. 
Conclusion
The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 as a straightforward state “fix” (Castree, 2008) to 
overcome the ‘ecological crisis’ due to capitalist accumulation processes results in 
producing more complications and repercussions on ground. The repercussion on the 
villages at the diversion and compensation end include loss of rights over forests, loss of 
land, drastic changes in land use and livelihood either due to dust from the construction 
or reduction in cultivable land, and severe lack of awareness and information. In trying 
to overcome an ‘ecological crisis’, the FCA produces further crises in the political, 
social and the ecological realm itself. The FCA causes complications in an already 
marginalized landscape, creating only a win-loss scenario. Both the user agency and 
the local communities pay the price of ecological compensation; the former driven to 
further profits and the latter driven to further marginalization. For the user agency only 
time and money are lost, which are more than recovered once the operations begin. But 
the local communities stand to lose due to long term implications on their landscape, 
affecting their lives. 
From the findings at the village level there is resonance with the idea that the FCA 
lacks a systems approach. Monetary valuation for trees and other environmental services 
depends on the type of forest, but leaves out the type of ‘dependence’ on forests by 
neighbouring villages. The village continues to exist in the same area having to deal with 
immense change but receives no compensation, unlike even villages that are displaced. 
Valuation only takes into account ecological aspects of the forests, i.e. if they are dense 
evergreen, scrub etc. without accommodating social value. 
From the findings it was also discernible that the FCA does operate within an unequal 
power setting on the ground. The inequality exists in access to prior information, 
non-recognition of pre-existing rights over the forest, customary use of land, and in 
relations with the state. The state plays no role in levelling the ground. By fixing prices for 
compensation beforehand, there is no scope for negotiation by the local communities for 
the loss of their forests. And on the other hand, there is no prior information given to the 
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village where compensation is undertaken; the village has no say on land being diverted 
for compensation. There exists a situation where communities at both the diversion and 
compensation site end up paying social and environmental costs. 
The findings of this paper contribute to developing a micro-level understanding 
of how a national legislation such as the Forest Conservation Act produces at times 
irreconcilable changes in the local socio-environmental conditions. Especially in a state 
like Odisha, where there is a presence of vast quantities of minerals which are under the 
constant scanner of capital, it is imperative to develop a micro-level understanding of 
such Acts due to potential forest diversions.
Within the FCA, the NPV does not include people and their access to land, and 
the degradation in the area is historical, not only by local people.  The “fix” should not 
further marginalize a landscape; it needs to be more nuanced to be able to deal with 
a complicated landscape, taking into account historical, political, and social processes 
already interacting within a setting. 
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Gender Based Inequities in the World of 
Work:  Insights from Latin America, Sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia
Sharmistha Sinha1
Abstract
This paper examines gender based disparities in the labour market, that persist 
across the globe in the form of low participation, occupational segregation, 
vulnerable employment, wage disparity, limited access to skill, gendered division 
of unpaid work and other forms of discrimination within and outside the labour 
market, which have serious implications on female empowerment and upon the 
macro economy. It gives an overview of the gendered structure of the labour 
market, focusing particularly the global South, taking selected countries from Latin 
America, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The paper discusses the various 
economic and social dynamics – both structural and trends, and looks at the policy 
structures in different countries of these three regions that govern the constraints 
to full economic participation of women. With this, the paper goes into analysing 
progressive strategies to reduce gender based inequities in the world of work – 
both paid and unpaid - to ensure stability and expansion of decent employment 
opportunities among women. 
Introduction
Inequality between the developed economies and developing ones, particularly in the Global 
South, between the richer and the poorer within a country, and in different other paradigms 
like regional, rural-urban, gender, social groups has increased in many countries over the 
last few decades, with rising disparities in income, land and other productive assets, work 
conditions, structural change in the labour market, access to education, health and other 
dimensions of human development. Various social groups, especially women, children, 
persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and migrants suffer disproportionately from 
income poverty and inadequate access to quality services. It is multi-dimensional, and is 
increasing across and within many countries, particularly in the South. 
Rising inequality has huge implications for social and economic development with 
its powerful and corrosive effects on economic growth, poverty alleviation, social and 
1  The author is the Deputy Director at the National Institute of Labour Economics Research and Development, NITI Aayog, Government of 
India. Her research interests include gender and macroeconomics, changing employment patterns across the world, inequality; email: sinha.
sharmistha@gmail.com
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economic stability and socially-sustainable development. In the aftermath of the global 
fi nancial and economic crisis, people living in poverty and vulnerable social groups, 
across the globe, have been affected a fortiori, adding urgency to the need to address 
inequalities and their consequences. Harsh fi scal austerities have constricted public 
expenditure, the brunt of the crisis thus falling more on the people, thus increasing their 
vulnerability and raising discontent towards the government, even in countries with 
consolidated democracies.
Globally, there exists huge inequality in the distribution of income. In 2012, the gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita in sub-Saharan Africa stood at $ 1,666, as against 
GDPs per capita of $ 32917 in the European Union and $ 51755 in the United States. 
Though the Latin American and Caribbean countries, Sub-Saharan Africa and the South 
Asian countries have been growing faster than the developed countries, the absolute 
gap in GDP per capita has been increasing between the developed nations and these 
groups (WDI, 2013) (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Difference in GDP per capita (US$) between developed economies and selected 
developing economies in the South (in US$)
2000 2012
Developed and Latin America and the Caribbean  18098.99 28616.16
Developed and South Asia 22049.81 36993.27
Developed and Sub-Saharan Africa 21962.43 36723.06
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, 2013
Fig. 1: GDP per capita (US$) in different countries
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx?isshared=true, accessed on 11 July 2014
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There are various dimensions of inequality. This paper will focus on labour market 
discrimination in terms of employment opportunities and wages – specifically on the 
unequal relations and labour market outcomes arising out of gender based discrimination 
and its relation to macroeconomic policies. 
Do gender based disparities in the labour market affect economic growth?
Gender based disparities persist in the form of limited access to assets, credit facilities, 
education and skill, burden of unpaid work at home, occupational segregation, wage 
discrimination, regularity of earnings, and concentration in self-employment, working 
mostly as family helpers. But underutilization of the full economic potential of women and 
gender based discrimination can have serious macroeconomic consequences. Cuberes 
and Teighnier (2012) estimate GDP per capita losses to the extent of 27 per cent because 
of gender gaps in the labour market. It is estimated that of the 865 million women 
worldwide who have the potential to contribute more fully to their national economies, 
812 million live in developing economies. Aguirre et al. (2012) suggest that if the female 
labour force participation rate (LFPR) is raised to country-specific male levels, it would, 
for instance, raise GDP in the United States by five per cent, in Japan by nine per cent, 
in the United Arab Emirates by 12 per cent, and in Egypt by 34 per cent.
There are various economic and social dynamics that govern the constraints to full 
economic participation of women. Even if they participate, given their reproductive 
responsibilities and the gendered structure of the labour market, they are concentrated 
mainly in ‘survivalist’ rather than ‘growth’ activities. The paper probes into the inequities 
in different sectors, regardless of income or class status, ethnicity or location, the type 
of employment women get engaged with and remunerations for their work, and tries to 
determine the factors leading to such disproportionate outcomes. 
Gendered structure of the labour market
Participation in the labour market
Between the early 1990s and 2007, world employment grew by around 30 per cent. 
However, the performance of the labour market varied between regions, the share of 
wages in GDP declined in many countries, and the gains from employment generation 
were not equally distributed among individuals in most of the countries. Gender based 
disparities persist in the labour market, as well as in the sphere of unpaid work. The female 
employment-to-population ratio has been consistently low, with women concentrated in 
low productivity and low pay occupations. Though there have been improvements over 
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time, globally, the labour force-to-population ratio was 77.1  per cent for males, and 
51.1 per cent for females in 2013 (ILO, 2014).
Table 2: Gender gaps in labour force participation rates (LFPR) (%)
Male labour force 
participation rate
Female labour force 
participation rate
Gap (percentage points)
Region 1992 2002 2013 1992 2002 2013 1992 2002 2013
WORLD 80.2 78.1 77.1 52.4 52.1 51.1 27.9 26.1 26
Developed economies 
and European Union
71.8 69.4 67.5 50.3 51.7 52.8 21.5 17.7 14.7
Central & Southeastern 
Europe (non-EU) & CIS
74.1 68 70.7 52.6 49.1 50.2 21.5 18.9 20.5
East Asia 84.2 81.4 79.4 71.4 69.1 66.4 12.8 12.4 13
Southeast Asia  
and Pacific
82.6 82.8 81.8 58.4 58.4 58.8 24.2 24.4 23.1
South Asia 84.8 83.3 81.3 36.1 35.8 31.8 48.6 47.5 49.5
Latin America  
and Caribbean
82.5 80.3 79.5 43.5 49.6 53.6 39 30.7 25.9
Middle East 77.6 73.8 74.3 13.3 17.2 18.7 64.3 56.6 55.5
North Africa 74.4 74.1 74.3 21.8 21.2 24.4 52.6 52.9 49.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 79 76.5 76.3 60.3 63.5 64.6 18.6 13 11.8
Source: Global Employment Trends, ILO, 2014
There are wide disparities in female LFPR among different countries/regions. It is 
high in many Sub-Saharan African countries, often more than the LFPR in developed 
economies, as in case of Zambia, Ghana, Botswana etc. (Fig 2a). Most of the work is 
subsistence based, and confined to farming and household enterprises. In some cases, 
remaining out of the labour force is not an option for women, as they have to engage 
themselves in some economic activities to eke out a livelihood. In India and Sri Lanka, 
the female LFPR is alarmingly low, with an increasing gender gap over the last ten years 
(difference between the male and female LFPR). Open unemployment is less in South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, but vulnerable employment (defined as own account 
workers plus unpaid family workers) is extremely high (at 76 per cent in 2012).  In India, 
Bangladesh, Ghana, Zambia etc. it reaches the extent of 85 per cent, as against three to 
four per cent in Norway and Sweden. In Brazil and Venezuela, female LFPR is about 50 
per cent. Chile, one of the most developed economies in Latin America, is closing the 
gender gap but the female LFPR at 47 per cent is much lower than the average (54 per 
cent) for Latin America taken as a whole. This low labour force participation of women is 
also accompanied by a low level of estimated income and high wage inequality among 
men and women. The ratio of female wages over male wages for similar work is less than 
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0.5 (Figure 4). In 2012, 388 million of the female workforce (66 per cent of the workforce) 
in South Asia was extremely poor (below US$2 a day), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa 
where 204 million of the workforce (63 per cent) were working poor (GET, 2014). 
Fig. 2a: Female and male LFPR, 2013 (%)
Fig. 2b: Gender gap in LFPR in 2013 (by percentage points)
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Fig 2c: Vulnerable employment among females, 2013 (%)
Source: World Development Indicators, 2014
Agriculture is the main source of employment for women in the rural areas of Sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia. In Latin America, rural female workers 
are equally distributed between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. In the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), rural women work mostly as self-employed agricultural 
workers, and rural men work mostly as non-agricultural wage earners. Self-employment 
is usually more prevalent among women, and thus they are less likely to be wage earners 
as compared to men. Among the self-employed, women are more likely than men to 
be working as family (rather than own-account) enterprise workers, mostly in traditional 
agriculture. South Asian women are also more likely to remain unpaid for work in their 
own family business, than in any other region. ILO data for 2007 indicates that 59 per 
cent of the total female labour force in South Asia works as contributing family workers, 
compared to 36 per cent in Southeast Asia and the Pacifi c, 35 per cent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and only seven per cent in Latin America. The corresponding shares for men are 
18 per cent in South Asia, 18 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa, and four per cent in Latin 
America (ILO, 2008). In contrast, in Central Asia and Europe, non-agricultural activities 
are the main source of employment for both men and women, where the majority of the 
rural population works as wage employees. 
In India, 76 million out of the 101 million rural women workers were engaged in 
agriculture in 2012. Among them, 37 million were unpaid family workers. In manufacturing 
too, 70 per cent of the women workers were self-employed, and 25 per cent of women 
workers in the manufacturing sector were family helpers (in both rural and urban areas). 
On one hand, female employment has declined since 2010; on the other, vulnerable 
employment is high among women. Female LFPR showed a decline in the period when 
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the Indian economy was growing at an unprecedented rate. During 2004-05 to 2009-
10, the female LFPR declined from 29 per cent to 23 per cent, and further down to 22 
per cent in 2011-12 (NSS Report, 2013). Even though there had been a decline in the 
employment of females in agriculture, 75 per cent of rural women are dependent on this 
sector.
Though women are the mainstay of small-scale agriculture, they lack land titles 
and other forms of property rights which then deprive them of the typically associated 
benefits, such as access to institutional credit, extension services and subsidized inputs, 
decision making and technology, post harvest management, and remunerative marketing 
opportunities. Additionally, in times of any economic crisis, they are more likely to be 
deprived of the benefits of crisis relief packages. It is also to be noted that with regard 
to ecological degradation and changing agricultural technology and practices, women’s 
work has become harder and more time-consuming, as they are largely dependent on 
agriculture and work mostly as manual workers.
In the industrial sector, men are more likely to be employed than women. This holds 
true even for developed economies – the lowest female to male ratios were exhibited in 
several developed economies like Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Canada and Australia 
in 1990 and 2010. It is especially notable that there has been a decline in the ratio of 
female-to-male share employed in the industrial sector since 2000 in countries where 
manufacturing employment was ‘feminized’ in the 1980s and 1990s, like in Mauritius, 
Hong Kong, SAR of China and Morocco, as they became more capital intensive. With 
globalization, poor women working in the manufacturing sector in developing countries 
have become more engaged in export-oriented labour-intensive manufacturing, with 
home based manufacturing being mostly at the end of the global value chain. In India, 
there has been an increase in the share of home based workers – those who work on 
their own (the self-employed), as well as those who work for others (mainly as industrial 
outworkers). With contracting and sub-contracting in developing countries, jobs in the 
manufacturing sector are increasingly shifting from factory floors to the home, and are 
performed predominantly by women. 
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Fig 3: Share of female workers by sectors, 2013
Horizontal and vertical segregation 
Women’s work is largely segregated into a few sectors, in occupations which are mainly 
informal, with low wages or profi ts, devoid of any social insurance, low in productivity 
(return for labour), and often with more drudgery (in terms of working hours and 
conditions). Despite the narrowing gender gap in education, there is still dependence on 
self-employment and other informal and intermittent type of work. 
In Angola, despite a very high economic growth in the last decade, inequality and 
levels of extreme poverty remain quite high. About 68 per cent of the Angolan population 
lived on less than $2 per day (in PPP) in 2009.  Poverty is greater in female-headed 
households, especially in rural areas. Even though agriculture and fi sheries contribute to 
only eight to ten per cent of the GDP, they account for more than 80 per cent of all jobs 
generated in the country. Women represent 70 per cent of total agricultural employment, 
including fi sheries. In urban areas, women are concentrated mainly in the informal sectors. 
Following the end of confl ict, the growth of the Angolan economy has been mainly driven 
by oil exports and, to some extent, diamond exports, which have been accelerating due 
to favourable international oil prices. But there has been an excessive appreciation in the 
real exchange rate (from the ‘hard-kwanza’) and a rise in prices of non-tradable goods 
within the domestic economy, and therefore very limited diversifi cation of the economy. 
However, there has been practically no diversifi cation towards service export activities or 
towards agriculture, light manufacturing, etc. where women are more engaged. 
In Kenya, South Africa and Zambia, which have the most rapidly growing high value 
agricultural export industries like fresh fl owers, fruits and vegetables, women comprise 
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about 70 per cent of the agricultural labour force and are concentrated in the most 
vulnerable and temporary segments of the commodity chains. In Africa, in general, 
informalization is very high, particularly when provided by global commodity chains. 
However, unlike chains in manufacturing, or in services such as data processing and 
other KPOs, here the chains are mainly agriculture based.
A structural shift is observed in many Sub-Saharan African countries, with changes 
in the gender based division of labour within informal sectors. In the face of high 
unemployment, men have started taking up many of the lucrative women’s jobs in the 
informal sector, like women’s tailoring, informal cosmetics manufacturing in West Africa, 
and beer brewing in East Africa. Women, on the other hand, are shifting to men’s informal 
activities, which are at the lower end (Meagher, 2010). 
Transnational informal economic networks are proliferating in many parts of Africa, like 
the ‘Mama Benz’ trading networks in West Africa, Hausa networks of Nigeria, Mouride 
networks of Senegal etc., all of which are extremely male dominated. If there are any 
women, they are mainly concentrated in the most vulnerable, low income end of these 
networks. Transnational informal employment opportunities for women have evolved 
very rapidly, but are mostly associated with global care chains for unregistered domestic 
labour or care for the elderly, and global prostitution networks associated with rising 
levels of female trafficking (Meagher, 2010). 
Therefore, there are varied and deep gender dynamics and power structures embedded 
within and outside the labour market that regulate how women are incorporated into 
this market. On the one hand, there are social stereotypes and legal norms. Women 
are pressed with high unpaid work, social welfare services, unequal access to skills, 
lack of access to productive assets and land rights, high prevalence of violence and 
so on, which disadvantage them in the labour market. But other than social difficulties, 
there is another factor, probably the most important, which is that international financial 
institutions and multinational corporations at the head of global commodity chains 
govern the structure of the labour market more dominantly, as we saw in case of Africa. 
Among the Latin American countries, there are more non-agricultural employment 
opportunities. Despite the rise in women´s participation rates and the growth of female 
employment in most of these countries, the labour market remains noticeably sex 
segmented, with the majority of women concentrated in services, and in wholesale and 
retail trade, while men are distributed more equally across all sectors. Moreover, a higher 
proportion of men are salaried workers, as compared with women. In 2011, in Chile, 78 
per cent of the male labour force occupied salaried positions, as compared with 66 per 
cent in the case of women. Domestic service was almost exclusively female, absorbing 
11.8 per cent of the female labour force, and only 0.6 per cent of the male labour force 
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(Rein, 2011). Open unemployment among women was close to ten per cent. 
Brazil, one of the largest economies of the world and the most populous country 
of Latin America, is much behind in terms of gender parity in economic participation 
and wage equality. The gender gap in Brazil is fully closed both in health and survival, 
and in education. But in terms of economic participation it has a long way to go, with 
the country ranking 81 out of 134, according to the Global Gender Gap Report, 2014 
– just three per cent closer to the closure of the gender gap in LFPR over the last ten 
years (Figure 2b). Therefore, the country with significant improvements in educational 
attainment has a huge educated talent pool which remains untapped. Investments in 
education are not seeing the returns that they ideally should have, had the barriers to 
women’s participation in the labour market been removed, particularly with regard to 
productive and remunerative employment opportunities. The case is similar in Japan 
and Chile. India too has witnessed rising female enrolment in education, which is again 
one of the important factors explaining the decline in female LFPR post-2005. These 
women are likely to, and should, join the labour force in the coming five to ten years, for 
which significant productive employment opportunities need to be created in the non-
agricultural sector so that they don’t go back to agriculture or low paid, low productive, 
non-agricultural sectors. 
In Brazil, the informal labour market is significant, though it is transforming over time. 
Women are overrepresented in the informal economy, working mainly as home based 
workers (own account workers), sub-contracted wage workers, small traders etc. The 
estimated earned income of women is only 59 per cent that of men, and in terms of wages 
it is 50 per cent of what men get. The difference arises as Brazil has started implementing 
targeted reforms to remove restrictions in access to resources and entitlements for women. 
The share of women who own land titles increased from 13 to 56 per cent between 2003 
and 2007, attributed mainly to the National Documentation Program for Rural Women 
Workers (Woytek, 2013). The Bolsa Familia direct cash transfer programme, launched 
in 2003, has increased women’s share in household income. Recently, in Brazil, legal 
changes have been approved giving more workplace rights to the country’s estimated 
6.5 million strong army of maids and other domestic helpers. The entitlements include 
minimum wages, a break during the day, social security coverage and a working week 
limited to 44 hours and a maximum eight hour day. The new amendments which is being 
cleared and passed by the Congress in June 2015 include entitlements to extra payments 
for night work, severance pay if fired without just cause, contributions to nursery care 
and insurance against workplace accidents (The Hindu, 2015). Such policy reforms are 
positive steps and need to be expanded to every sector, which will have a long term 
impact on just not the welfare of the women workers or their individual future but on the 
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economy as well. AIAS (2009) shows that an increase in Statutory Minimum Wage in 
Brazil during 1995-2005 accounted for 44% of the total reduction of the Gini coeffi cient 
of the country. Along with rise in SMW, wider and stronger net of legislations are needed, 
particularly in the informal sector which engages a signifi cant share of women, to promote 
gender equality and empowerment of women.   
Wage disparity 
Gender based wage disparity cuts across all countries and both developed and 
developing economies. Undervaluation of women’s work, sex segregation channelling 
women into low value added jobs, an overall wage structure in the economy with a focus 
on sectors that are male dominated, the view of women as economic dependants and 
secondary earners, women being concentrated in informal work and therefore out of 
the ambit of unions etc., and women as unpaid workers within the family and also the 
economic sphere, all contribute to the wage gap.  
Fig 4: Gender wage gap (ratio of female to male wages for similar work), 2013 
Source: Global gender gap report, 2014
There are other factors too. For instance, there is often a calculated process of 
suppressing women in the labour market in the form of low wages, informality etc. and 
thus raising the rate of profi t. In the pretext of increasing and sustaining competitiveness, 
there has been a downward mobility of wages, increasing casualization, a shift to part-time 
work or piece-rate contracts, and an insistence on greater freedom of hiring and fi ring. 
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Low female wages have in fact spurred investment and exports by lowering unit labour 
costs, providing the necessary resources to purchase capital and intermediate goods 
that raise productivity and growth rates. In export-oriented activities, women workers are 
preferred by employers, primarily because of the lower pay (which women might accept 
as they have lower reservation wages than men), longer hours and inferior conditions of 
work, less secure contracts, and because they typically do not unionize. Hiring and firing 
is easier as life-cycle changes such as marriage and childbirth are used to terminate their 
employment and engage a fresher set of female workers. The high ‘burnout’ in many 
of the sunrise sectors of the late 20th century, such as consumer electronics, required 
periodic replacement of workers, which was easier when the employed group consisted 
of young, mostly unmarried, women who could move on to other phases of their life 
cycle (Ghosh, 2013a, 2013b).
As often argued, especially in a globalized economy where firms are under a great 
deal of pressure to hire least-cost workers, demand for female labour will be sustained 
and, eventually, upward pressure on female wages will lead to wage convergence of 
male and female workers. 
One factor affecting the widening gender gap in the labour market may be the 
insufficient public support for care work or policies, thus increasing their burden, and 
therefore restricting women’s participation in the labour market, or confining it mainly 
to those activities which they can easily calibrate with their household duties. However, 
this unpaid work is not exogenous to the economic system. Women’s work contributes 
to the economy even if it is not recognized or accounted for. women’s work – be it 
unpaid work, non-remunerative family help, self-employment or low paid wage work 
– actually adds to capital accumulation through non-payment, lesser payment, piece 
rated payment, informality of structure, keeping it home based (thus avoiding social 
protection) and flexible (thus irregular hours spent on work), but extracting the surplus 
value from their work (both paid and unpaid).
Unpaid work – the gender dynamics
Women’s ability to participate in the labour market is constrained by a higher allocation 
of time to unpaid work like child care, care for the elderly, ill as well as able bodied adults, 
cooking, cleaning, collecting water and fuel, and other household activities. Even though 
their contribution to non-economic activities leads to substantial economic gains, it often 
remains unrecognized and unaccounted. It goes unseen that their labour in unpaid work 
frees the male members to go out to work. This gender dynamic at the household level 
leads to gender division between market and household work, and vice versa. 
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Fig 4: Time spent in unpaid work (minutes per day) 
Source: OECD statistics, 2013
The chore gap, defi ned as the gender-wise difference in time spent in unpaid work, 
like care, household duties etc., is signifi cantly high in India. Women spend an average of 
352 minutes per day on unpaid work, as against 52 minutes per day by men. In Japan, 
Korea and South Africa, too, the gap is very high. Therefore, women spend more time 
on unpaid work. In contrast, in Norway, Sweden, the United States, Germany, Belgium 
and Australia, men spend about 150 to 170 minutes per day on unpaid work, therefore 
reducing the disparity. More women are thereby released, who can join the labour force. 
Sweden’s generous and fl exible parental leave policy with a high coverage rate for 
child care, job guarantees and eligibility for reduced working hours, contributes to high 
female labour participation rate, with a gender gap of only six per cent. The Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, who have the highest 
public spending as a share of GDP on child care and education services for children 
under the age of fi ve, have been found to have higher employment rates among mothers 
with young children (Aguirre et al., 2012).
The ‘Skilled Labour Strategy’ in Germany has, since 2011, included measures  to 
improve the availability of child care facilities, and to promote more family-friendly working 
hours, in order to raise the female LFPR of 52 per cent, as against 66 per cent of male 
LFPR (Woytek et al., 2012). 
It is estimated that female LFPR in Japan would rise if career opportunities for women 
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were enhanced along with better child care facilities, which would then lead to a rise 
in the annual economic growth rate of the country (Steinberg and Nakane, 2012). 
Antonopolous and Kim (2011), in their study on the economic benefits of investing in 
social care (South Africa and United States), argue that job creation in the care of children 
and the elderly can increase female labour force participation by reducing the burden of 
unpaid work for women and girls, and expanding income earning options for women. 
The Programa de Estancias Infantiles para Apoyar a Madres Trabajadoras (PEIMT), 
a federal programme in Mexico, aims to provide day-care to facilitate female labour 
market engagement, as well as to promote the development of children. The programme 
provides financial support to both individuals and to public organizations that intend to 
start up nurseries, and a subsidy to low-income mothers. In 2011, 45,000 jobs were 
created for day-care providers and their assistants, mainly poor women, while 300,000 
children were enrolled and 10,000 day-care centres were registered in the programme. In 
1986, Colombia established the Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar (HCB) programme, 
through which community nurseries were created and the focus was on childhood 
development, nutrition and health, with the government providing food and nutritional 
supplements for children. Even though this programme does not explicitly intend to 
improve female labour force participation, Attanasio and Vera-Hernandez (2004) found 
that HCB participation increased the probability of mothers’ employment and working 
hours. 
All countries in Latin America experience early marriage of women, which then tends 
to extend and enhance the reproductive period of women, thus spending more time on 
unpaid work. This hinders the probability of their gaining skill levels, delays their entry into 
the formal sector, and impedes their continuation in it. OECD statistics demonstrate that 
all countries of Latin America experience degrees of violence against women that have 
serious implications on productivity levels (Rein, 2011).  
In every country, even those where female LFPR is high, there should be regulatory 
reforms to support child and elderly care. It has been observed that in many countries, 
women are mostly in vulnerable employment, concentrated mainly in the agricultural 
sector. Enforcing regulatory reforms will release women so they can allocate more time 
to pursue education/skills, which would further increase their productivity, generate more 
employment, and reduce gender based disparities at household and labour market to 
some extent. This, again, needs more public investment in the service facilities, including 
those that directly impact the time allocation of women.   
Formal part-time employment to balance work with family responsibilities
The gendered division of labour outside the labour market has significant implications on 
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the labour market itself. To balance work and family responsibilities, women often seek 
jobs that are flexible and part-time, often home-based jobs. This undermines women’s 
position and negotiating power in the paid labour market, and often hinders their access 
to credit and other productive resources. Many European countries are experimenting 
with formal part-time employment, based on the ILO Part-time Work Convention (C175) 
and the European Community Directive. In the Netherlands, the female LFPR has 
increased since 2000, as part-time work contracts have been regularized along with 
social security coverage, well-compensated parental leave, employment protection and 
rules as full-time workers, also facilitating the transition from part-time to full-time status 
(ILO, 2010; Steinberg  and Nakane, 2012). However, part-time work arrangements which 
can enhance female LFPR can also perpetuate gender roles, resulting in disadvantages 
in career development. 
Conclusion
Across countries, women’s economic participation is lower than that of men, women 
account for most of the unpaid and non-economic work, and in the labour market 
women are over-represented in the low-productive agriculture sector and other informal 
sectors, as well as among the poor. Various factors, both economic and non-economic, 
which are often interlinked, contribute to the gender based inequities. Intra-household 
division of labour implies more time allocation for women in unpaid work such as the care 
of children, the elderly, and ill as well as able bodied adults, cooking, cleaning, collecting 
water and fuel and other household activities, which restrain their participation in paid 
economic activities to a large extent. Long periods of absence from the labour market 
reduce their skills. Public investments to provide basic service facilities are very low in 
most of the countries. The provision of child care facilities, drinking water, sanitation, 
health care etc. can help women to join the labour market. Publicly financed parental 
leave schemes can also help shift gender norms and support an increase in female 
LFPR.
Even though there have been improvements in education, illiteracy still looms large, 
more so among women. Lack of education and skills is an important factor that deters 
female participation and upward mobility. There is practically no technical education 
among women. Educational and professional training and certification courses, including 
introductory training and continuous learning, high school-level technical professional 
education, and technological higher education courses are necessary. Training institutes 
are generally city based, which makes it difficult for rural women to access them. Therefore, 
there should be increased expenditure on female education, along with improvements 
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in spatial distribution of the educational and training institutes and development of rural 
infrastructure, to boost female LFPR in emerging and developing countries.
International financial institutions and multinational corporations at the head of global 
commodity chains decide the rules governing the labour market to a large extent, as in 
the case of Africa. The case is similar in many parts of Asia, where women are generally 
at the lowest end of the global value added chains. These distortions, which are artificially 
created for the economic gains of the market, have an adverse impact not only on the 
economic gains of the country but also on the sufferings of women even though they 
often work more than men.
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Situating India’s Food Security Challenges 
in a Political Economy Framework1
Roshan Kishore2
Abstract
Notwithstanding claims of reduction in poverty, undernourishment continues to be 
an acute problem in India. The enactment of National Food Security Act was a subtle 
admission of this problem. However, it is early days to comment whether the act 
will succeed in its objectives, given the myriad factors which would determine the 
pursuit of food security, many of which are rooted in the nature of overall economic 
regime. 
Introduction 
The post-Independence economic regime in India had a significant element of state 
control and economic planning involved in it. While the model is credited with achieving 
feats like the development of heavy industries, and later, the Green Revolution which 
imparted self-sufficiency in food grains for the country, it attracted criticism from the 
votaries of deregulation for repressing the market forces and hence preventing an efficient 
allocation of resources. This policy orientation, it was argued, was the main reason for 
poverty and disguised unemployment in the agriculture sector in the country.3 Although 
the dilution of this policy regime had started in the 1980s itself, it is 1991 which is taken 
as a watershed year in terms of shift in economic policy in India. Today, after more than 
two decades of unleashing economic reforms in the country, there is adequate evidence 
to examine the distributional and welfare implications of these policies. The findings are 
in keeping with the acquired wisdom that merely increasing the growth rate of GDP 
need not lead to better distributional and welfare implications, unless conscious efforts 
are made towards this goal. The biggest policy indictment of the adverse effects of the 
neoliberal growth trajectory on welfare can be found in the coinage of the term ‘inclusive 
growth’, after the initial bravado of increased growth rates alone being the silver bullet 
died down by the end of 1990s. The central argument which the paper tries to buttress 
is the following: being the “spontaneous system” that it is, capitalism in its neoliberal 
1 This paper was presented by the author in his capacity as a participant at the 7th South-South on ‘Inequality, Democracy and Development un-
der Neoliberalism and Beyond’ organized by the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO), the Council for the Development of Social 
Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the International Development Economic Associates (IDEAs) held in November 2014 in Bangkok.
2 PhD candidate, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India.
3 Bhagwati (2001)
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phase has generated its own dynamics which might impose restrictions on the ability of 
policy makers to successfully pursue welfare augmenting policies, without running into 
a conflict with other classes in the domestic and global economy. In other words, unless 
there is a structural break from the neoliberal/free market growth trajectory itself, the 
idea of ensuring growth through all possible means and then distributing the enhanced 
resources to augment welfare might not work. The paper will try and make this argument 
by highlighting issues related to food security in the Indian economy. 
I: State of food insecurity in India and its underlying causes
While there is an implicit admission of the fact that economic reforms have not been 
successful in delivering on the promises which were made, the official view continues 
to assert that there has been a significant decline in poverty during this period.4 Given 
the fact that income data is not available in India and the official poverty estimates are 
not pegged to any consistent benchmark, these claims have drawn scathing criticism 
in literature, with alternative estimates suggesting a significant increase in direct (calorie 
norm based) poverty during this period.5
As per Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) data, the number of food insecure 
people in India has hovered around the 200 million mark since the last two decades. 
Although FAO data does show a 10 per cent decline in the share of undernourished 
people, it needs to be underlined that estimates of food insecurity by FAO are extremely 
conservative by its own admission. Not only are they based on nutrition requirements for 
a sedentary lifestyle – which requires much less energy than anybody who is engaged 
in manual labour would need – there are other conceptual problems in the way these 
estimates are calculated.6 To give an example, FAO’s food security cut-off for India is 
1,788 kcal/day, while the Indian Council of Medical Research has pegged nutrition 
requirements (which were supposed to be the benchmark of poverty calculations 
originally) at 2,100 kcal/day and 2,400 kcal/day for urban and rural areas, respectively.  
Given the fact that poverty has been ‘officially’ declining in India during the reform 
period, it is to be assumed that food insecurity should have been declining as well. 
However, this is not supported by data regarding nutritional intake in the country. As 
per National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) data, there has been a continuous 
decline in the calorie and protein intake levels in the country during the reform period, as 
is shown in Table 1. 
4  As per official estimates, the percentage of people below poverty line in India declined from 35.97 to 21.92 between 1993-94 and 2011-12 
(data given in Reserve Bank of India website).
5  For example, see Patnaik (2007) and Patnaik (2013)
6  For a discussion on these issues see Annex 2, FAO (2012) and Wise et al (2012) 
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Table 1: Nutritional Intake in India
Calorie (Kcal/day) Protein (gram/day) Fat (gram/day)
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
1993-94 2153 2071 60.2 57.2 31.4 42
2004-05 2047 2020 57 57 35.5 47.5
2009-10 2020 1946 55 53.5 38.3 47.9
Source: Various NSSO Reports
The reason for this decline appears to be a sharp fall in cereal consumption during 
this period, given the fact that it continues to provide a big share of calorie and protein 
intake in India (more than 50 and 60 per cent in urban and rural areas). Chart 1 shows 
the trends in per person cereal consumption. 
Chart 1: Cereal consumption in India
Source: Various NSSO Reports
Clearly, there seems to be a conflict between the claims of declining poverty and 
worsening nutrition levels as a result of a sharp decline in cereal consumption. At the 
root of this conflict is the economic explanation of the decline in cereal consumption in 
the country during this period. The official view has been to attribute this reduction to a 
voluntary dietary diversification owing to increasing incomes, along with factors such as 
reduced calorie needs, etc.7 However, given the fact that there exists no income data 
7  For example, see 3.13.4, NSSO Report Number 538,‘Level and Pattern of Consumer Expenditure’.
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to back this claim and this period has witnessed a fall in nutrition levels, there is enough 
reason to be circumspect about this explanation. 
In 2013, the government enacted a National Food Security Act (NFSA) in the country, 
which seeks to bring up to two-thirds of the population in the country under the coverage 
of subsidized cereal provisions.8 This marked a partial undoing of the dilution of the 
erstwhile Public Distribution System (PDS) into a Targeted Public Distribution System 
(TPDS), which brought in a distinction between Above Poverty Line and Below Poverty 
Line households where the former were entitled to cereals from the PDS at much higher 
prices. Although the NFSA stopped short of making the PDS into a universal scheme, 
it does involve a significant distribution of subsidized cereals if implemented in letter 
and spirit. At the level of policy making, the NFSA amounts to a subtle admission of the 
fact that the logic of increasing incomes leading to declining cereal consumption was 
a flawed one, lest there would be no logical basis to such a large-scale programme 
that seeks to boost cereal consumption of up to two thirds of the population. While the 
journey from TPDS to NFSA is a classic case of readjustment in economic policy making 
to pursue welfare goals, the question that arises is whether the goal can be achieved. 
II: Can the NFSA successfully ensure food security in India?
This section will deal with two issues primarily: one, whether the NFSA can be implemented 
successfully and live up to its objectives; and two, does it successfully address the 
various aspects which concern the ensuring of food security in the country? The answer 
to this question is connected with the design of the programme, state of food production 
and management in the economy and policy space vis-à-vis India’s commitments to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Cash transfer based food security programmes versus direct provisioning of 
food grains
First of all, the fact that the NFSA is a targeted programme makes its success contingent 
on the appropriate handling of the identification problem, failing which it can suffer from 
large-scale wrong exclusion, which would defeat the very purpose of the programme. 
Wrong exclusion was one of the biggest reasons for the failure of TPDS to ensure food 
security in the country. Notwithstanding this important concern, there are additional 
reasons to believe that the manner in which the NFSA is being planned would create 
more problems in the pursuit of food security. 
Food security policy in India has been based on the public stockholding route, where 
the government procures foodgrains through the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and then 
8  See National Food Security Act at http://indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/202013.pdf.
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distributes it through a network of Fair Price Shops (FPSs) across the country. Arguments 
have been made that such a system is inefficient and leakage prone, and should make 
way for a cash transfer based food security programme where targeted beneficiaries 
can access foodgrains from the open market by using monetary entitlements transferred 
to them under the food security programme.9 An additional argument which has been 
made in support of such a policy transition is its conformity to Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA) rules in the WTO.10
There is a strong ground to argue that such a policy change would be detrimental 
to the ability of the NFSA to ensure food security. There is a rich literature which argues 
that cash transfers can lead to mixed outcomes when used for welfare programmes 
due to various factors.11 Any successful cash transfer programme requires a large 
administrative apparatus, which involves huge costs. In a country with a population as 
large as India, the administrative costs of running a successful cash transfer programme 
can be prohibitively high. Also, the probability of cash transfers being successful is 
contingent on the level of financial inclusion in a given region, which tends to be much 
lower in Third World countries compared to developed ones. There is also the risk of 
cash entitlements being diverted for other usage instead of buying foodgrains, which 
can undermine the objective the programme itself. Another important constraint which 
all cash transfer based programmes face is the question in indexation of entitlements. 
Given the fact that food inflation tends to be much higher in Third World countries, a 
failure to regularly index cash entitlements can lead to erosion in the real value of food 
entitlements of the food security programme. 
In addition to these factors, there is another important reason why shifting to a cash 
transfer based food security programme from the public stockholding route can be 
counterproductive from the viewpoint of food security in India. This has to do with the 
fact that there exists a large amount of pent up demand for cereals in India due to the 
lack of economic wherewithal, with a large part of the population to access them, which 
is what the NFSA seeks to bridge by providing grains at subsidized prices. Even if one 
were to assume that the cash transfer based programme can overcome all identification 
and indexation problems, the food security programme would be faced with a situation 
where an additional and significantly large (the NFSA talks about distributing more than 
55 million tons of cereals) price inelastic demand for cereals would be created in the 
market, as the government is committed to indexing the entitlements for any change in 
prices. In a situation where the government has frittered away its ability to control the 
9  For example see Basu (2011) 
10  More on this will follow in the discussion.
11  For example, see ‘Cash Transfers as a Strategy for Poverty Reduction: A critical assessment’ available at networkideas.org.
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food market by diluting its procurement mechanism, private players can easily indulge in 
speculative activities, thus increasing the cost of running such a programme. 
Food Security in any region is contingent on a complex interplay of demand and supply 
side factors. The FAO has described four key dimensions to it, namely, food availability, 
economic and physical access to food, food utilization, and stability (vulnerability and 
shocks).12 Whether or not a programme like the NFSA can be successful, depends not 
just on the design of the programme but the larger macroeconomic indicators which are 
captured in the four dimensions of food security listed above. Ascertaining the state of 
these factors requires a macroeconomic analysis of the overall food economy. 
The macroeconomic state of food production and agriculture during 
the neoliberal regime
Prior to the introduction of high  yielding varieties in India, or what is also termed as 
the Green Revolution in Indian agriculture, the economy was dependent on imports for 
fulfilling its foodgrain requirements. On the face of it, food production seems to have 
done reasonably well in India, with the total cereal production crossing 260 million tons 
and a continuous increase in cereal (primarily rice) exports during the reform period. The 
notion of a glut in food production has been further enforced by accumulating stocks 
with the government, which are at their highest levels. However, a closer examination 
of the situation reveals a different picture. First of all, there has been a decline in the per 
capita production and availability13  of cereals in the economy during the reform period. 
While there has been some recovery in the per capita production figures during the 11th 
Five Year Plan period, the availability figures have continued their downward trend. Chart 
2 shows these trends.
12 FAO(2013).
13   Availability = production + net import – addition to stocks.
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Chart 2: Per capita production and availability of cereals in India
Source: Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Government of India
The decline in per capita production and availability figures has serious repercussions 
for the Indian food economy. Not only does it show that increase in cereal production 
has failed to keep pace with population growth, it also points towards a fall in per capita 
demand for cereals in this period. It is important to introduce a distinction between the 
concept of direct and indirect demand for cereals at this point. While the direct demand 
for cereals (demand for cereal consumption in staple form) might decline with increasing 
incomes, the indirect component (as feed to raise meat based diets) increases with 
incomes and drives the total demand up with an increase in income levels. Yotopoulos14 
had described this relationship through a diagram which is given below.
Diagram 1: Relation between income and cereal demand
Source: Yotopoulos (1985)
14 Yotopoulos (1985) 
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The argument which Yotopoulos makes is consistent with both cross-sectional and 
time series international data on per capita availability of cereals, which shows higher per 
capita figures for countries with higher incomes. The argument developed by Yotopoulos 
debunks the thesis of increasing income leading to declining cereal consumption and 
buttresses our point that at present it would not be prudent to harbour notions of a glut 
in cereal production, since present consumption levels might be based on squeezed 
demand owing to lack of purchasing power. The Planning Commission also made similar 
observations in the 12th Five Year Plan document.15
Another important factor in the Indian food economy is large-scale procurement by 
the government and huge stocks of food grains which have been accumulated as a 
result of this process.16 Arguments have been made that increasing Minimum Support 
Prices (MSP) and unlimited procurement have led to an overproduction of rice and wheat 
in the country which has adversely affected the production of other crops, especially 
fruits and vegetables. While the exact nature of procurement and foodgrain policy has 
been a subject of much debate in the country17, there seems to be little factual ground 
for such claims, which was shown by a performance audit of the FCI by the official audit 
agency, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG). In its performance audit 
the CAG clearly said that the average procurement by the government had been less 
than its sanctioned offtake in the last five years, and the situation could only be salvaged 
because ex-post offtake figures were much less than what was decided ex-ante.18 While 
the government made a virtue of the situation, using it to justify its lower offtake, it is 
possible that the situation represents a failure on the part of the PDS to provide promised 
entitlements to its beneficiaries, which in turn is also contributing to the accumulation of 
reserves with the government. 
15   “Another important and related issue is the likely future demand for food. The Twelfth Plan Working Group on Crop Husbandry, Demand and 
Supply Projections, Agricultural Inputs and Agricultural Statistics has made projections for foodgrains and other food items by the terminal year 
of the Twelfth Plan, that is, 2016–17 … which would suggest that present levels of cereals production already exceed likely demand at the end 
of the Twelfth Plan. These projections are based on actual past patterns of observed demand and the fact that cereals consumption per capita 
has declined since at least mid-1990s. However, it is also the case that India has very high levels of malnutrition and, although there are many 
reasons for this, deficiencies in calorie intake remain one of the most important. With cereals supplying over 50 per cent of total calorie intake 
even now, falling cereals consumption is the main reason why per capita calorie intake has not increased despite rising incomes. It is not just that 
the share of cereals in total food expenditure is falling; even poor people are reducing the share of income spent on all foods in order to meet 
other non-food needs. In such a situation, where there is a disjunction between such a basic element of human development as nutrition and 
other demands in an increasingly consumerist society, there is need to ensure that minimum nutrition requirements are actually met.”  
Chapter 12, page 17, Volume II ‘Twelfth Five Year’ (2012-17), Planning Commission, YojanaBhawan, Government of India.
16  Against a buffer requirement of 250 lakh tonnes of rice and wheat, the government had food stocks to the extent of 427.45 lakh tones as per 
FCI data.
17  The newly elected government has formed a committee to look into the restructuring of FCI which is yet to submit its report.
18 http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_Report/Government_Wise/union_audit/recent_reports/union_performance/2013/
Civil/Report_7/Report_7.html.
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Shrinking policy space for pursuing public stockholding based food security 
programmes
The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Agriculture treats public stockholding 
based food security programmes (where foodgrains are procured at an administered 
price) as an amber box item. The quantum of support which is added to Aggregate 
Measure of Support (AMS) is the product of quantity of grain procured times the External 
Reference Price (ERP).19 India and other developing country members comprising the 
G-33 sought an amendment to this rule in the Bali Ministerial Conference of the WTO 
held last in December 2013, as it forecloses any effective use of a public stockholding 
based food security programme.20 As things stand right now, the WTO General Council 
has put in place a permanent peace clause which would provide immunity from being 
dragged to the WTO’s dispute settlement body to any developing country member that 
has such a programme in place, until a permanent solution is arrived upon. While the 
present arrangement is better compared to what existed before the Bali Ministerial, or 
the four-year peace clause that was agreed upon in Bali, it is by no means a win-win 
situation for food security policymaking in India. Firstly, the agreement imposes serious 
notification and information requirements vis-à-vis the procurement programme in the 
country and brings in the scope of interference by other WTO members. Also, the 
peace clause does not provide any immunity from disputes under the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures clause of the WTO, which can be used to challenge export of 
cereals from government stocks.
III: Is India’s pursuit of food security in sync with its agricultural policy?   
The foregoing discussion indicates that ensuring food security in India is not just a 
question of allocation of fiscal resources and distribution but linked to food production in 
a crucial way. In this regard it becomes important to evaluate whether policy making in 
agriculture is suited to creating an environment which would enhance cereal production 
in the country. We argue that there exists a wedge between the policy perspective vis-
à-vis food security and agriculture in India, which is capable of undermining the pursuit 
of former. To take an example, India has emerged as the most important stakeholder in 
the current efforts to amend the AoA rules which foreclose an effective use of the public 
stockholding route for food security, and understandably so, given the commitments 
made in the NFSA. However, even as the outcome of these efforts remains uncertain 
– given the strong reluctance of developed country WTO members, particularly the US 
19  External Reference Price is average international price of the commodities during 1986-88 (fob/cif price, depending on whether a country 
was exporter/importer). 
20  For a detailed discussion on this issue see Dhar and Kishore (2014) 
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and EU, to allow for any amendments to the AoA – important functionaries in the Indian 
policy making establishment have been arguing for dismantling the public stockholding 
food security programme and putting in place a cash transfer based programme where 
there would not be any need for the government to procure cereals in excess of its buffer 
stock requirements. While the final verdict on whether such a policy change would be 
implemented or not is still uncertain, these arguments seem to be resonating across the 
political spectrum, as can be seen from the volte face by the incumbent government that 
had promised 50 per cent return over and above the cost of cultivation to the farmers 
during the election campaign.21 At least four political economy factors can be attributed 
to these tendencies in the realm of agricultural policy making. While each of these merits 
a detailed study separately, a brief discussion on what they entail for India’s agriculture 
and food security is given below.
Worsening balance between income and employment in agriculture
Contrary to what was promised by the votaries of economic reforms, the balance 
between agriculture’s share of income and employment has been deteriorating steadily 
in India during the post reform period. Chart 5 shows these trends. 
Chart 5: Share of agriculture in employment and GDP
Source: GDP share from Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Government of India and Employment share from FAOSTAT Data
An important reason for this deterioration has been slow growth of employment 
opportunities outside agriculture, which is why there has not been a concomitant decline 
21  Instead of doing anything to fulfill its poll promise, the government issued an order which bars state governments from paying any bonus 
above the MSP to farmers. 
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in agriculture’s share in employment with the fall in its share in GDP. While a discussion on 
the reasons and scope of generating gainful employment outside agriculture is beyond 
the scope of this paper, there are enough grounds to argue that it would be extremely 
difficult to absorb the huge population which is engaged in agriculture in a country like 
India in manufacturing (on the lines of a Lewis Model type transformation), given the 
low employment generation potential of the sector today. Against this backdrop, the 
agricultural policy should be focused on preventing displacement of a large amount of 
labour force in imitation of agrarian sectors in the advanced capitalist countries, and 
ensure that smallholder agriculture remains viable so that distress driven outmigration 
does not happen. 
One of the most important policy measures which was taken to address this concern 
was the enactment of a rural employment guarantee scheme (MGNREGA) which 
entitled each member of a household to 100 days of unskilled labour. The newly elected 
government has made clear its intentions to dilute this law by restricting it to some of the 
most backward districts of the country.22 A glimpse of the government’s thinking on the 
labour question in agriculture can be seen in the previous year’s Economic Survey which 
laments the fact that compared to mechanization levels of more than 90 per cent in the 
West, Indian agriculture has mechanization levels of less than 25 per cent.23
There is an important political economy explanation to such a policy. The availability of 
a poorly paid rural labour force facilitates outmigration to urban areas, which ensures that 
wages remain low. Rural wages saw a rise after the enactment of the MGNREGA, thus 
inviting the ire of those who stand to gain by lower wages. However, while availability of 
a workforce willing to accept lower wages might do good for those who save in wage 
costs, such footloose labour is not only susceptible to the denial of minimum wages, 
given the lack of any bargaining power, but also most vulnerable to food insecurity, given 
the fact that it is ill-suited to avail of the extant welfare programmes as its mobile nature 
creates difficulties in accessing these programmes. 
Emerging imbalance between food security requirements and market dictated 
demand-supply scenario
As pressure on agricultural land is increasing for non-agricultural purposes like housing 
etc., the conflict regarding what the shrinking agricultural land should be used to grow 
is also deepening. Intuitively, when such a conflict comes into being, what is produced 
would depend on what would command the best price in the market, thus making the 
production basket sensitive to the demands of the rich. In India, the running refrain for 
22 http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/economists-petition-modi-against-dilution-of-mgnrega-114101301328_1.html
23  See Section 8.29, page 144 Economic Survey 2013-14.
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the last few years has been that unjust increase in MSPs has led to an over-cultivation 
of cereals at the cost of other agricultural products like fruits and vegetables, although 
there is no factual evidence to support the claim that cereals have had adverse acreage 
effect for fruits and vegetables in the recent period, as is shown in Chart 6.
Chart 6: Area under the cultivation of cereals, fruits and vegetables
Source: Database of Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India
However, there is evidence to suggest that in case of a situation where real MSPs are 
allowed to fall down by keeping nominal MSPs stagnant, there is a fall in the area under 
cereal cultivation as farmers try to shift to other crops which might be more remunerative 
in their view. Chart 7, which shows the trends in area under cultivation for wheat and MSP, 
proves this point. The fall in area under wheat cultivation, accompanied by a depletion of 
reserves through subsidized exports, necessitated the import of wheat in the country.24
24 India had to import 5.4 and 1.8 million tonnes of wheat in 2006-06 and 2007-08 after area under cultivation went down due to stagnant 
MSPs.
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Chart 7: Area under cultivation for wheat and MSP
Source: Database of Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India
An important reason for the adverse environment against MSP regime is the pressure 
to bid away agricultural land from cereal production for other crops, which are in greater 
demand from the richer sections of the society. 
Increasing aspirations of big business in the Indian food market
Thanks to its procurement regime, the government is the biggest buyer of cereals in 
the Indian economy, with its procurement amounting to more than 40 per cent of the 
marketed surplus in the country. It is clear that such a scale of procurement ensures 
that there exists some kind of pressure on the market to keep the market price at 
par with the MSP. Therefore, it is in the interest of big private buyers that the current 
procurement programmes are diluted. However, the logic given for such arguments is 
the exact opposite, which is that allowing market forces to determine prices would lead 
to increased earnings for farmers as it would get rid of the middlemen who are involved 
in such transactions. But there exists no evidence to show that private buying would 
necessarily lead to improved earnings for farmers. On the contrary two examples can be 
given to show that when corporations buy directly from farmers, the latter experience a 
decline in their share of prices. The fi rst example is that of farm retail price spread from 
the US economy, which has been increasing continuously as shown in Chart 8. As can 
be seen in the chart, the gap between farm gate and retail prices has been increasing 
continuously, which suggests that farmers have not been getting a fair deal in one of the 
most corporatized agricultural economy in the world.
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Chart 8: Farm-retail price spread in the US for bakery products
Source: USDA Data
Another buttress to this argument is to calculate the share of expenditure on raw 
materials to sales for Indian companies in the bakery and milling products sector, which 
would give a rough estimate for the trend in per unit value the farmers receive for selling 
their cereals to these companies. Chart 9 shows these trends. When compared to the 
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) for cereals, it can be seen that the  per unit share of farmers 
has not increased despite the fact that cereal prices have increased significantly.
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Chart 9: Share of raw material expenditure to sales
Source: Calculated by using PROWESS and WPI data; WPI fi gures are fi nancial year averages from 1994-95 onwards
On the basis of the data presented above, it can be argued that there is enough 
ground to be circumspect to the claim that allowing corporations to buy directly from 
farmers would lead to greater incomes for them.
Changing dynamics in the international food market
By the 1970s, the dominant narrative coming from advanced capitalist countries was 
that Third World countries should not be growing cereals as the former could produce 
them more in a more effi cient manner.25 However, the situation has changed drastically 
today because of food production growth in the advanced capitalist world hitting a 
plateau, which has resulted in a situation where they are not in a position to increase 
their exports to the rest of the world. Chart 10 shows these trends.
25 See Friedmann (1990)
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Chart 10: Cereal exports from North America
Source: FAOSTAT Data
This discernible change in the international food economy has created a situation 
where there is objective ground for countries like India to export more and more cereals 
in the world economy. Although exports per se are not contradictory to food security, 
they can have an adverse effect if they bring down the level of per capita availability of 
cereals in any economy – which is what has been happening in the case of India. 
In lieu of a conclusion
The discussion we have had so far points towards the fact that despite the government 
enacting an ambitious food security legislation to address food security, there exist myriad 
contradictions in the Indian food economy which can undermine the pursuit of food 
security. The root of these contradictions lies in two interrelated facts: firstly; the overall 
policy environment which is pro big business and hence not taking steps to provide 
smallholder agriculture, which is worsening the income employment balance; secondly, 
an emerging asymmetry between the market desired food production basket and food 
security needs, due to inequality in income and hence effective demand. Whether or not 
these contradictions are handled successfully concerns not just agriculture/food security 
policy but the overall macroeconomic regime.
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Commodification and Westernization:  
Explaining declining nutrition intake in 
contemporary rural China
Zhun Xu1,Wei Zhang2
Abstract
Despite China’s rapid growth in the past decade, Chinese rural residents suffer from 
a continuing decline of both calorie and protein intakes. We investigate the dramatic 
historical changes in nutrition intake in the Chinese countryside. There are two main 
explanations for the decline: first, the changing demographic and economic structure 
contributes to a lower demand for energy compared to traditional rural society; 
second, the rising cost of non-food essential goods could lead to a squeeze in food 
budget. Using both national level and provincial level data, we find evidence for both 
factors. We further argue that the current abnormally low level of nutrition intake is 
mainly due to commodification in the context of diet Westernization. The nutrition 
intake of rural residents declines, as they divert their consumption from relatively 
cheap sources of energy (grain and vegetable) to more expensive alternatives (meat 
and poultry) under a squeezed budget.
Introduction
China’s rapid growth in the past decades has been accompanied by a decisive increase 
in both real per capita income and food consumption. One of the easiest measures 
of the wellbeing of the Chinese people is seeing what they have on the dinner table 
because, according to an old Chinese saying, “food is heaven”. In general, the Chinese 
have been quickly moving from a plant-based to a meat-based diet in recent years. 
Nowadays China produces 600 million metric tons of grain and consumes even more, 
as it has recently become a major importer on the global food market (Xu et al., 2014).
At the same time, however, China’s bon appétit seems not to be evenly shared among 
its population, at least in terms of nutrition. There has been a secular declining trend in 
nutrition intake for the more than 600 million rural residents in China in the last decade. 
Figure 1 illustrates the historical pattern of both per capita calorie and protein intake of 
rural residents. In the 1980s both calorie and protein intakes were increasing, while in 
the 1990s they stagnated for several years. Starting from the early 2000s, both nutrition 
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intakes have been decreasing.
The trend seems to be at odds with the rapid poverty reduction in the last decades. 
A closer examination suggests that the official poverty rate might fail to pay enough 
attention to the actual cost of living. The Chinese poverty line was first derived in 1985, 
largely based on a typical basket of individual food consumption in the 1980s that 
provides 2400 Kcal per day. In the late 1990s, China revised its poverty line, substantially 
decreasing the share of non-food consumption and lowering the minimum calorie intake 
requirement to 2100 Kcal per day. With the consumption pattern and prices changing 
rapidly, the official poverty line calculation tends to under estimate poverty standards and 
overestimate poverty reduction (Park and Wang, 2001). In fact, the rural population in 
poverty increased by 100 million when China finally, and significantly, amended its official 
poverty line in 2011.3
The data used here is based on the compiled survey results of the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). One may suspect that this puzzling trend of nutrition intake is 
driven by a significant change in the method of collecting food consumption data in rural 
households. However, there is no such evidence. The NBS has been using the same 
food diary method of data collection consistently during the last three decades.4
A related concern stems from the rural school mapping programme in China starting 
from the early 2000s. The programme closed many small rural schools and, as a result, 
an increasingly large number of schoolchildren have to attend boarding schools and 
eat away from home. The food consumption of these children is not included in the 
household food diary. If the NBS were to still count them as household members in 
calculating average food consumption, it would create underestimated results for the last 
decade. As a matter of fact, in their calculation, the NBS excludes household members 
who mainly eat outside.5 Consequently, the school mapping policy and related social 
change has no impact on the observed trend. 
While the schoolchildren might be excluded from our data, it does not mean they 
have a healthier life. Luo et al. (2009) gives a detailed account of the poor canteen 
services provided by boarding schools in rural Shaanxi Province. In their 2008 survey, 
only 30 percent of the school canteens served breakfast, and seven per cent provided 
eggs; 36 percent provided meat, fish or eggs for lunch, and 27 per cent for dinner. Even 
if any animal protein was served, it was only twice a week and had to be purchased by 
students. In China’s poor rural regions, such as the Qinghai, Ningxia, Shaanxi provinces, 
students in boarding schools or those who eat lunch at school are more vulnerable 
3  See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/30/china-raises-rural-poverty-line, accessed on 10 Dec 2014.
4  The authors have confirmed this by online exchanges with the NBS.
5  The authors have confirmed this by online exchanges with the NBS.
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to under-nutrition due to the lack of adequate facilities, services and quality food. The 
adverse health consequences of such inadequacy include low height-for-age score, 
anaemia and low haemoglobin (Luo et al., 2009; Luo et al,. 2010; Luo et al., 2011).
The recent literature on rural public health provides a general picture of severe 
nutrition and health outcomes in the last decade. For example, there is some evidence 
of an increase in the rates of both stunting and being underweight among rural children 
since the mid-2000s, reversing the decreasing trend in the previous decade or two (Liu 
et al., 2013, p.302). Similarly, Zhou et al. (2012) finds that children less than five years 
of age in seven remote and poor counties have a high prevalence of stunting (19.3 per 
cent) and being underweight (13.1 per cent)in surveys between 2007 and 2010. Another 
survey in 2010 covering 84 villages in the mid-western provinces reports the prevalence 
of stunting among children below three years as being 27.0 per cent (Jiang et al., 2014). 
A 2004 survey of 100 villages in Northwest China (Gansu Province) shows striking 
food deficiency in food insecure families (Hannum et al., 2014). When asked about 
recent food consumption, 77 percent of mothers in food insecure households reported 
that their children (under 16) had “almost never” consumed meat in the past month; the 
corresponding numbers were 57 percent for rice, 57 percent for eggs, 73 per cent for 
fruits, and 96 percent for dairy products. 
Although some recent studies document that the rate of being overweight has been 
increasing in both rural and urban China (De Brauw and Mu, 2011; Gordon-Larsen et al., 
2014), Wang et al. (2009) suggests that the truth might be ‘stunting overweight’,” which 
could be traced back to under-nutrition of the children in the infant period, and of the 
mothers during pregnancy and lactation period. Based on a 2006 survey of 50 counties 
of 13 mid-western provinces, Wang et al. (2009) draws particular attention to the high 
prevalence of stunting (57.6 percent) among overweight children. The study also reports 
the rates of stunting and being underweight are, respectively, as high as 30.2 percent 
and 10.2 percent for children under five years of age. 
China is not an isolated case on the issue of declining nutrition intake. In recent years, 
scholars have observed similar declining nutrition trends in India. For example, Deaton 
and Dreze (2009) find that average calorie intake of Indian rural residents declined by 10 
percent from 2240 Kcal to 2047 Kcal between 1983 and 2004. Basu and Basole (2013) 
suggest that the declining trend in India started in the early 1970s. But the Chinese case 
differs from the Indian one in two ways. First, the magnitude of the decline in China is 
considerably more dramatic than India in absolute and percentage terms. According 
to our estimation, calorie intake declined by 20 per cent, 2595 Kcal to 1991 Kcal from 
2000 to 2011. Second, unlike the long term trend in the Indian data, the Chinese rural 
nutrition intake has different trends in the previous decades and the dramatic decline is 
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only a recent phenomenon.
Broadly speaking, there exist two plausible hypotheses for the observed nutrition 
intake decline: lower energy demand and budget squeeze (Basu and Basole, 2013). 
First, economic development often brings improvement in technology and changes in 
occupation and demographic structure (with urbanization), which naturally reduces the 
amount of energy needed in people’s daily life. Therefore, we might observe a declining 
tendency of nutrition intake over the course of economic development. This channel is 
mostly voluntary and does not necessarily suggest a deteriorating level of population 
health. Second, economic growth often accompanies increasing commodification. 
This might lead to higher cost of running a family business and necessary non-food 
expenditure such as health and education. Meeting the requirement of those necessary 
expenditures, households might be forced to squeeze their budget on food items, which 
could cause an involuntary decrease in nutrition intake.
This paper incorporates both types of explanations into our analysis of the Chinese 
story. First, by examining the historical patterns of national nutrition intake we critically 
review the relevance of major factors. We find that explanations for both the lower 
energy demand and the budget squeeze are related to nutrition decline. Second, with 
our compiled provincial level panel dataset, we conducted econometric exercises and 
found further evidence for both the lower energy demand and the budget squeeze 
hypotheses. In particular, the baseline fixed effect model suggests that a one percentage 
point increase in the non-food essential share of household consumption would lead to 
a 0.86 percent decrease in calorie intake and a 0.84 percent decrease in protein intake. 
For example, from 2000 to 2010, the average Chinese rural family increased the share of 
their spending on education and health care and other non-food essential goods by 10 
percentage points of their consumption budget. That alone would decrease their daily 
calorie intake by almost 9 percent, from 2595 Kcal to 2360 Kcal.
Based on discussions on the historical transformations of the rural diet, we argue that 
the abnormally low level of nutrition intake is due to commodification in the context of 
Westernization. The rural residents have been continuously Westernizing their diet from 
a plant-based to a meat-based one, while suffering from a budget squeeze resulting 
from increasing commodification as part of the agrarian change. As households divert 
their consumption from relatively cheap sources of energy (grain and vegetable) to more 
expensive alternatives (meat and poultry) under a squeezed budget, their nutrition intake 
(in terms of both calorie and protein) declines.
The next section reviews relevant literature and examines the national data. The third 
section looks at the question using provincial panel data and discusses the causes of the 
nutrition decline with econometric results. The fourth section has some further considerations 
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in the context of Chinese economic development. The last section concludes the paper.
Alternative explanations and the Chinese story
China is not the only country experiencing energy intake decline in a booming economy. 
The Indian “calorie consumption puzzle” (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2003) has aroused 
considerable academic interest. The widely cited work by Deaton and Dreze (2009) 
mainly explains what has happened in India with voluntary factors such as a lower level 
of physical activity and better health environment. Meanwhile, there are also works that 
delve into involuntary factors that have more political economy implications. Patnaik 
(2007, 2009, 2010) argues that it is general impoverishment which causes declining 
nutrition intake. Basu and Basole (2013, 2014) discuss both voluntary and involuntary 
factors in nutrition intake determination and find strong support for involuntary explanation 
in Indian data.
The Chinese nutrition intake decline was also noted a decade ago (Du et al., 2002; 
Du et al., 2004), but not until recently has it been examined and attention overwhelmingly 
been paid to the voluntary dimension. For example, it has been argued that demographic 
changes (the age/gender structure) might have a significant impact on the energy 
demand of the Chinese population with other conditions unchanged (Zhong et al., 2012; 
Zhong and Xiang, 2012; Carter et al., 2009). Chinese urbanization has attracted millions 
of young and middle aged rural labour to move to the cities in recent years. This change 
in demographic structure might lower energy demand of the rural population left behind, 
since children and older people consume less energy compared to young adults.
To what extent does the Chinese data support this argument? We use demographic 
survey and census data from 1991 to 2011 to produce an adjusted nutrition intake 
series which standardizes age and gender. Following the method described in Zhong 
et. al. (2012), we calculate for each year a seventeen-year-old male equivalent scale for 
the entire population and then calculate the average calorie/protein intake of that male 
equivalent across years (see Appendix 1 for details). This enables us to examine whether 
nutrition intake has declined after controlling demographic factors. Figure 2 shows the 
adjusted series of both calorie and protein intake in the countryside between 1991 and 
2011. It is clear that the declining trend in the last decade does not change significantly 
after adjustment. Therefore, demographic change seems not to be a key driver behind 
the observed nutrition intake decline in rural China. 
Second, as some studies have suggested, occupational change and/or more 
mechanization may lead to less physical activity and energy demand in China (Xiang and 
Zhong, 2012; Zhong and Xiang, 2012). Intuitively, agriculture could be more physically 
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demanding than most other occupations; rural residents working in agriculture would 
need to consume more energy compared to their counterparts. Similarly, a higher 
degree of mechanization should correspond to a lower energy demand. A simple check 
seems to bear this argument out. Figure 3a shows a positive cross-sectional relationship 
between occupational change (ratio of rural labour force working in agriculture) and 
per capita rural calorie intake based on provincial level data; while Figure 3b also plots 
a negative relationship between mechanization (machine power per acre of land) and 
calorie intake. Both panels seem to suggest that, as rural population gradually moves 
out of agriculture and substitutes machine for labour as a result of economic growth, 
they would reduce their nutrition intake due to a lower energy demand.
But if the nutrition decline is entirely caused by the results of economic development 
and its by-products, we would expect to see a consistent pattern in nutrition intake 
changes. For example, the richest regions (the eastern part) should in general correspond 
to a larger decrease in nutrition intake compared to poorer regions (the central and 
western parts). However, this seems not to be the case in China. Based on data from 
nine provinces, Du et al. (2004) report that, between 1989 and 1997, while total energy 
intake declined for all income groups, declines were the lowest for the top tertile and 
highest for the low and middle income tertiles (p.1507). Our national data also confirms 
this pattern. Figure 4a illustrates the percentage changes in calorie intake in eastern, 
central and western regions over the past 30 years. Between 2000 and 2009, average 
calorie intake has declined by 19 percent in eastern regions, while in less developed 
central regions the calorie intake has declined by 26 percent. Obviously something more 
than voluntary factors are at play here. The limitation of voluntary type arguments can 
also be seen from Figure 4b which shows rural calorie intake based on five different 
household income levels. Before 2000, the high income classes and low income classes 
saw mild calorie intake increase and decrease, respectively. But all income classes 
experienced calorie intake decline after 2000. Even if high income classes might reduce 
their nutrition intake because of less energy need, we cannot say exactly the same for 
people in the lowest income groups. In a nutshell, the voluntary type factors might be 
part of the story, but they are far from the whole story.
Different from the voluntary type of explanation, the involuntary type of arguments 
mainly concern the deteriorating economic conditions of the population. The involuntary 
type of explanation does not necessarily imply a decreasing trend of rural real income. 
In fact, between 2000 and 2010, rural real income per capita steadily increased at over 
7 per cent per year. At the same time, however, China saw increasing commodification 
of subsistence goods such as education and health care that tend to raise the cost of 
living.
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One study that has paid due attention to the involuntary dimension in the Chinese 
context is by Meng et al.(2009). The study finds and explains the continuous calorie 
intake decline for the urban poor in the 1990s: during this period, public provision of 
social welfare (such as health care, education and housing) was dismantled and replaced 
with a market-oriented system; although their income did not fall, low income urban 
residents had to increasingly spend on non-food necessities, leaving the budget for food 
vulnerable.
Our study proposes a similar interpretation for China’s rural dwellers. The 
commodification of basic goods and the urban-biased growth have systematically 
made life more difficult for the average rural household. National data shows that rural 
families faced a growing financial burden of health care: between 2000 and 2012, health 
spending as a share of total household expenditure increased from 5.2 per cent to 8.7 
per cent (NBS 2013). Despite a significant extension of health insurance coverage in the 
2000s, the percentage of rural households facing catastrophic health expenses (defined 
as an amount equal to or greater than 40 per cent of a household’s disposable income 
less subsistence expenditures) did not fall; rather, it increased slightly from13.2 per cent 
in 2003 to 13.8 per cent in 2011 (Meng et al., 2012).
State policies are often ineffective and create extra hurdles for rural residents. For 
example, the aforementioned school mapping programme, which requires rural students 
to attend boarding school in towns, significantly increases expenditure on commuting 
(Zhao and Parolin, 2002). As another example, China implemented a major rural tax 
reform in the early 2000s, intending to alleviate the fiscal burden of farmers that had 
surged since the de-collectivization of rural China. However, the programme reduced the 
fiscal capacity of villages to provide public services such as a primary school and public 
health facilities, which disproportionately increased the financial burden on poor families 
(Alm and Liu, 2013).
These policies also tend to aggravate the existing problems arising from 
commodification. The marketization of higher education and consequently tuition surge 
in the late 1990s already createda major burden for the rural poor. Due to the worsening 
quality of public education in the countryside, families have to shoulder even higher 
costs. Based on a survey of 11 provinces in western China, Zhang (2014) finds that in 
addition to the direct financial burden of tuition increase, low and middleincome families 
had to invest more in the early stages of their children’s education process if they planned 
to send their kids to colleges, 
All these increasing costs of subsistence lead to a budget squeeze on food among 
the less well-to-do households. As Hannum et al. (2014) states, based on a survey 
in northwest China,“36 percent of mothers reported that their families went hungry 
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because of insufficient food or money to buy food; 41percent reported having had to 
depend on relatives or friends to give food; 49 percent reported that they or their family 
had borrowed money from relatives or friends to buy food; and 23 percent reported 
having to cut food available for children because there was not enough food or money.”
One type of such a budget squeeze takes place within the rural household 
consumption bundle. The increasing cost of essential goods and services such as 
health care and education is more likely to be a burden for less privileged people like 
rural residents compared with their urban counterparts. For example, the price index for 
health care and school textbook expenses in the countryside has increased by almost 
200 percent over the last two decades (China Statistical Yearbook, various years). In 
order to meet the requirement of non-food essential expenses, rural households might 
have to decrease their spending on food. As Figure 5 demonstrates, from 1993 to 
2011, the ratio of non-food essential expenditure (spending on residence, health care, 
transport and telecommunication, education and cultural services, etc.) increases from 
27 per cent to 45 per cent, while the ratio of food expenditure decreases from 58 per 
cent to 40 per cent. This change cannot be simply regarded as a result of the so-called 
Engel’s law (the proportion of income spent on food decreases as income rises), as the 
nutrition intake has declined to an abnormally low level at the same time. At least part of 
these budgetary changes must reflect the burden of life and the squeeze on household 
food consumption.
Another possible source of such a budget squeeze, which is unique for the rural 
residents, is the rising cost of family business. Agricultural input prices have increased 
almost three times over the last 20 years (China Statistical Yearbook, various years). 
In order to maintain the basic operation of the family business, rural households might 
have to cut their spending on household consumption. Figure 6 compares the ratio 
of household consumption and basic family business operation within the total rural 
household budget from 1998 to 2011. Although the proportion of the budget spent on 
basic family operation cost does not have a persistent trend, it does seem to have a 
negative relationship (i.e. squeeze) with that of household consumption. 
Based on the descriptive evidence above, we are able to identify several possible 
causes of the observed nutrition intake decline from both voluntary and involuntary type 
explanations. The decreasing need for energy is mainly due to occupational change, 
mechanization and economic development in general. On the other hand, we do find 
clear evidence of a budget squeeze from both operation of family business and increasing 
expenditure on non-food essential goods. The relationship between nutrition intake and 
these factors are examined in more detail in the next section.
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Econometric Exercises
Data and Methodology
In order to examine the causes of nutrition intake decline, we need to formulate a 
conceptual model for nutritional determination. First and foremost, the average nutrition 
intake level is determined by the actual household expenditure on food. More spending 
on food naturally leads to more nutrition intake. This is where the budget question comes 
into the story. As we discussed above, two types of budget squeeze could have a 
significant impact on how much households would like to spend on food compared to 
other necessary spending on family business and other essential goods and services. 
Of course, the spending on food is also affected by the need for energy, where the 
voluntary type factors come into account. As the previous section suggests, moving out 
of agriculture and more mechanization could lead to a decrease in physical activities, 
which may in turn lower the need for nutrition intake. All of these can be perceived as a 
by-product of overall economic development. 
Besides, dietary choices also affect the level of nutrition intake. Given the amount 
of spending on food, the transition from a plant-based diet to a more expensive meat-
based one is a possible way to decrease the amount of total calorie and protein intake 
for consumers. Some of the above factors also have an impact on dietary choices. For 
example, given the same amount of spending on food items, a higher level of living 
standards might induce people to choose a more expensive/less energy intensive diet.
Therefore, the basic model of nutrition intake can be described as below: 
NI = G (Ef ,d) (1)
Where NI is nutrition intake; Ef  is real expenditure on food items; d is dietary choice.
Real expenditure on food items is determined by the following equation:
Ef  = E × rC × rf (2)
Where E is real total expenditure; rC  is the ratio of consumption in total expenditure; 
rf  is the ratio of spending on food items in household consumption.
In the three decision processes for household consumption, rC and rf are both affected 
by voluntary and involuntary factors. The budget squeeze resulting from costs of family 
business operation and non-food essential goods and services would decrease rC and 
rf . On the other hand, a lower energy demand might also lead to a decrease in both 
consumption ratios. So in general, we have the following:
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rC, f  = H(V;IV) (3)
WhereV is voluntary type factors; IV is involuntary type factors.
Based on (1)-(3), we obtain a more specific model of nutrition intake determination:
NI = G(E,d;H(V;IV)) = F(E,d;V,IV) (4)
In short, nutrition intake level is determined by total real expenditure, dietary pattern, 
and various voluntary/involuntary factors. Since we have already specifically discussed 
the relevant indicators in both voluntary and involuntary type arguments, we can write 
down our baseline empirical model based on the above formulations:
(5)
where NI refers to either calorie or protein intake; NFE is the portion of non-food 
essential spending in household consumption; FBC is the portion of spending on 
basic family business operation in total household expenditure; E is total household 
real expenditure; d is dietary pattern in food consumption; Aglab is the ratio of rural 
labour force working in agriculture; Mac is the total machine power per acre of land;  
and  refers to provincial/regional fixed effect and year fixed effect, which capture the 
unobserved differences across time and location.
We compile a panel dataset of 30 Chinese provinces/regions for the time period of 
1998-2010 (see Appendix 1 for variable construction and data sources). The sample 
covers the whole Chinese mainland, with the exception of Tibet due to data unavailability. 
Results and Discussions
Table 1 presents the results from the baseline models in column (1) and (4) for calorie 
and protein intake respectively. We are most concerned with the four main voluntary 
and involuntary factors. The coefficients of both non-food essential spending and family 
business spending are statistically significantly negative, confirming our hypothesis 
that involuntary factors play an important role in determining nutrition intake. At the 
same time, one voluntary factor, the ratio of rural labour force in agriculture, also has a 
statistically significantly positive relationship with nutrition intake. But the other voluntary 
factor, the machine power variable, does not have a significant impact on nutrition intake 
after controlling other variables. Overall, the empirical results provide support for both 
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voluntary type and involuntary type arguments.
How do we interpret the results? The baseline estimation suggests that a budget 
squeeze resulting from both non-food essential consumption and family business 
operation leads to a decrease in nutrition intake. Specifically, a percentage point increase 
in the proportion of consumption on non-food essential means a 0.86 percent decrease 
in calorie intake and 0.84 percent decrease in protein intake. A percentage point increase 
in ratio of family business in total expenditure will cause 0.39 percent decrease in calorie 
intake and 0.44 percent decrease in protein intake. The share of non-food essential 
spending alone has increased by 10 percentage points in the last decade; if other 
factors are unchanged, that alone would imply an approximately 9 percent decrease in 
both calorie and protein intake.
As for voluntary factors, a percentage point decrease in rural population working in 
agriculture would lead to a tiny change in nutrition intake: 0.43 percent in calorie intake 
and 0.34 percent decrease in protein intake. It seems that although voluntary factors 
such as moving out of agriculture do have statistically significant impacts on nutrition 
intake, the effects are rather small compared with those of involuntary factors. 
The coefficients of the two remaining variables also provide some important clues to 
understanding the nutrition decline problem. Firstly, the real household total expenditure 
has a positive impact on nutrition intake, given that others are controlled. As household 
expenditure has increased steadily over the past decades, that would have prevented 
nutrition intake from falling even more than the current records. Second, the Chinese diet 
has been shifting from a plant-based one to a meat-based one in the past few years and 
continues to do so. Our results suggest that the process of dietary change (in the sense 
of higher portion of protein from meat) has a statistically significantly negative impact on 
nutrition intake. We will discuss more on the effect of dietary change in the next section.
For robustness checks, we add two loosely related control variables in order: real per 
capita net income and the ratio of purchased cereal to total cereal consumption (see 
Appendix 1 for data sources). Data on net income is available for the whole period from 
1998 to 2011 while the cereal purchase information is only available from 2004 onwards. 
Conceptually, real net income has an ambivalent impact on nutrition intake: on the one 
hand, higher income might cause more food consumption and more nutrition intake; 
on the other hand, higher income might imply less physical activities and better living 
conditions that need less energy. The ratio of cereal purchase partly reflects food costs 
of rural households, as the spending on food items increases if more cereal comes from 
the market instead of self-production. Historically, this ratio started at merely 17 percent 
in year 2003 and has steadily increased to 37 percent in 2011. The ratio is close to 50 
percent in 2011 in advanced regions such as Guangdong. In Beijing, more than 90 
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percent of cereal consumption in the rural households comes from market purchase.
Table 1 presents the results in Column (2),(3) and (5),(6). We have some brief 
comments on them. First, the main findings in the baseline models are intact. We can 
still see the significant impacts from non-food essential spending and dietary changes. 
Second, none of the newly added variables are statistically significant and their addition 
does not change the magnitude or sign of the baseline model coefficients. 
These exercises reinforce our confidence on the baseline model results and shed 
light on a coherent story about the historical changes of nutrition intake in rural China. 
Particularly, we need to understand how the budget squeeze factors (such as the 
increasing spending on non-food essential goods) and dietary upgrading together lead 
to the current nutrition crisis. The next section discusses the interplay of the two distinct 
causes and its implications for nutrition ofthe rural population.
Budget squeeze, dietary change and nutrition
According to the above empirical results, both voluntary and involuntary factors as well 
as dietary change have been significant players in shaping the decline in calorie and 
protein intake in the Chinese countryside during the last decade. Nevertheless, all these 
factors deserve some more consideration before we move on to further discussion.
First of all, the voluntary causes, such as moving out of agriculture, play a limited role 
in the historical process. Not only is the scale of its impact small compared with others, 
as our baseline model suggests, it would also show a lack of common sense to assume 
that a rural resident would reduce her nutrition intake to an abnormally low level because 
of a lower energy demand. 
Second, the two remaining factors share credit in bringing down the rural nutrition 
intake. Diet upgrading alone would not necessarily cause much nutrition loss, unless 
only a limited portion of consumption budget is spent on food. If there is no budget 
squeeze, we would expect to see a constant or increasing nutrition intake along with 
an upgrade in diet. Similarly, a relative decrease in spending on food items itself would 
not be sufficient for causing the dramatic nutrition intake decline as China saw in recent 
years. If rural residents resort to cheaper and more plant-based diets, we are unlikely to 
observe any declining trend of nutrition.
Therefore, we argue that the huge decline of the rural nutrition intake can be better 
understood as largely a joint result of both budget squeeze and China’s rapidly upgrading 
diet. The increasing cost of non-food essential goods, in the context of diet upgrading, 
leads to the pattern changes presented in Table 2. Figure 7 presents a more visual 
illustration of the dietary changes. Grain and vegetable consumption of an average rural 
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resident seemed to have increased between 1980 and 1990, had a small decrease 
between 1990 and 2000, and was followed by a big drop in grain and vegetable 
consumption between 2000 and 2010. At the same time, however, the consumption 
of meat/poultry/dairy products seems to be steadily increasing. In other words, with an 
already squeezed food budget, Chinese rural households are at the same time moving 
away from traditional diets, starting to consume more expensive energy sources.
Figure 8 clearly illustrates this historical change in the lens of protein sources. In the 
1980s, rural households were able to consume more meat and poultry while maintaining 
their grain and vegetable consumption, which resulted in a temporary improvement in 
their nutrition status. Throughout the 1990s, the protein from grain and vegetables had a 
moderate decline but still maintained a relatively high level of nearly 60 g or so per capita 
per day, while the protein from animal sources kept increasing. That is why the total 
nutrition intake was relatively stable during the 1990s. But the trend starts to change 
in the last decade, when nutrition gains from increasing consumption of meat/poultry/
diary fall behind the nutrition loss from decreasing consumption of grain and vegetables. 
Thus the total nutrition intake, whether measured in calories or protein, starts to decline 
dramatically.
Whenever budget squeeze limits rural households’ access to food and nutrition, 
dietary change aggravates the problem. For ease of interpretation, Table 3 provides two 
hypothetical scenarios with different diets (grain and meat), which shows the impact of 
dietary choice under the same budget. In Scenario 1, a consumption bundle of 12 kg 
of grain and 2 kg of pork provides 1560 Kcal and 37 g of protein. In Scenario 2, a more 
meat-based consumption bundle only provides 1106 Kcal and 22 g of protein. This 
simple illustration partly reflects what was going on with regard to consumption in rural 
households during the 2000s.
What causes underlie the Westernization of rural diet? Pingali (2007) notes that current 
food consumption patterns are showing signs of convergence towards a Western diet 
in Asian countries. Globalization, and the consequent global interconnectedness of the 
urban middle class, is the driving force behind the convergence of diets. A complete 
survey of factors in China is beyond the reach of the current paper. One possible 
reason might be the increasing impact of the urban/modern lifestyle through television 
shows and advertisements. Since more than ten years ago, the mainstream media has 
started advocating the idea of a “modern/rational” diet which includes much less grain 
consumption and much more dairy/poultry consumption (Beijing Evening News, 2001). 
Although the countryside provides the cities with food, it is the urban capital which 
dominates the country’s food imagination. Keep in mind that economic growth in the last 
two decades has also increased the rural-urban income difference (except very recently). 
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Now an average urban resident earns two times more than a rural counterpart. It might 
be reasonable for the urban population to continue consuming more meat and poultry, 
but it might not be such a healthy choice for rural people.
In this sense, the nutrition intake decline in the last decade or so has been a 
genuine product of the Chinese agrarian change featured by both commodification 
and Westernization. On the one hand, commodification significantly fuels the tension 
between food consumption and non-food spending (both essential consumption and 
family business operation), and thereby squeezes the food budget. On the other hand, 
Westernization widely boosts consumption of more expensive energy sources and 
promotes a Westernized diet for less affluent population like rural residents. According 
to our discussions above, these factors are the crucial forces behind the nutrition crisis 
in contemporary rural China.
Concluding Remarks
The nutrition story in this paper reveals the often neglected side of Chinese economic 
prosperity. Despite China’s rapid growth in the past decade, Chinese rural residents 
suffer from a continuing decline of both calorie and protein intake. 
We argue that both voluntary and involuntary factors contribute to the observed 
change in trend in the 2000s, but the abnormally low level of nutrition intake is due 
to commodification in the context of diet Westernization. As households divert their 
consumption from relatively cheap sources of energy (grain and vegetable) to more 
expensive alternatives (meat and poultry) due to a squeezed budget, their nutrition intake 
(in terms of both calories and protein) declines.
The declining nutrition intake is a result of dramatic changes in the contemporary 
Chinese agrarian relations. The shocking failure of sustaining a healthy rural population 
is a unique manifestation of the contradiction of the Chinese agrarian change. The 
deepening of commodification, the pro-market state policies and the encroachment 
of Western/urban lifestyles into rural families all contribute to the story. At the same 
time, the worsening nutrition status of rural residents will further accelerate the ongoing 
agrarian transition and catalyse broader social changes in China.
The nutrition story has a long-lasting impact on both China and the world, as 
commodification and Westernization continue. On the one hand, the dietary change 
could imply a more severe decline in nutrition intake, given that the budget squeeze 
factors are still at work. That will definitely damage the health of the rural population which 
is a serious concern for China’s future development. On the other hand, if the current 
economic growth could bring more benefits to the rural residents and to some extent 
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relieve the current budget squeeze, a dietary upgrade would simply mean much more 
food consumption in the countryside. That might have long-term disturbing effects on 
China’s food security and the global food market. A real solution to the above problems 
has to include both an improvement in the economic conditions of rural households and 
a change to a more sustainable plant-based diet.
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Appendix 1: Variable Definition and Data Sources
Appendix Table 1
Variable Definition and Data Sources
NI
Nutrition intake 
•		Rural	household	daily	calorie	(kcal)	and	protein	(g)	intake	per	capita
•		Authors’	calculation	based	on	data	of	rural	household	per	capita	consumption	on	major	food	per	year	
(divided by 365), China Rural Statistical Yearbook, various years (except for 1992) and China Yearbook 
of Rural Household Survey for 1992. See Appendix 2 for methodology of converting food consumption 
into calorie and protein intake. 
NFE
Non-food essential expenditure ratio 
•		Share	 of	 expenditures	 for	 (a)	 housing,	 (b)	 medicine	 and	 health	 care,	 	 (c)	 transport,	 post	 and	
telecommunications, and (d) cultural, educational, recreational services in total living expenditure, %.
•		Authors’	calculation	based	on	data	from	China Rural Statistical Yearbook, various years.
FBC
Household business costs, taxes & fees ratio  
•		Share	of	expenditures	for	(a)	rural	household	business	and	(b)	taxes	and	fees	in	total	expenditure,	%.
•		Authors’	calculation	based	on	data	from	China Yearbook of Rural Household Survey for the years 1998-
2009; China Rural Statistical Yearbook for theyears 2010 and 2011. 
E
Total real expenditure per capita
•		China Yearbook of Rural Household Survey for the years 1998-2009; China Rural Statistical Yearbook 
for the years 2010 and 2011. 
•		Adjusted	for	Rural	Consumer	Price	Indices	(2011	CPI=100).	China Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
d
Dietary choice
•		Share	of	animal	protein	in	total	protein,	%.
•		Authors’	calculation	based	on	data	from	China Statistical Yearbook, various years (except for 1992) and 
China Yearbook of Rural Household Survey for 1992.
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Aglab
Agricultural labour
•		Agricultural	sector	employees	as	a	share	of	total	rural	employees,	%.
•		Authors’	 calculation	 based	 on	 number	 of	 total	 rural	 employees	 and	 number	 of	 rural	 employees	 in	
agriculture from New China 60 Years of Agricultural Statistical Materials (for the years 1998-2008) and 
China Rural Statistical Yearbook (for the years 2009 and 2010).
Mac
Mechanization 
•		Major	agricultural	machinery	power	(10kw/1,000hectare).
•		Authors’	calculation	based	on	data	of	total	sown	area	of	farm	crops	(1,000	hectare)	and	total	power	of	
year-end major agricultural machinery (10,000 kw) from China Rural Statistical Yearbook, various years.
Net Income
Real per capita net income of rural households
•		China Statistical Yearbook, various years.
•		Adjusted	for	Rural	Consumer	Price	Indices	(2011	CPI=100).
Cereal 
Purchased cereal to total cereal consumption ratio, %.
•		Authors’	calculation	based	on	data	of	cereal	purchase	and	cereal	consumption.
•		China Yearbook of Household Survey for the years 2010 and 2011; China Yearbook of Rural Household 
Survey for the years 2003-2009.
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Appendix 2: Calculating (Adjusted) Nutrition Intake
Calculating Nutrition Intake per capita, NI
We calculate nutrition intake by converting household per capita consumption on major 
food into calories and protein. The China Statistical Yearbook includes and documents 
nine major food categories that provide nutrition. These nine food categories and the 
energy and protein that they provide are listed below:   
Appendix Table 2 
Calculating Adjusted Nutrition Intake per capita, NIadj
The adjusted annual nutrition intake is calculated by applying the following formula:
WhereAMES is the Adult Male Equivalent Scale, used to adjust nutrition intake for 
China’s demographic profile. FollowingZhong et al. (2012, pp.1012-5), we calculate the 
AMES in each year by adding up the Adult Male Equivalent Coefficient (AMEC) for each 
age-sex group weighted by the population ratio of each corresponding demographic 
group:
Demographic data is obtained from the China Population & Employment Statistics 
Yearbook (2007-2012) and China Population Statistics Yearbook (1992-2006). AMEC 
data is computed in Zhong et al. (2012, pp.1014, Table 1).Their method is to assume 
the daily energy requirement of a 17-year-old male (the most energy demanding age-sex 
category, barring women in pregnancy and lactation) to be one, and then proportionally 
convert the daily energy requirement of people in other age-gender categories into 
indexes ranging from zero to one. 
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Table 1: Determinants of Nutrition Intake
Calorie Protein
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-food Essential -0.862 *** -0.836 *** -0.954 *** -0.836 *** -0.847 *** -0.830 ***
(0.116) (0.118) (0.165) (0.121) (0.124) (0.174)
Family Business -0.387 *** -0.378 ** -0.205 -0.441 *** -0.445 *** -0.217
(0.148) (0.149) (0.174) (0.155) (0.156) (0.183)
Total Expenditure 0.230 *** 0.210 *** 0.167 *** 0.119 ** 0.128 ** 0.026
(0.045) (0.048) (0.063) (0.047) (0.051) (0.067)
Diet -2.381 *** -2.423 *** -1.958 *** -2.009 *** -1.990 *** -1.820 ***
(0.173) (0.177) (0.252) (0.181) (0.186) (0.290)
Agricultural Labour 0.434 *** 0.449 *** 0.362 *** 0.344 *** 0.337 *** 0.356 ***
(0.084) (0.085) (0.104) (0.088) (0.089) (0.109)
Machine Power -0.071 -0.066 -0.117 ** -0.064 -0.064 -0.128 **
(0.042) (0.042) (0.053) (0.044) (0.044) (0.055)
Net Income 0.067 0.000 -0.029 0.039
(0.060) (0.087) (0.063) (0.091)
Cereal Purchase -0.028 -0.037
(0.058) (0.061)
Sample Size 390 390 240 390 390 240
R-Squared 0.81 o 0.81 o 0.68 o 0.77 o 0.77 o 0.66 o
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 1%,5%,10% is denoted by ***,**,* respectively.
Table 2: Key rural food items annual per capita consumption in selected years
1980 1990 2000 2010
(kg) (kg) (kg) (kg)
Grain 257 262 250 181
Vegetable 127 134 107 93
Meat 8 11 14 16
Poultry 1 1 3 4
Aqua-product 1 2 4 5
Dairy 1 1 1 4
Calorie (Kcal) 2384 2586 2595 2041
Protein (gram) 63 66 65 52
Note: All numbers are rounded. There are other food items like edible oil and eggs that are not listed here to save space. The calorie and 
protein is calculated using the total food consumption.
Source: See Appendix 1 and Figure 1.
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Table 3: Diet and Nutrition 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Quantity Calorie Protein Quantity Calorie Protein
(kg) (Kcal) (gram) (kg) (Kcal) (gram)
Grain 12 1208 32 4 403 11 
Meat 2 352 6 4 704 12 
Total o 1560 37 o 1106 22 
Note: Both scenarios assume a monthly food budget of 100 RMB (the Chinese currency), grain price at 5RMB/kg, meat price at 20RMB/
kg. These assumptions are loosely based on current market prices. See appendix for the method of calculating food nutrition. Both calorie 
and protein are on a daily basis.
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Source: see Appendix2.
Source: see Appendix 2.
Figure 3: Occupation, mechanization and calorie intake across provinces in 2010
Source: see Appendix 1. Tibet is excluded for lack of data.
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Figure 4:Geography, income and calorie intake.
Source: Author calculated based onChina Statistical Yearbook, various years.
Source: see Appendix 1.
Source: see Appendix 1.
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Source: see Appendix 1.
Source: see Appendix 1.
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Political Economy of Land Ownership and 
Development in Eastern Indonesia: A Case 
Study of Two Provinces1
Emilianus Yakob Sese Tolo2
Abstract
Nowadays, Indonesia is still facing the problem of poverty, and inequality of land 
ownership is one of the main causes. Poverty is mostly concentrated in the 
village level, especially villages in eastern Indonesia. It is approximately 70% of 
uderdeveloped villages situated in 32.000 villages ineastern Indonesia. Utilizing 
the combination of qualitative and quantitative research methodology by doing 
approximately 60 in-depth interviews and 640 questioner fillings, this research aims 
to evaluate the government program on land certification in two islands –Floresand 
Seram- in eastern Indonesia. The paper concludes that poverty in eastern Indonesia 
is mainly caused by inequalities of land ownership, caused by the Dutch colonization, 
land grabbing by men, village traditional leadersand governmental elites, and 
privatization. This paper recommends that agrarian reform by leverage has to be 
done in order to enhance development in eastern Indonesia. Besides, cooperatives 
and village industrialization too can boast the economic progress which benefits 
more to people in eastern Indonesia. In addition, based on its cultural setting, the 
paper also proposes for implementing the collective land certification instead of 
individual land certification in eastern Indonesia.  
Key Words: poverty, developement, inequility, land ownership, agrarian reform by 
leverage, cooperatives, idustrialization and collective land certification. 
Introduction
Indonesia is rich in natural resources but many of its people live in poverty, inequality of 
land ownership being one of the main causes. A huge portion of land is concentrated in 
the hands of the State and the economic-political elite ranging from the national to the 
village level. In 2013, while 98.88 per cent of small enterprises found it difficult to get 
access to land, most of the land was utilized by 0.01 per cent of big corporations that 
1 This paper was first presented at the international seminar of South-South Tricontinental Collaborative Program Seventh South-South Institute 
on “Inequality, Democracy and Development under Neoliberalism and Beyond? in Bangkok, Thailand, November 3-8 2014. The paper derives 
from collaboration between Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia and University of Agder, Norway, funded by Royal Norwegian Embassy Indonesia. 
Special thanks to Prof. Stein Kristiansen for allowing me to utilise his fieldwork data. 
2  The author is a researcher at the Graduate School of Public Administration, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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contribute 41.83 per cent ofthe national income and 82.98 of export (Palupi, 2014).3 
Therefore, the Gini index of landownership continues to rise from year to year, from0.50 
in 1983 to 0.72 in 2003 (Initiative Policy Review, 2011). Since the New Order (Orde 
Baru), the average amount of land owned by a farmer has been decreasing yearly – 1.05 
hectare (1963), 0.99 hectare (1973), 0.90 (1983), 0.5 (2003) and 0.3 (2011) (Setiawan 
2008). 
Inequality of land ownership in Indonesia can occur either in urban or rural areas 
(Lucas 1992). However, most inequalities of land ownership are in rural areas (Mulyanto 
etal., 2009). Therefore, poverty too is mostly in the rural areas, at 63.4 per cent (Setiawan, 
2008; Prakrasa Policy Review, 2011; Mulyanto et al., 2009). According to the research 
done by Mulyanto et al. (2009) in Java, agricultural land at the village level is concentrated 
among the rich local elite. For example, the research on Wetankali village reveals that 
most of villagers (57.8 per cent) are landless; only a few of them (0.2 per cent) have 
agricultural land, but less than one hectare. Out of 605 people who own land, only 26 
people (4 per cent) own a big portion of land, approximately 8.4 hectares each, and 17 
per cent of the land is cultivated by sharecroppers (Mulyanto etal., 2009). 
Inequalities of land ownership in Indonesia are dominantly caused by land grabs by 
the state, businessmen, bureaucrats4 and the political elite (Tolo, 2014). Land grabs in 
Indonesia occur in four ways: regulation, market, legitimating, and force (Hall et al., 2011). 
Most of the land (70 per cent) is claimed as government ownership under the forestry 
department. However, local people in many places in Indonesia also claim government 
land as theirs, although without any land certification. Moreover, according to Yusuf 
3 According to Prakarsa Policy Review (2011), the wealth of 40 from the economic and political elite is equal to that of 60 million people. 
Alternatively, the wealth of 43,000 people is equal to the wealth of 140 million people.Therefore, the Gini index is rising yearly as follows: 0.39 
(2009), 0.38 (2010) and 0.41 (2011). Eventhough the Indonesian economic growth has performed quite well in the last five years – 4.5 per cent 
in 2009, 6.1 per cent in 2010, 6.5 per cent in 2011, 6.3 per cent in 2012, and 5.78 per cent in 2013 – it did not contribute to poverty reduction. 
According to the data from the statistical office (BPS 2012), the total number of poor was 11.96 per cent (29.13 million) of the total population 
in Indonesia, wherein 63.4 per cent live in the villages. The World Bank (2011) revealed that 40 per cent of Indonesians are poor (Sinaga, 2012, 
Media Indonesia, 5.1.2012). In the last three years (2009-2011), the number of poor people increased to 2.7 million (Sinaga, 2012). Economic 
problems of the national level also occur at the province level, especially in eastern Indonesia. For example, in Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), 
according to the province statistics office, in the three years from 2010 to 2012 economic growth was 5.6 per cent. Since 2008-2012, income 
per capita has been increasing yearly: 4.5 million IDR (2008), 4.8 million IDR (2009), 5.7 million IDR (2010) and 6.1 million IDR (2011). However, 
the Gini index NTT (2012) was 0.38. In 2012, out of a total population of 4.8 million, there were one million poor people. Poverty is concentrated 
more in the rural areas (22.41 per cent) than urban areas (12.21 per cent). Compared to the data in 2010, poverty reduction was 0.29 per cent, 
in urban areas only; in the rural areas, poverty was increasing at a rate of 1.19 per cent. Besides, the number of unemployed people in 2012 was 
62, 400.  
4 Due to legal and illegal land grabs since the late 1980s, land disputes have been increasing significantly, which involve the bureaucracy and 
developers. In many cases, according to Lucas (1997: 232, 234, 250), for the sake of development: first, ‘bureaucracy plays pivotal role in the 
administration of land clearance and in the settling of land disputes’; second, ‘local government is expected to facilitate private investment in 
industrial development, natural resource development, industrial forestry, and estate agriculture, as well as tourism’; and third, ‘the military ... is 
seen to backing private developers’. 
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(2001) only five per cent of land in Indonesia is registered for land certification and the 
rest has disputed claims. The domination of state over land, the concentration of land 
in the hands of the elite, and the absence of land certification in rural areas have caused 
land disputes between local people and the government because of unclear ownership, 
as in Flores, Mesuji, Bima, Pulau Padang, Jambi, North Sulawesi and Papua (Prior, 2013; 
Tolo, 2014). Therefore, the development agenda in the agricultural sector seems to have 
failed to enhance people welfare and sustainable resources management.
After the introduction, we will give a literature review ofthe political economy of land 
ownership in Indonesia. In the third section, we will elaborate a general view of land 
ownership and development. In Section Four, we will present the methodology and the 
data collected. Finding and discussion will be explained in Section Five. The paper will 
end with a conclusion and recommendation.
Political Economy of Land Ownership in Indonesia
Political economy aims to “understand the relationship between economic growth and 
poverty... by seeing the ways more powerful classes accumulate by appropriating surplus 
from less powerful” (Corta, 2010: 18). Bernstein (2010) proposes four questions in order 
to reveal the relation between economic growth and poverty, as follows: Who owns what? 
Who does what? Who gets what? And, what do they do with it? By answeringthese 
questions, we can reveal the predicament of the poor in the agrarian sector, finding the 
connection with the social relationship through which they are exploited and oppressed 
by the rich. With this approach, we would like to understand the agrarian injustice that 
has led to poverty in Indonesia. 
Agrarian injustice in Indonesia can be traced back to the kingdom era when all land 
belonged to the king. According to Javanese political culture, the king is entitled to all 
land within the kingdom (Anderson, 1990). Therefore, ordinary citizens had to pay taxes 
to the king. In the colonial era in Java (1830-1970), there were land enclosures and 
slave labour (rodi). In 1870, the Dutch government issued a law to facilitate private land 
ownership, which led to land grabbing in Indonesia5 (Lucas, 1992; Borras & Franco, 
2011). In addition, under the law Staatbland 1838 No. 45, those who had suffered 
from land grabbing and did not do slave labour, were caught legally to work as unpaid 
workers in the Dutch estates (Mulyanto, 2011). When the Japanese occupied Indonesia, 
5 Today, along with the expansion of capitalism, land grabbing is growing rapidly, especially in developing countries (Braun &Meinsen-Dick, 
2009) such as Africa (Klopp, 2000; Cotula et al., 2009; FIAN 2010), Asia (Borras& Franco, 2011) and Latin America (Borras et al., 2012), which 
bringsa great manynegative effects on the welfare of the people. As a developing country, Indonesia too experiences land grabbing (Lucas, 1992; 
Borras& Franco, 2011). With comparative advantage (arable land, rich natural resources and cheap labour), since the colonial era Indonesia has 
become the most strategic target for land grabbing for the sake of dometic and foreign capital investment.
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the land system was regulated according to their interests. Therefore, during the Dutch 
and Japanese occupation, the land tenure system in Indonesia was more beneficial to 
the interests of the colonizers and local elite (Soemarjdan, 1962). 
After Independence, the Indonesian founding fathers initiated change in the colonial 
land tenure system. In 1945, agrarian reforms took place in Banyumas, Central Java. With 
Law No. 13 1946, landlords’ privilege rights over land were taken by the government and 
land was distributed to sharecroppers. As compensation, the government gave lifelong 
monthly payment to the landlords. In the guided democracy era, the government issued 
Law No. 1/1958 which led to the abolition of private estate (particuliere landerijen), and 
all landlords’ privileges over land were taken over by the government. The landlords 
were given two options: (1) selling the land directly to landless farmers or (2) selling to 
the government which would distribute the lands to sharecroppers in the particuliere 
landerijen. In the both cases, the government was authorized to set the price and ensure 
gradual payment within five months (Soemardjan, 1962;Rachman, 2012).
The peak for government initiation of agrarian justice was when it issued Law No. 
5/1960 on Basic Agrarian Law (Peraturan Dasar Pokok-Pokok Agraria) (UUPA) and Law 
No. 2/1962 on Sharecropping Law (Undang Perjanjian Bagi Hasil). The aims of Law No. 
5/1960 were (1) to change the colonial tenure system to the Indonesian tenure system 
which would benefit Indonesia’s interests more, especially the farmers’ (2) to end the 
dualism of the land law system with respect to local wisdom (hukumadat) (3) to give 
a legal certainty over land, especially about people’s rights. The purpose of Law No. 
2/1960 was (1) to create fairness between sharecroppers and landlords (2) to protect 
sharecroppers who are vulnerable to the exploitation by landlords (3) to stimulate the 
sharecroppers to enhance their productivity (Soemardjan, 1962).
However, during Orde Baru,6 Law No. 5/1960 and No. 2/1960, which demand 
agrarian reform, were suppressed and neglected by the government. It allocated only 30 
per cent of Indonesian land for Law No. 5/1960 after a forestry law was issued in 1967 
(Setiawan, 2008). In 1971, the government stopped the funding to promote agrarian 
reform based on Law No. 5/1965 and No. 2/1960. It seemed that “…agrarian reform 
was ‘no longer a government priority’” (Lucas, 1992: 83). Therefore, during Orde Baru, 
the Gini index of land ownership increased yearly. Local governments were in a dilemma. 
On the one hand, they had to defend people’s lives over land, but on the other, they 
had to facilitate national development. People who fought against government policies 
over land were vulnerable to physical torture and violence, and were brought to jail and 
6 OrdeBaru is the 32-year administration under the second Indonesian president, Suharto (1966-1998). It is the opposite of Orde Lama, the 
period when Sukarno was president, after Indonesia got its independence in 1945. 
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marked as communists (PKI) (Lucas, 1992; Lucas, 1997). 
When Orde Baru collapsed, the new government stipulated Tap MPR No. IX/
MPR/2001 on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resources Management. The purpose of 
this law was (1) to create agrarian justice (2) to utilize natural resources fairly (3) to resolve 
conflict over agrarian and natural resources utilization. In addition, this law too demanded 
the implementation of Law No. 5/1960 for agrarian reform. Tap MPR No. IX/2001, Tap 
MPR No. 1/2003, and Tap MPR No. V/2003 forced the government to implement Tap 
MPR No. IX/MPR/2001, to overcome all agrarian conflict and push agrarian reform by 
establishing an independent institution (Setiawan, 2008).  
In 2007, Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), planned to 
implement agrarian reform with the principle ‘tanahuntukkeadilandankesejahteranrakyat 
(lands for fairness and people welfare)’. The Indonesian Parliament (DPR RI) too insisted 
that Law No. 5/1965 was still relevant and urgent for Indonesia. One year before, SBY 
had planned to allocate the conversion of 18.15 million hectares of productive forests 
for the national land reform agenda. However, at the end of 2007, with no political will, 
no land reform could be implemented. In 2010, the government issued regulation (PP) 
No. 11 on Curbing and Utilization of Neglected Lands (Penertiban dan Pendayagunaan 
Tanah Terlantar). Out of the 4.8 million hectares of ‘neglected lands’ that were to be 
distributed to landless farmers, the National Land Department (BPN RI) only gave 37,223 
hectares.Most of the neglected lands have not been distributed to farmers until now 
(Setiawan, 2008).
In 2012, the DPR RI stipulated Law No. 2 for Land Acquisition for Development and 
Public Needs (Pengadaan Tanah untuk Pembangunan bagi Kepentingan Umum) and 
Presidential Regulation (Perpres) No. 71 regarding Land for Development and Public 
Needs (Penyelenggaraan Tanah bagi Pembangunan untuk Kepentingan Umum). These 
two laws led to land acquisition for development and public needs, and agrarian conflicts 
cropped up across the country (in 29 out of 33 provinces in Indonesia)7. During the SBY 
administration (2004-2012), there were 618 agrarian conflicts all across the country, over 
2.4 million hectares, involving 731,342 families (Arsyad, 2012). 
Agrarian injustice in Indonesia has caused poverty to the Indonesian farmer. With 43 
per cent of Indonesian labour working in the agriculture sector (Khudori, 2013), most of 
7 The highest number of agrarian conflicts occurred in JawaTimur province (24 conflicts) and Sumatra Utara (21 conflicts). During SBY’s leader-
ship itself (2004-2012), there have been 618 conflicts (Arsyad, 2012b). In the three years from 2010 to 2012, agrarian conflicts were on the 
increase – 106 cases in 2010, 163 cases in 2011 and 198 cases in 2012, within 963,411.2 hectares, involving 141,915 families. Out of 198 
agrarian conflicts in 2012, 40 per cent happened in the plantation sector (90 cases), 30 per cent in the infrastructure construction sector (60 
cases), 11 per cent in the mining sector (21 cases), 4 per cent in the forestry sector (20 cases), 3 per cent in the fish farming sector (5 cases), 
and 1 per cent in the marine and coastal areas (2 cases). Most of the conflicts in the plantation sector occurred due to land grabbing, wherein 
the government gave concession permits to certain companies without a local community agreement (Arsyad, 2012b).  
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them are landless. According to Joyo Winoto (2013), the current head of the National 
Land Department (Badan Pertanahan Nasional), approximately 84 per centof farmers 
possess agricultural land of less than one hectare. Most agricultural land is located in 
the villages. Therefore, more than 60 per cent of poverty is concentrated in the villages 
in Indonesia, due to inequalities of land ownership (Setiawan, 2008; Prakrasa Policy 
Review, 2011; Mulyantoet al., 2009). 
As previously explained, agrarian injustice in Indonesia is caused by land concentration 
among the local-national elite and state-private corporations. At the national level, land is 
concentrated among State and private corporations. In the plantation sector, in 30 years 
(1968-1998), the extent of plantationsincreased from 4.96 million hectares to 14.67 
million hectares (Wiradi, 2005). Palm oil plantations contribute to agrarian injustice in 
Indonesia (Arsyad, 2012; Magdoff 2014). Today, there are 11.5 million hectares of palm 
oil plantation, of which 52 per cent is owned by private corporations and 11.69 per cent 
by State corporations (Arsyad, 2012). 
In the forestry sector, 35.8 million hectares of forests are owned by national and 
international conglomerates within 531 concessions areas. Indonesian farmers only 
manage to get 0.25 million hectare, meaning that only 0.19 per cent villagers have 
legal access to forests. In the mining sector, from 1998 to 2010, three million hectares 
of protected forests were converted to mining areas. PT Freeport itself has 2.9 million 
hectares of concession area in the forestry areas of Papua. Besides, more than 20 
islands have been privatized by foreign institutions for tourism (Arsyad, 2012; Setiawan, 
2008). 
Land Ownership and Development
Development of Land Ownership System
In traditional society, land ownership isorganized by local communities based on 
customary laws, in order to pursue economic growth and development. However, in 
the modern State, ownership is based on State-led public policies. In Indonesia, the 
reason behind State control over land ownership is that the State can play a role to 
prevent “the tragedy of the commons” as underlined by Hardin (1968). Besides, only 
the State can play a rational redistributive function of the resources to all citizenship, as 
stated in Chapter 33 Paragraph 3 of the 1945Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia: 
“all land, water and space, including natural deposits contained therein as a gift of God 
Almighty, is a national treasure; and the right to control and authority is given to the State” 
(Sumarto and Diyanto, 2012). In some developing countries, however, State control over 
land ownership is often not fully put in practice, especially at the village level, which leads 
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to dualism in the land rights system. For example, in the early 1990s, most developing 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa still practised dualism in the land rights system (Place 
& Peter, 1993). State control over land therefore does not effectively facilitate economic 
growth and national development and has brought countless negative effects such as 
land insecurity, unclear land ownership, and land tenure disputes (Myers and Hetz, 2004). 
Recent research has concluded that unclear land ownership in developing countries 
has led to land insecurity that hinders development (Feder&Onchan, 1987; Place 
&Hazell, 1993; Maura, 2013; Valsechhi, 2014). Maura (2005: 197) argues that unclear 
land ownership becomes an “obstacle to economic development and generates multiple 
negative ramifications for poverty and overall human well-being”. Moreover, developing 
countries in which traditional institutions still play pivotal rolest end to prevent their people 
from pursuing economic progress. 
For example, in Mongolia, according to Myers and Hetz (2004: i) “[t]he absence of clear 
property rights is undermining investment, contributing to corruption, and undermining 
economic development”. In Indonesia, at the village level, land is organized by traditional 
leaders who tend to oppose the economic progress of people (Orinbao, 1992). Ordinary 
people do not have full rights ownership of land within a clan, especially those from slave 
and migrant families, like in Flores (Muda, 1986;Pareira, 1988; Forth, 2001; Tule 2004). 
Ordinary famers from the lowest social stratification status cultivate their agricultural land 
only for subsistence, and are reluctant to plant cash crops with high economic value, 
due to the experience thatthe land of ordinary farmers who have planted cash crops 
tends to be grabbed by the traditional village elite (mosalaki), by manipulating the history 
of the land ownership using indigenous folklore and fake genealogy (Tule, 2004; Tule, 
2006; Tolo, 2014). In Sub-Saharan Africa, most traditional land tenure systems do not 
give “full ownership right over land” to individuals, but to the community (Place & Hazell, 
1993: 12). The land tenure system in developing countries mentioned above hinders 
economic growth and sustainable development. 
In the 1980s, the inefficiency of land ownership based on State control and the debt 
crises (Borras,2007) led to privatization. Most developed countries, especially the USA, 
promote privatization by issuing land certification in most developing countries (Myers 
and Hetz, 2004). Along with the promotion by developed countries to encourage land 
privatization in developing countries, most recent research insists that land privatization 
through owning land certificates does facilitate development. Federand Onchan 
(1987: 311) argue that land with legal ownership documents in Thailand “affects both 
investment incentives and the availability of resources to finance investment”, especially 
in a society where there are many formal lending institutions. Besides, land security too 
“...induces higher levels of land improvements”. In Brazil, land certification programmes 
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have contributed to development, which boosts people’s happiness (Maura, 2013). 
In Mexico, Valsechhi (2014:2) witnesses that with a land certificate in hand, “Mexican 
household members can now leave their land (and even rent it out) without fear of being 
expropriated or losing their inheritance, they may able to migrate to seek higher-income 
work in urban areas or the US”. In Mongolia, according to Myers and Hetz (2004: i), 
land privatization contributes to“economic growth, good governance, and urban/rural 
development”.
Conversely, some recent research doubts the promise of enhancing economic growth 
and sustainable development from land privatization in developing countries. With regard 
to Sub-Saharan Africa, with little exception, Place and Hazell (1993) critically question 
the worldwide ambition for land privatization because their findings reveal that it does 
not enhance local investment and productivity. In Mexico, Smith et al. (2009) witness 
that land ownership has brought many negative effects on development because the 
promise of land privatization to enhance land security that could push local investment 
and productivity is not occurring. On the contrary, land privatization has increased 
conflict over land title, deforestation, distinction of local institutions, and the threat to 
indigenous land rights. In Brazil, according to Maura (2013), land privatization does 
boost the happiness of the people, but has also led to the concentration of land among 
the rich. In Indonesia, land certification of customary lands has led to tenure disputes in 
Maluku (Adam, 2010). Besides, land privatization in Papua, as evaluated by Obidzinki 
et al. (2013: 95) in the programme called Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate 
(MIFEE), land privatization of 1.2 million hectares has not contributed to sustainable forest 
management and local development. In fact, it has enhanced “conflicts, displacement, 
or exploitation”. 
In the case of forest land ownership, land privatization in most developing countries has 
led to deforestation and impoverishment of the local people (Ostorm, 1990). In Indonesia, 
by issuing a law with the spirit of privatization, namely Law No. 1/1967 on Penanaman 
Modal Asing (foreign investment) and Law No. 11/1968 on Penaman Modal Dalam 
Negeri (domestic investment), 143 million hectares of forests became open to foreign 
and national investment,which led to massive deforestation and the impoverishment of 
the local people (Siahaan, 2007: 18). Forest concessions were given by an authoritarian 
government to investors without resistance from indigenous people (Awang, 2006: 20). 
Therefore, in 1989-2000, there were 547-600 units of forest concessions over 64 million 
hectares of forests, contributing to massive deforestation in 1985-2004 –that is, 1.7-3.8 
million hectares yearly (Awang, 2005: 20-21;Sihaan, 2007).  More currently, privatizing 
11.5 million hectares of palm oil plantations has led to land grabs in Indonesia (Arsyad, 
2012). Land grabs in Indonesia will be increasing in the future because, according to 
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Borrasand Franco (2011: 29), the expansion of palm oil plantations will triple by 2020 to 
20 million hectares, and to 30 million hectares by 2025. In Indonesia, the privatization 
of forests has caused “land conflicts between famers and plantation owners …across 
Indonesia as local and multinational companies have been encouraged to seize and then 
deforest customary land… (Magdoff, 2013)”.
Land privatization focuses more on economic growth, tends to neglect the sustainable 
management of lands and forests, and ignores economic equity in society. It is too 
“income-centred and growth-oriented” (Borras, 2007: 5). Therefore, it only contributes 
to development in the short-term period, but is a catastrophe in the long-term period 
(Norgaard and Horworth, 1991). Besides, in privatization, land is not seen as a mother, 
but as a commodity to be bought and sold (Akram-Lohdi, 2013).8 Land privatization in 
developing countries therefore increases the Gini index of land ownership that brings 
more negative impact than positive promises on the development agenda. 
Due to the failure of privatization, in the late 1980 ssome scholars proposed common 
pool resources management (CPRs) for land ownership. For example,Ostorm (1990) 
insists that it is much more economically effective and environmentally efficient if the 
common pool resources are organized by communal management. Ostorm (1990) gets 
this idea by synthesizing the notion of “collective action” from Olson (1965) and the 
concept of “tragedy of the commons” from Hardin (1968). Learning from Olson and 
Hardin, Ostorm (1990) proposes the management of the commons through communal 
management with a special social arrangement, such as clear borders of common 
land, congruity between rules and traditions, user participation in decision making, and 
an effective monitoring and penalty mechanism. Yonariza and Shivakoti (2008) tested 
Ostorm’s ideas to evaluate forest management by a local institution called Nagari in West 
Sumatra, Indonesia, revealing that communal management of forest lands by “guarding” 
and “regulating” contribute to sustainable forest management and the welfare of the 
local people. By doing research in India, Bhutan, Nepal, Thailandand Vietnam, Agrawal 
and Ostorm (2008) confirm that communal management for forest lands by establishing 
“community based forestry” contributes more to forest sustainability and boosts local 
people welfare. The same confirmation also comes from Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) 
after research in 80 forest areas in ten countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. 
8 In the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, small-scale peasants around the world were witnessing the forces of modernity eviscerat-
ing their world, as rural elites used legal and illegal methods to forcibly evict peasants from their territory, fence it and enclose it for their own 
private use. In so doing, peasant land was transformed from being a mother into being a commodity to be bought and sold. This was passively 
and actively resisted by peasants, who called instead, in their hundreds of millions, for pro-poor redistributive land reform, by consent if possible, 
by force if necessary’ (Akram-Lodhi 2013: 80).
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However, even though CPR management contributes positively to sustainable resource 
use and people welfare, according to Agarwal (2001) CPR sometimes lacks community 
cohesion and equity. Coleman and Steed (2009) argue that CPR has limitations in the 
monitoring and penalty system. Li (2002) insists that CPR is not compatible with modern 
goals of economic development. Fuentes-Castro (2009) underlines that CPR tends not 
to maximize resource usage for development.  
Agrarian Reform and Local Development
Both privatization and communal management of lands seems to neglect the social and 
agrarian structure in society. Therefore, the offered strategies fail to achieve sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation. The accent on land security without changing the 
Gini index of land ownership in society contributes to entrenched poverty even though 
the growth of economy is positive. This is because those who have large tracts of lands 
will progress economically, and vice versa.  For example, in South Sulawesi, Indonesia, 
“…original settlers and their descendants have easier access to land than later 
arrivals” (Pomp (1995: 853). In addition, communal management in traditional society 
in developing countries tends to fall into “elite capture”, like in India (Meher, 2009). In 
decentralized governance, elite capture becomes a serious threat to local development. 
Dutta (2009: 3) argues that “one common disadvantage of the decentralization process 
is the phenomenon of elite capture, especially in developing countries”. In Indonesia, 
decentralization has been hijacked by the local elite (Hadiz, 2005) and “[c]oncepts like 
‘local wisdom’, ‘village autonomy’ and ‘customary values’ are often used naively –in 
fact, such concepts could provide for highly patrimonial and authoritarian government 
structures” (Antlov 2003: 210). Therefore, land security without agrarian justice (land 
equality) cannot contribute to local development and poverty alleviation.
Agrarian justice occurs if only there is agrarian reform9, since the main purpose of 
agrarian reform is to establish agrarian justice. To develop agricultural sectors, agrarian 
reform is a sine qua non. According to previous research (Feder & Onchan, 1987; Ip & 
Stahl, 1978; Barlowe, 1953; Ahmed, 1976; Place & Hazell, 1993), agrarian justice has 
a positive impact on economic development. However, agrarian justice, after agrarian 
reform, has to be supported by other developmental factors such as legal right over 
lands, availability of cheap credit institutions, access to advocating institutions, access 
to information and technology, access to education and skill centres, and access to 
9 In modern history, the first biggest agrarian reform occurred in France in the 18th century, which expanded to West Europe, Central Europe 
and East Europe. After the Second World War, agrarian reform occurred in Asian countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (Barlowe, 
1953; Wiradi, 2005). However, until the mid 20th century, the aim of agrarian reform was only for social justice – there was no purpose of eco-
nomic development. In 1880, Bulgaria was the first country that initiated agrarian reform with economic considerations by establishing supporting 
programmes such as socialization and education, crediting, marketing, and technology (Wiradi, 2008). 
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other production means (Wiradi, 2005). 
There are two kinds of agrarian reforms: agrarian reform by leverage, and agrarian 
reform by grace (Tolo, 2013a).10 Agrarian reform by leverage is initiated by political will of 
the people, but agrarian reform by grace is initiated by political will of the government. 
In this paper, we will propose agrarian reform by leverage. In the context of Indonesia, 
agrarian reform by leverage is more suited to the objective condition of the country 
(Wiradi, 2009). Indonesians have experienced agrarian reform by grace during the 
Sukarno era (Orde Lama) in 1946-1965 (Soemardjan, 1962). However, when Suharto 
(OrdeBaru, 1966-1998) came to power, he stopped the agrarian reform agenda, and it 
was not included in the national development programme. Those who sued for agrarian 
reform were stamped as PKI11 with the consequence of being jailed, tortured and killed 
(Lucas, 1992). However, since agrarian reform by grace does not have strong roots in 
the political will of the people, as agrarian reform by leverage does, even though the 
national leader changes the reform agenda still remains a national agenda because of 
the strong support from the people (Tolo, 2013a). 
In order to pursue sustainable development, agrarian reform by leverage focuses 
not merely on asset reform, but also on access reform. Asset reform only focuses on 
fair land distribution through land reforms (Tolo, 2013a). However, having enough land 
for agricultural activities is not enough to get economic gain for farmers. By conducting 
research in 25 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Ahmed (1976) concludes 
that productivity from the agrarian sector can be enhanced not only by agrarian justice 
but also by good policies and technological interventions. Therefore, access reform is 
needed in this case and is likely to provide famers with good production devices, good 
production models and good distribution of agricultural production (Tolo, 2013a). The 
production and distribution agenda therefore should be depoliticized, meaning that there 
should not be aco-optingof the national and foreign eliteby political powers (Wahono, 
2004), as happened during the Green Revolution in Indonesia (Hardiyoko and Saryoto, 
2004).
Village Industry, Cooperatives and Village Development
The enhancement of productivity due to agrarian justice can lead to economic 
development and industrialization (Ip & Stahl, 1978). Industrialization is paramount in the 
development of a country because of its effect on national development (Lane, 2013). 
10 Borras (2007: 6) proposed and discussed market-led agrarian reform and state-led agrarian reform. 
11 PKI is [PartaiKomunis Indonesia] (Communist Party of Indonesia) which proposed land reform in Indonesia and facilitated the government 
in the making of the UUPA (Basic Agrarian Law) No. 5/1960 for land reform. PKI also provoked the people through the BarisanTani Indonesia 
(Indonesia Farmers’ Organization) to fight for land reform. However, when Suharto came to power, PKI was banned from the national polity and it 
is estimated that 800,000-3,000,000 PKI members were killed during this ban. 
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Therefore, many developing technocrats have thought that investment in the agricultural 
sector is not so profitable because of its low marginal rate of return compared to the 
industrial sector. The agricultural sector is assessed too slowly and tends to seem 
stagnant in the show of economic growth. However, developing the agricultural sector 
is in fact a good base for industrialization (Raharjdjo, 1991). The agricultural sector is 
able to contribute a significant surplus that can be invested in the industrial sector. It can 
also contribute to cheap food resources and good raw material for industry. Besides, it 
could boost the number of people in the middle class which can be good for industrial 
markets. In addition, developing the agricultural sector effectively and efficiently can 
prevent movement of labour from rural to urban areas to work in the industrial sector. With 
limited labour from the rural areas, industrial labour is likely to enjoy a better bargaining 
position for wages and working conditions (Tolo, 2013a). Therefore, “the success of the 
industrial sector … does depend on the development of agricultural sectors for the basis 
of economic development” (Raharjdjo, 1991: 4). 
In Asian countries like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, agrarian justice after 
agrarian reforms has led to economic development and industrialization (Wiradi, 
2005; Borras, 2007; Solon & Saragih, 2013). What makes developed countries move 
forward economically is that they “integrate the agricultural and industrial sector” in their 
development agenda (Raharjdo, 1991: 18). By merging the two sectors, the government 
produces food and raw industrial material not only for domestic consumption, but also 
for export. In developed countries, products from the agricultural sector are processed 
by industry before being exported at a higher economic value to other countries. In 
addition, the industrial sector also produces material inputs for the agricultural sector, 
like devices, medicines and seeds. 
For most famers in developing countries, it is difficult to get access to agricultural inputs 
such as devices, fertilizer and technology. Raharjdjo (1991: 25) insists that “agricultural 
development needs to be accompanied simultaneously by developing village industries 
to produce agricultural devices, fertilizer, and processing of agricultural production”. 
Besides, village industries could alsoprevent economic surplus in the agrarian sector 
in villages from going to industrial activities in the city (Arsyad, 2012;Tolo, 2013a). This 
aims to balance the development in the urban and rural areas (Raharjdjo, 1991), for 
inequalities arising out of urban industrial development and village development can 
potentially create class polarization between urban capitalists and village farmers, which 
can be a source of severe crisis as may occur in the USA in future (Hadiz, 2013).
For ensuring economic democracy within village industrial activities, cooperative 
institutions should handle their development (Ilyas, 2012). As Lenin said, the weapon 
of the weak is an organization (Hill, 2009). Therefore, cooperatives function not only for 
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economic proposes, but also political goals, for social justice, especially agrarian justice. 
In Indonesia, there is a village cooperative, the so-called Koperasi Unit Desa (KUD), 
but it is entrenched with corruption and needs to be revitalized. Last but not the least, 
besides establishing cooperatives, developing the agricultural sector and village industry 
needs quality human resources from among the people in the village (Raharjdjo, 1991). 
Cooperatives canplay a pivotal role in enhancing this (Tolo, 2013a).
Methodology
This research was conducted from November 2013 to January 2014 in Flores and 
Seram Island. Geographically, these two Islands are located in the two poorest provinces 
in eastern Indonesia: Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) and Maluku province. Flores has a 
huge variety of cultures and traditions among its districts. Florenese people speak five 
different languages. However, in Seram, every district has more less the same culture 
and tradition as a result of the impact of the long colonization of the kingdom of Tidore 
from the 11th to the 19thcentury. 
Flores is a small Island (14, 273 sq. km), situated in the south of the Pacific Ocean, 
consisting of 8 districts (kabupaten) under the NTT province administration. It is 
predominantly Catholic, and one of the poorest islands in Indonesia. According to the 
data from the Statistics Office (BPS) (2010), there are 1.8 million inhabitants in Flores, 
of whom 17 per cent (330,380) are poor. In 2008, the Human Development Index (HDI) 
there was 66.15, lower than national HDI 71.17. Flores was colonized from the 14th to 
the 20th century by the kingdoms of Majapahit, Goa and Ternate, the Bima Sultanate, 
and the Portuguese and Dutch (Tolo, 2014).
Seram is a small island located in Maluku province, and is categorized as a poor 
island although abundant in natural resources. Seram too experienced being colonized 
by the kingdoms of Majapahit and Ternate, and by the Portuguese and Dutch from the 
11th to the 20th century. In Seram, there are three districts under the Maluku province 
administration. The number of Muslims and Christians is 50-50, and during 1998-2006, 
Seram experienced religious conflicts between the two. 
The research in Flores was conducted between the end of November 2013 and 
February 2014. Research methodology is a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, 
and there were in-depth interviews with and questionnaires filled in by farmers, traditional 
leaders, village leaders, religious leaders, the political elite and government officers in 
each study site. 
More than 60 in-depth interviews were conducted during November 2013-January 
2014, each lasting for one to two hours. In Flores, in-depth interviews were conducted 
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in the three districts of Nagekeo, Ngada and Manggarai. In Nagekeo, interviews were in 
the villages (desa) of Dhawe, Mulakoli, and Maukeli. In Ngada, the same activities were 
carried out in the villages of Seso, Wangka, and Ruto, and in Manggarai, in the villages 
of Compang Dalo, Narangand Robek. In Seram, the interviews covered all three districts 
of Maluku Tengah, Seram Bagian Barat and Seram BagianTimur.
Across the two islands, 640 questionnaires were distributed to a random selection 
from nine villages in Flores and nine sub-villages in Seram. At each site, we distributed 
35-40 questionnaires. In Seram, this was done only in one district covering the three 
villages (negeri) of Luhu, Murnaten and Rumberu, consisting of nine study sites at the 
sub-village level. In Flores, it covered three villages in each of three districts; in Nagekeo, 
in the villages of Dhawe, Mulakoli, and Maukeli;in Ngada, in the villages of Seso, Wangka, 
and Ruto; and in Manggarai, in the villages of Compang Dalo, Narang and Robek.
Findings and Discussion
Colonization and the Change inthe Land Tenure System
Seram and Flores are fertile islands with abundant natural resources. Seram Island is 
mostly covered by tropical forests. During Dutch occupation, this was one of the foremost 
islands in Indonesia to produce cloves and other spices (Ellen, 2002). Geographically, 
Flores is just like Seram, fertile and covered by forests. The Japanese captain who took 
over Flores from the Dutch in the 1940s describes Flores as an island with an “abundance 
of fertile tropical forests, trees, wild fruits, mild wind and beautiful fountains” (Sato and 
Tennien, 1957, 1976: 15). However, though rich in natural resources, these two islands 
are categorized as poor islands in Indonesia. One of the causes of poverty is the long 
period of colonization by local kingdoms and Westerners.  
Colonization of Seram and the Change in its Land Tenure System 
Seram was under the kingdom of Tidorein the 11th century. During the 12th-14th centuries, 
Arab traders came there and spread Islam. In the 13th century, the kingdom of Majapahit 
was very influential in the archipelago, and Seram was part of it. However, Majapahit 
became weak in the late 14th century,12 and Tidore took back Seram. During Tidore rule, 
there were several local kingdoms in Seram, such as Huamual and Sawai. The Portuguese 
came to Seram in the 16thcentury to trade and to spread Catholicism. In the 17th century, 
the Dutch came to Seram to trade and to spread Protestantism (Ellen, 2002). 
12 Bernard HM Vlekke (1959), as cited by Daniel Dhakidae (2001), in the footnote no. 1 (page viii-ix) says that “Gadjah-Mada deaths in 1364 
made the king despair… A few years later all the power in the state was once more given to a prime minister. The records for the later period of 
AyamWuruk’s reign are scarce, and after his death in 1389 Majapahit already begins to fall back into obscurity”.
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Among these colonizers, the Dutch exerted the most influence over administration 
and the land tenure system in Seram. In the beginning, they came with violence. For 
example, according to the village secretary in Luhu, in 1625-1656, Luhu got help from 
the kingdom of Goa and fought the Dutch. However, Luhu lost in 1956 and the Dutch 
took over the Makasarese fortress (Benteng Makasar) and established their own fortress 
called Oven Beach. Ellen (2002) writes that in the late 17th century, the Nuaulu people too 
fought against the Dutch, but lost. 
The kingdoms that lost to the Dutch were forced to move from the uplands to the 
coastal areas so they were more easily controllable. The Dutch also replaced some local 
kings who opposed their interests in Seram. For example, in the late 19th century, the 
Dutch forced the Nuaulu people to move to Sepa, one of the villages on the coast south 
of Seram (Elen, 2002).  One of the saniri13 members in Murnaten reveals that their village 
was established in the early 20th century forcibly by the Dutch, replacing the old village 
called Ratu Lesi in the uplands area. The head of the dusun in Liaela also says that their 
village was established due to the intervention of the Dutch in the 1940s. 
During Dutch occupation, people were forced to plant cash crops like cloves, nutmeg, 
and other spice producing plants. It seems that in the 19th century, the Dutch had already 
made Maluku, including Seram, one of the centres of spice production in Indonesia 
for their international trade. Gordon (1975) writes that in the 19th century, Dutch boats 
transported spices from Maluku to Batavia, but the boats were disturbed by pirates in 
the Flores Sea. 
The Dutch applied the strategy of divide et impera (divide and rule) to colonize Seram. 
For example, according to the village secretary in Luhu, when the Dutch conquered 
Luhu, they distributed lands of the Huamual kingdom of Luhu to other neighbouring 
kingdoms in Seram. In Murnaten and Rumberu village, some of the leading clans were 
upset by the Dutch who replaced the true kings with fake ones.14 The local kingdoms 
and the elite within the kingdoms therefore fought each other and became weak, which 
benefited the Dutch who began to rule Seram. 
In Seram, by grabbing land and replacing kings, the Dutch succeeded in changing 
the land tenure system to benefit their own economic interests. First, they set up 
forest borders and categorized a forest according to its function. Forests that were not 
cultivated by the people automatically belonged to the Dutch. Second, in the areas of 
Dutch occupation, famers had to plant cash crops needed by the Dutch for international 
13 A saniri is a representative member of the village administration. Usually, saniris are selected from each sub-village (dusun) and are either 
from the leading clans or noble families.
14 In Murnaten and Rumberu village, those who were upset are still fighting to seize back their position, and are waiting for a local regulation that 
says that the head of the village has to be from the true leading family, not the ones the Dutch appointed.  
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trade. Third, people were forced to move to the coastal areas. Local kings with a strong 
authority over land were replaced by the Dutch. Some of them were killed – for example, 
King Soya of Murnaten was killed in Ambon. Therefore, tradition over lands was either 
distinct or weakly practice. 
Colonization of Flores and Change in its Land Tenure System 
In the 14th century, Flores was under the Majapahit kingdom. At that time, the name of 
Flores Island was Solot (Metzner, 1982). When Majapahit became weak in the late 14th 
century, Flores was ruled also by the two local kingdoms of Goa and Ternate from the 
15th to 16th century. Tidore ruled the eastern part of Flores, and Goa ruled the central and 
western part, but in the 17thcentury the western part of Flores fell to the sultanate of Bima 
(Gordon, 1975; Erb, 2010). 
The Portuguese came to Floresto trade and spread Catholicism in the 16thcentury, 
but only ruled Larantuka and Solor in the eastern part of Flores (Metzner, 2001). In 1646, 
with the Treaty of Solor, the Dutch came to Flores for trading. Flores formally fell into 
the hands of the Dutch in 1859 (Webb, 1968) when the “Portuguese sold Flores to the 
Dutch” (Prior, 2013: 216). According to Bekkum (1946, 1974), till the early 20thcentury, 
the Dutch only administered Flores from Bima. They began direct administration in Flores 
in 1908 by establishing an office in Ruteng-Flores (Gordon, 1975).
As with Seram, the Dutch were the only colonizers to have a huge influence over the 
land tenure system and administration in Flores. Again like in Seram, they applied divide 
et impera in Flores by establishing the kingdom system (rajaschap). If fact, before the 
Dutch came, Flores had no kingdom system like in Europe. It was organized on the nua 
system, characterized by a small unit of government consisting of 100-200 people. A 
nua is a “completely independent body” from other nua. However, in order to rule Flores 
more easily, the Dutch created a kingdom system by selecting a strong local leader in 
the district. Therefore, during the Dutch occupation, in 1909-1929, there were eight 
oder afdeeling led by a king –Manggarai, Ngada, Riung, Nagekeo, Ende, Lio, Sikka and 
Larantuka (Tule, 2004).
In Manggarai, when the Dutch first came to Flores, there were 38 dalu and approximately 
150 landlords (Bekkum, 1946, 1976). In order to control the place better, the Dutch 
united Manggarai as one kingdom, and in 1924 appointed Kraeng Bagung from Pongkor 
to become the acting king. In 1930, the Dutch selected Alexander Baruk from Todo to 
become the first Manggarai king, and below him was his young nephew, Joseph Huwa 
(Gordon, 1975). The same strategy was applied in Nagekeo where the Dutch selected a 
king (raja) and several village leaders (kepala mere or kepala gemeente). Only if someone 
possessed at least ten hectares of land could he be selected to be a kepala mere. For 
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example, in 1917, the Dutch appointed Seme Rau, the direct descendant of Tuku Naru 
(the first dweller), as kepala mere in Worowatu (Tule, 2006). 
The coming of the Dutch to Flores did increaseproductivity. “Agricultural improvement 
began and food productivity rose” (Gordon, 1975: 15). The Dutch also introduced wet-
rice fields (sawah)15 and coffee plantations. In the 1920s, the Dutch brought Robusta 
coffee to Manggarai. In 1918, they started wet-rice fields in Dampek and Waso with the 
help of Balinese prisoners. In 1935, wet-rice fields were established in Kenari (Mbura) 
and near Loloh by employing Manggaraian people. In 1937, the Dutch declared 3,000 
hectares of Manggarain Flores “closed” for public activities (Prior, 2013). In 1938, several 
dalu16 and landlords (land guardians) were sent to Bima to learn how to develop wet-
rice fields, fish ponds and terrace systems. Not all landlords (tu’ateno) agreed to develop 
terrace systems in Manggarai because it was different from the traditional land tenure 
system, called lodok. Those landlords who did not agree to the terrace system for their 
agricultural lands were jailed by the Dutch till they fell in line. In 1942, a demonstration 
wet-rice field system was started in Lambaleda. With the introduction of sawah, people 
shifted from dry-rice to wet-rice fields and “[v]illagers began to accept new agricultural 
methods and adapted to a petty cash economy” (Gordon 1975: 15). As further 
consequence, some of the tradition and ritual over lands were distinct. For example, 
Gordon (1975: 131) writes that a “land, which consists mainly of sawah, does not require 
a communal decision to determine planting dates or division of labour”.
To get sustainable control over Flores and its resources when Indonesia got 
Independence in 1945, the Dutch proposed a United State of Flores that aimed to reduce 
the influence of the national movement from Java. Gordon (1975: 68) explains that in late 
1946, “the NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) and the rajas of the districts of 
Flores agreed to form a united kingdom of Flores to be known as the ‘Flores Federatie’. 
The government of the ‘federatie’ was in the hands of a council of rajas (Dewas Raja-Raja) 
who were assisted by a People Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)”. 
However, this plan failed in the early 1950s when the new Indonesian government became 
stronger, and the Dutch failed to continue their colonization over Flores. 
Land Ownership, Tradition and Development
The average ownership of land for each family in Seram and Flores is 2.6 hectares. 
Therefore, 90 per cent of the people admit to having access to agricultural land, grazing 
land and forest. However, the fact is that ownership of land is concentrated among the 
15 In fact, in 1891, Meerburg found a wet-rice field in Reo. Twenty years later, Staple found wet-rice fields owned by the Bimanese in Reo, Pota  
and Labuan Bajo. Keperus (1941) found wet-rice in Flores started by the Bimanese with the help of the government. 
16 Dalu is a traditional system of government in Manggarai. Under the raja (king) is dalu, and under the dalu is gelarang. 
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village elite and first dweller families. In Manggarai, according to Karang Ngamal, as 
quoted by Gordon (1975: 132), “each dalu had at least one oka, field, within his territory 
upon which animals graze”. The oka, or grazing lands, can be hundreds of hectares. 
The families of most of our respondents (62 per cent) have been living in the villages 
for several centuries, and only 20 per cent in the village are of the third generation. The 
newcomers (20 per cent) mostly have small portions of land compared to those whose 
families have been there longer – except for those from slave families (ho’o), who have 
no land and work as cultivators and sharecroppers. In Flores, the sharecropper system 
applies 5:5 and 6:4 as share of the profit. In Seso village, the sharecropper system 
contributes to 40 per centof the harvest to the landowner. In Compang Dalo village, 50 
per cent of the yields are given to the land owner.
In both islands, the village leaders –called mosalaki in Flores and raja in Seram – 
have a pivotal role in the land tenure system. It is their privilege to distribute and solve 
conflicts with regard to land. In Seram, to solve land disputes within the village, the raja is 
helped by as aniri member, but solving conflicts among villages is the responsibility of the 
lattupati–an organization of a raja. In Flores, in line with the findings of Orinbao (1992) in 
Ende and Gordon (1975) in Manggarai,the mosalaki is the one who determines the day 
and date forplanting and harvesting in the village, and is himself the first to start. If the 
mosalaki has not planted and harvested, the others have to wait. If a villager breaks the 
rules, he or she is punished spiritually and culturally. Sometimes, the mosalaki can take 
away the offender’s right over land. 
Communal land is distributed to every individual in the village by the mosalaki and 
raja. Once this is done, the land is owned privately but it is not a permanent ownership 
because the mosalaki and raja still play a role in controlling the use of land. However, 
while most of the respondents (97per cent) in Seram consider the ownership permanent, 
only 55 per cent of respondents in Flores think it so. It is usually prohibited to sell land 
to others, especially outsiders. In 15 out of 18 villages, clan leaders forbid the villagers 
to sell. In only three villages in Manggarai district, there is permanent ownership of land 
after distribution by clan leaders (tu’ateno), and the owner is free to utilize and sell. Land 
transactions in Manggarai are therefore quite high. Since the 1970s, land in Manggarai 
has been concentrated in the hands of those who have capital, as noted by Gordon 
(1975: 145-146): “land for which titles have been issued can be bought and sold, and 
within the last decade a new class of wealthy entrepreneurs has emerged in Manggarai 
capable of buying land…[Bureaucrats] can buy jeeps, build houses and buy land. Usually 
they do all three. But land is often their first choice.”
Both in Seram and Flores, landis only distributed to men. Out of 18 villages, only in 
Ruto land is given to women, but still highly controlled by men, especially by brothers. 
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Therefore, women usually do not have access to full ownership rights over land. They are 
expected to marry and get land from their husbands. Both in Flores and Seram, women 
are allowed to cultivate the family land if they do not get married. Once a woman gets 
married, she has to leave the land she cultivated when single. 
Despite the domination ofthe mosalaki and raja and men, 90 per cent agree that 
the land tenure system in their village is based on “fair principles”, and 80 per cent of 
respondents feel that agricultural land is enough for all villagers to achieve a “decent 
living”. In fact, however, productivity is quite low with the current system. Based on our 
survey, annually, one hectare of land in Flores and Seram only produces an income 
generation of 13.6 million IRD (1170 USD). Besides, most of the land is under-utilized 
because of unclear ownership and domination by clan leaders andthe elite. According 
to the data, 72per cent of the respondents in Flores and 47 per cent respondents in 
Seramthink that most of their land is under-utilized. 
However, 97per cent of the respondents in Seram and 57 per cent in Flores firmly 
believe that development of the village would be more easily achieved if there were to be 
a change in the land tenure system. Also, 77 per cent of respondents in Flores and 62 
per centin Seraminsist that famers’ productivity will increase with a change. One of the 
changes suggested is to make land ownership permanent, with no intervention from clan 
leaders who tend to create setbacks in agricultural development, and 98 per cent of the 
respondents in Seram and 60 per cent in Flores would like certification of their land. Our 
survey reveals that at present only 40 per cent of the respondents have land certification. 
According to data from the National Land Agency (BPN), it appears that the amount of 
agriculture land with certification is much lower than reported by the respondents. The 
main reason for wanting land certification in Seram and Flores is to avoid conflict (95 per 
cent). Very few respondents (4 per cent) think of it as a means to sell their land.This data 
is in line with the finding of Li (2004) in her research over land tenure system in Sulawesi. 
People in eastern Indonesia refuse to consider land as commodity that can be freely 
traded. As in Keo society, they look at it as a father and mother that have to be respected 
(Tule, 2004). In Manggarai, during the Barong Wae ceremony, forests are given respect 
and treated as a mother (Tolo, 2013b). 
Both in Seram and Flores, even without certification, land borders are clear to everyone 
in the village and so they are not particular about the issuance of certificates. Moreover, 
land with certification is taxed by the government. Since the 1970s, the Indonesian 
government has been proposing land certification, but people in Flores do not seem 
keen to get it done. As reported by Gordon (1975: 145),“[l]and disputes in Manggarai 
are less often concerned with land titles than with other aspects of agriculture. Thus the 
Manggarai do not feel a great need to rush in to Ruteng and pay to have their land holding 
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measured and registered. A further reason which delays the progress of ‘agraria’ is that 
many villagers think registration will lead to more taxes”. The secretary of the village of 
Luhu says that “every individual knows land borders and can sell the land without land 
certification; therefore, we do not need land certification”. However, according to people 
in Seram and Flores, land borders become unclear when investors enter the villages. 
In terms of enhancing development, people in the study sites are mostly sceptical 
about investment in mining and logging. This is because they have experienced being 
outsmarted by investors who have colluded with the local government. However, they 
seem to welcome investors for oil palm plantations. Especially in Seram, most people 
in Kobi Sadar, Waraloing, Sawai, Luhu and Rumberu have a positive expectation about 
oil palm plantations. For example, in Rumberu village, a head of dusun says,“We will 
allocate 10,000 hectares for Sitorus, an investor from Batak, with a contract for 25 years, 
with a profit sharing of 30:70 per cent, meaning 30per cent for the people. People would 
also work as labour in the plantation.”
Village Politics, Land Ownership and Development
Land ownership in the villages in Seram and Flores is dominated and organized by local 
clan leaders (mosalaki and raja). Moreover, traditional institutions are not based on the 
Pancasila17 democracy. This has led to elite capture, land concentration among certain 
elite, and the under-utilization of huge areas of land that causes poverty in the village. 
Towards the end of the 1950s, the Indonesian government introduced a new kind 
of village called desa; the locals called it desagayabaru or ‘new-style villages’ (Tule, 
2006: 213). In Flores, these villages led to the reduction of the administrative power 
of local traditional leaders because the new village leaders were not always selected 
from among village clan leaders. This has contributed to increasing conflict between the 
traditional village leaders and the new government village leaders over land and territory. 
On the other hand, in Seram, government village leaders are automatically chosen from 
the leading family in the clan. It does not create conflict over land, but still leads to elite 
capture and agrarian injustice. 
In Indonesia, in fact, the village government plays a pivotal role in development. 
During the colonial era, self-rule was encouraged for village governments, “but making 
them the lowest administrative unit and allowing them to be taxed”. During Orde Baru, 
with Law 5/1975, Suharto “wished to design a uniform structure and a clear hierarchy 
giving the central government power over local communities”. The Central government 
had “full control of the countryside, supervising village government” (Antlov 2003: 194-
17 Pancasila: 1. Belief in the one supreme God 2. Just and civilized humanity 3. The unity of Indonesia 4. Democracy led by the wisdom of 
deliberations among representatives 5. Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.
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195). Therefore, people in the village were depoliticized and only became objects of 
development programmes. The head of the village became the hand of the higher 
government to control the village, and the army’s Babinsa were present in the villages to 
make people obey. 
After Suharto’s fall, with Law No. 22/1999, later replaced by Law No. 32/2004, the 
village government became more independent even though the army’s Babinsa are still 
present in most villages, with less power. Village governments are less depoliticized 
and contribute to development. Village governments are allowed to have village-owned 
enterprises, which was prohibited by the previous Law No. 5/1975. Besides, the latest 
Law No. 6/2014 on village government allows it to establish enterprises that work not for 
profit but for the welfare of the village people (Maschab, 2013). Moreover, annually, the 
national government plans to allocate to every village government in Indonesia at least 
one billion rupiahs as development funds.
However, according to our findings in Flores and in Seram, village governments seem 
to not function well as described by the laws. In Flores, village governments appear 
neglected in the development programme, subject to mostly unsustainable development 
projects of the higher government. For example, in 2008, the village government in 
Wangka was not involved by forestry department in their forestry programme, especially 
in drawing the forest borders. According to the forestry department, agricultural land 
is located within government forests which people have occupied for centuries. Those 
who worked in these lands were victimized by the police and the army. Finally, the 
people were involved in a physical conflict with government apparatus in 2008 and 
2011. According to the head of the village, “The government did not involve us in 
the establishment of forest borders and, above all, the government did not respect 
our customary laws.” Besides, the head of the village in Compang Dalo complained 
about the district agriculture department’s unsustainable development programme for 
vegetables,which lasted only for one year. 
In Seram, village governments are actively involved in the development programme 
only when investors enter the villages. This cooperation aims only to release the 
customary lands for mining, logging and oil palm plantation. As a village leader and 
clan leader, araja has privilege authority over land. Indecentralized Indonesia, a village 
representative member (badan  perwakilan  desa), called saniri in Seram,is only a ‘rubber 
stamp’ of the raja. It is the same in Flores. Village governments in Seram still become the 
object of development programmes of the higher government. 
Both in Flores and Seram, we found that village leaders don’t always develop their 
villages based on ‘fair and democratic principles’. Elite capture often occurs in village 
governments. The village people are not involved in development programmes and 
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therefore tend to ignore them. In Seram, we found that village development funding is 
misused, and priority is given to the centre of the village (dusunpusat) where the village 
head lives. The sub-villages (dusun) seem less developed and are categorized as poor. 
For example, the dusunpusat in Luhu, Sawai, and Murnaten –except Rumberu village – 
are better developed and less poor compared to other sub-villages. This is because the 
usage of development funds from the government and investors are decided by the raja 
and saniri members who mostly live in the dusunpusat. 
Conclusion & Recommendation
Based on the information from in-depth interviews and questionnaires filled in 18 study 
sites in Flores and Seram, we draw several conclusions. 
First, land ownership based on customary laws (adat laws) in eastern Indonesia is 
mostly concentrated among the government, traditional leaders, village leaders and 
men. Village politics is dominated by traditional leaders and tend to hinder development 
programmes in the whole village. Elite capture is a common practice in the villages, in 
Flores and Seram. Therefore, development funding is hijacked by people with power 
for self-interest – for themselves and the benefit of close relatives. Our conclusion is in 
line with previous research on village government and land ownership. Antlove (2003) 
concludes that in decentralized Indonesia, the traditional and government elite in villages 
use public funding and resources to enrich themselves. Besides, Prior (2013: 230) says 
that “insistence on the traditional inalienability of adat land is seen to benefit only the 
leaders, who increasingly claim ownership rather than guardianship of what has now 
become a commodity”. This has led to agrarian injustice that causes poverty in rural 
eastern Indonesia.
Second, village leaders play a pivotal role in the distribution of land and resources, 
which tends towards elite capture. The traditional elite who become village leaders are 
more prone to elite capture of development funding and customary lands. Therefore, 
development in Seram and Flores is hindered by tradition, which has led to uneven land 
distribution and insecurity of ownership. However, development can be achieved if we 
can reduce the negative impact of tradition and enhance its positive values. Investment 
in natural resources is a way to progress. However, investment without improving the 
land tenure system and its tradition, and without agrarian reform, will bring huge negative 
impact on development and to the people in Flores and Seram. 
Third, the customary tenure system is more respected by local people than the national 
land tenure system. Therefore, people obey the village and clan leaders’ decisions more 
than government regulations. 
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Fourth, colonization in eastern Indonesia has contributed to the change of land 
tenure systems which reduced the role and function of traditional institutions. With the 
interference of colonizers, land that was respected as mother and father became a 
commodity that could be bought and sold. The aim of commodification of land was to 
fulfill the colonizers’ economic interests.
Fifth, the central government tends to consider village people as objects of 
development. Land is utilized for a national interest that neglects village governments. 
In decentralized Indonesia, the practice of objectifying village people still occurs even 
though there has been a democratic change in the legislation system. Therefore, conflicts 
over lands continue to occur in Flores between the government and the local people.
In order to achieve better development, based on the information from the fieldwork 
we recommend the following:
First, local people have to initiate agarian reform by leverage in eastern Indonesia. 
Only then will there be agrarian justice and poverty alleviation.The government should 
support peoples’ initiatives for agrarian reform. Agrian reform by leverage will lead to 
agrarian justice not only between people, but also between genders. 
Second, the government needs to respect more adator traditional institutions and 
involve them in development programmes because these have power and influence over 
people’s lives. However, the government should make sure that all traditional regulations 
that hinder development and are not in line with Pancasila democracy are improved and 
replaced by better ones. Also, the government needs to preserve the positive aspects of 
customary laws of land ownership, such as resisting commodification of land ownership 
by outsiders, especially investors.
Third, the government needs to increase land security not only by issuing collective 
certificates, but by defining clear roles and functions of traditional and village leaders 
with regard to land ownership, according to fair principles and Pancasila democracy. In 
eastern Indonesia, based on anthropological research, as an Austronesia nation, there is 
no concept of a landlord, but a land guardian. Therefore, it is not correct for the traditional 
elite in Flores and Seramto proclaim themselves as landlords possessing huge tracts of 
lands. With anthropological inputs, the government can produce rules and regulations 
that guarantee agrarian justice to all people. Besides, the government needs to put into 
practice Law No.5/1960 to limit land ownership based on the total population18 in the 
area, and government regulation No. 56/1960 that regulates the maximum ownership of 
agricultural lands to only two hectares.
18 If in a society the population is 400 people in every square kilometre, they are only allowed to possess five hectare sawah and six hectares 
ladang. Conversely, if in a society the population is only 50 people in every square kilometre, they are allowed to own 15 hectares sawah and 20 
hectares ladang. 
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Fifth, the government needs to establish village industries for people in villages. Law 
No. 6/2014 allows village governments to possess enterprises or industries for the 
benefit and welfare of the local people. Village-owned industries should be designed 
to produce things for people’s basic needs as well as for agriculture, such as good 
seeds, fertilizer and farming equipments. Besides, village cooperatives (KUD) need to be 
revitalized in order to support these industries. Village-owned industry and cooperatives 
not only play a role in increasing economic development, but also in boosting the quality 
of human resources and political awareness. Good human resources and political 
awareness are paramount for people in villages to make the government, especially the 
village government, really work for people welfare.
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Political Ecology of Herders’ Insurgency on 
Tiv Farmers in Benue State – Nigeria under 
Neoliberalism 
Vanger, Emmanuel Terngu1
Abstract
This paper looks at herders’ insurgency on Tiv farmers in Benue State from a socio-
political-ecology perspective, anchored in theories of existentialism, environmental 
thesis, political ecology and neoliberalism. Armed insurgency on Tiv farmers by 
herders is precipitated by environmental, political, cultural and social stressors 
as well as a poor socio-ecological resilience framework that affects sustainable 
livelihood, and the insurgency is a battle for  survival which has implications for food 
security in Benue State. The paper reveals that herders’ insurgency on Tiv farmers 
in Benue State is caused by trespassing on farms, resource competition, climate 
change, and farmers’ resistance to farm trespass and crop damage. It also shows 
that socio-demographic characteristics and food security indicators are affected 
by herders’ insurgency. The conflicts will persist pending State action to mitigate 
desertification, deforestation and climate change via a socio-ecological resilience 
framework by succeessive Nigerian governments, as opposed to the neoliberal 
posture that society should be the outcome of processes rather than planning
Key words: Political Ecology; Herders’ Insurgency; Tiv Farmers; Benue State, 
Nigeria; Existentialism; Environmental Thesis; Neoliberalism
Introduction
Political ecology according to Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) is juxtaposing the concerns of 
ecology and a broadly defined political economy to show that, the science of environment 
has both social and political underpinning rather than separating ecology issues from 
social and political realms. The justification for combining the concerns of ecology and 
political economy as averred by Forsyth (2003: 2) is to explain the social and political 
conditions surrounding the causes, experiences and management of environmental 
problems. The presence of weak governments and institutions, rapid population growth, 
widespread water stress, reliance on rain-fed agriculture, a large fraction of economic 
productivity occurring in climate sensitive sectors, and the climate change that has 
1  Institute for Developmental Studies, University of Nigeria Enugu Campus, Nigeria.
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already occurred, combine to make African societies very vulnerable to climate change 
(IPCC, 2007; Niang, Nyong and Clark, 2007). However, model projections of the physical 
effects of climate change in Africa are highly uncertain, particularly at the national and 
sub-national spatial scales at which political processes operate. 
Against this backdrop of great social vulnerability and physical climate uncertainty, 
research communities have begun to explore the possible security consequences of 
climate change, describing it as a stressor or a threat multiplier with the potential to 
contribute to conflict and State failure. Consequently, scholars have looked to historic 
data on rainfall variability, disasters, temperature change, refugee movements (all 
expected effects of climate change) to try to get traction on the causal connections 
between climate phenomena and security outcomes.
In Nigeria, the persistent loss of lives and property since the return of democracy in 
1999 has caused many fingers to point to the critical state of growing inequality created 
by neoliberal democracy as the major culprit; and indeed, there seem to be structural 
links between neoliberal democracy, political processes and environmental change as 
crucial aspects in explaining resource-related farmer-herder conflicts (Amakom, 2014). 
However, research communities over time have focused on explaining the cause(s) of 
the conflict between herders and farmers, with less attention paid to the impact of these 
conflicts (insurgency/counter-insurgency) on the rural economies of states (Khalif and 
Oba, 2013), and in this case, the impact of the conflicts on either food or social security, 
especially given that this occurs in the rural areas where there is arable land suitable 
for farming and herding. It is pertinent to note here that the Tiv and Fulani, who have 
farming and herding as their source of livelihood respectively, are critical to Nigeria’s 
food security, and a war between these two, if it lingers much longer, will undermine the 
nation’s food security. 
The herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria is a war: multifaceted, stimulated, driven and 
fuelled by environmental, political and cultural stressors (Hagher, 2013). Nigeria’s 
experience is unique in two respects; most notably, the ambiguous prestige of pastoral 
culture particular to Fulani pastoralists as well as its large and comparatively wealthy 
population. Nigeria has a restricted inventory of pastoral peoples: the Fulani, the Kanuri-
related groups, the Shuwa, the Yedina and the Uled Suleiman (Hagher, 2013). In Nigeria, 
conflict between farmers and herders has always been there except that, in recent times, 
it has assumed the dimension of a full-blown war between the Fulani and Tiv “cousins” 
(Hagher, 2013). This new trend calls for quiver-action because both the Tiv and Fulani 
are stakeholders in Nigeria’s food security project.
 This is premised on the creed that the Tiv are producers of food crops, cash crops, 
fruits, vegetables, poultry and livestock, which has earned them the status of ‘food-
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basket of the nation’. The Tiv tribe is found in Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau, Niger and 
Taraba States. The Fulanis, on the other hand, are the largest cattle herders in the 
country, which implies that most of the beef and fresh milk consumed in the country 
comes from them. Therefore, an ongoing war between these two is likely to undermine 
the nation’s food security status (Hagher).
Farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel are a common feature and have existed for 
centuries now (Breusers et al., 1998), premised on the human need for vital resources. 
Mechanisms of resource access are often very intricate in many parts of the world, and 
especially in dryland areas, where people have adjusted to unstable resource bases and 
uncertain resource access through centuries. Resource-related conflicts can hence be 
both a struggle to gain access to resources, or result from the use of them (Le Billon, 
2001). The term ‘farmer-herder conflict’ has come to represent many different types 
of conflicts: interest conflicts, resource disputes, political action, evictions, killings and 
livestock theft, to mention a few (Hussein et al., 1999). 
Single-factor explanations are therefore not sufficient for most such cases. How, 
then, can we define farmer-herder conflicts? Indeed, as Moritz (2006) asks: “Are only 
conflicts over natural resources ‘herder-farmer’ conflicts, or are all conflicts in which the 
parties identify themselves or are identified by others as such herder-farmer conflicts? 
Also, how do we know if conflicts are about natural resources, if they are motivated by 
‘a culture of competition’ or articulate with other religious or political conflicts? Could we 
define herder-farmer conflicts other than by saying they involve herders and farmers?”
The most common way of defining farmer-herder conflicts, then, is as “low-level, 
small-scale conflicts between herders and farmers over access to grazing lands 
and campsites and crop damage” (Moritz, 2006). Such tensions are often linked to 
longstanding insecurity, drought and scarcity of natural resources, and portrayed as ‘in-
the-moment, instinctive scrambles’ for resources, as the differences between farmers’ 
and herders’ livelihoods and ways of using the land are seemingly obvious causes for 
conflict. It is believed that tensions erupt easily under a state of constant competition 
(Turner, 2004). It is also believed that violent farmer-herder conflicts have increased 
during the last decades, due to “i) changing patterns of resource use and increasing 
competition for resources, and ii) the breakdown of ‘traditional’ mechanisms governing 
resource management and conflict resolution” (Hussein et al., 1999). However, important 
to note, the assumption that farmer-herder relations were in terms of ‘symbiosis’ before, 
“in an often unspecified epoch in the past”, but have grown more conflictual the last 
decades, has been questioned by several researchers (Breusers et al., 1998, Hussein 
et al., 1999). 
The cattle-based pastoralism of the Fulani has thus been the most significant focus 
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of herder/farmer conflict in Nigeria. For a long period, the Fulani were confined to the 
edge of the desert (Hagher). During the 20th century, Fulani herders began to migrate 
through and settle in whole zones that were previously inaccessible to pastoralists, 
bringing them into contact with unknown peoples, cultures and production systems. 
The consequences of this were a raft of untested interactions between all parties and 
considerable space for misunderstanding and conflict. However, if Fulani herders are 
unable to build up exchange relations with their host communities, particularly farmers, 
they can only survive either by settling, by flexible movement patterns that involve 
encountering new arable communities every year, or by intimidation of the farmers. All of 
these strategies occur in Nigeria, sometimes practised simultaneously by different Fulani 
herders’ groups (Odoh, 2012). 
The fact must be pointed out that the nomadic Fulani are conflicted in much of West 
Africa (Hagher). In Mali, Guinea, Senegal, Ghana and Niger, as in Nigeria, the story of 
clashes between Fulani herdsmen and crop farmers abound. In all cases, it starts with 
one or more Fulani herdsmen driving cattle into crop farms to graze. In order to protect 
their crops, farms and livelihood, the farmers attack the Fulani or attempt to chase them 
away. The Fulani retaliate by opening fire or violently defending their cows by killing or 
maiming the farmers. The conflict escalates as the Fulani migrate from that scene to yet 
another. In the last two years, the Fulani-Tiv skirmishes have manifested as a full-scale 
war, and can as well be likened to the 33 other armed conflicts taking place globally 
in the last two years. The combatants are armed with sophisticated assault weapons 
and are determined to wreak maximum havoc. The killing of men, women and children, 
and the destruction of farm crops and animals are a regular feature of this war (Hagher, 
2013). In Ghana and Nigeria, the clashes between the Fulani and crop farmers have 
intensified as desertification, deforestation, and climate changes continue unchecked by 
successive governments.
Of the several factors that have been advanced towards the precipitation of these 
conflicts, the structural links between inequality, neoliberal democracy, political processes 
and environmental change are crucial aspects in explaining resource-related farmer-
herder conflicts (Amakom, 2014). The situation is further exacerbated by a poor social-
ecological resilience framework that recognises the critical importance of ecological 
considerations in herder-farmer conflicts. Moreover, these conflicts will persist so long 
as no significant attention is paid to the dynamics of how resource competition can 
be transformed to strengthen socio-ecological resilience and mitigate conflict in terms 
of policy provisions – more so because the Tiv and Fulani are critical to Nigeria’s food 
security and, if it continues much longer, a war between these two will undermine the 
nation’s food security.
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Statement of the Problem
The problem here is that research communities over time have focused on explaining 
the cause(s) of the conflict between herders and farmers, with less attention paid to the 
impact of these conflicts on either food or social security. The Tiv and Fulani are critical to 
Nigeria’s food security and a lingering war between these two will undermine the nation’s 
food security.
Purpose of the Study 
The general purpose of the study was to determine the impact of herders’ insurgency on 
the food security of Tiv farmers in Benue State, Nigeria. Specifically, the study sought to: 
 i.  Examine the cause(s) of conflict between nomadic herders and farmers 
 ii.  Examine the impact of herders’ insurgency on the socio-demographic 
characteristics of Tiv farming communities 
 iii.  Examine the impact of herders’ insurgency on food production, availability, 
affordability and accessibility 
Analytical Framework: Political Ecology, Existentialism, 
Environmental Thesis And Neoliberalism
The theoretical framework is drawn from four theoretical assumptions comprising the 
environmental thesis, whose argument is that environmental problems are created by 
man and they affect human security, and that climate change breeds violent conflicts. 
This suggests that climate change is caused by human activities – industrialization 
and exploration as well as indiscriminate tree felling without replacement, which 
create adverse climate change evidenced in increased natural disasters, drought and 
desertification on the one hand, rising sea levels and freshwater scarcity on the other, 
and also the increase in resource scarcity (foliage and freshwater). All of this eventually 
leads to herders’ migration and subsequent trespass, and herder-farmer conflict. This 
situation is worsened by the absence of a social-ecological resilience framework, as a 
result of the neoliberal philosophy of the Nigerian State that advocates a market-based 
economy where government involvement by way of regulating and planning is frowned 
upon. This makes it difficult for the government to attempt to mitigate the impact of 
adverse climate change and its attendant consequences (evidenced in the neoliberal 
model). 
By the foregoing, it is now obvious that the postulation of the political ecology theory 
– that there are social and political conditions surrounding the causes, experiences and 
management of environmental problems – is factual. Therefore, the neoliberal approach 
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adopted by the Nigerian State  and its inability to manage the environmental stressors 
with a targeted socio-ecological resilience framework (political ecology) results in 
herders’ migration (quest for survival, i.e. existentialism). The theory of existentialism 
which comes into the scene at this point depicts the natural tendency of man towards 
freedom, self-determination and responsibility in a perceptibly unfriendly environment. 
This is so because the State has been unable to effectively mitigate climate change, or 
better still, put in place a socio-ecological resilience framework on the herders and their 
cattle to manage the impact of a climate change that now forces the herders to migrate 
with their cattle towards the south of Nigeria, which is just a temporary solution to this 
problem. 
The implication of this is that there is fragility and vulnerability to clashes between 
herders and farmers due to increasing competition for available freshwater and arable 
grazing land, which is visible in either the driving of cattle or the straying of herds into 
farms where they eat or damage crops. At this stage, farmers attempt to chase the 
herders and cattle off the farms, followed by herders’ revolt against farmers, leading to 
armed conflict or insurgency on farmers by the herders. Therefore it becomes clear that 
the quest for survival (existentialism) is what causes herders to launch an offensive on 
farmers, to subdue them so as to be able to survive with their cattle. Hence their survival 
is in their hands, especially in this age of neoliberalism. 
The link between neoliberalism, the environmental thesis, theory of existentialism and 
political ecology is that with the adoption of the neoliberal approach by the Nigerian 
State, emphasis has been placed on deregulation and non-interference of the State in 
the economy and the burden of allocating resources placed on the markets. Markets, 
according to Rodrik (2011), “are not self-creating, self-regulating, self-stabilizing or self-
legitimizing”. The implication of this is that every well-functioning market economy blends 
State and market, laissez faire and intervention. The precise mix, he argues, depends on 
each nation’s position preferences, its international position and its historical trajectory. 
This is because no country has figured out how to develop without placing substantial 
responsibilities on its public sector. Now, if States are indispensable to the operation 
of national markets, they are also the main obstacles to the establishment of global 
markets because their practices or preferences are the very source of transaction costs 
that globalization has to surmount.
By the foregoing, liberals believe that the form of society should be the outcome of 
processes. Liberals are generally hostile to any “interference with process and therefore 
reject any design or plan for society – religious, utopian, or ethical”. Liberals feel that society 
and State should not have fixed goals, but that “process should determine outcome”. 
Liberalism is therefore inherently hostile to competing non-liberal societies – which it sees 
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not simply as different, but as wrong. Nevertheless liberalism has compromised with 
one specific form of non-liberal ideology: nationalism, in the ethno-national form which 
underlies most present nation-states. Neoliberalism later extended this belief, claiming 
that all social life should be determined by the market. The neoliberal argument then 
suggests that the State does not need to mitigate environmental stressors via a socio-
ecological resilience framework. Hence the livelihood of farmers and herders depends 
on the environment, and the market should determine what happens in the sector. 
Consequently, the State has abandoned its role of ensuring a level playing field for all, 
and this has given room to the recurrent herder-farmer conflict that has implications for 
food and social security of the nation. 
During herders’ insurgency against farmers, there are casualties as well as loss of 
lives of farmers, herders, women, children and the aged. There is also the destruction 
of farms, shelter and livestock, which results in the displacement of farmers who take 
to their heels for fear of being killed. This further leads to the loss of the farmers’ source 
of livelihood, which is manifested in food and social insecurity, and the crippling of local 
economies through the temporary collapse of health, education, social and physical 
infrastructure, as well as markets.
Therefore, the theoretical framework has helped to show the link between political 
ecology theory, environmental thesis, existentialism and neoliberalism in the understanding 
of how human activities can lead to adverse climate change. The effects are shortage of 
freshwater, scarcity of arable grazing lands, and the lack of a feasible and viable socio-
ecological resilience framework or policy aimed at mitigating adverse climate conditions, 
which results in herders’ migration in search of arable grazing land and freshwater. All this 
is precipitated by competition for these resources among farmers, the driving or straying 
of herds into farms, subsequent damage to crops, and farmers’ resistance matched 
by armed insurgency of herders. The consequence is loss of lives, property, farms and 
livestock, the displacement of farmers, crippling of the rural economy, loss of livelihood 
sources, and consequently, food and social insecurity.
The political ecology approach, according to Blaikie and Brookfield (1987: 17), 
“combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy”. The goal 
is to explain “the social and political conditions surrounding the causes, experiences, 
and management of environmental problems” (Forsyth, 2003: 2). Stott and Sullivan 
(2000: 2) also emphasize that “the ‘science’ of environment is socially and politically 
situated, rather than unambiguous or separable from the subjective location of human 
perception”.
There are many areas of focus within the field of political ecology. These can be 
summarized in the following four issues of concern, according to Robbins (2004):
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i.  degradation and marginalization, which seeks to explain environmental change in a 
“larger political and economic context”
ii.  environmental conflict, which seeks to explain such conflict and access in a larger 
struggle, including aspects of gender, class, race and identity
iii.  conservation and control, which seeks to explain problems within conservation 
practice, and political and economic exclusion of environmental conservation
iv.  environmental identity and social movement, which seeks to explain “social upheaval” 
linking “political and social struggles” to environmental issues
There are furthermore many different voices and contrasting approaches, but in 
general, according to Bryant and Bailey (1997: 28), most accounts and research within 
political ecology share a common premise; “environmental change is not a neutral 
process amenable to technical management. Rather, it has political sources”. Studies of 
ecology with a political content emerged in the 1960s, when cultural ecology appeared 
as a field of influence in studies of human impact on the environment (Forsyth 2003: 4). 
This approach held that humans are part of a larger system and direct contributors to the 
development of the environment (Robbins 2004: 28, Sauer 1963). Several approaches, 
including cultural ecology, contributed to build political ecology as a reference in its early 
days, but it was during the last 20 to 30 years that it arose as an independent theoretical 
approach.
Political ecology stands basically as the opposite of apolitical ecology, which holds 
that the environment is natural and untouched by political or economic processes, and 
not affected by any power relations. In particular, apolitical ecologists claim to be neutral 
and non-political in their views on the environment. Apolitical ecology can loosely be 
defined as ecology without context, and it typically sees the environment as neutral and 
objective (Robbins 2004: 5). Nature is seen as distinct from society and thus ahistorical. 
Examples of typical apolitical ecological approaches are eco-scarcity and the Tragedy of 
the Commons thesis. These views regard the environment as separate from political and 
economic processes, and political ecology offers an alternative to and challenge to such 
views. Political ecology seeks to critically see the environment through a more contextual 
approach of political, historical and societal processes. It sees nature as power-laden, 
and it focuses on multi-level connections, structures and actors in the environment and 
among decision makers and hierarchies of power (Robbins, 2004; Bryant 2001: 167; 
Adger et al., 2001: 682). 
Political ecology hence identifies broader systems rather than local, and sees history, 
power economics and politics as essential in explaining environmental processes, 
relations and management. According to Robbins (2004: 12), political ecology in sum 
i) describes “empirical, research-based explorations to explain linkages in the condition 
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and change of social/ environmental systems, with explicit consideration of relations 
of power”, ii) seeks to find causes rather than symptoms of environmental and social 
problems, and iii) not only stresses how environmental systems are political in their 
essence, but also how political systems and economy influence the environment. 
Accordingly, political ecology attempts to do two things at the same time: “critically 
explaining what is wrong with dominant accounts of environmental change, while at the 
same time exploring alternatives, adaptations, and creative human action in the face of 
mismanagement and exploitation” (Robbins, 2004: 12).
Political ecology therefore offers a suitable framework for analysing environmental 
discourse and narratives, such as environmental security and the herders’ insurgency crisis 
in Nigeria. Peet and Watts (1996) argue that such analysis is central in political ecology, 
and emphasizes the importance of using a socio-historical context in environmental 
research. Stott and Sullivan (2000: 2) also emphasize this, and say that political ecology 
is “concerned with tracing the genealogy of identifying power relationships supported by 
such narratives”. Based on this, the political ecology approach is suitable for analysing 
farmer-herder conflicts. Indeed, as Bassett (1988: 455) argues: “A weakness of human 
ecological analysis of peasant-herder conflicts is their failure to address sufficiently the 
politics of land use.”
The theory of existentialism was originally propounded by the Danish philosopher, 
Kierkegaard (1913–1955) to depict the natural tendency of man towards freedom, 
self determination and responsibility in a perceptibly unfriendly environment. Over the 
years, the theory has come to assume diverse cognate interpretations and applications 
based on scholarly extrapolations. In its simplest understanding, however, the theory 
of existentialism is based on the postulate that man is a unique and isolated individual 
in an indifferent or hostile universe, responsible for his own actions and free to choose 
his destiny (cf. ‘existentialism’ at http://www.google.ca). In its more contemporary 
understanding, the theory has been applied to explaining the objective attitude of man 
in an environment where his survival and subsistence are threatened. It is in this light 
that the study sees the herder-farmer crisis as a product of struggle for survival and 
self determination by the Fulani herdsmen and Tiv people in an environment that is 
perceptibly averse to their purposes. 
The application of the existentialist theory to the present analysis may be problematic 
in view of its apparent conceptual and epistemological vagueness. Yet the theory, 
properly contextualized, would prove plausible in providing insights into the correlation 
between the perceived socio-political and ecological abuses of the Fulani herdsmen 
and the rising restiveness, criminality and offensive often launched on the farmers in 
their native communities. When considered against the propositions of political ecology, 
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the analytical utility of philosophical existentialism becomes clearer, particularly in the 
context of the proposed study. With reference to the theoretical positions considered 
above, what could be gleaned from the foregoing is that the herder-farmer crisis has 
been motivated by factors relating to the survival and existential conditions of the cattle 
Fulani herders and Tiv farmers. 
Methods
Research Design
This study adopts a survey research design that is ex post facto in nature. The justification 
for the choice is that it provides a general framework for the collection of appropriate 
data that explores the impact of herders’ insurgency on the food security of Tiv farmers 
in Benue State, Nigeria. This was feasible via the use of the interview method, through 
the administering of a structured questionnaire. The choice of this design is in line 
with the premise that a survey is an investigation about the characteristics of a given 
population by means of collecting data from a sample of that population, and estimating 
its characteristics through the systematic use of statistical methodology. It is believed 
that at the end of the study, any result obtained is generalizable or representative of the 
study population.
Area of Study
The area of study for this work is Benue State, Nigeria. The study focused on the Tiv 
ethnic farming communities that were affected by the Fulani herders’ insurgency. The 
choice of this delineation is premised on the fact that it is not all of Benue State that has 
been affected but specifically the Local Government Areas (LGAs) in the Tiv nation that 
are border LGAs with the northern part of the country from where the Fulani migrate to 
Benue and it is convenient for the herders to invade one community after the other. The 
land here is adjudged to be fertile for both farming and herding activities. 
Population of the Study
The study population is made up of the Tiv farming communities in the seven LGAs 
affected by this crisis in Benue State, namely Guma, Makurdi, Gwer-East, Gwer-West, 
Logo, Kwande and Katsina Ala. These affected LGAs have Tiv farmers who live in 
scattered settlement patterns with their farmsteads behind their homes, who are agrarian 
in nature, located in Benue State and affected by the herders’ insurgency. Indeed, the 
elements in the population of the study include: farmers, children, women, livestock, 
farmlands, farms, food barns, houses, economic trees, water sources, schools, health 
facilities, places of worship, markets, recreational centres and all the social and physical 
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infrastructure in the affected communities that enhance the sources of livelihood of the 
Tiv farmers in the study area. The justification for this delineation of the study population 
is that the LGAs selected share similar ecological features, are farming communities, and 
the impact analysis of herders’ insurgency of Tiv farmers on food and social security can 
only be valid if data is generated from these elements of the study population since it is 
directly affected by the conflict.
Sample and Sampling Technique 
The study adopted a multi-stage sampling technique. The sample size for the study 
is 384 respondents. The choice for the Krejcie and Morgan (1970) sample formula is 
because of its precision in providing a sample size that can supply reliable answers 
to research questions investigated that are representative of the entire population and 
generalizable. The sample size is representative of the population of the study and is 
generalizable given the degree of freedom at the desired confidence level (3.841) and the 
population proportion (assumed to be .50 since this would provide the maximum sample 
size) as well as the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (.05).
Data Analysis
The data was analysed using inferential statistics of Multiple Regression and Pearson 
Product Moment Correlation statistical techniques. This was done using Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 20.0 with a cut-off set at p = 0.05 level of 
significance.
Results
Table 1 below shows the link between socio-demographic variables and the impact of 
insurgency on food production. 
The result reveals that there is an association between impact of insurgency on 
food production and gender as a socio-demographic characteristic, and is statistically 
significant at P>0.05. The implication of this result is that gender is associated with 
the impact of the insurgency of farmers as it concerns food production. This means 
that the female gender, which falls into a vulnerable group of society, was worse-off 
in the experience of insurgency because women were victims of sexual and physical 
abuse, and could hardly run fast enough to escape from the insurgents who were out 
to kill every living creature, not sparing women, children, the physically challenged or the 
elderly. More so, a lot of women became widows as a result of the insurgency, some lost 
both children and husband, and this trauma has implications for food production and 
security. 
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On whether there is an association between the impact of insurgency on food 
production and the age of respondents, the result was statistically significant at P>0.05. 
The implication of this is that age is associated with the impact of insurgency on food 
production, and the age bracket most affected is less than 30 years, made up of children 
and youth who need to be taken care of and who constitute the workforce. This group 
lost their lives and parents to the insurgency making them orphans and greatly reducing 
the size of the workforce, which is of consequence to food security. 
On whether there is an association between the impact of insurgency on food 
production and education, the result of regression was statistically significant at P>0.05. 
The implication of this result is that access to education was affected, as farming 
communities were displaced due to the insecurity created by the insurgency which also 
destroyed school facilities. Schools in farming communities were shut down, teachers 
were unwilling to go back and have now migrated to urban areas. This means that a 
fundamental human right has been impeded, and that meeting the MDGs  target of 
universal basic education for all children by 2015, irrespective of their gender, is not a 
reality for Nigeria. This will have a psychological effect on the children who will not see 
education as a must-have but resign themselves to fate. At the time normalcy returns to 
the land, reorienting the children to fit into the school system will be difficult. Moreover, 
candidates for the O Level SSCE could not take their examination. On whether there 
is an association between the impact of insurgency on food production marital status 
and religious affiliation as socio-demographic characteristics, the regression proved 
statistically significant at P>0.05. 
Table 1: Association between socio-demographic characteristics and the  impact of 
insurgency on food production
B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for 
EXP(B)
Lower
Gender(1) -1.060 .258 16.913 1 .000 .347 .209
Age (1) -.893 .271 10.892 1 .001 .410 .241
Education(1) 1.552 .471 10.840 1 .001 4.719 1.874
Marital(1) 1.321 .270 23.949 1 .000 3.746 2.207
Religion(1) .920 .346 7.065 1 .008 2.509 1.273
Constant -.046 .448 .011 1 .918 .955
Source: Fieldwork 2014
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Table 2 below shows the association between the cause(s) of conflict and impact of 
insurgency on food production. 
On whether there is an association between farm trespass and impact of insurgency 
on food production, the result was statistically significant at P<0.05. The implication of 
this result is that farm trespass is a cause of herders’ insurgency and has impact on 
food production, be it in terms of quantity or quality of food produced. This is because 
trespass on farms by Fulani cattle damaged crops and even the harvested and stored 
farm produce on the farms. It is worthy of mention here that once this trespass had 
ignited the crisis, there was insecurity in the land and the affected communities were 
displaced and so farming activities were suspended. 
On whether there is an association between climate change and the impact of 
insurgency on food production, the result was statistically significant at P>0.05. The 
livelihood of both farmers and herders is climate sensitive. Both are caught up in 
environmental stressors, and so responsible for a conflict brought about due to poor 
socio-ecological resilience that makes herders migrate and trespass on farms and 
causes destruction of crops.
On whether there is an association between competition for the scarce resources 
available (freshwater and foliage) and impact of insurgency on food production, the result 
was statistically significant at P>0.05. This means that when herders drive their cattle 
into surface waters that serve the communities as their only source of water for drinking, 
domestic use and irrigation, the water is muddied and contaminated with cow dung 
making it unusable. This is therefore a further cause of conflict between herders and 
farmers.
On whether there is an association between farmers’ resistance to trespass and crop 
damage and the impact of insurgency on food production, the result was statistically 
significant at P>0.05. This means that the invasion on Tiv farmers was matured to actual 
conflict when farmers resisted the trespass and crop damage. Consequently, Fulani 
herders launched a full military offensive on the farmers, destroying lives and property as 
well as displacing them and putting on hold food production. 
In summary, trespass, climate change, resource competition and farmers’ resistance 
are the causes of herders’ insurgency on Tiv farmers in Benue State. 
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Table 2: Association between socio-demographic characteristics and the  impact of 
insurgency on food production
Score Df Sig.
Trepass(1) 57.906 1 .000
Climate_change(1) 3.793 1 .051
Resource_compe(1) 29.048 1 .000
Farmers_Resistance(1) 35.677 1 .000
Overall Statistics 118.538 4 .000
Source: Fieldwork 2014
Table 3 shows the association between food security and the impact of insurgency on 
food production. 
On whether the insurgency has affected food availability, the result proved statistically 
significant. The result implies that once food production has been affected in terms of 
quantity, it is difficult to have sufficient food available for the affected communities and for 
the larger Benue State which is acclaimed the ‘food basket of the nation’. 
On whether the insurgency has affected food affordability (prices), the result was 
statistically significant at P>0.05. Based on this, it is obvious that since food production 
was affected it had a spillover effect on availability and affected prices of food items 
significantly, thereby making it difficult for many to purchase food. This is because if 
food is not sufficiently produced or there is a sharp drop in the quantity produced, the 
amount of food in circulation will be insufficient to meet the dietary needs of the affected 
communities. There will be food shortage, with a severe impact on the whole of Benue 
State, and hence the total quantity of food produced will drop significantly. 
On the impact of the insurgency on food access, the result proved statistically 
significant at P>0.05. This result points to the fact that due to the shortfall in the quantity 
of food produced and the increasing demand for food supply – and bearing in mind the 
first law of demand and supply, that the higher the price the lower the demand – the 
insurgency has affected food availability (quantity/quality) and affordability (prices). Food 
access is hampered principally because the right to food becomes a luxury, the intake 
of food for dietary needs becomes a rare opportunity, and hunger and malnutrition then 
set in. 
On whether the insurgency has affected hunger and famine in the affected communities 
and its environs, the result proved statistically significant at P>0.05. By this result, hunger 
and famine are evident in the affected communities and, by implication, in the whole of 
Benue State – hence there is a link between food production, availability, affordability 
and usage. The insurgents destroyed and looted stored food, farm crops, as well as 
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economic trees and livestock, killed people and destroyed properties, and also displaced 
people making them refugees in their own land. Especially because this happens during 
the cropping season, it forced them to depend on food aid and subjected them to harsh 
economic and health realities.
On whether the insurgency brought malnutrition to the affected communities, the result 
was statistically significant at P>0.05. The implication is that due to impeded access to 
food caused by rising prices created by a shortfall in supply over demand – resultant 
from the reduction in the quantity of food produced and the subsequent problem of food 
availability, affordability and access – malnutrition became a consequence of that chain. 
Moreover, malnourished people can hardly be healthy enough to engage in the rigour 
of farming, which means that food insecurity will persist in the community until frantic 
efforts are made to ameliorate this situation, first through provision of food aid, and then 
guarding against further occurrence of the insurgency situation.
On whether the insurgency affected the ability to cope with farming stress, the result 
proved statistically significant at P>0.05. It indicates that due to the destruction of lives 
and property and the mass exodus from the communities during the insurgency, it has 
been difficult for normal farming activities to resume in the affected areas, and farmers 
have to start from scratch. This also implies that it will take a much longer time for 
farmers to gather momentum, pick the pieces and stabilize their source of livelihood so 
as to make meaning out of farming. Further, farmers have to first battle with hunger and 
emotional trauma before trying to settle down to farming again.  
On whether the insurgency has increased the poverty cycle in the farming 
communities, the result was statistically significant at P>0.05. The implication is that the 
gap between the rural and urban areas has worsened, even though the urban centres 
are also affected because it is the rural areas that supply food to the urban. More so, 
starting life afresh out of naught for the affected peasant farming rural communities is 
devastating psychologically. 
In summary, since farmers’ life investments were destroyed they are not likely to 
produce in commercial quantities again until there is clear evidence that insurgency will 
no longer be a routine occurrence on their land and that their security is guaranteed. Over 
the years, farmers have put in enormous energy and time into farming, and have come 
out even more impoverished than ever due to the recurrent insurgency that destroys 
all they live for and leave them with no option but to start afresh. This is a serious 
disincentive for them to re-engage with farming.
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Table 3: Association between food security and the  impact of insurgency on food production 
Score df Sig.
Food_availability(1) 11.976 1 .001
Food_affordability(1) 37.817 1 .000
Food_access(1) 30.822 1 .000
Hunger_famine(1) 10.704 1 .001
Malnutrition(1) 73.690 1 .000
Coping_stress(1) 2.883 1 .090
Poverty(1) 11.346 1 .001
Overall Statistics 127.086 7 .000
Source: Fieldwork 2014
Conclusion
This paper looked at the political ecology of herders’ insurgency on Tiv farmers from a 
socio-political-ecology perspective and concludes that armed insurgency on Tiv farmers 
is a battle for survival precipitated by environmental, political, cultural and social stressors 
as well as a poor socio-ecological resilience framework that affect sustainable livelihood 
and has implications for food security in Benue State. It reveals that  herders’ insurgency 
on Tiv farmers in Benue State is caused by trespass on farms, resource competition, 
climate change, and farmers’ resistance to farm trespass and crop damage. It also 
shows that socio-demograhic characteristics and food security indicators are affected by 
the insurgency. The conflicts will persist pending State action to mitigate desertification, 
deforestation and climate change via a socio-ecological resilience framework by 
succeessive Nigerian governments, as opposed to the neoliberal posture that society 
should be the outcome of processes rather than planning. Therefore, in order to protect 
the livelihood of farmers and herders, Nigeria must borrow a leaf from other countries 
where ranching has put on hold conflicts between these groups.  
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Political Exclusion, Violent Conflicts  
and Development in Africa:  
A cross country analysis
Ogbonnaya, Ufiem Maurice1
Abstract
Using Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda as case 
studies, this study engaged in the analysis of the relationship between political 
exclusion, ethnicity and violent conflict in Africa’s Great Lakes region. The study 
adopted the Transmission Model of Conflict Analysis as an analytical framework. 
It relied predominantly on secondary data obtained from the Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance (IIAG) and Human Development Report. The study covered 
the period between 2000 and 2012. Findings showed that conflicts in the region 
were fuelled by ethnocentric tendencies. This has had negative impacts on 
political stability and democratic consolidation, culminating ultimately in the socio-
economic underdevelopment in the region. Consequently, the paper recommended 
the institutionalization of a robust nation-building and political process that de-
emphasizes ethnicity and promotes political and socio-economic justice.
Introduction
The Great Lakes region, made up of countries of the east and central regions of Africa, 
namely, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania 
and Uganda has, since the 1960s, been mired in complex and overlapping violent ethno-
political conflicts from which only  Tanzania  has largely escaped (Lunn, 2006:4). The 
scope, spread and intensity of the conflicts have escalated since the 1990s, especially 
in Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda. Burundi’s crisis and ethnic clashes resumed after 
the October 1993 coup d’état that saw the overthrow of the Melchior Ndadaye-led 
government. Between 1996 and 2003, the DRC witnessed two successive and complex 
wars that wrecked havoc on the state. The tragic events within the region came to a 
climax with the Rwandan genocide of 1994 that saw the death of over 800,000 Tutsis 
and moderate Hutus.2 Until date, ethnic rivalry and political conflicts are still festering in 
Burundi and the DRC. 
Generally, scholars have attempted to explain the various causes of conflicts in 
1  Ogbonnaya, Ufiem Maurice is a Security and Policy Analyst in the Department of Research and Training, National Institute for Legislative Stud-
ies (NILS), National Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria, and currently a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of Uyo, Nigeria.
maurice.ogbonnaya@gmail.com; godscourt24@yahoo.com 
2  UN, Rwanda: ‘A Brief History of the Country’, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml
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Africa, which in most cases result in political instability and state failure, as is the case 
in Somalia and South Sudan, amongst others. Kawabata (2006), Meredith (2005) and 
Bauart (1993) have located conflicts in the nature of Africa’s post-colonial state. Others 
have argued that conflicts in Africa are rooted in domestic factors such as ethnicity, 
which coalesce to throw up favourable conditions for some and unfavourable conditions 
for others (Levitt, 2005; Mbaku and Paul, 1989). Yet, others have blamed it on global 
developments and the politics within international governance bodies and institutions 
(Alemazung, 2010; Edi, 2006). The central theses of the arguments by the afore-listed 
scholars is that the increasing escalation of conflicts in Africa has significantly threatened 
the institutionalization of a democratic formula capable of carrying African states out of 
their endemic cycle of conflicts that have persisted over the decades (Barret, 2004).
However, the conflicts in the Great Lakes region are said to be rooted in domestic 
and external factors that are political, socio-cultural and economic in nature. Specifically, 
three main factors – ethnicity, political exclusion, and the quest for the control of state 
power/resources – have been identified as key contributors to the conflicts across the 
region. According to Chege (2007), ethno-political variables remain the predominant 
causes of the conflicts and thus cannot be ruled out as the major causative factors. 
This is also the case with other African countries, where verifiable evidences point to 
the fact that political exclusion and socio-economic inequality have been at the root 
of violent conflicts. This is because exclusion and inequality threaten the identity and 
belongingness of those left out in the allocation of societal values. When these build up 
to frustration, the excluded resort to violence in an attempt to seek redress.
One feature of the conflicts in the Great Lakes region is the prevalence of armed militia 
groups, which play prominent role in the escalation and sustenance of the conflicts. In 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la 
Libération du Congo (AFDL) led by Laurent-Desire Kabila, championed the revolutionary 
movement that overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime. While the Armée Patriotique 
Rwandaise (APR) held sway in Rwanada, the Conseil National pour la Défense de la 
Démocratie (CNDD), led by Leonard Nyangoma, was one of the leading armed groups in 
the Hutu rebellion in Burundi. In Uganda, two armed opposition movements, Tabliq and 
the West Nile Liberation Front (WNLF) have been prominent (Chiege, 2007). A common 
characteristic of these armed militia groups is that they are ethnocentric in nature, 
in orientation and in ideological inclination. In other words, they are ethnic creations. 
Consequently, they pursue ethnic courses and agenda that are driven by the quest for 
political and economic survival. 
Over the years, these ethnic-based armed groups have had tremendous influence on 
the dynamics of violent conflicts within the region. This in turn has affected the pattern 
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of political and democratic development. For instance, the establishment of political 
structures, alliances, loyalty and patronage along ethnic lines are pointers to this assertion. 
Yet, a vast array of literature and scholarship on political exclusion, violent conflicts and 
democratic governance in Africa such as Beswick, (2011), Alemazung (2010), Bujra 
(2002) and Collins (1993), amongst others, have paid little or no attention to the nexus 
or linkages amongst exclusion or inequality, conflicts and the nature of development 
that subsists within the African state. Thus, this study engages in the analysis of the 
relationship amongst political exclusion, violent conflicts and development in Africa’s 
Great Lakes region. 
Specific Case Studies
In this study, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are selected 
as specific case studies. These countries were selected because violent ethno-political 
conflicts and political instability have been most prevalent and pronounced here, 
especially within the period under focus. Background information of the selected states 
in the region is provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Background information on Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda
Burundi DRC Rwanda
Surface area 27,830 km2 2,344,860 km2 26,340 km2
Population 8.382 million 65.965 million 10.624 million
Annual population growth rate (since 1990) 2.6 % 2.7 % 3.0 %
Life expectancy at birth: women/men 51.3/48.5 years 49.7/46.5 years 56.4/53.8 years
Adult illiteracy rate: women/men 39.1/27.4 % 45.1/20.5 % 33.2/25.0 %
GDP per capita 192.1 USD 199.3 USD 529.7 USD
Percentage of Population with less than 2 
USD per day
93 % NA* 82.4 %
Source: World Bank’s 2013 World Development Indicators
*Figures not available
Generally, the study examined the relationship between political exclusion and violent 
conflicts, and their impacts on the pattern of political development in Rwanda, Burundi 
and the DRC. Specifically, amongst other things, it:
	 •		examined	the	nature,	causes	and	dimensions	of	political	exclusion;
	 •		examined	the	nature,	causes	and	dimensions	of	violent	conflicts;
	 •		conducted	dynamic	comparative	analysis	of	the	interplay	between	the	two	variables	
and their impacts on patterns of political development in the selected states.  
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Analytical Framework
The study was anchored on the Transmission Model of Conflict Analysis. The model 
espouses the linkages among conflict-causing variables that combine in a dialectical 
sequential order. The central thesis of the model is that in an ethnic pluralistic society, 
as is the case in Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda, political dominance by one ethnic 
group results in the exclusion and marginalization of the others. The marginalized/
excluded ethnic groups seek survival through the quest for the control of state power 
and economic resources. In an intense political situation, the agitation for the control of 
state power and resources results in the formation of ethnic militia and armed groups to 
sustain the agitations by means of violence. This is because, “the preservation of ethnic 
hegemony is perceived as a condition for physical survival by the incumbents, with the 
elimination of rival claimants as the only means by which survival could be assured” 
(Lemarchand, 1997:15).
Over time, ethnic agitations influence the pattern of political development. Party 
formations and alliances, political loyalty, patronage and allocation of state resources bear 
the imprints of ethnic rather than national considerations and outlook. The consequence 
of this is further escalation of violent conflicts that in turn threaten political stability, human 
security, maximization of social welfare and socio-economic development (see Fig.1);
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Applied within the context of our study here, there is no denying the fact that the 
interplay of ethnic rivalry and the quest for the control of state power and resources 
play a crucial role in the prevalence and escalation of violent conflicts in the Great Lakes 
region. Neither can a full understanding of the escalation of the conflicts in the region be 
attained without factoring in the role played by ethnic overlords and their armed militia.
Causes, Nature and Dimensions of Violent Conflicts in the Great 
Lakes Region
There are three major ethnic nationalities in the Great Lakes region, namely, the Twa 
that are said to represent one per cent of the population in each country of the region, 
the Tutsi with 14 per cent, and the Hutu that make up about 80 to 85 per cent of the 
population. Since the early 1990s, this region has been convulsed by interlocking ethnic 
and inter-state conflicts and civil wars (Lunn, 2006:26).
First, conflicts in the region are rooted in ethnicity, political exclusion, territorial and 
socio-economic imperatives. According to the International Refugee Rights Initiative, 
one major source of conflicts in the region has been disputes over group and national 
membership: ethnic, racial and religious populations have been identified as illegitimate 
members of local communities and nations, and their exclusion has been used to legitimize 
individual persecution, ethnic violence, civil war and genocide. Targeted populations have 
been forcibly displaced from their homes, social networks and governmental protection, 
and have been forced to seek refuge within their own countries and across borders 
(IRRI, 2011). These conflicts, according to Matsanza (2013), are also associated with 
struggles over the distribution of political power and access to land, including the pillage 
of the immense natural resources in the region.
In a study, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2011) has also established a linkage between violent 
conflicts in the Great Lakes region and ethnic rivalry on the one hand, and colonialism on 
the other. According to him, of all the major geographical areas of Africa, the Great Lakes 
region has paid the highest price in both human lives and material destruction because of 
ethnic conflict. In addition to the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, the region has witnessed 
several episodes of inter-ethnic massacres since 1959 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2011:61). 
He also attributed the protracted Hutu-Tutsi conflict that has been a recurrent decimal 
in the region in large part to the grafting of the colonial social ideology of racism and 
paternalism on the pre-colonial social system of both Rwanda and Burundi. In a related 
study, but with particular focus on the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Check (2011:2) has 
asserted that the genocide represents a high point of a diabolic pseudo-Fascist plan 
by the majority Hutu, to establish a mono-ethnic Hutu oligarchy at the expense of the 
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minority Tutsi. This, according to him, has been part of the Rwandan revolution that 
started in 1959.
Secondly, conflicts in the Great Lakes region are complex and interlinked. This is 
because conflict in one country may lead to a similar situation in other countries and 
can trigger a spiral effect and consequences in the entire region. The cause of this 
complex and interwoven nature of conflict can be explained by two major factors. First 
is the geographical proximity of the countries within the region. Second is the presence 
of the two most dominant ethnic nationalities, Hutus and Tutsis, in all the countries of 
the region. According to Matsanza (2013:1), the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda 
all appear to be connected by geographical and historical factors, and the legacies 
of decades of conflict interspersed by episodes of peace. Thus, conflict in the region 
grows in part out of population movements across borders, an unresolved citizenship 
question, and an explosive mixture of internal, regional and international actors. Thus, 
the violent conflicts in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi are all part of a series of complex 
and interlinked conflicts encompassing the region (Reyntjens, 2009:13).
Lunn (2006:10) has succinctly X-rayed this complex and interconnected nature 
of conflicts in the region and its impact on political stability there. According to him, 
consequent upon the Rwandan genocide, over one million Hutu refugees fled into 
Eastern Zaire (now the DRC). Amongst them were the remnants of the former Rwandan 
army and the extremist Hutu militia group, the Interahamwe. While this imposed a grave 
burden upon the administration and people, at first it did not appear to pose a major 
threat to the Mobutu regime itself. However, relations between Rwanda, its (then) close 
ally Uganda, and Zaire quickly deteriorated as Rwanda accused Zaire of displaying pro-
Hutu sympathies and failing to prevent exiled Hutu groups from preparing to mount a 
counter-offensive against the new Tutsi-dominated government in Kigali. As preparations 
advanced within Zaire towards the holding of national elections during 1996, Rwandan 
troops crossed into the East and forcibly dismantled the Hutu refugee camps in North 
and South Kivu, pursuing those they claimed had been linked to armed groups within 
the camps.  At the same time, with Rwandan and Ugandan support, Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila formed the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo with the aim 
of overthrowing Mobutu. The AFDL advanced across Zaire rapidly and seized Kinshasa 
in May 1997. Kabila declared himself President and changed the country’s name to 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nevertheless, Rwanda and Uganda’s alliance with 
Kabila was short-lived. Kabila sought to reduce the power of his Rwandan sponsors. By 
July 1998, Rwanda and Uganda had decided that Kabila must be removed. As a result, 
Rwanda and Uganda sent troops back across the border into the East and, working with 
Congolese allies, initiated new rebellions. The two countries also had the implicit support 
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of Burundi. Kabila was saved only by the speedy intervention of Angola, Zimbabwe and 
Namibia, which sent troops into the country to support his government. In the ensuing 
crisis, two main rebel groups emerged: the Congolese Assembly for Democracy (RCD) 
and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). The MLC, led by Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, was initially formed as a proxy for Uganda but also had close ties with members 
of the old Mobutu regime. The RCD was Rwanda’s surrogate, drawing support from 
the Kinyarwanda-speaking population of the East. The DRC Government had its own 
supporters in the Mai-Mai militia, which collaborated with former Interahamwe in fighting 
the rebel groups. By the end of 1998, Rwanda and Uganda had fallen out over their 
attitude to the DRC. The RCD began to split into factions, which aligned themselves with 
either Rwanda or Uganda.
Thirdly, ethnic conflict has been a source of socio-demographic destabilization and 
instability in the region. According to Mpangala (2004) and Oucho (1997), one of the 
most serious aspects of destabilization has been the problem of refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). Guy Aundu Matsanza has also provided a historical perspective 
on the movement of people across the borders of states in the region to illustrate the 
problems linked to the refugee crisis as a consequence of the conflict in the region. 
According to him, in 1962, Parmehutu, the party of the Hutu emancipation movement, 
assumed power in Rwanda after a pogrom against the Tutsi community that began in 
1959. Some Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries, such as the DRC, Uganda, Tanzania 
and Burundi, while some were recruited into armed Lumumbist groups, such as the 
Simba (1963–64), who fought against the Congolese regime after Lumumba’s murder. 
Later, some of the descendants of these refugees became part of the Congolese Tutsi 
community known as the Banyamulenge, which later became a factor in the crisis of 
Congolese citizenship. In the case of Uganda, some of the Tutsi refugees, including 
Fred Rwigema and Paul Kagame, joined the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by 
Yoweri Museveni. After the NRA overthrew Milton Obote’s government in 1986, Major 
Kagame was appointed Assistant Director of the Ugandan military intelligence. This 
coincided with the early formation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR). With the help of 
the Ugandan army, the FPR wanted, among other things, to depose the Habyarimana 
regime in Rwanda. In Burundi, a Tutsi military junta led by Micombero, supported by 
the Tutsi party Union for National Progress (UPRONA), protected the Tutsi refugees. 
When Bagaza managed to overthrow Micombero in 1976, he also protected the Tutsi 
refugees. Even when Pierre Buyoya seized power from Bagaza in 1987, the policy was 
maintained. In 1993, the electoral defeat of Buyoya’s party, UPRONA, by the Hutu-
dominated Burundian Democratic Front (FRODEBU) led by Ndadaye, put an end to 
the Tutsi domination. But Ndadaye’s murder in October 1993, only a few months after 
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his election, plunged Burundi into violence as Hutu armed groups protested the killing. 
The designation of Cyprien Ntaryamira to replace Ndadaye did not reduce the violence, 
especially after Ntaryamira’s disappearance with the Rwandan president, Habyarimana, 
in the crash of their plane. Ntaryamira’s successor, Sylvestre Ntibantuganya, was unable 
to restore peace. The Tutsi minority in the army seized power in another coup led by 
Major Buyoya in July 1996. 
Not until the signing of the peace agreements of 2003 was power transferred to the 
Hutu majority, and Pierre Nkurunziza replaced former president Domitien Ndayizeye in 
2005 (Matsanza, 2013:2-4). 
Consequently, the region “as a whole continues to host more than a million refugees 
and ten million internally displaced persons” (IRRI, 2011). In addition to the economic 
burden of hosting refugees and IDPs, these groups have been by themselves a cause of 
instability as they have often been a source of misunderstandings between neighbouring 
countries. They have also been a cause of border skirmishes.
Finally, conflict in the region has also been a source of arms trafficking. It has created 
big markets for arms industries in developed countries. The sale and circulation of arms 
has grown considerably through governments, rebel groups and ethnic militia. Rebel 
groups cannot sustain civil wars without reliable sources of supply of arms of various 
types, and trafficking in arms has been a matter of great security concern in the region 
(Check, 2011:6-7; Elvis, 2002).
Interpretations of Stylized Facts and Implications for Political and 
Economic Development
This section provides a descriptive analysis of how political exclusion occasions violent 
conflicts and how this affects political and socio-economic variables in Burundi, DRC 
and Rwanda. The period covered is 2000 to 2012.  The data used for the analysis 
was generated from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), United Nations Human Development 
Reports and other sources. The IIAG scores from 0-100, where 100 is the best 
and 0 is the worst. The indicators to be considered for political development were 
Political Participation, Human Rights and National Security, while the socio-economic 
development indicators were Infrastructure, Welfare, Education and Health (see Tables 2 
and 3 for full details of performance by selected countries).
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Table 2: Selected Socio-Economic and Political Indicators for Burundi,  
DRC and Rwanda: 2000-2012
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Burundi
Political Participation 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 40.8 55.3 59.7 48.6 57.5 46.9 44.7 44.7
Human  Rights 35.8 36.0 39.2 41.6 41.7 47.4 46.0 43.8 35.2 40.8 31.0 40.7 40.5
National Security 28.3 28.3 28.3 28.3 37.9 41.3 42.5 59.4 49.4 68.7 64.6 64.8 63.2
Infrastructure 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 13.5 15.9 15.9 15.1 18.6 16.8
Welfare 39.3 39.4 39.4 39.2 39.0 38.9 42.5 47.4 47.1 46.7 48.0 48.7 51.9
Education 28.5 29.9 31.1 32.1 32.8 34.3 34.3 35.5 35.5 36.0 38.3 40.5 39.0
Health 39.3 47.6 48.1 48.5 49.1 44.8 44.8 45.6 45.0 48.3 49.9 52.4 52.4
DRC
Political Participation 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 30.4 38.2 29.3 41.8 43.3 37.7 37.7
Human  Rights 18.6 20.8 28.2 21.2 28.2 29.2 25.6 28.9 23.7 21.9 24.2 20.9 20.9
National Security 32.0 31.9 37.0 35.6 37.6 43.5 41.7 33.5 35.5 41.8 48.4 53.6 33.8
Infrastructure 00.0 00.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 11.6 11.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0
Welfare 29.9 30.0 30.1 29.1 28.1 28.3 29.8 30.0 30.1 30.2 30.9 30.9 31.6
Education 38.5 38.5 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.2 38.2 44.4 39.5 41.0 41.2 41.1 41.1
Health 34.5 40.4 43.3 36.2 39.4 41.3 42.6 44.3 43.3 45.7 45.4 47.8 47.8
Rwanda
Political Participation 12.4 12.4 12.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 28.5 28.9 17.1 16.0 15.7 14.6 16.0
Human  Rights 42.8 32.3 26.4 26.3 28.6 28.5 30.1 26.8 30.5 27.6 26.7 28.2 27.5
National Security 46.7 44.4 54.8 63.2 64.2 61.6 62.3 75.8 76.5 58.5 53.4 54.0 54.0
Infrastructure 27.6 27.6 27.6 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.8 27.9 23.9 24.4 27.5 29.1 30.5
Welfare 52.4 52.5 52.7 54.2 55.8 56.5 57.3 55.3 61.4 64.8 65.3 66.4 68.9
Education 43.9 44.8 44.3 45.9 45.7 44.9 45.0 43.6 45.6 49.8 51.1 53.8 54.4
Health 43.0 52.6 56.9 63.3 64.4 58.3 70.0 72.4 75.0 79.0 80.2 80.2 80.2
Source: IIAG (2013)
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Table 3: Selected Political and Socio-Economic Indicators for Burundi,  
DRC & Rwanda: 2000-2012 Averages
A Burundi Averages (2000-2012)
Political Participation 34.5
Human  Rights 40.0
National Security 46.5
Infrastructure 14.0
Welfare 44.0
Education 29.3
Health 47.4
B DRC Averages (2000-2012)
Political Participation 22.5
Human  Rights 22.0
National Security 39.0
Infrastructure   2.1
Welfare 30.0
Education 40.0
Health 42.7
C Rwanda Averages (2000-2012)
Political Participation 19.7
Human  Rights 29.4
National Security 59.2
Infrastructure 27.5
Welfare 58.7
Education 47.1
Health 67.4
Source: Author’s Computations with data from IIAG (2013)
Implications for Political Development
Political Participation
One of the implications of political exclusion in the selected states is the resort to ethnic 
agitations. This, in turn, has influenced the pattern of political development; party 
formations and alliances, political loyalty, patronage and allocation of states resources 
bear the imprints of ethnic rather than national considerations. 
The 2006 and 2011 presidential elections in DRC clearly demonstrate this point. In 
2006, the result of the election showed that the three most successful candidates were 
Joseph Kabila, 44.8 per cent; Jean-Pierre Bemba, 20 per cent; and Antoine Gizenga, 
13 per cent. 
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Kabila, who stood as an independent at the head of the Alliance for a Presidential 
Majority (AMP), performed strongly in the East, where his support was high amongst the 
non-Tutsi majority there. Bemba, who stood as the candidate of the Rally of Congolese 
Nationalists (RENACO), won most of the votes in the Lingala-speaking West of the 
country. 
In Kinshasa, Bemba won 50 per cent of the votes, and Kabila 20 per cent, because 
opponents of Kabila alleged that he was of Rwandan ancestry. On the other hand, 
Antoine Gizenga of the Union for Development and Social Process (UDPS) had his 
support from Kasais and Katanga (Lunn, 2006).  
The same scenario of ethnic patronage played out again in the 2011 presidential 
elections. The four most successful candidates – Joseph Kabila (Independent), Etienne 
Tshisekedi (UDPS), Vital Kamerhe (UNC), and Leon Kengo wa Dondo (UFC), all drew 
support from their ethnic and regional bases (see Table 4).
Table 4: Results of the 2011 Presidential Elections in DRC for Selected Candidates
Province
Registered 
Voters
Number of 
Votes
Joseph Kabila
Etienne 
Tshisekedi
Vital Kamerhe Leon Kengo
Kinshasha 3,287,745 1,868,549 544,529 1,162,183 67,288 13,023
Bas-Congo 1,502,939 883,185 168,000 626,482 13,404 4,490
Bandundu 3,553,322 2,012,832 1,419,619 378,182 32,251 26,119
Equateur 3,960,643 2,015,754 238,169 654,425 73,311 772,202
Orientale 3,886,524 2,223,460 1,279,912 282,184 155,232 58,311
Nord-Kivu 3,003,246 1,913,685 712,317 389,350 423,376 8,632
Sud-Kivu 2,022,960 1,402,710 599,825 132,826 558,564 3,804
Maniema 874,809 525,044 433,482 14,548 36,308 1,063
Katanga 4,627,302 3,224,483 2,823,234 221,922 34,297 4,514
Kasai-Or 2,643,905 1,432,345 366,380 976,145 5,337 3,392
Kasai-Occ 2,661,245 1,412,044 295,477 1,026,528 4,004 2,812
Total 32,024,640 18,914,091 8,880,944 5,864,775 1,403,372 898,362
Percent 48.95% 32.33% 7.74% 4.95%
Source: The Carter Center, 2011. p.59
In Burundi, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA – Union pour le Progres 
National) and the Movement for the  Rehabilitation of the Citizen (MRC – Mouvement 
pour la Réhabilitation du Citoyen) are predominantly Tutsi parties. On the other hand, 
the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD), the National Council for the 
Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and the Front 
for the Democracy of Burundi (FRODEBU) are predominantly Hutu parties (ICG, 2005).
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In Rwanda, party formations, alliances and political patronage were also determined 
by ethnic rather than national considerations. The Rwandese Alliance for National Unity 
(RANU) was formed in 1979 by Tutsi refugee intelligentsia in Uganda to discuss a possible 
return to Rwanda (Mamdani, 2002). Also, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed 
in 1989 by Tutsi refugee Diaspora in Uganda. 
Above all, the access to relevant information on governance to citizens, and their 
freedom to participate in the political process, are highly limited by political exclusionism. 
The consequences of this have been a high degree of political instability and a protracted 
low political participation by the electorates (see Fig.2).
Source: Compiled with data from IIAG (2013) 
Human Rights
In Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda, state mechanisms and legal frameworks aimed at 
encouraging human, political and workers’ rights, remain largely underdeveloped while 
statistics indicate a high tendency by the governments to curtail civil liberties (see Fig.3);
Source: Compiled with data from IIAG (2013)
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National Security
This is measured using two main variables: the level of criminality/violent crime, and 
whether the government is involvement in armed confl icts. Available statistics show that 
confl ict in the Great Lakes region has also been a source of arms traffi cking. It has 
created big markets for arms industries in developed countries. The sale and circulation 
of arms has grown considerably through governments, rebel groups and ethnic militia. 
This has constituted a source of great security concern in the region (Elvis, 2002).
Consequently, there is high level of criminality and violent crime, which impedes 
personal safety, and the low performance by the selected countries (especially Burundi 
and the DRC) in National Security indicates high involvement of the government in armed 
confl icts (see Fig.4).
Source: Compiled with data from IIAG (2013) 
Implications for Socio-Economic Development
Infrastructure
Given the high degree of political instability in the region, there are defi ciencies in physical 
infrastructure that disrupt business activities and cause loss of income to the country. 
Thus, the abysmal performance in Infrastructure by the selected countries, as shown in 
Fig.5.
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Source: Compiled with data from IIAG (2013) 
Given the absence of enabling infrastructure, there is a low rate of economic growth. 
In 2013, World Development Indicators showed that the GDP per capita of the selected 
countries stood at US$192.1 for Burundi, US$199.3 for DRC and US$529.7 for Rwanda. 
Welfare
With an average score of 44.0 points for Burundi, 30.0 points for the DRC and 58.7 
points for Rwanda, performance in Welfare fell below average, except for Rwanda (see 
Fig.6). This is because a signifi cant proportion of the population is isolated due to a high 
level of poverty and income inequality, while the states have put no mechanisms in place 
to ensure equality of access to safety nets that compensate for poverty and natural 
disasters.
Source: Compiled with data from IIAG (2013) 
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This is in tandem with 2013 World Development Indicators Report, which showed 
that the percentage of population with less than US$ 2 per day is 93 per cent in Burundi 
and 82.4 per cent in Rwanda.
Education
Performance in Education is also poor because the states have not instituted an enabling 
framework to promote equal access for men and women to education, training and 
public resources (see Fig.7). 
Source: Compiled with data from IIAG (2013) 
The 2013 World Development Indicators Report supports the data above. According 
to the report, adult illiteracy rate for men and women in Burundi was 39.1/27.4 per cent, 
45.1/20.5 per cent for DRC, and 33.2/25.0 per cent for Rwanda
Health
Apart from Rwanda with an average score of 67.4 points, the rest scored below the 
average point (see Fig.8).  Burundi and DRC’s poor performances in Health are due 
to the inability of the states to put mechanisms in place that ensure availability of and 
access to quality health services. 
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Source: Compiled with data from IIAG (2013) 
Overall, if the IIAG fi gures for socio-economic development are compared with those 
from the Human Development Report, it is observed that there is no signifi cant difference 
between the two. This is because data from the Human Development Report indicates 
that between 2000 and 2010, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC – the epicentres of violent 
confl icts in the Great Lakes region – have maintained a consistent low rating in the 
Human Development Index as shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Human Development Index for Burundi, DRC & Rwanda: 2000-2010
Country
Human Development Index
2000 2005 2009 2010
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank
Burundi 0.245 170/174 0.285 169/177 0.312 174/182 0.317 166/169
DRC 0.224 152/174 0.260 167/177 0.277 176/182 0.282 168/169
Rwanda 0.313 164/174 0.376 159/177 0.419 167/182 0.425 152/169
Source: Human Development Reports of Selected Years
Comparative Analysis
A comparative analysis of the three countries sampled reveals that Rwanda ranks better 
than the other two in virtually all the selected development indicators, except in political 
participation and human rights, where it fell below Burundi. On the other hand, the DRC 
ranks the lowest (see Fig.9).
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Source: Compiled with data from IIAG (2013)
Ideally, this is not expected, given that the 1994 genocide had created a high level 
of human insecurity and socio-economic dislocation in Rwanda. However, Rwanda’s 
better ranking in the selected indicators is because after the genocide, efforts in the 
country were geared towards nation-building and constitutional development process 
that de-emphasized ethnic imperatives. Post-genocide policy formulations engineered 
and institutionalized a Rwandan citizenry devoid of regional and ethnic stereotypes. 
Political parties with a regional or ethnic support base are not allowed to operate, and all 
political parties are obliged to belong to the political party forum. In this forum, the general 
political future of the country and policies pertaining to the reconciliation drive in the 
country are debated. Secondly, the post-genocide Constitution of 19 July 2003 forbids 
any recourse to ethnicity in the discharge of private and state services. Specifi cally, it 
provides in Article 11 that:
Discrimination of whatever kind based on, inter alia, ethnic origin, 
tribe, clan, colour, sex, region, social origin, religion or faith, opinion, 
economic status, culture, language, social status, physical or 
mental disability or any other form of discrimination is prohibited and 
punishable by law. 
This may well explain why two decades after the genocide, Rwanda has become a 
beacon of hope, development and prosperity in the Great Lakes region (Check, 2011). 
Unfortunately, this is not the case with Burundi and the DRC, where violent ethno-political 
confl icts occasioned by exclusionism are still festering.
Political Exclusion, Violent Conflicts  and Development in Africa
Inequality, Democracy and Development under Neoliberalism and Beyond 229
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
From the foregoing analysis, the assumption of the transmission model of conflict 
analysis that political exclusion engenders ethnic rivalry, which in turn results in political 
instability that reproduces itself in socio-economic underdevelopment, is validated. 
Thus, the whole scenario, as portrayed above, translates into an endemic cycle of evil 
that begets evil. 
Arising from the Rwandan experience, it is recommended that individual countries in 
the region, the East African Community (EAC) and the East African Legislative Assembly 
should put measures in place to ensure the institutionalization of a robust nation building, 
political and constitutional development processes that de-emphasize ethnic imperatives 
and promote economic and social justice. This will ameliorate the recurrence of political 
exclusion that results in violent ethno-political conflicts with its negative consequences.
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The Promise of Prosperity Through  
Urban Revitalization in the Philippines  
and Indonesia under a Devolved  
and Neoliberal Regime
Bryan Joseph Ortiz1
Abstract
Problems like high unemployment still exist in cities that are considered models of 
good governance, such as Marikina and Surakarta. To account for the persistence of 
such problems, this paper probes the patchwork result of (local) state formation and 
uncovers the interplay between agents and institutions in creating and implementing 
“transformative” projects at the local level under a neoliberal regime. Results derived 
from the use of a combination of Kim, Snyder and Nas’s works as guides and 
Comparative Historical Analysis as the methodology indicate that residents’ access 
to social services and infrastructure in the two cities were enhanced by state-led 
projects. Such enhanced access was enabled by the mayors’ visions and the ties 
created between the local state and key social forces. However, continuous shifts 
towards liberalization and the nature of the mayors’ relationships with other state 
elite and social forces hinder the sustainability of the projects. 
Introduction 
The rise of capitalism convinced some social scientists to assume the convergence of 
polities on a certain path. In the era of globalization, when the survival of nation-states 
seems to depend on integration with international trade, the path leads to the creation 
of a liberal market economy where all will gain by seeking comparative advantage in the 
global division of labour in order to be competitive. But the promise of material prosperity 
remains unfulfilled to a large segment of the world’s population. What accounts for the 
presence of uneven development? In attending to concerns about social inequality, it is 
important to address the question of solving the collective action problem of structural 
transformation. With modernizing in mind, the quest for structural transformation from 
agrarian-based economies into industrial-based ones became the grand goal of those 
who wanted to catch up with the leading or dominant powers. Although industrialization 
engenders contradictory outcomes like class divisions, several political economists of 
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19th and early 20th century continental Europe saw that the task of harnessing everyone’s 
potential rests on an entity that will guard universal welfare – the state (List, 1841; von 
Stein, 1964; Schmoller, 1895). Its transformative capacity was proven in the modern 
world, as attested by the creation of “democratic capitalism” in the form of welfare states 
in Europe (Streeck and Yamamura, 2001). The successful experience in state-building 
extends to the East Asian region wherein several countries attained the status of Newly-
Industrialized Countries (NICs). The phenomenon of rapid economic growth based on 
nurturing productive sectors of the economy, like manufacturing, led scholars to term 
those countries as “developmental states” (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Johnson, 
1982; Studwell, 2013; Wade,1990). 
Others were not so lucky. As several Third world states successfully escaped 
from peripheral status in the global division of labour, pressures for greater economic 
integration through globalization were intensified. The emerging discourse of neoliberal 
ideology championed the cause of state retreat, as neoliberals argue that the efficiency 
in the allocation of resources should be left to the dictates of market forces. Globalization 
became their hope for further economic prosperity. Even then, the transition towards 
greater integration with the global market requires guidance from the state, with 
sufficient institutional capacity (Evans,1997:62-87; for arguments in favour of the 
state’s transformative capacity even in the neoliberal era using the concept of governed 
interdependence, see Weiss,1998). Unfortunately, the expectations do not cohere with 
the realities, especially in many Third World countries. In those places, many citizens 
often depend on societal forces for interventions that are supposed to be filled by the 
state – a circumstance reflecting the inability of Third World states to assert authority in 
undertaking social control (Migdal, 1988 and 1994).
Still, it is far-fetched to conclude that the project of state-building failed, as the 
outcomes of transformative projects are mixed, with countries like the Philippines and 
Indonesia as exemplars (for the Philippine case, see Abinales and Amoroso, 2005). 
While the two countries had various regime types in place for much of the 20th century, 
both had a history of state-mediated economic transformation that failed to be on a 
par with the accomplishments of the Northeast Asian states, and all have competitive 
electoral democratic institutions. Local government units (LGUs) in those countries have 
significant powers in rule-making, as the idea of devolving power to the local level became 
popular. Devolution was done with the expectation that grassroots-level of participation 
in governance would enable the state to be more responsive to its citizens’ concerns. 
With the ascendance of the neoliberal ideology in the post-authoritarian era, discourses 
on “transparency”, “good and participatory governance”, “social safety nets”, and the 
like became popular. But such expectations were not fulfilled as local strong men (re)
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emerged to dominate local politics, mostly acting in a predatory manner. Their style 
of governing is often described by scholars as exemplars of “bossism”, “clientelism”, 
“money politics” and “neo-patrimonial rule”, among others (Anderson,1998; Hadiz, 2010; 
McCoy,1994; Sidel,1997). Nonetheless, there are exceptions. Due to the seeming rarity 
of the so-called reform-oriented leaders at the local level, a study of such exceptions is 
a worthwhile endeavour.  
As part of the scholarly attempt to make sense of economic change, state formation 
and other emerging forms of social configurations, this paper tackles the project of urban 
revitalization in Indonesia and the Philippines, particularly as pursued by the cities of 
Surakarta and Marikina. In both cities, the heads of local governments did not behave in 
a predatory manner, as many of their counterparts did in in other parts of their respective 
countries. Instead, they initiated and implemented policies that attended to concerns 
associated with rapid urbanization, as they believed that their intervention served the 
interest of all. Examples include Surakarta’s relocation of street vendors and Marikina’s 
efficient waste management. Marikina and Surakarta’s urban revitalization projects are 
similar to those pursued in other Third World cities, such as Bogota’s Transmilenio Bus 
Rapid Transit and Mexico City’s revitalization of open spaces like parks and plazas, as 
these cities seek to redefine urban living with recent emphasis on environment protection 
(Ebrard, 2014). However, problems typically encountered by other cities, such as high 
unemployment and huge gaps between the rich and the poor, still lurk beneath these 
cities that are renowned as “models” of “sustainable development”. Projects of urban 
revitalization can be dismissed as a policy promoting gentrification that dispossesses 
the poor, an undertaking that serves the interest of finance capital and exacerbates 
social inequality. True enough, but in the case of Marikina and Surakarta, there are 
instances when the local state intervened in favour of the urban poor to the detriment of 
the upper class. There were efforts to balance the interest of capital and the subordinate 
classes. Such action can be interpreted as a reassertion of the state’s reassertion of its 
developmental goal, albeit in quite an inclusive arrangement. What is interesting here is 
whether a 21st century developmental state, as argued by Evans (2008), can be formed. 
Brazil’s recent experience in reducing poverty and social inequality provided Evans 
and Heller (2012) with convincing proof of the possibility of constructing a 21st century 
developmental state through “democratic deepening”. However, the stagnant growth 
generated by Brazil as well as the neighbouring country of Argentina in the last few 
years raises some doubts about the sustainability of the country’s development. For 
someone who adheres to a critical perspective, like Ebenau and Liberatore (2013), there 
are limits to the new developmental model pursued by these countries. The model, 
called neodevelopmentalism, is characterized by a commitment to the reinvigoration 
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of industrial policies, adherence to fiscal discipline and provision of social services – a 
proposition championed by Bresser-Pereira (2012). The gains of the two Latin American 
countries did not provide a decisive escape from a dependent position in capitalist 
development. This is due to the persistence of a large share of extractivist activities in 
generating economic growth and the fundamental class contradictions that maintain 
the exclusionary character of state capitalism. These situations present ecological 
dangers and the difficulty of balancing the interest between (domestic) capital and the 
working class. The problem with Ebenau and Liberatore’s (2013) analysis lies in the lack 
of analysis of the mode of expression of class interest in the two countries. While they 
are critical to neodevelopmentalism’s “idealized” notion of the state, other factors that 
affect the degree of “stateness”, such as the fragmented nature in the organization of 
social groups and the persistence of clientelism, were not noticed. The exploration of 
those factors is important especially in investigating other Third World countries, like the 
Philippines and Indonesia, which have a less spectacular record of industrialization. 
This paper will, however, not dwell on modern capitalism’s (ultimate) future. Whatever 
the case, the researcher hopes that this paper will help uncover some clues that will lead 
to a greater understanding of the interplay of the dynamics of state formation, human 
agency, and economic changes over time. An account of the resilience of modern 
capitalism, especially in the Third World, cannot be sufficient if there is no elucidation of 
the presence of “pockets of efficiency” or “islands of state strength” in countries that are 
generally considered weak. 
Research Questions 
In accounting for the persistence of the urban problems mentioned above, this paper 
will probe the patchwork result of a long period of state formation and uncover the 
interplay between agents, existing institutional framework, and the ascendance of 
neoliberal ideology in generating the contours of socio-economic transformation in so-
called weak states, at the local level. In line with these plans, the following questions 
must be answered: 
1.  What are the preconditions that allow the formation of an institutional framework 
suitable for a transformative project to take place? 
2.  How do the cognition, normative values, belief systems, preferences, and ideological or 
programmatic commitments of the actors involved affect the trajectory of institutional 
change? 
3.  In what ways do an (existing) state structure as well as the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of state actors and major social groups shape or constrain programmatic 
commitments in carrying out transformative projects?  
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Theoretical Framework and Methodology
In exploring answers to research questions, this paper attempts to provide a theoretical 
formulation that combines the exposition of state structure and ties with social forces 
that are prevalent in developmental state literatures, the polities’ political history, and the 
role of agents in shaping specific outcomes of a phenomenon under investigation. 
As noted in the Introduction, the state’s efficacy in carrying out societal transformation 
has already been documented in developmental state (DS) literatures, the most famous 
of these including the works of Chalmers Johnson (1982), Alice Amsden (1989), Robert 
Wade (1990), Peter Evans (1995) and Atul Kohli (2004) (even if the last prefers to term DS as 
“cohesive capitalist states”). They stressed the importance of creating industrial policies, 
strong and autonomous bureaucratic machineries, and ties with peak organizations. 
Clearly, the rise of the DS defies the logic espoused by neoclassical economics. 
However, in explaining the emergence of such states, DS scholars did not account for 
the crucial importance of political history in the successful economic performance of 
these states, despite the recognition of economic development as an explicitly political 
project. Moreover, DS literatures did not adequately include the one in charge – the 
person at the apex of the state. Such a critique of DS literatures is championed by 
Byung-Kook Kim (2011) in The Park Chung-hee Era. While he is able to elaborate on 
the complexities involved in forging Korea’s industrialization, he overstates his criticisms 
of DS literatures. He tends to magnify the role of President Park Chung-hee in fostering 
Korea’s rapid industrial growth at the expense of adequate exposition of Korea’s historical 
antecedents of state-building which enabled Park and his clique to dominate in the first 
place. When he criticizes DS scholars on their supposed adoption of Weber’s idea about 
bureaucratic rationality, which leads to overemphasis on the bureaucracy’s possession 
of technocratic ethos, he forgets to incorporate Weber’s maxim to people who wanted 
to have a hand “on the wheel of history”. Park’s political career, which ended with his 
assassination, could be assessed in relation to Max Weber’s elucidation of qualities that 
a politician must possess: sense of passion, responsibility, and judgment (Weber, 1978). 
Besides, DS scholars did not view the emergence East Asian NICs in a static fashion. 
What is missing in Byung-Kook Kim’s work is explication of the interplay between the 
historical legacy of state-formation and personality in Korea’s industrial development. 
To diminish the shortcomings of DS literatures and Byung-Kook Kim’s work, this paper 
adopts Richard Snyder’s (2004) proposition on the possibility of subversion of neoliberal 
projects at the sub-national level. Snyder’s work is useful because the timeframe for 
his study of different pathways in the reorganization of the coffee industry in Mexican 
states under a devolved governing arrangement is focused on the years when the 
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neoliberal ideology was in its ascendancy. His argument illustrates the impossibility of 
social, economic and political homogenization hoped for by neoclassical theorists. In 
this paper, however, Snyder’s proposition is used with a twist. First, there is a difference 
in the geographical focus of the (comparative) research. This paper focuses on case 
studies at the city and cross-national levels, while Snyder’s is at the provincial and 
within one country level. Second, while accepting his argument about the corporatist 
project’s viability within a participatory regulatory framework, this paper demonstrates 
that a “transformative” project that ignores elements of a neoliberal agenda can also be 
accomplished, at least for the time being. Third, as this paper concentrates on cities, a 
little more prominent place is given to local chief executives (mayors) due to their more 
proactive role in setting the pace for the kind of urbanization in their localities – a role that 
can be described as “directors of urban change” (Nas, 2005). Their choices during a 
critical juncture made a difference to the nature of the projects for urban revitalization. At 
the same time, the manner of conducting political contestations and the kind of linkages 
forged with key social forces shaped the directions of such projects. 
With the above theoretical framework as a guide, this paper answers the research 
questions with the following arguments:
 1.  Local state elite crafted an array of policies that are state-led or mediated in 
contrast to neoliberal prescriptions. 
 2.  Their policies are informed by a developmental vision rooted in the nationalist 
sentiment and prior private entrepreneurial experience of their localities, legacies 
of state formation, and vulnerability pressures generated by the devolution of 
power. 
 3.  Engagements with key social forces in urban revitalization projects do not 
necessarily have to be participatory in orientation. 
 4.  The choices of the local state elite with regard to their relationship with the central 
state actors/central state-level politicians bring consequences to the nature of 
their linkages with key social forces (and vice versa). 
 5.  The inability of local state elite to forge long-lasting ties with key members of 
social forces condemns them to act within the confines of a traditional way of 
engaging in politics, which threatens the sustainability of projects. 
In validating the propositions mentioned above, this paper utilizes comparative 
historical analysis (CHA) as the methodology. CHA, as one of the basic foundations 
of the social sciences, has been proven to be a powerful tool in the construction and 
refinement of theories (Rueschemeyer and Mahoney, 2003). Marikina and Surakarta are 
chosen for comparison due to similar commitments by the local state elite, particularly 
Mayors Bayani Fernando (BF) and Joko Widodo, to urban revitalization through state 
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intervention within the framework of a devolved and neoliberal regime in the 1990s 
and 2000s. However, as the local state elite of the two cities undertook various tactical 
choices with respect to their ties with key (local) social forces and national-level state 
elite/politicians, and as informed by their visions, backgrounds as private entrepreneur 
and past experiences of state formation, their political careers underwent different 
paths. This affected the resilience of the urban revitalization project and its impact on 
those who were supposed to gain. In Marikina, the local state leaders’ alliances with the 
national state elite and ties with social forces were shaped by the historical trajectory of 
Philippine’s state formation, which is in general based on patronage and the resilience of 
local politics. The relationship with key members of the social forces was defined by the 
relative endurance of Marikina’s social movements and the presence of local enterprises 
nurtured by the ISI. Surakarta’s experience was influenced by the legacy of a long period 
of Suharto’s authoritarian rule. Although there was a commitment to “democratization” 
through the devolution of power, this policy was taken advantage of by the Indonesian 
state elite and members of the social forces linked with the authoritarian regime to 
reassert themselves in the local arena. The situation prompted Jokowi to interact in a 
pronouncedly informal manner, particularly with the masses, for the execution of the 
city’s urban revitalization projects. 
Results
Marikina and Surakarta’s “improvements” with respect to several policy concerns could 
give the impression that they catered to the sensibilities of the middle and upper class, or 
were simply a gentrification. But Marikina and Surakarta are more than that. Both cities 
once had a dynamic industrial base comprising significantly of lifestyle products (footwear 
for the former and batik for the latter), which their local governments sought to rescue 
from the intensive pressures of trade liberalization. The state elite are still committed to 
industrialization and they believe that urban revitalization projects will help in (re)attaining 
it. While efforts to industrialize could produce inconclusive results, urban revitalization 
projects significantly alter other aspects of urban life which gain popularity (or notoriety) 
among the state elite. The sequence in the discussion of research results is as follows: 
1. Description of the cities’ urban revitalization projects 2. Historical antecedents of the 
cities 3. Reassertion of (local) state power 4. Mayors and their ties with social forces and 
national-level state elite.
 
The Promise of Prosperity Through  Urban Revitalization in the Philippines  and Indonesia
Inequality, Democracy and Development under Neoliberalism and Beyond 239
Urban Revitalization Projects
Marikina
From 1992 until 2010, the local government presided over, at minimal cost, the swift 
construction and paving of over 700 km of roads and footpaths, in-city resettlement 
and housing with basic amenities such as water, electricity and sanitation services for 
17,974 families who lived on the riverbank and in other illegal settlements, efficient waste 
collection (99 per cent), five-minute emergency response time, subsidized healthcare; 
etc. (Adamos III, 2006; City of Marikina, 1999; Mariano, 1999; Marikina Facts and 
Figures, 2010; Marikina City Annual Report, various years). Concurrently, its annual 
income increased from 70,000,000 pesos in 1992 to 1,625,422,638 pesos in 2009 
(Fernando and Maliwat, 2009; Magno, 2011). 
The well-known projects include housing/resettlement and waste segregation. Some 
of the resettlement sites were private property owned by a real estate company that was 
asked to sell the land at a price lower than its initial demand (Singh, 1993). Resettled 
residents, in turn, were obliged to pay for the land but in instalments and on a long term 
basis. Each resettled family occupies a 24 square metre lot and can acquired it through 
community mortgage. Funds for land acquisition were derived from the government’s 
National Home Mortgage Financing Corporation (Lorenzo, 2007). The local government 
put in basic necessities and infrastructure while residents constructed their houses 
(Mariano, 1999). The cost of this housing scheme was much lower compared to schemes 
offered by other local governments, NGOs and international aid agencies (Ortiz, 2011). 
In another project, schoolchildren were encouraged to collect recyclable material and 
bring it to school on a designated day each week. The recyclable material was received 
by the Waste Management Office and the students, in turn, were given corresponding 
points on their Eco-Savers Passbook. Earned points could be bartered for grocery 
items and school supplies (Fernando and Maliwat, 2009: 41). Like the housing and 
resettlement scheme, the waste segregation project is cost-effective because it relies on 
stakeholders’ cooperation. 
Those projects earned Marikina its reputation for “good governance”, which is partly 
derived from its distinction as a Hall of Fame Awardee of the Galing Pook Foundation, 
a body sponsored by the government, academia, private and foreign aid agencies that 
reward “innovative” projects and practices (Galing Pook website) of local governments. 
In this case, the local government used this reputation to draw outsiders in for organized 
excursions. Holiday festivals were also held to attract tourists (Fernando and Maliwat, 
2009).To promote the city’s shoe industry, the Shoe Museum was built which houses 
Imelda Marcos’s 2,000 pairs of shoes (many of which were Marikina-made) and displays 
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the largest pair of shoes as per the Guinness Book of World Records, the Philippine 
Footwear Design Competition was inaugurated, and the Shoemakers’ Festival was 
observed (ibid., 89; Allen, 2005). Still, the shoe industry’s fate remains uncertain as it 
encounter stiff competition due to trade liberalization (Allen, 2005).  
Surakarta
The Surakarta city government, between 2005 and 2012, relocated 4,000 people who 
lived in 1,000 houses that lie on the city’s riverbanks, renovated 3,750 houses, moved 
hundreds of street vendors to covered public markets, reduced the processing of permits 
to six days, facilitated healthcare for the uninsured by issuing the so-called gold and 
silver cards to 13,000 and 195,000 people respectively, and revived the city’s tourism 
(Majeed, 2012). Unlike Marikina, the Surakarta government does not have the power to 
raise taxes without the central government’s permission. As 70 per cent of Surakarta’s 
budget is derived from the central government, the local government leans on efficiency 
in the execution of projects (ibid.). 
The relocation of street vendors was one of the most popular projects. Its success 
stemmed from the ability of the city government to convince vendors to move away 
from streets and footpaths and occupy instead the covered public markets built by 
the government. The vision of thoroughfares cleared of street vendors’ stalls and other 
obstructions to pedestrian and vehicular flow is not something recent in Indonesia, as 
it dates back to Suharto’s dictatorship when Jakarta removed things that symbolized 
“poverty and backwardness” from its streets in the 1970s (Henley, 2014). In Surakarta, 
the high unemployment caused by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had increased the 
number of people in the informal sector (Majeed, 2012). Conventional solutions like 
forced removal were tried but failed as the city government encountered strong resistance 
from street vendors. So the city mayor resorted to informal dialogue. After 54 rounds 
of negotiations, street vendors were persuaded to relocate after the city government 
agreed to provide them with vending equipment and training sessions for business 
promotion (ibid.; Pratikno and Lay, 2011). Relocated vendors paid standardized fees 
under transparent regulations to avoid bribery. The relocation was done with fanfare. The 
vendors and the city government organized a festive procession that signalled amicable 
settlement. To increase profitability, 13 covered public markets and vending areas were 
constructed or renovated between 2006 and 2011. It was forbidden for ‘traditional’ 
covered public markets to be converted into modern shopping malls or retail stores. 
Modern shopping malls were also banned within 500 metres of ‘traditional’ markets 
(Majeed, 2012). The city government’s efforts to assist the informal sector, however, 
produced mixed results. Although there was a reported increase of as much as 200 
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per cent in vendors’ revenue, scepticism was expressed about the supposed overall 
success of the relocation. Some vendors went out of business while others even went 
back to the streets albeit in a different location (ibid.; Obermayr, 2012). The problem 
partly stemmed from the inaccessibility of some of covered public markets to potential 
customers (Majeed, 2012). 
Historical Antecedents
Marikina
Marikina was closely linked with the other part of Metro Manila even before its 
incorporation into the latter in the 1970s. The historical evolution of the metropolis is 
defined by the primacy of private interest and the weakness of the Philippine state (van 
den Muijzenberg and van Naerssen, 2005; Camba, 2011). Today’s Metro Manila was 
a cluster of landed estates (hacienda) owned by rich and powerful clans. The fate of 
the haciendas varied, depending on its owners’ responses to Manila’s demographic 
expansion after World War II. Some passively collected rent, while others took on a 
proactive role to convert the estates into commercial, retail and upscale residential 
complexes (van den Muijzenberg and van Naerssen, 2005: 133-137). At the same time, 
the state attempted to create a new capital city outside Manila which was envisioned 
during Manuel Quezon’s presidency (1935-1944) in response to Manila’s burgeoning 
population. However, the plan failed to a large extent not only due to the War but also 
the inability to steer the trend to suburbanization in the post-War years. A combination of 
the preference of the elite to move outside Manila, the preoccupation of the government 
and the Americans with the city’s reconstruction, the real estate boom generated by 
American private interest, the Manila city government’s taxation policy, the presence 
of Filipino-owned landed estates outside Manila, and the government’s preference for 
private sector driven urban development contributed to a “suburbanization process” that 
predominantly catered to the needs of the wealthy and the upper middle class (Camba, 
2011). 
The unplanned expansion of urban areas to Manila’s outskirts reveals the state’s 
lack of administrative and political apparatus in asserting its power – a condition that 
persisted until the Martial Law era (1972-86) of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos (van den 
Muijzenberg and van Naerssen, 2005). Governor Imelda unleashed a series of projects 
that fell under an integrated plan for the newly-established metropolitan area, from 
healthcare to transportation. Her vision was to create a “City of Man” where residents 
could live with dignity and pride with Filipino culture. However, the overall outcome was 
the construction of edifices as a showcase to the international community at the expense 
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of the urban poor (pp. 137-139). The end of conjugal dictatorship in 1986 ushered in a 
fragmented vision for the metropolis which was, again, driven by private interest (ibid.). 
In view of the discussion about the trajectory of Metro Manila’s urbanization in the 
preceding paragraphs, where does Marikina figure? Like many cities in today’s Metro 
Manila, Marikina was once an agricultural landed estate owned by a rich clan in the first 
half of the 20th century. Concurrently, the municipality had a shoe industry that began 
in 1887, an economic activity that remains the city’s main source of livelihood to this 
day. Tenancy was a major issue confronted by the town, together with the defence of 
trade union interests (Isidro, 1991). Several peasant organizations were formed with the 
goal of land redistribution by the Tuason clan, the estate owners. The surge of peasant 
organizations coincided with the rise of agrarian unrest in other parts of Luzon Island 
during the 1920s and 30s. Even if President Manuel Quezon promised “social justice”, 
there were limits to the state’s ability to actualize it, as the proposal to break up landed 
estates met with firm opposition and he was beholden to the interest of the landlords 
(Abinales and Amoroso, 2005: 154). Thus, the Marikina peasants relied on their organizing 
ability. Their success in doing so varied. Some acquired the land, others gained a larger 
share of the harvest, while the rest either lost interest or did not participate for fear of 
antagonizing the Tuasons (Isidro, 1991). Overall, the Marikina tenants’ struggle for land 
was a success, considering the fate of peasants in other parts of the Philippines whose 
demands were met with repression. According to Paz (n.d.), the Tuasons agreed to sell 
104 hectares to tenants for 300,000 pesos. Among those who received land was Gil 
Fernando, Bayani Fernando’s father. Gil would later become the town’s councillor and 
mayor. It is noteworthy that local political families led the struggle for the defence of trade 
union interest and peasant organizations (ibid.; Isidro, 1991). Wenceslao de la Paz’s 
election as mayor in the 1930s was attributed to his role in the peasants’ purchase of 
the estate (Paz, n.d.). 
Still, electoral contestations are focused on the electorate’s loyalties to personalities 
or families rather than ideology or programmatic commitments – a feature that marked 
Marikina’s politics in the succeeding decades. As Isidro (1991: 147) had observed, 
“voters generally look at the merits of their political leaders and not necessarily those 
of their platforms”. Unlike in other Philippine localities, none of Marikina’s key politicians 
had built a durable and undisputable hold on power for themselves or their families. Gil 
Fernando, for instance, did not hold the mayoral seat for consecutive terms. The only 
mayor who occupied the mayoralty post for a long time was Osmundo de Guzman, 
Gil Fernando’s successor (Paz, n.d.). But then, de Guzman’s mayoralty coincided with 
Marikina’s incorporation into Metropolitan Manila in 1975 when Governor Imelda had 
overwhelming powers. 
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Marikina’s urbanization occurred long before it became part of Metro Manila. In 
1957, its industrialization commenced when the Philippine state favoured an ISI mode 
of development. Together with the long established shoe industry, the town became 
the site of factories that produced textile, fertilizer, paper, food, cigarettes, etc. Migrants 
lured by the proliferation of factories caused a population increase from 21,000 in 1955 
to 112,598 in 1970 (The Urbanization of Marikina, n.d.:7). Concurrently, agricultural lands 
were converted into housing enclaves for the middle class and government employees. 
As Marikina became more crowded, tensions between residents increased. Incidents 
of petty quarrels, thefts, hold-ups, homicide and rape were blamed on migrants (ibid.: 
10-11). By the 1980s and early 90s, the town had a reputation as a crime-infested place 
and a haven for urban insurgency (Culibao, 2004: 32; ILO, 2010). 
Surakarta 
Indonesia had a more enduring period of state centralization than the Philippines. 
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and Suharto’s New Order had limited the chances of the 
local elite to build an autonomous power base (Hadiz, 2010). Suharto gained paramount 
status as President by concentrating state power in his hands. His regime’s stability 
depended on the skilful manipulation of inter-elite rivalry and the containment of social 
forces. The corporatist governing arrangement became clear with the creation of state-
sponsored functional constituencies (Case, 2002). Suharto’s patronage guaranteed 
their loyalty. Social quiescence was partly secured by economic performance and 
accommodation to the nationalist, ethnic and religious sensibilities of social forces. If 
everything else failed, the regime resorted to repression. Nonetheless, it gave itself a 
semblance of legitimacy by organizing rigged parliamentary elections consistently won 
by Suharto’s Golkar Party (ibid.). 
Vulnerability to external shocks due to dependence on the shifting fortunes of oil 
production in the 1970s, the liberal entry of foreign capital, and the inability to change its 
landholding pattern like in the Philippines had made Indonesia’s economic performance 
not at par with East Asian NICs (Studwell, 2013). The 1997 Asian Economic Crisis 
and excessive patrimonial plunder brought the Suharto regime to an abrupt end. 
Overconcentration of power gave way to empowerment of local governments, with 
the hope of preserving Indonesia’s territorial integrity and promoting grassroots level 
of governance. On the surface, the holding of genuine competitive elections, including 
the electorate’s direct election of President and local government heads, indicates 
sustained progress towards democratic consolidation. But Suharto’s political machinery 
remained intact, even though disunity of the elite helped in making competitive contest 
for power a regular feature of post-Suharto era politics. The New Order nurtured elite 
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had demonstrated their resilience by reasserting power under different settings (Hadiz, 
2010). They found local politics to be a lucrative arena for exercising predatory power 
that was relatively free from central state control (ibid.). In the absence of Suharto, 
power holders turned to political parties and control of local government as some of the 
sources of patronage. Traditionally, Indonesian political parties were formed based on 
cleavages between traditionalists, secularists, Islamicists, and ‘communists’. The New 
Order regime brutally eliminated the last category. Elections in the post-Suharto era tend 
to reflect such cleavages, with the addition of the divide between “reformists” and status 
quo advocates. However, the identification of political parties with those cleavages have 
gradually receded over the course of the post-Suharto era (Ufen, 2008). Rather than 
serving as venues for the articulation of ideological and programmatic commitments, 
political parties are used as vehicles for building tactical alliances among the elite. 
Since electoral struggles are precipitated by what Hadiz calls “competing coalitions of 
predatory interest,” those who want to give a voice to other social interests like labour 
are marginalized (Hadiz, 2010). This situation happens even in the presence of vibrant 
civil society organizations (CSOs). 
In Surakarta, there were attempts by the local government to elicit the CSOs in 
development planning to subvert the opposition of the local parliament to the then 
Mayor Slamet Suryanto’s “populist” policies. During Suryanto’s incumbency, smooth 
ties between the mayor and the local parliament were a vital necessity as the latter 
had the power to elect and depose the former. However, this was not the case even 
if Suryanto and the majority of the local parliament members belonged to President 
Megawati’s secularist PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle). Suryanto and his 
group had to coalesce with local parliamentarians who represented the military and the 
police (Pratikno and Lay, 2011). His lack of administrative skills forced him to rely on the 
skills of the Local Development Planning Body. In this context, the Body’s inclusion of 
CSOs is a challenge to the legitimacy of the local parliament. Still, the capacity to bring 
and implement a transformative agenda is limited, as the existence of CSOs does not 
rest on ideological foundations though it purports to represent the vulnerable sectors of 
society, such as small retailers. Rather, its existence was bolstered by the intervention of 
foreign aid agencies such as Ford Foundation and UNDP. Moreover, Suryanto’s efficacy 
to govern was questioned by allegations of corruption (ibid.). Overall, the transition to 
a new political arrangement did not go smoothly in Surakarta just like in other local 
entities, as the city had to grapple with the emerging threat of terrorism and persistent 
massive unemployment that forced some to engage in informal employment such as 
street vending. The magnitude of unemployment is reflected by the fact that 38.3 per 
cent of Surakarta’s working population belonged to the informal sector in 2002. By 
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2005, Surakarta’s poverty rate had reached 16 per cent (Majeed, 2012). This gave the 
city the impression of being chaotic and hopeless. 
Reassertion of (Local) State Power
Urban revitalization projects demonstrate the state’s assertion of its power to (re)gain 
control of urban space. In Marikina and Surakarta, there was no instance of state retreat 
under Bayani Fernando and Joko Widodo’s mayoral rules. The two cities utilized the 
bureaucratic machinery in creating and enforcing such projects though, in doing so, they 
adopted different tactics. In Marikina, the local state did not hesitate to use force against 
those who resisted, an act that, for critics, borders on ruthlessness, as with clearing 
sidewalks of street vendors (Santos, n.d.). Acts of deviance, like littering, were met with 
strict punishment. Surakarta, in contrast, resorted to persuasion for accepting the local 
government’s projects. This, however, did not mean the prevalence of participatory 
governance as understood by its advocates because the efficiency and reliability 
remained paramount concerns of the local government.  
The efficacy of the bureaucratic machinery in project delivery in the two cities rested 
on a series of policies that enhanced coordination and efficiency, such as the retention 
and professionalization of local government personnel, the introduction of planning 
process, the designation of a lead agency or department in the creation and execution 
of specific projects, and performance evaluation (City of Marikina, 1999; Majeed, 2012). 
In Marikina, these policies translated into the city mayor’s propensity to consider the 
department heads as “members of his inner circle or team” due to their technical 
expertise or experience (Adamos III, 2006: 79, 88; Tordecilla, 1997: 17). They were 
mostly those involved in planning the city’s development, with almost no participation 
from NGOs (Tumbaga, 1997:86). For instance, the mayor relied on technical experts 
from various departments of the local government such as the City Engineering Office, 
Marikina Settlements Office (MSO), Waste Management Office, etc. for the rehabilitation 
of the Marikina River and the demolition of settlements on its banks (Tordecilla, 1997: 17). 
If there was any participation from the NGOs, it was confined to non-vital aspects of the 
river rehabilitation project, such as the construction of certain landmarks like the Chinese 
pagoda (Adamos, 2006: 60, 86). Complaints against the local government’s policies and 
projects were coursed to the relevant departments for resolution instead of immediate 
visitation to the mayor (City of Marikina, 1999). The local government was competent 
enough to directly supervise the construction of the required infrastructure. Instead of 
relying on private contractors, through its engineering department the local government 
had repair and maintenance facilities, “its own batching plant, steel fabrication, pre-
casting and its electrical and traffic divisions” (Fernando, 2001: 3). These facilities were 
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housed in a 2.2 hectare site called Public Services Center, which was bought from a 
bank at a price of 13.5 million pesos (ibid.). The presence of the local state was felt not 
only in the building of physical structures and in the enforcement of regulations with an 
“iron fist” but also in taxation, by raising the rate as high as 200 per cent (Lopez, 2007:8). 
It helps considerably when the one in charge of all these regulations and projects – the 
mayor – is an engineer himself, who prefers a “hands-on” style of management (City of 
Marikina, 1999). 
In Surakarta, the bureaucracy was mandated to speed up the required working 
processes to deliver its functions, from the issuance of licenses to the delivery of social 
services. Like Marikina, complaints were handled through bureaucracy by setting up 
a help-desk as a ‘One Stop Service’. Personnel involved in bribery were dismissed. 
The bureaucracy had an important role in planning but it was the mayor who made 
major decisions. He crafted the overall vision, while the deputy mayor administered 
civil servants in project execution (Majeed, 2012). To monitor the status of projects, 
the mayor often visited the offices and project sites unannounced – an act known as 
blusukan, which made him popular among those frustrated with the bureaucracy (Dewi 
and Anitorang, 2009). 
Mayors and Their Ties with Social Forces and National-level State Elites
Marikina and Surakarta’s urban revitalization projects derived significantly from BF 
and Jokowi’s vision for their cities and the nation as a whole. They may not have 
been articulate but had a set of beliefs and programmatic commitments to which they 
sincerely adhered. Those beliefs and commitments were informed by their upbringing, 
professional experience, and interactions with other members of the state elite and 
social forces. Their ability to deliver projects hinged on their choice of action and position 
in an array of social forces and state actors/elite engaged in contestations within a given 
institutional structure. Concerns expressed by social groups from the grassroots were 
heard only if they were organized or accredited by the local state. Interventions for urban 
revitalization not only changed the physical look of Marikina and Surakarta but also 
brought a positive impact on their residents, especially with regard to the provision of 
basic social services. Nonetheless, problems such as unemployment were not drastically 
reduced despite these accomplishments and interventions, including efforts to promote 
local industry. Trade liberalization is not the only thing to be blamed. An account of BF 
and Jokowi’s ties with other state actors under the decentralized and patronage oriented 
regime must be factored in to clarify the uncertainty that surrounds the sustainability of 
urban revitalization projects. 
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Bayani Fernando and Joko Widodo  
BF and Jokowi have similar personal and career trajectories when it comes to the 
following: (fond) memories of the river from their childhood years, inclination to engage 
in a production-oriented entrepreneurship, the occupation of the mayoralty post when 
more than 40 years old and at a time when the powers of local government heads had 
been newly strengthened, and a belief in the necessity of adopting a developmental 
agenda as a solution to their city’s (and country’s) predicament (Dewi, 2013; Tordecilla, 
1997). Their similarities also extend to other apparently trivial matters. When they 
became mayors, the heads of state in their respective countries, Fidel Ramos and Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), were former military officers who had been given ministerial 
posts on security matters by female heads of state of the previous government. Upon 
taking over the presidency, Ramos and SBY embarked with a reformist image. BF and 
Jokowi’s similarities parted in the choice of their patron at the national state level. BF was 
a Ramos ally, while Jokowi preferred to be affiliated with PDI-P, the political party of SBY’s 
nemesis, Megawati, who was already out of power when Jokowi took office. Jokowi 
remained with the PDI-P even if it meant being with the opposition, which lessened 
chances of gaining access to patronage (Dewi and Aritonang, 2014; The Jakarta Post, 
2013). In contrast, BF supported whoever was in the presidency. This choice affected 
their bid to reach higher political office. The two also differed in the tactics used in the 
execution of urban revitalization projects. BF pushed through his projects with force that 
bordered on ruthlessness, from his critics’ perspective, though he was open to dialogue. 
On the other hand, Jokowi was more patient as he engaged in a series of negotiations 
to convince those who were about to be affected by his projects. Nevertheless, both BF 
and Jokowi were known for their “hands-on” style in project management. 
If Jokowi is known as an admirer of heavy metal music, BF is deeply immersed in 
real metals, as the company that he established, BF Metals, has been engaged in steel 
fabrication for industrial and commercial purposes since 1968 (Beech, 2014; Construction 
Management Magazine, 1995; BF Metals website). BF’s entry into the steel fabrication 
business was facilitated by the vocational and professional training he received at the 
Marikina School of Arts and Trades and in Philippines’ premier engineering and technical 
school, Mapua Institute of Technology (MIT) (Bayani Fernando, Subok Na, n.d.).  After he 
became a mechanical engineer in MIT, he worked in a company that produced agricultural 
machinery. Afterwards, he obtained a loan worth 6,000 pesos to start his own business. 
Within a few decades, he expanded his company’s clientele not only in the Philippines 
but in foreign companies from several countries which needed its expertise in the 
construction of industrial plants, power plant structures, transmission towers, bridges, 
skyscrapers, etc. (Construction Management Magazine, 1995; BF Metals website). But 
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BF’s entrepreneurial success did not simply arise from self-initiative. He learnt the art 
and technique of management in 1971 by attending the Manager’s Course for Small 
Scale Industries offered by the University of the Philippines, the country’s premier state 
university (Myrnaco, 2012). 
Jokowi’s initiation into private entrepreneurial practice was, as with BF, not entirely 
self-made. He started his career as an employee of his uncle’s furniture workshop. In 
1989, he obtained a loan of 15 million rupiah to start a business but failed in the early 90s 
(Mas’udi, 2014). To start again, he obtained a loan of 500 million rupiah from the State 
Gas Enterprise, a state-owned enterprise that assisted small and medium businesses. 
He then became successful, especially during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis when the 
rupiah’s devaluation against the US dollar produced huge profits to his furniture-exporting 
business. By 2002, he was successful enough to become director of the Surakarta 
chapter of ASMINDO, an organization of furniture producers. His entrepreneurial success 
was also noticed by a retired general, who later obtained a 49 per cent share in Jokowi’s 
company (ibid.). He was backed by ASMINDO when he decided to contest the mayoral 
seat, where his opponents were also businessmen. 
BF and Jokowi’s Visions
BF’s electoral victory in 1992 was his second attempt to enter local politics after he lost 
a mayoralty bid in 1988 (Tordecilla, 1997: 16). His defeat suggested that the electorates’ 
memory of his father’s mayoralty was not sufficient in securing Marikina’s top local 
government post. In his election campaign, he disseminated his vision for Marikina in 
his Program of Government pamphlet. Those interventions had to be done to realize the 
vision for Marikina to be an “industry-friendly, happy, working-class community” (Program 
of Government, n.d.). This vision was created with the goal of industrialization in mind. 
BF asserted that a place could only be described as developed if “the dejected places 
are sorted out and the citizens have established jobs due to opportunities given by the 
industries impressed by the environs’ order and beauty and the citizens’ way of 
thinking” (researcher’s emphasis) (p. 3). Industrialization could be exerted by means 
of “PHYSICAL RECONSTRUCTION and SOCIAL REORIENTATION (capitalized in the 
original) with this program of government as a guide and the force of a disciplined 
bureaucracy and citizenry as implementor” (researcher’s emphasis) (p. 6). Clearly, BF 
thought of creating a strong state that had a developmental goal bolstered by a corporatist 
structure of interest representation. Contrary to the dominant discourse disseminated 
by “good governance”, advocating that the lack of “transparency” and “accountability” 
were some of the root causes of the Philippines’ ills, BF believed that “productivity” was 
the thing that ought to be solved. Poverty, for him, was caused by the inability to build a 
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productive capacity generated by a combination of skill and ingenuity (Fabros,2008:22; 
Bayani Fernando Subok Na, n.d.). Partly, the implication of such a belief was the creation 
of an argument about the necessity to elect an engineer with extensive managerial skills, 
since the main concern was to get the task done. BF’s can-do spirit, derived from pride 
in his professional experience as an engineer, is a factor that may explain his preference 
to work almost exclusively with bureaucrats who had technical expertise when it came 
to crafting the city’s developmental plans. He insisted that his projects were for the good 
of all, therefore all must obey the regulations. Deviance was to be frowned upon because 
“individualism has no place in a progressive community” (Disiplina sa Bangketa, n.d., 
Fabros, 2008: 25). 
Jokowi shared BF’s desire for order, as illustrated by the priority given to the removal 
of street vendors from footpaths and major thoroughfares. He did not derive his 
popularity from making memorable speeches. Rather, it came from his ability to enact 
administrative reforms as efficiently as possible in an environment where dysfunctional 
bureaucracy appeared to be the norm. It appeared that what he looked for was an 
ideal middle class community, where material success came from the presence of 
fairness and order (Henley, 2014). This, together with his insistence on transparency in 
the release of Surakarta’s finances, could be interpreted as adherence to the neoliberal 
project of good governance. Such cannot be the case as, like BF, he wanted the state to 
take a more prominent role in industrialization. For instance, he sought the revival of the 
indigenous motor vehicle industry by sponsoring the Esemka national car project built by 
Surakarta’s students (The Jakarta Post, 2013). Moreover, the local government procured 
the locally produced ‘Railbus’ as a commuter train for the city (Ayuningtyas, 2014). The 
construction of ‘traditional’ markets was an attempt to promote locally made goods. 
BF and Jokowi’s visions were lofty enough. But as Padilla (2008:464) notes, “Social 
order is not a given. It is a goal to be achieved.” The way these visions were carried out 
produced unintended outcomes as revealed in the following sections.  
Marikina 
There were a number of organizations that attended to civic concerns and promoted 
sectoral interests long before BF’s election in 1992, ranging from peasant associations, 
trade unions and civic groups, to business associations (Isidro, 1991). The proliferation 
and resilience of social movements during the 20th century had made it difficult for BF and 
the city government to ignore their demands. Upon BF’s occupation of the mayoral office, 
he had to work or contend with persons who had an experience of participation in social 
movements. His strongest critic, Congressman Romeo Candazo, was an anti-Marcos 
and labour rights activist (Salaverria, 2013). Nevertheless, BF overcame Candazo’s 
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opposition by collaborating with others. In executing housing and resettlement projects, 
for instance, BF appointed Harry Singh as MSO head because, as BF reminded him, 
“Squatting, demolitions and resettlement, and the attendant negotiations are all explosive 
issues…Your experience when you were active in the protest movement could be put 
to good use as you understand the critical issues in the program” (Mariano, 1999:9). It 
appears that the historical ties of social movements with the municipality/city’s influential 
families, as well as their roots in local industrialization, had given them the leeway to 
engage in the city government’s projects, unlike in other localities where peasants and 
labour unions were brutally crushed (Sidel, 1997). They were strong enough to be heard 
but not enough to be at the core of the decision making process, as their participation 
in the city’s projects was confined to implementation. Industrial manufacturers were the 
only ‘NGO’ involved in creating the city’s development plan (Salvador, 1997: 31). Even 
so, their participation too was minimal. This does not mean the absence of linkages 
of the local state with social forces. BF’s Program of Government envisaged people’s 
involvement in civic affairs but they could only do so by joining associations assisted, 
recognized and strengthened by the government (Program of Government, n.d.:24). 
In the housing and resettlement project, the Community Relations Office and the MSO 
organized community associations for the urban poor. Their efforts paid off as 158 
community associations were created by 1999 and it jumped to 251 before 2005 (City 
of Marikina, 1999:21,23; Mariano, 1999:16; Marikina City 2005 Annual Report:5). 
The drastic decline of Marikina’s manufacturing sector, however, was not arrested. 
Unemployment in 2005 reached 17 per cent (Lorenzo, 2007). This could be attributed 
to trade liberalization’s impact on the shoe industry. The value of Philippines’ footwear 
exports declined from US$ 120,993,000 in 1992 to US$ 36,233,000 in 2003 (Scott, 
2005: 83). The difficulties of the shoe industry were aggravated by rampant smuggling 
tolerated by the national government’s Bureau of Customs, even while the local 
government lobbied for the industry’s protection. A “watchdog” (note the terminology!) 
was hired by the local government to deter smuggling but failed to do so (ibid.; Lorenzo, 
2007). Despite the drastic decline of the manufacturing sector, the city’s population grew 
from 211,613 in 1980 to 357,231 in the mid-90s (Tordecilla, 1997:14). Such problems, 
together with Marikina’s reputation as crime-infested place, generated survival pressures 
on all. In response to and in line with BF’s Program of Government, a memorandum of 
agreement (MOA) was signed between the Alliance of Trade Unions of Marikina, the 
local government and industry in September 1995, to promote industrial and social 
growth, maintain industrial peace and increase government income (International Labour 
Organisation, 2010). The Workers Affairs Office, staffed with labour organizers, evaluated 
and monitored the implementation of the MOA. To enhance the working skills of residents, 
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the local government, in partnership with the private sector and national government, 
provided free skills training for 16 courses through its Center for Excellence (CENTEX) 
office. The skills training scheme reduced labour recruitment costs for firms. Available job 
vacancies shifted from manufacturing to service-oriented business process outsourcing 
and animation, a trend that compelled the local government to expand its list of courses 
(ibid.:75-78). The trend, together with the precarious employment conditions of some 
graduates and the growing population, probably prompted the local government to 
increase investment in formal education. As the new generation of workers who entered 
a more service-oriented labour market are averse to joining trade unions, the tripartite 
coalition that BF had built is in danger of decline. This and the fact that some projects 
of the local government require assistance from the national government, explain why 
BF and his wife as successor had to depend on allegiance to the president whoever he 
or she was, a move that will be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. BF and the 
local government also had to take on the consequences of a decentralized metropolitan 
governance structure and his alliance with other state elite in a patronage-driven regime. 
BF’s 1992 electoral victory was due to President Fidel Ramos’s backing through his 
affiliation with Ramos’s Lakas-NUCD Party and his choice of Del de Guzman as his vice 
mayoral candidate. Del was from a family that defeated BF’s father in the 1960 mayoral 
elections (Paz, n.d.). Despite intense opposition from Congressman Candazo, BF’s 
hold on power as mayor was sustained for a full three terms, for nine years from 1992 
up to 2001. He then positioned his wife, Marides Fernando, as the mayoral candidate 
for the 2001 electoral contest against Candazo (Alquitran, 2001).The problem was the 
Fernandos’ non-affiliation with the new government of President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo, who came to power in January 2001, after a street protest against and withdrawal 
of military support to President Joseph Estrada because of allegations of corruption and 
supposed involvement in illegal gambling. The poor who formed Estrada’s support base, 
made a failed counter protest in favour of Estrada’s return to the presidency, a move in 
time for the senatorial and local government elections. Candazo was with Arroyo’s Lakas 
NUCD Party-People Power Coalition while Marides won under the banner of her local 
political party, Kabayani (Alquitran, 2001). In the following year, the Fernandos switched 
their allegiance to President Arroyo. The latter, ostensibly with a wish to extend Marikina’s 
accomplishments to all of Metro Manila, invited BF to be Chairman of the Metro Manila 
Development Authority (MMDA), to which he was appointed in 2002 (Fabros, 2008: 26). 
Upon BF’s appointment to this post by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, he cleared 
the metropolis of street vendors, implemented schemes to reduce traffic congestion, flood, 
and garbage, and built medium-rise dwellings for transient workers (van den Muijzenberg 
and van Naerssen, 2005; Fernando, 2007:10-19). His chairmanship indicated MMDA’s 
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growing role in governing the metropolis, a circumstance overwhelmingly disliked by 
some Metro Manila mayors. He found himself confronted by intense opposition from 
some Metro Manila politicians and resistance from the informal sector (Fabros, 2008). In 
the showdown for control of the metropolis, he could only rely on his loyalty to Arroyo, 
as some mayors allied with the president were also against him. Allegations of Arroyo’s 
corrupt practices and electoral fraud were met with growing outrage. Despite calls for 
her ouster, BF remained with the president until a few months before the end of her term 
in 2010, when other politicians had already abandoned her. He hoped that his loyalty 
would bring his nomination as her presidential candidate (Fabros, 2008). BF only broke 
away from Arroyo’s party after it chose another politician as its presidential nominee. By 
that time, some of his former allies had already joined the presidential campaign of an 
anti-Arroyo senator. BF’s presidential ambition was relegated to a vice presidential bid 
after he teamed up with another senator who also wanted to become president. This 
situation was exploited by other Marikina politicians who distanced themselves from 
Arroyo and gained leverage at BF’s expense (Llanto, 2010). BF’s chief contender was an 
anti-Arroyo Makati City mayor who fiercely opposed his projects. In his last electoral bid, 
he met destructive defeat. 
Surakarta 
When Suryanto challenged Jokowi in an electoral contest, a law had already been 
passed which mandated the direct election of the local government head. Suryanto lost 
due to the city’s deteriorating economic situation as well as allegations of corruption. 
PDI-P politicians had already deserted him, as they accepted Jokowi’s decision to be 
affiliated with their political party. His decision was critical, for the headman of the political 
party, FX Hadi Rudyatmo (Rudy), had extensive ties with grassroots organizations 
(Majeed, 2012; Pratikno and Lay, 2011). Rudy assisted Jokowi in engaging with media 
and organizational management. Rudy quit his mayoral candidacy due to the potential 
liability of being a Catholic in a Muslim-majority constituency. He preferred to become 
Jokowi’s deputy mayor instead (The Jakarta Post, 2013). Under Jokowi, CSOs took part 
in a dialogue between the local government and affected groups regarding the former’s 
revitalization projects. Jokowi had proved that symbiotic ties between the local state and 
social groups were possible. But, like in Marikina, the involvement of social groups is set 
within the institutional parameters created by the local state. A good example would be 
the housing renovation in so-called slum neighbourhoods, where a working group of 
seven or eight persons enlisted by residents to the Department of Community, Women 
and Children Empowerment and Family Planning, assessed the settlements that have 
to be reconstructed or renovated. The group then submitted recommendations to the 
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district and city committees – composed of NGOs and local government officials – for 
verification before sending it to the department for approval. Houses were renovated by 
the people themselves under the group’s guidance (Majeed, 2012; Obermayr, 2012). 
Jokowi often conducts unannounced visits or blusukan to inspect not only the progress 
of the local government’s projects but also to hear the remarks of Surakarta residents. 
This action indicates that the probability of implementing the local government’s projects 
depends significantly on personal encounters. The same was true when Jokowi 
conducted negotiations with street vendors and slum dwellers about their relocation. 
Despite the initiatives taken by Jokowi and the city administration to revitalize Surakarta, 
the Jakarta Post newspaper notes that 13.3 per cent of the city’s 400,000 residents are 
still poor – a figure higher than the national average poverty rate of 11 per cent. Open 
unemployment is at 9 per cent, and slums still exist (The Jakarta Post, 2014). Despite the 
proliferation of CSOs or NGOs, there were no strong labour-oriented political parties. As 
mentioned earlier, since Indonesian political parties became an alliance of power holders 
with predatory interest, it is not surprising that even Joko Widodo himself, especially as 
he occupied a higher office, was forced to coalesce with other power holders with links 
to the New Order or questionable human rights record, despite winning over those from 
the grassroots (The Jakarta Post, 2013). 
Conclusion
Marikina and Surakarta’s experience in implementing urban revitalization projects 
demonstrated the local state’s capability of asserting itself under BF and Jokowi’s 
leadership, even in the neoliberal era. Their upbringing, including their professional and 
political experience, inclined them to endorse projects that had developmental goals, 
reminiscent to some extent of East Asian countries’ experience of state-mediated 
capitalism. The difference between the two cities and the classic case of East Asian 
DS is the emphasis of the former on “quality of life” issues, compared to the obsession 
with industrial production by the latter. Overall, however, urban revitalization projects 
did not necessarily bring a decisively transformative result in the two cities. Though 
the local states are capable of providing basic urban infrastructure and amenities, the 
citizens of both cities still have to grapple with high unemployment and poverty. BF 
and Jokowi had a vision of balancing the interest between capital and the subordinate 
classes. However, a tripartite coalition inspired by state-mediated capitalism of the mid 
20th century is difficult to create or sustain in the face of manufacturing sector decline and 
persistence of patronage-based politics. This situation demonstrates the shortcomings 
of a vision that is not sensitive to historical particularities. Inability to address poverty 
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and unemployment concerns does not automatically imply the exhaustion of the state’s 
capacity to intervene. Rather, it is a matter of forming an institutional configuration that 
will forge new sets of shared goals. 
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Vulnerability and Social Sense Production: 
An analysis of the social representations 
of gender in the Ecuadorian press over the 
last ten years, within the context of sumak 
kawsay (good living) defence
Meysis Carmenati1
Abstract
This paper can be described as a preliminary work leading to a larger research, 
which analyses the social production and reproduction of sense regarding historically 
excluded groups, specifically women, and gender violence conditions within the 
context of Ecuador in the last years. Despite new legislations, the principles of 
sumak kawsay and the National Plan of Good Living (2013) adopted in the South 
American country still reproduce discriminatory representations, that belong to an 
exclusive and traditionalist discourse hegemony; it naturalizes discrimination and 
violence, while simplifying the dimensions of the problem. This shows the need of 
a diagnosis of the use, by the press, of standardized arguments that reproduce the 
exclusion.
Keywords: gender, violence, sumak kawsay, press, violation of rights.
Introduction
On 25 May 2014, the digital version of  El Universo, one of the most important 
newspapers in Ecuador, carried the following headline: ‘Women’s aggressors are normal 
and conscious people’ (El Universo, 2014). This press release referred to an interview on 
feminicide with Amanda Fiallos Escalada, psychiatrist at the Abel Gilbert Pontón Hospital.
However, starting from the headline, the wording causedan effect contrary to the one 
intended. The first paragraph – that has the greatest communication power, known as 
‘lead’by journalists – literally said: “Men who commit feminicide are completely normal 
people, conscious of their actions; however, they are unable to control their impulses.” 
Further on, according to the press release, the psychologist advised women “not no 
argue with their partners when they have fits of anger”.
1  Dr. Meysis Carmenati, research professor, Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (National Higher Studies Institute), and Universidad Andina 
Simón Bolívar (Simón Bolívar Andean University), Quito, Ecuador. meysisc@gmail.com
Vulnerability and Social Sense Production
Inequality, Democracy and Development under Neoliberalism and Beyond 260
Its purpose was to assert the need to pass judgement on guilty people, not attenuate 
them by stating that they were mentally ill. Instead, due to ideological reasons or the 
journalist’s incompetence, it naturalized gender violence by suggesting that it was a 
normal action and that women are, in part, guilty since they should avoid angering men. 
It is not even remotely an unusual case. In a research on information about gender 
and violence in two Ecuadorian newspapers with the largest circulation (El Universo and 
El Comercio), carried out between 2008 and 2010, it was concluded that all of the 171 
cases identified in 150 news items appeared in yellow journalism articles, and none on 
the front page. The author stated that the issue was addressed as a domestic matter 
that lacked public and political relevance. The news focused on sexist and stereotyped 
content, and only 0.6 per cent of them included statistical data while the rest privileged 
information “without a greater context and analysis”(Pontón, 2010).
The conclusions refer to a context in which unequal gender relations are reproduced, 
and the press is only one way through which these are expressed. Between November 
and December 2011, three institutions – the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Commission 
for the Transition towards the Women’s and Gender Equality Council, and the National 
Institute of Statistics and Census – carried out the National Survey of Family Relationships 
and Gender Violence. Data showed that six out of ten Ecuadorian women have suffered 
some kind of violence at some point in their lives (Palacios, 2014). Encouraged by 
their wish to unravel the role of the mass media in this issue, in 2013 a team from the 
Media Observatory on the Lookout for Women’s Rights, analysed how ten Ecuadorian 
newspapers treated gender. Their results confirmed that they continue to report death and 
other extreme situations without providing an analysis of the context for the systematic 
violence in the region (Diego & Diego, 2014). This pattern had already been identified by 
the observatory in their earliest researches (Diego, 2011). 
These are only a few examples. After tracking the available information, it can be 
argued that, with some exceptions, the news coverage of gender violence has not 
presented substantial changes. It continues to be dominated by a reductionist and 
stereotypical style that is loaded with prejudices. 
In the press, social representations of violence against women portray a naturalized 
and simplified picture of the problem. There are no elements that contribute to a reflection 
on the historical and social conditions of these facts, which appear to be isolated and 
domestic in essence. The individualization of cases prevents us from conceiving this kind 
of violence as a structural problem that responds to a system of exclusion and historical 
declassment. In such a system, the relations of the hierarchy and power of men versus 
women are reproduced within the collective imagination, and have legitimized a system 
of inequality that is essentially illegitimate.
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Regulations and their application in Ecuador
Of course, identifying the violation of women’s rights in the press is not even remotely 
limited to Ecuador. I could mention a similar research, conducted between 1999 and 
2001 by the Department of Journalism and Audiovisual Communication at the University 
Pompeu Fabra in Spain, on the representation of violence against women in the 
Spanish press (El Pais and El Mundo),among the countless examples, by Claudia Vallejo 
Rubinstein. 
In line with previous studies, the author concludes that:
“The role of the media regarding the social representations of gender 
violence goes beyond the fact of reporting what happens; it is jointly 
responsible for and co-constructor – along with other structures of 
socialization, such as family or school – of socially prevailing views on 
the problem...” (Vallejo, 2005).
However, Ecuador has become the spotlight in recent years, thanks to the adoption 
of a set of laws with direct impact on the development of action programmes and public 
policy. After decades of invisibility and confrontation, gender equality became the arena 
of legislative changes.
According to a summary by Paulina Palacios, lawyer for the Sub-Directorate of 
Gender of the Judiciary Council, in addition to the defence explicit in the Constitution 
of the Republic of 2008 (Arts.11;702), the secondary legislation of the Ecuadorian State 
has a Law Against Violence to Women and the Family (1995), the National Plan for 
the Eradication of Gender Violence Against Women, Children and Adolescents (2007), 
the Organic Code of Health (2007) the National Plan to Fight Trafficking (2004), among 
others. 
For Palacios, the restructuring of the judicial function determines the creation of 
specialized justice spaces, along with regulations of the autonomous governments, 
which regulate mechanisms guaranteeing rights, such as equality ordinances for people 
of different sexes, generic in three of the most important regions (Cuenca, Quito and the 
province of Guayas). Likewise, the lawyer emphasizes the creation, on 15 July 2013, 
during the Plenary Meeting of the Judiciary Council, of judicial units for violence against 
women and the family. By September that year, 28 of those units started to operate in 
2 “Nobody can be discriminated neither by ethnic reasons, birthplace, age, sex, gender identity, cultural identity, marital status, language, 
religion, ideology, political affiliation, background criminal record, socio-economic status, migration status, sexual orientation, health condition, HIV 
carrier status, physical difference, nor for any individual or social difference, permanent or temporal, that try to diminish the acknowledgment or 
use of individual rights” (Art. 11, num. 2). “The State will design and apply rules to reach equality between women and men; this through special-
ized mechanisms according to the law, it will incorporate gender focus in different plan and programmes; it will also give specialized support for 
its obligatory application in the public service” (Art.70).
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18 provinces. During the first semester itself, an index of over 33 percent was recorded 
in the resolution of cases, compared to the average of 13 in the corresponding period in 
previous years (Palacios, 2014).
In the last decade, Ecuador also included the protagonist of the academic-institutional 
debate, the concept of sumak kawsay, or ‘good living’, whose proposals acquired official 
recognition through the National Plan for Good Living (PNBV), adopted on 24 June 2013. 
The latter can be defined as a programme to radicalize democracy. And the truth is that, 
at least in principle, the so-called Socialism of Good Living dramatically compromises 
the traditional liberal structure and political core of Modernity. So it seems important 
to analyse the relationship between the new postulates of sumak kawsay and those 
shared social representations that violate women’s rights and those of other historically 
excluded groups. Faced with these new procedural principles set out in PNBV, and as a 
constant violation of their approaches, such discriminatory representations circulate and 
become legitimate on a daily basis, through the press.
The concept of sumak kawsay
Since its appearance, sumak kawsay became the breeding ground for a group of 
unpublished conceptualizations about the role of the subjects, the relationship with 
nature and the diversity. This made it possible to rescue the debate on otherness, from a 
unique perspective so far. Just the idea of  recognition of harmonious relations between 
humans and nature involves a re-conceptualization of neoliberal economic forms against 
the imminent sustainability of life (Ramírez, 2012).
According to de Sousa, this concept includes aspects, such as indigenous justice, 
that go beyond the scope of culture and mainly become “a matter of political economy”. 
This author states that: “The future of indigenous justice depends on whether the rudder 
moves in the direction of dependent capitalism (neoextractivista) or in the direction of 
sumak kawsay...” (Sousa Santos, 2012: 50).
Although its appearance responds to social and historical circumstances that have, 
too quickly, turned the concept in a kind of saving ark against the deluge, it is also true 
that it opened a dispute about the redefinition of identities within the public space. The 
new and resulting points of view can have an influence on the meeting of demands in the 
areas of law and justice, social equality in opportunities and access, differential treatment 
of what is national and plurinational, andon other forms of relationships and political 
communication.
You must understand that sumak kawsay postulates, “in theory”, the interaction of 
identities towards the quality of a decent life, the cultural production of an emancipated 
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social sense, the recognition of freedom starting with the criticism of its formal character, 
and the rupture with the forms of existence of unequal and exclusive relationships. It is 
no coincidence that it quickly positioned itself at the forefront of the recognition of the 
diversity and sovereignty of indigenous peoples, and of the empowerment movement 
against gender discrimination. 
In Ecuador, these symbolic references are nucleated around the reform of the State, 
and founded the universe of proposals, sometimes coherent and at other times openly 
contradictory; a civilizational alternative that still faces the challenge of its making. 
However, the demand for political participation, the proposed change of the productive 
matrix to the expanded reproduction of life and not merely the capital, the relationship 
between social diversity and economic diversity, the latter linked to the recognition and 
the emergence of new plural subjects, aim towards a radical decolonization that opens 
the debate on sovereignty and self-determination of marginalized social groups. Broadly 
speaking, these are the tenets of the National Plan of Good Living, as they have been set 
forth. But the reality surpasses the text in complexity and contradiction.
Some of the questions that the process of transformation of this South American 
country has formulated are: What might be the impact of a political-legislative programme 
when compelled to transcend the regulatory framework and express itself through the 
change of common sense, towards a good sense placed in the redefinition and revaluation 
of identities? To what extent can these processes be considered a political project, that 
is, an organized strategy product, of a common will? Does the existence of a position 
of confrontation against the hegemonic sense, delimiting access to opportunities within 
a social value system, ensure empowerment from a new sense? Does the fact that 
collective subjectivities obtain empowerment processes, perhaps, found an awareness 
of emancipation? 
Despite these efforts – the implementation of public policies and the strengthening 
of the legislative framework – gender violence continues to produce a large number of 
victims every year. Specifically, its manifestation through the reproduction of discriminatory 
stereotypes in the media has shown no relevant changes. Concepts like sumak kawsay 
can do even less if we consider that its substantive existence implies the practical-critical 
transformation of how humans relate to each other and with nature.
Also, in the press of a country that has raised the diversity and plurinationality flag, it is 
quite unusual to find references in the media about the relationship between the violation 
of the rights of women and their belonging to a specific class, race or nationality, their 
age or disabilities, their status or not as migrants, and their educational level, occupation 
or profession. These circumstances disappear before the weight of hegemonic social 
representations, and prevent the analysis of structural violence from exceeding the 
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common use of standardized arguments and violent stereotypes – or from turning to 
the invisibility of the disaggregated approach, perhaps the most common resource of 
mediatic discourse.
In contrast, in the research on the movements for the rights of women and gender 
there is an increasing interest in addressing this problem from an intersectional 
perspective. As Marta Cabezas explains, this “has allowed a more complex theorization 
of the relationships between women with different positions in the class and ethno-racial 
hierarchies, as well as those of feminism with subordinate women” (Cabezas, 2012).
Despite these efforts, mass media appears to remain in the prehistory of any critical 
approach to social research; with valuable exceptions, mostly located within alternative 
publications. 
It is concluded that the violation of the rights of women and other historically 
excluded groups in the press is not simply a matter of professional or media ethics. 
The observatories, as required pressure authorities, are spaces for reporting incurred 
violations, once these have arisen. Therefore, it is urgent to move from the protest to 
the analysis of the conditions of possibility and the existence of mass media industries 
that, worldwide, constantly commit acts of discrimination. The question does address 
the abuse of power, but the reproduction of discriminatory representations that exist 
beyond the means of and naturalize within social relationships, in an exclusive system 
that legitimizes the historical inequality.
Critical analysis of press discourse
One of the disciplines that has more consistently denounced the abuse of power has 
been the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Its purpose is not reduced to the study of 
discursive practices of manipulation. Unlike ordinary “scientistic objectivism” the CDA 
expects to contribute in an effective manner to the resistance against inequality and 
discrimination (van Dijk, 2003; Fairclough, 2008).
Included in his fundamental thesis is the definition of discourse as social practice, as 
well as the understanding of media violence from the analysis of the context of news 
– the relationship between reporters and editorial policy, between the latter and the 
interests of the media, the tensions of the interaction between media and the public, 
and the complex exchange of language and communication from political, cultural and 
historical dimensions (van Dijk, 1999).
The most interesting concept for us about this perspective are the social 
representations. Even though the CDA identifies a vast number of structures that allow 
that allow the control of public discourse, this is only possible because of the relation 
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between the subjective individual representations and the shared social representations. 
The latter are considered, most of the time, either presuppositions or beliefs regarded as 
“genuine” (Baker & Wodak, 2011; van Dijk, 2005).
Among these, we find stereotypes and common social prejudices like xenophobia, 
racism, chauvinism or other types of discrimination. For Wodak, these are identified 
with the topoi, that is, “a number of standardized arguments used to legitimize the 
allegations” (Colorado, 2010). Van Dijk prefers to link them with the properties of mental 
models which control the production and reception of discourse that keeps an organic 
relationship with the social structure (van Dijk, 2003).
It is a complex relationship between discourse and representation, or between 
representation and reality, which is the same thing. This view contradicts the idea of a 
“given” reality and proposes a reflection on how different representations exhibit them 
as natural instead of showing what they really are, that is, a social product of the current 
historical and social context. Such representations make legitimate, ideas such as “what 
a woman is and must be”, “her role in society”, and the so-called “proper” behaviour 
within society. Behind women stereotypes lies the legitimization of unequal roles and 
unequal opportunities given to them in societies.
Only the naturalization of violence allows discriminatory discourse to reoccur in mass 
media, without any significant reaction. This strengthens the idea already suggested, 
that there is a clear connection between cultural factors and domination structures. 
The studies to determine how structural violence is legitimized and reproduced through 
shared social representation was the focus of the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, 
who defined it as the common sense concept.
In the Prison Notebooks he describes the phenomenon of power from the initial idea 
of hegemony, which sees the social environment as a field being affected by tense and 
lax relationships in which a system of rules and values is produced; here, a manifestation 
of power is also produced (Carmenati, 2013). In that sense, the Notebooks addresses 
implicit cultural aspects of domination that flow with the communication channels, and 
which underlie different lifestyles and people relationships. 
“School as a positive educational function and courts as an educational 
way of negative repression are the most important state activities in 
this sense. Indeed, many other initiatives and activities that pretend to 
be private tend to pursue the same goal; they belong to the hegemonic 
political and cultural system…”(Gramsci, 1993: p.174).
The Gramscianism concept of hegemony deals with a kind of structural domination 
that lies on a daily basis. Even if we are not to blame, we are responsible for this. The 
schools teachers, marketing designers and even mothers play a very important role 
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when reproducing these hegemonic and discriminative representations about gender. 
Of course, mass media has no less a responsibility in this. This leads us to question 
gender violence as an issue, about how social “sense” is created and produced. For 
that reason, to the Italian communist, to deconstruct the present ideas implies a deep 
transformation that goes beyond so-called common sense. This idea gives an important 
role to the analysis of the usual glossary commonly used in discriminatory discourse.  
Conclusion
This brief article possesses a central premise: the multilateral transformation process 
–by which a traditional and derogatory view is fractured, and a “citizen’s self-esteem” is 
shaped – has to be closely linked to collective action and to the organization schemes 
of a resistance that favours access to equality and is against discrimination based on 
class, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and race, among others.  It is true that, in 
recent years, the world has paid special attention to the changes that have taken place 
in certain countries in South America. Besides, the development of the Socialism of 
the XXI Century in Venezuela (1999), the communitarian socialism and the policies of 
Suma Qamana in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (2005), and the policies of Sumak 
Kawsay or Good Living of the Citizen’s Revolution in Ecuador (2007) have gained 
attention. At the dawn of this new century, these processes burst into the scene as 
a way to elaborate transformation principles and decolonize societies from different 
postures and perspectives.  Articulation spaces were created; institutional platforms that 
remained isolated or reproduced the disappearance of class distinctions and restricted 
access practices have been reactivated. Basically, policies were developed from the 
estrangement and rejection to move towards neoliberalism, while civilization change had 
to respond to a history marked by dependency.
It is essential to point out that, at a certain time, such processes began to be lead 
by left or progressive governments, which, at least at the beginning, vouched for a 
more participatory system by making changes through public policies aimed at a more 
inclusive vision of society and democracy. While being aware of the problem posed by 
permanence–present in every transformation process – these governments opted for 
turning “new practices” into institutions when drafting new constitutions. In that way, 
the construction of plurinational states and societies in South America was marked 
by reforms in the judicial, labour and educational systems, in the creation of new 
impact laws and policies. This is what Boaventura de Sousa has called “transforming 
constitutionalism”(2012).
Likewise, it is worth mentioning that civilization change processes that have taken 
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place in Ecuador during the last decade are still being fought over. A lot of their results have 
not been collected yet, and others are being implemented or revised. The Ecuadorian 
case is hard, multiple, and has not revealed all its motivations yet. Still, its uniqueness 
has caused a recent interest in the forms of existence of its democratizing policies, 
especially those related to the conception of the Good Living. Indeed, Ecuador rewrote 
its constitution to legitimize the claim of legal relations to the shared management of 
social rights of all historically excluded groups.
However, although it is a fact that democratic policies in recent years in these 
countries have gained the support of a large part of the population, we cannot forget 
that for maintaining all transformation, an impact on social sense production is required 
in the production of subjectivities and of social representations in public spaces.
First of all, the need to agree with the coherence of transformation demands a 
critical look at its own condition, in such a way that the greatest challenge lies in the 
permanence of the implemented sociopolitical proposals. This is even more so if the 
dependence is on a programme identified by a movement or party of power, and not on 
a project of society, which is able to transcend formal policy structure and to re-launch 
itself from significant ideological keys that impact the public space in the production of 
inter-subjectivity. Such a question alludes to a major issue, directly related to the struggle 
of political hegemonies that sets the criteria of significance and value in the public arena.
Hence, a model of post-neoliberal society and radical democracy necessarily has to 
reflect on the conditions of the possibility of historically excluded groups, and on how to 
shape a society capable of overcoming the apparent nomination of the modern concept 
of equality.
Taking into account the above, one should conduct an analysis of the relations of 
production and reproduction of social consciousness on the historically excluded groups 
that, despite the new laws and paradigmatic principles of sumak kawsay and of the 
National Plan of Good Living, continue to reproduce discriminatory social representations 
of a discursive hegemony, whose existence implies the need for a deeper radicalization 
of the public policies implemented in South America. Such an analysis must be capable 
of converting these policies into an organic and political process of practical and critical 
transformation.
In the analysis of the relationship between the social production of meaning and 
reproduction of a historical system of the naturalization of violence, discrimination and 
social exclusion, a first step could be taken through the development of a vulnerability 
diagnosis of hegemonic social representations of women in the press, where the 
consolidation of stereotypes, superficiality, triviality and contextualization of gender 
violence predominate on a daily basis. This deforms and quietly undermines the 
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effectiveness of any proposal for radical democracy and equal rights and opportunities. 
From now on, every word matters. 
The deconstruction of domination begins with the acknowledgement of the hegemonic 
sense that naturalizes it.
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Neoliberal Extractive Resource 
Governance Frameworks and Interregional 
Economic Inequality in the Global South: 
Strengthening regional competitiveness 
through local content policies 
Chilenye Nwapi1
Abstract
This paper examines how, within a neoliberal extractive resource governance 
framework, countries in the global South can forge their own development 
path successfully. The paper proceeds from the standpoint that the meaning of 
neoliberalism is not cast in stone and that it is possible within a neoliberal framework 
for countries in the global South to formulate new policies that are capable of lifting 
them out of poverty and inequality. The paper focuses on how the global South 
may use the local content policy in extractive resource governance to strengthen 
regional competitiveness and address interregional inequalities. It argues that a 
local content policy designed to give deliberate consideration to the regions where 
the resource extraction takes place, accompanied by an income redistribution 
policy administered by the central government, has a great potential to engender 
regional competitiveness and consequently address interregional inequalities within 
countries in the global South.
Introduction
Discussions of neoliberalism are dominated by those at the extreme poles of the political 
and economic spectrum. One extreme – championed by the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions – sees neoliberalism as the silver bullet for eradicating 
poverty and inequality among and within nations. Occupants of this extreme prescribe 
reforms aimed at eliminating government intervention in economic activity and at 
liberalizing the global economy by providing legal and institutional frameworks that 
are investor-friendly (Saadatmand & Choquette, 2012). The other extreme – promoted 
vigorously by scholars in the global South – sees neoliberalism as the brain behind 
poverty in the global South and the widening inequality between the global South and 
the global North (Campbell, 2012; Szablowski, 2010). This extreme seeks the immediate 
1  The author is a Banting Post Doctoral Fellow at the Canadian Institute of Resources Law, University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada.  
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dethronement of neoliberal structures as the starting point of economic reforms that can 
boost the economic development of the global South. 
Experiences of the last decades have proved the first group to be wrong, as large 
sections of global populations, particularly within the global South, remain poor and 
marginalized while the gains of economic globalization are seized by a few (Hopkins, 
2009). This failure of neoliberal promises has strengthened the case for the dethronement 
of neoliberalism, resulting, however, in a rendition of neoliberalism as immutable. As 
Bristow (2010:142) has observed, “[t]here are good grounds for asserting that the 
apparent immutability of neoliberalism has been somewhat overstated.” To be clear, 
neoliberalism has established certain key assumptions about the global political 
economy – most fundamentally, about the role of the state in economic activity. But its 
meaning is not cast in stone. Like other ideological constructs, it is subject to continuous 
reconfiguration to accommodate new policies. Indeed, it has not been pursued uniformly 
across countries. As Birch and Mykhnenko (2009) have pointed out, traditional neoliberal 
policies such as privatization, deregulation and trade liberalization have been pursued in 
different ways, to varying degrees, and for different reasons across countries, particularly 
within Europe. I believe that within a neoliberal resource governance framework, there 
is significant space for countries in the global South to forge their own development 
path with assurance. As Bristow (2010:143) has argued, “[w]hilst the probability that 
neoliberalism itself will be toppled may … be unlikely, the scope for transformation and 
change should not be entirely ruled out.” 
This paper focuses on how the global South may use the local content policy in 
extractive resource governance to strengthen regional competitiveness and address 
interregional inequalities in the global South. It argues that a local content policy designed 
to give deliberate consideration to the regions where the resource extraction takes place, 
accompanied by an income redistribution policy administered by the central government, 
has a great potential to engender regional competitiveness and consequently address 
interregional inequalities within countries in the global South. 
Section 2 of this paper analyses the concept of neoliberal extractive resource 
governance. Section 3 is a brief review of the literature on the link between FDI and 
interregional economic inequality. Section 4 discusses the link between competitiveness 
and inequality, addressing the question, can competitiveness reduce interregional 
inequality? Section 5 discusses local content policies as a viable mechanism for the 
promotion of regional competitiveness, and consequently for the reduction in interregional 
inequality in the global South. Section 6 summarizes the conclusions of this paper.
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What is Neoliberal Extractive Resource Governance? 
Neoliberalism can be defined as “a distinctive political-economic philosophy that took 
meaningful shape for the first time during the 1970s, dedicated to the extension of the 
market (and market-like) forms of governance, rule and control across – tendentially, 
at least – all spheres of social life” (Peck &Tickell, 2007:28). It favours ideas such as 
privatization, deregulation, decentralization and competitiveness (Bistrow, 2010). It 
calls for legal and regulatory reforms to establish a favourable environment for foreign 
investments in the extractive sector, and calls for a reorganization of the internal working 
mechanisms of the State to promote market efficiency and the establishment of resource 
governance frameworks that promote easy flow of FDI (Shaikh, 2005). This is expected 
to have several positive effects, including increased productivity, technology transfers, 
the introduction of new processes and know-how in the domestic market (Alfaro et al., 
2004). 
In a 1992 technical report on African mining, the World Bank stated that “[t]he most 
important move” for African States was “to create a suitable environment for private 
investments” (World Bank, 1992:53). The Bank stated unequivocally that African 
governments had a choice either to “continue ‘business as usual’” and “stagnate” mineral 
production, or to “take the initiative to accelerate growth”. The latter required “[a] clearly 
articulated mining sector policy that emphasizes the role of the private sector as owner 
and operator and of government as regulator and promoter” (World Bank, 1992:53).It 
also required “[e]arly privatization of public mining assets” (World Bank, 1992:53). The 
Bank regarded this as “the most effective signal to international mining companies that 
governments intend to follow a private-sector strategy” (World Bank, 1992:53).
According to Szablowski (2010:34),
“the new agenda advocated comprehensive privatization of state 
companies, an end to restrictions on foreign ownership and the 
repatriation of profits, lowering rates of taxation and royalties, 
restructuring labour laws to permit greater flexibility, and the 
termination of performance requirements such as those mandating 
local sourcing or local hiring. In addition, mining legislation had to be 
rationalized, administrative processes simplified, technical services to 
the industry (such as modernization of the mining cadastre) improved 
and “subjective” elements of bureaucratic discretion removed from 
the permitting and approvals processes.”
These externally driven changes entail a redefinition of the role of the State in socio-
economic development and have resulted in a weakening of State sovereignty, State 
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autonomy and authority, and the capacity of States to take charge of and influence their own 
development (Campbell, 2012). In response, States have adopted strategies to reconcile 
the pressures under which these reforms have put them. At times, the strategies have 
involved “a formal award of rights to the investor accompanied by an informal delegation 
of local regulatory responsibilities”, resulting in transnational mining companies assuming 
“state-like responsibilities” (Szablowski 2010:27). This abdication of responsibility by 
States has blurred the line of responsibility of States and mining companies towards 
mining communities, with significant consequences for mining companies (Campbell, 
2012). Szablowski (2010:45) summarized the consequences as follows:
“[M]ining enterprises operating in the Global South are not able to 
respond to their critics, either locally or transnationally, with the simple 
assertion that their responsibilities begin and end with compliance 
with a host state’s legal requirements. It may be that in a globalizing 
era, for many audiences, states appear too weak or too complicit 
to offer a convincing check on the actions of corporate giants. Or 
perhaps, curiously, the retreat of the state from the mediation of socio-
economic relations has left private enterprise increasingly subject to 
social claims.”
These consequences have created a “legitimacy” problem for extractive companies 
and the imperative to obtain the “social licence to operate” (Campbell, 2012: 40, 41). 
Thus neoliberal extractive resource governance has become both a danger to economic 
growth in countries in the global South and a threat to the operations of transnational 
corporate actors.
FDI and Interregional Economic Inequality 
The history of economic development shows that mineral development has contributed 
significantly to the development of local communities and regions around the world 
(Eggert, 2001). The positive impact of FDI on economic growth is due to the capacity 
of FDI to create jobs for local populations with a consequent increase in per capita 
income through higher wages. Domestic firms also experience higher productivity as a 
result of technology transfer and knowledge spillover brought about by FDI (Teekasap, 
2013). But mineral development has also contributed to the under-development of many 
local communities and regions, particularly in the global South. Bond (2006) has argued 
that neoliberal-induced macroeconomic policies have aided the preservation of uneven 
development in Africa, where wealth accumulation and poverty live side by side. The 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria readily comes to mind, a region characterized by socio-
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economic and environmental degradation occasioned by oil and gas development, 
despite huge revenues the Nigerian government derives from the resources. There has 
been continuing conflict in Nigeria over the negative socio-environmental impacts of 
oil extraction and the distribution of the resource wealth between the resource bearing 
region and the federal government (Nwapi, 2010). Among the factors identified as 
responsible for this is “the historical failure of governance at all levels” (UNDP, 2006:17). 
Consequently, assessing a country’s economic development based solely on national 
economic statistics may be grossly misleading. According to economic development 
theory, intra-country disparities in political and economic institutions among the different 
parts of a country can be almost as wide-ranging as inter-country disparities (Libman, 
2011). The disparities are a result of a myriad of factors, including: the deposit of 
mineral resources in different parts of the country (Libman, 2011), the distribution of 
FDI to the different parts of the country (Lessmann, 2013), the interplay of subnational 
institutions and resources (Libman, 2011), and the subnational impact of national 
institutions (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014). Rodríguez-Pose (2012) identifies 
the accessibility of foreign markets by the different regions of a country as another factor 
influencing the impact of FDI on regional inequality. He posits that this factor is conditioned 
by “the degree of coincidence between the existing regional income distribution and 
the distribution of relative access to foreign market”, arguing that countries are more 
likely to experience a reduction in regional inequality where the increased foreign market 
accessibility is in poorer regions (Rodríguez-Pose, 2012:120). Lessmann (2013) finds 
that while FDI has had a positive impact on China’s growth performance, it has been 
a cause for regional inequality in China. This, according to Lessmann, is because FDI 
inflow in China is concentrated geographically in the eastern provinces. This geographical 
concentration is mainly because of preferential policies the Chinese government 
adopted in favour of the eastern provinces, which gradually opened the provinces to 
foreign investors (Lessmann, 2013). Thus, while FDI has the capacity to make positive 
contributions to a country’s economic development, its capacity to create within-country 
inequality is well acknowledged. The critical question is therefore how to maximize FDI 
while minimizing its impacts on regional inequality. It is argued below that one way of 
addressing this question is through policies that foster regional competitiveness.
Regional Competitiveness and Interregional Inequality
What is Regional/Subnational Competitiveness? 
Competitiveness is regarded as “the cornerstone of economic life” because of its potential 
to foster “efficiency” (Bartling, 2009:1). The idea itself originates from the comparative 
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advantage theory of British political economist David Ricardo. According to Ricardo, a 
country produces (or should focus on the production of) those goods and services in 
which it has a comparative advantage over other countries. Competitiveness is therefore 
defined as “the degree to which, under open market conditions, a country can produce 
goods and services that meet the test of foreign competition while simultaneously 
maintaining and expanding domestic real income” (OECD, 1992:237). In the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCI) 2014–2015, the World Economic Forum (WEF) (2014:4) 
sees competitiveness as “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the 
level of productivity of a country.” This view aligns with Krugman’s belief that what has 
been termed “competitiveness” is better regarded as “productivity”, for, unlike firms, 
countries are not in competition with one another (Krugman, 1994). Productivity itself 
sets the tone for economic prosperity and determines the rate of return on investments 
in an economy (WEF, 2014).
The definitions of competitiveness cited above are, however, relevant at the macro-
economic level, i.e., in terms of national competition. The concept of competitiveness 
has however been scaled down to the micro-economic, regional level. Regional 
competitiveness is defined as “the capability of a region to attract and keep firms with 
stable or increasing markets in an activity, while maintaining stable or increasing standards 
of living for those who participate in it” (Storper, 1997:264). Similarly, in a report to the 
European Commission Directorate-General Regional Policy, regional competitiveness is 
defined as “[a] regional economy’s ability to optimise its indigenous assets in order to 
compete and prosper in national and global markets and to adapt to change in these 
markets” (Martin, 2012:3). These definitions focus on firm productivity as well as regional 
economic development generally, “region” being understood as “a scale between the 
national state and the local” (Bristow, 2010:6). In this sense, regional could be regarded 
as synonymous with subnational.
Tan and Amri (2013) divide subnational competitiveness into four major bands: macro-
economic, micro-economic, institutional setting, and quality of life and infrastructure 
development. The macro-economic band encompasses the economic viability of the 
region, its openness to trade and services, and its attractiveness to foreign investors. 
The micro-economic band speaks to the performance of the firms and the challenges 
they face and encompasses the “Financial Deepening and Business Efficiency” of the 
environment, “Labour Market Flexibility” and “Productivity Performance” (Tan and Amri, 
2013:2). Institutional setting covers such issues as government policies and fiscal 
sustainability, governance, leadership, and rule of law. Quality of life and infrastructure 
development comprehends both physical and technological infrastructure and 
general “standard of living, education and social stability” (Tan and Amri, 2013:2).The 
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competitiveness of a region is thus to be looked for not only in the competitiveness of 
the firms operating within the region, but also in the broader assets and socio-economic 
and institutional features of the particular region. 
It must be pointed out, however, that regional competitiveness does not mean regions 
competing with one another as such. Rather, it is “the promotion of local economic 
development in competition with other territories” (Cheshire and Gordon, 1998:321). It is 
the actions that firms and other economic agents within a region undertake to boost the 
standard of living of their territory. It is thus the economic agents that actually carry out the 
competition (Poot, 2000). The regions as such are not in competition with one another, for 
the development of one region does not come at the expense of another’s development 
(Nazara, Sonis and Hewings, 2000). Thus, Krugman (1994), a staunch critic of the notion 
of national competitiveness, affirms that whereas a firm’s success is frequently at the 
expense of another firm when competing for market share, the success of one country 
or region fosters rather than extinguishes opportunities for other countries or regions to 
succeed. As Thissen et al. (2013:50) have stated, “[a] region is competitive when it has 
the conditions to enable it to raise the standard of living of its inhabitants.” The role of the 
national government in the competition is therefore to create a favourable condition for the 
economic agents within its regions to compete favourably with agents in other regions and 
countries (Nazara, Sonis and Hewings, 2000). By extension, this also imposes duties on 
regional governments to create favourable conditions for the economic agents within their 
territory to compete favourably with agents in other regions and countries. This requires 
“promoting the territory as a competitive place to do business and [this] may be more 
directed at improving the environment for existing local businesses and fostering new firm 
formation, than in trying to attract inward investment”(Cheshire and Gordon, 1998:322).
In GCI 2014–2015, the WEF identifies 12 pillars of competitiveness, among which 
are (1) institutions, (2) higher education and training, (3) technological readiness, and 
(4) technological innovation. By institutions are meant “the legal and administrative 
framework within which individuals, firms, and governments interact to generate wealth” 
(WEF, 2014:4). Higher education and training refers to the availability of a well-educated 
workforce with the capacity to perform complex tasks and adapt readily to the evolving 
needs of the environment and the production system (WEF, 2014). Technological 
readiness is “the agility with which an economy adopts existing technologies to enhance 
the productivity of its industries” (WEF, 2014:7–8). And technological innovation is 
concerned with a country’s ability to develop cutting-edge ideas, products and processes 
to avoid stagnation in their development. This requires, among other things, investments 
in research and development as well as the establishment of educational and research 
and training institutions (WEF, 2014). Although these pillars are analysed in the context 
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of competitiveness at the national level, they are also relevant to competitiveness at the 
regional/subnational level.
The importance of regional competitiveness has been recognized by the European 
Commission (2008:viii), which remarks that “strengthening regional competitiveness 
throughout the Union and helping people fulfil their capabilities will boost the growth 
potential of the EU economy as a whole to the common benefit of all”. But there is also 
significant critical literature highlighting the shortcomings of competitiveness. Krugman’s 
(1994) derision of competitiveness as a “dangerous obsession” is well known. Krugman 
(1997:237) believes that regions develop and prosper as a result of particular path-
dependent processes and cites California’s Silicon Valley as owing its existence to “small 
and historical accidents that, occurring at the right time, set in motion a cumulative 
process of self-reinforcing growth”. Unwin (2006) re-echoes Krugman’s sentiments when 
he asserts that the competitiveness obsession conceals larger factors impacting on the 
economic performance of regions. Kitson, Martin and Tyler (2004:997) call it “misleading” 
and “dangerous” to think that “regions and cities compete over market shares, as if 
they are in some sort of global race in which there are only ‘winners’ and ‘losers’”. 
These critical perspectives, however, do not dismiss the value of competitiveness. 
As Bristow (2010:122) has noted, there is need to broaden our perspectives beyond 
competitiveness to avoid “foreclosing wider analysis and understanding” about regional 
development, as this would hinder the emergence of more comprehensive regional 
development programmes and constrain policy interventions.
Can Regional Competitiveness Reduce Interregional Inequality?
A recent study by the Asia Competitiveness Institute on subnational competitiveness 
in Indonesia shows that subnational competitiveness has contributed favourably to 
Indonesia’s economic performance (Tan and Amri, 2013b). The study suggests that to 
boost the competitiveness of the less competitive Indonesian provinces, the Indonesian 
central government may assign Special Economic Zone or Investment Focused Area 
status to such provinces to help facilitate investments in such provinces to enhance their 
economic performance. Following Richardson’s (1973) competitive-generative theory 
of regional growth, Nazara, Sonis and Hewings (2000) view subnational growth as “a 
generative process” and national growth as “an aggregate” of subnational growth. Since 
regions are not competing with one another, they argue, and since the economic growth 
of one region contributes positively to national growth, national policies should focus on 
maximizing the growth in a particular region, as this will be tantamount to maximizing 
national growth. This relationship between regional growth and national growth is as a 
result of the sectoral relationships between and among regions, which produces regional 
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interdependence (Sonis and Hewings, 2000).
In a study of within-country economic inequality in eight developed countries and 
eight developing countries, Shankar (2003) finds that unitary States are more unequal 
than federal States and that this owes much to the decentralization of economic power 
in federal States, as it puts them in a better position to equalize economic differences 
among the federating regions. Shankar (2003) notes other factors that induce federal 
States to adopt equalization policies: (1) the fact that increasing regional inequality 
poses a greater political risk in federal States than in unitary States, and may lead to 
separatist calls by certain regions; (2) since national political parties have to contend for 
votes in the federating regions, they may be constrained to follow policies that ensure 
equal development of the regions; and (3) relatively autonomous regional governments 
accountable to the local electorate have greater incentives to adopt local development 
policies, compared to national governments that are more remote from the local people. 
He adds that “competition among regional governments may also lead to greater regional 
equality” (Shankar, 2003:1439).
Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2009) have studied the implications of recent trends 
towards transfer of authority to subnational governments on regional inequality in 26 
developed and less developed countries, and across countries with diverse histories. 
They find that decentralization tends to exacerbate regional inequality in less developed 
countries while it may have no impact or may even contribute towards reduction in 
regional inequality in developed countries. The fact that developed countries generally 
have less regional inequality is an important factor. Other factors responsible for the 
impact of decentralization on regional inequality include disparities in “institutional 
capacities and socio-economic endowments among regions” (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Ezcurra, 2009:9). Thus, in poor regions, due to the loss of economies of scale, 
decentralization may not result in a more efficient distribution of public goods. Weak and 
corrupt institutions and lower technological endowments that often characterize less 
developed countries, hamper the capacity of the regions in such countries to attract 
foreign investment and to innovate (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2009:9).This also 
constrains their competitiveness. This study is relevant to the present paper because 
one of the rationales for decentralization is to attain greater regional efficiency and 
competitiveness (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 
(2009) thus emphasize the capacity of decentralization to mobilize resources and 
engender competition among subnational governments. They note that, in this sense, 
decentralization may catalyse “economic convergence” among the different regions of 
a country. For through the series of incentives it generates for regional competition, it 
may contribute to the equalization of regional standards of living. These incentives would 
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be especially stronger in democratic systems and there may be no difference between 
developed and less developed countries (Ezcurra and Pascual, 2008). Rodríguez-Pose 
and Ezcurra (2009) warn, however, that this equalization may be hard to achieve in the 
absence of some income redistribution policy by the central government.
Bristow (2010:122) has pointed to “[t]he persistence of regional inequalities” even in 
those countries that can be said to have pursued regional competitiveness vigorously, 
such as the European Union and the UK. Citing Birch and Mykhnenko (2009), he 
remarks that competitiveness may be reinforcing and reproducing regional and inter-
country inequality. There is, however, some evidence suggesting that the problem is not 
competitiveness per se, but its implementation (Bristow, 2010; Rodríguez-Pose, 1999). 
Acknowledging the existence of “regional winners and losers from the competitiveness 
game”, Bristow (2010:124) makes the redistribution argument by suggesting that it may 
be that “insufficient policy attention is being paid to providing targeted support to weaker 
regions or to focusing on cohesion and the reduction in regional inequalities”. 
In sum, regional competitiveness can foster or reduce regional inequality, depending 
on the existence of other factors. Its capacity to reduce regional inequality, however, 
would require some form of income redistribution policy by the central government to 
boost the competitiveness of weaker regions. 
Local Content Policies as a Mechanism for Promoting Regional 
Competitiveness
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013 emphasizes that Africa is lagging significantly 
behind in “technological readiness” (WEF et al., 2013:8). The report also shows that 
Africa’s “talent pool” is “underperforming significantly” (WEF et al., 2013:9). It emphasizes 
Africa’s youth unemployment level and the large number of people expected to enter 
the labour market in the foreseeable future. Short-term measures would require the 
development of labour-absorbing sectors to accommodate the teeming new entrants 
into the labour market, while long-term measures would require investments in education 
and skills training, particularly in the acquisition of modern technological knowhow. These 
views are confirmed in the CGI 2014–2015 which shows that in the ranking on higher 
education and training, eight of the lowest ten countries are in Africa – Angola (144), Chad 
(143), Burundi (142), Mauritania (141), Guinea (140), Yemen (139), Mozambique (138), 
Sierra Leone (137), Burkina Faso (136), and Myanmar (135). In technological readiness, 
Africa is home to seven of the ten lowest ranked countries – Myanmar (144), Chad 
(143), Burundi (142), Timor-Leste (141), Angola (140), Guinea (139), Sierra Leone (138), 
Lesotho (137), Yemen (136), and Malawi (135) (WEF, 2014). African performance on 
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innovation is also roughly the same picture, with five of the ten lowest ranked countries.
The picture is not very different for other regions in the global South, although it is less 
gloomy for these other regions. In Asia, for instance, the competitiveness landscape is 
mixed, owing to the fact that the region hosts some of the most competitive countries in 
the world, including three countries in the top ten in the overall CGI ranking – Singapore 
(2nd), Hong Kong SAR (6th) and Japan 7th) – as well as some of the most dynamic 
and rapidly improving countries, competitiveness-wise, such as Indonesia and the 
Philippines (WEF, 2014). But many Asian countries fare poorly on higher education 
and training – Myanmar (135), Pakistan (127), Bangladesh (125), and Cambodia (123), 
in technological readiness – Myanmar (144), Timor-Leste (141), Yemen (136), Nepal 
(128), and Bangladesh (126), and in innovation, where three of the ten lowest ranked 
countries are Asian (WEF, 2014). In Latin America, according to the WEF, building the 
economic resilience of the region will depend on the region’s capacity to strengthen 
the fundamentals of its economy by boosting its competitiveness (WEF, 2014).While no 
Latin American country ranks in the lowest ten in higher education and training and in 
technological readiness, and only one country in innovation (Venezuela (137), the WEF 
(2014:32) identifies “[a] lack of sufficient investments in growth-enhancing areas” as the 
major factor slowing down the economic progress of the region. The growth-enhancing 
areas include infrastructure, skills development and innovation. 
From the foregoing, it follows that for countries in the global South to enhance their 
competitiveness, their economic policies must place higher education and training, 
technological acquisition and innovation on the front burner. Governments must not 
only remove obstacles that hamper the growth of local firms, they must also initiate 
mechanisms that would enhance their growth in technological knowhow to compete 
both locally and internationally. There is also need for large multinational firms operating 
within Southern territories to engage proactively in technology transfer through the 
training of the local workforce.
Especially within the extractive resource sector, local content policies, defined as the 
requirement that “a given percentage of domestic value added or domestic components 
be embodied in a specified final product” (Grossman, 1981:583), presents a viable tool 
towards the realization of these. It is a type of policy intervention known as “productive 
development policies” (PDPs) whose essence is to “strengthen the productive structure 
of a particular national economy” (Melo & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, 2006:5). The ultimate 
goal of PDPs is “to raise growth and improve the competitiveness of the overall economy 
while maintaining a rising trend in living standards” (Melo & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, 
2006:5). Local content policies are designed to increase local participation in FDI by 
directing the utilization of indigenous companies in goods and services procurement, 
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the employment of locals, and the use of local raw materials by investors. They are 
undertaken to reduce inequalities faced by domestic firms in relation to foreign firms, 
to increase the participation of the national industry in specific sectors of economic 
activity, to improve national technological development, to create job opportunities so 
as to lower poverty, to support economic diversification and reduce over-dependence 
on one sector by enhancing the value-creating capacity of a particular sector, and to 
enable domestic firms to compete regionally and internationally (Tordo et al., 2013). The 
requirements are either implanted in contractual agreements between governments and 
firms or embedded in binding legislation.
In practice, local content policies require firms, particularly multinational firms operating 
within a country’s territory, to give “first consideration” or “deliberate preference” to the 
country’s nationals in matters of employment and training and in the procurement of 
goods and services (United Republic of Tanzania, 2014; Government of Nigeria, 2010). 
It is believed that this has the potential to strengthen the capacity of extractive resources 
to contribute positively to local economic development while at the same time reducing 
its capacity to produce negative externalities. Esteves and Ivanova (2013) have argued 
that local economies will develop more vigorously if the non-extractive sectors are 
encouraged to grow and the extractive companies are encouraged to focus their local 
content energies on strengthening local businesses. 
However, the idea of “local” in prevailing local content policies has been understood 
as referring to the nationals of the country, regardless of which part of the country the 
nationals come from. There is no requirement for consideration of the nationals who 
come from the region where the extractive activities take place and who are the people 
bearing the brunt of the negative impacts of such activities. While such an approach 
can enhance the competitiveness of a country in relation to other countries, a “localist” 
approach that gives deliberate preference to the region where the extractive activities 
take place can perform that function equally well and help the country to address a 
myriad other problems associated with extractive resource development, as well as 
engender a sense of competition among the regions or subnational components of 
the country. Given that revenues from extractive resources are managed by national 
governments (in most jurisdictions), a localist approach that gives deliberate preference 
to local populations around the extractive region can provide a mechanism to meet the 
demands of subnational stakeholders, such as communities. This will, in turn, enable 
firms to obtain the badly needed social license to operate. Community dissatisfaction as 
a result of seeing lucrative jobs being passed to “outsiders” can provoke conflicts. Local 
content policies can thus serve as a mechanism for reducing natural resource conflicts. 
They can promote competition and facilitate local economic development because they 
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can incentivize local governments as well as local residents to protect the industries 
operating on their territory and help to guard company facilities. A local community-
oriented approach to local content policies would give local governments and residents 
a greater motivation to do so because they stand to benefit most from the growth of 
the companies operating on their territory. The death of the companies would have 
detrimental consequences on their host communities’ socio-economic wellbeing. Every 
region of a country would therefore be compelled to create a favourable operational 
environment for the companies operating in its area so as to ensure their sustenance. 
The result would be interregional competition. It is not, however, for each region to design 
its own local policy; rather the local content policy is to be designed at the national level 
while the regions compete to ensure that firms operating within its territory are retained.
To be sure, such interregional competition would have the potential to foster 
interregional inequality since natural resources are not distributed evenly throughout 
a country. Interregional inequality has negative consequences for a country, including 
contributing to the causes of conflicts (Buhaug et al., 2012; Deiwiks, Cederman and 
Gleditsch, 2012). However, the national government can intervene through the creation 
of equalization or redistribution programmes to assist regions that are less endowed. 
Such programmes are prevalent in many countries, such as Canada, Germany and the 
United States. Other measures include tax holidays in favour of disadvantaged regions, 
subsidies for specific industries, and public investments in public goods (Lessmann, 
2013). Besides, giving deliberate presence to the local populations where the extractive 
activities take place does not mean precluding other nationals from consideration. 
Instead, it may be implemented through the creation of a quota system that allocates 
certain percentages to the local populations.
Conclusion
While neoliberalism has fostered interregional economic inequality in the global South, 
there is significant space for those countries to forge their own development path with 
assurance, without waiting for the dethronement of neoliberalism. The main thesis of 
this paper is that local content policy in extractive resource governance provides these 
countries a viable tool to strengthen regional competitiveness and address interregional 
inequalities. The paper argues that a local content policy designed to give deliberate 
consideration to the regions where the extractive activities take place, accompanied 
by an income redistribution policy administered by the central government, has great 
potential to engender regional competitiveness and consequently address interregional 
inequalities within countries in the global South.
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